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MR. TABAK: Some of you may be wondering why we called
this program Law and Disorder? Is Effective Law Enforcement
Inconsistent with Good Police-Community Relations? Some may
wonder, "How could the answer to that question be yes?" Yet
many people in this city and elsewhere in the country have been
lead to believe that the answer is yes-that you cannot reduce
serious crime without also exacerbating police-community
relations.
We want to explore the extent to which that is or is not true. We
have six speakers, plus excerpts from a report co-authored by a
speaker who could not be here, followed by questions and answers.
Our first speaker is Professor Paul Chevigny of New York
University Law School. He has been a professor there since 1981,
and previously was involved with police conduct as the director of
the Police Practices Project and as a staff attorney with the New
York Civil Liberties Union. He was writing on the subject of
police abuses in New York City as long ago as 1969 and, more
recently, has been working on a comparative analysis of the
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problems of police violence in Third World cities. In the 1990s, he
prepared a critique of the failure of the United States federal
government to deal with police violence in American cities for
Human Rights Watch.'
PROFESSOR CHEVIGNY: At the outset, I want to say a word
about tonight's question. Clearly, it can have only one answer. We
can not conduct government by violating people's rights. If we
believe violations to be inevitable in the law enforcement process,
then something is wrong with the organization of policing, or even,
society. We must take the view that effective law enforcement can
coincide with good police-community relations.
The proposition in question tonight stems from a popular saying
that I'm sure everyone is familiar with: "If you have to kick a little
butt to keep order and reduce crime, so be it." Millions believe
this, including many, many police.
If you are familiar with the Mollen Commission report,2 the
officers who were interviewed in connection with the commission's
investigation mentioned that the abuses in which they had engaged
were done for the purpose of showing people who was boss-in
other words, to keep order. Their belief was that violence was
necessary to establish their authority.
That proposition is unacceptable because it implies that the
police must disregard rights to keep order. We discovered after the
shooting in the famous Diallo case 3 that there were 40,000 stop and
frisks by the Street Crime Unit alone in two years, and the State
Attorney General's Office has examined many more cases.4 Those
cases could not have all met the reasonable suspicion standard, as
is required by the Supreme Court. Attorney General Spitzer
inevitably found discrimination in stop and frisks,5 and a case has
1. PAUL CHEVIGNY, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, POLICE BRUTALITY IN THE
UNITED STATES: A POLICY STATEMENT ON THE NEED FOR FEDERAL OVERSIGHT
(1991).
2. CITY OF N.Y. COMM'N TO INVESTIGATE ALLEGATIONS OF POLICE
CORRUPTION & THE ANTI-CORRUPTION PROCEDURES OF THE POLICE DEP'T,
REPORT OF NEW YORK COMMISSION TO INVESTIGATE ALLEGATIONS OF POLICE
CORRUPTION AND THE ANTI-CORRUPTION PROCEDURES OF THE POLICE
DEPARTMENT (1994). The Commission is popularly known as the "Mollen
Commission," after its chair, the Hon. Milton Mollen.
3. People v. Boss, 701 N.Y.S.2d 342 (App. Div. 1999); see generally David
Kociensievsky, Success of Elite Unit Exacts a Toll on the Streets, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15,
1999, at A4 (describing the aggressive approach of the street crime unit).
4. OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GEN. OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, THE NEW
YORK CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT'S "STOP & FRISK" PRACTICES (1999) [hereinafter
A.G. REPORT].
5. Id. at ch. 5.
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been brought by the Center for Constitutional Rights concerning
this discrimination.6
This would be unacceptable even if it were effective law
enforcement because it violates rights. It is easy to conceive of
systems that would violate rights and probably be very effective. I
don't know whether they really would be "law" enforcement.
Nevertheless, it is very important to take a position of zero
tolerance of unconstitutional action and the violation of people's
rights, even if such misconduct effectively decreases crime. Society
has to abandon the attitude that kicking a little butt is necessary to
keep order.
Fortunately, there are alternatives. These are illustrated by the
somewhat similar Boston7 and San Diego8 models. Basically, these
are examples of problem-solving policing that emphasize
community participation. The police show respect for the
population, and the population comes to value the police much
more.
Recently, the polls show that the Boston Police are very highly
regarded by the population, across the board.9 They are highly
thought of by minority as well as other citizens. 10
The programs in Boston are not "namby pamby" programs.
Boston has some very tough programs in the effort to control
deadly violence by youth." There's an Operation Night Light in
which probation officers visit youths who are at risk.' 2 The Youth
Violence Strike Force works with community and other agencies to
identify and counsel at-risk youth.13 Operation Cease Fire carries
this out as well.'4 In all of these programs, the Boston Police target
youths based on information received from the community. They
get a lot of cooperation from the churches, the schools, and a large
number of other public agencies. They use a broad-gauged
enforcement method.
6. Nat'l Cong. for Puerto Rican Rights v. City of New York, 194 F.R.D. 105
(S.D.N.Y. 1999).
7. Such policies are commonly referred to as "neighborhood policing." OFFICE
OF THE POLICE COMM'R, BOSTON POLICE DEPARTMENT 1999 ANNUAL REPORT
(1999).
8. CITY OF SAN DIEGO, POLICE DEPARTMENT MISSION STATEMENT (2000).
9. Jose Martinez, Crime Fears Down in a Hub, BOSTON HERALD, April 22, 2000,
at 1.
10. Contra id.
11. OFFICE OF THE POLICE COMM'R, supra note 7 at 30.
12. Boston's 'Magic' Formula, BOSTON HERALD, Feb. 20, 1997 at 24.
13. OFFICE OF THE POLICE COMM'R, supra note 7 at 30.
14. Id. at 33.
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The important thing is that the policing programs also include
alternatives to getting involved in gang violence: services and jobs
for these youths. That is essential.
Problem solving policing improves community relations, and it
also involves community participation. I want to emphasize that.
So-called community policing that does not mean participation by
the people isn't really community policing.
San Diego's program is less formal.15 The police have been
reorganized along neighborhood lines. They also use a system of
problem-solving policing and have community groups that identify
problems. The police, with the community groups, explore what
law enforcement means might be used to solve the identified
problems. This might include civil remedies, such as trying to take
control of a crack house as a nuisance. 6
Again, participation is the key. In both of these cities, there has
been a decrease in arrests and in crime. 7 And also, there are much
better police-community relations. San Diego also uses a system
that maps the crime in the various districts. This is very similar to
the New York City Compstat system,18 which is quite consistent
with a problem-solving policing approach. However, the problem
in New York is that there isn't enough community cooperation.
For example, after last year's scandal about the number of stop and
frisks, there was a full page ad in The New York Times in which a
long list of mostly private youth services organizations complained
that harassment and abuse by police prevented them from doing
their work.
Why was it necessary for youth service organizations to take out
an ad in The New York Times in order to complain about police
problems? The police, and city agencies, should reach out to these
organizations to try to resolve problems with youths. In New York,
the lack of community participation is solvable and would create
better community relations.
MR.TABAK: Thank you Professor Chevigny.
15. Model for a Chief: City Should Continue Community Policing, SAN DIEGO
UNION-TRIB., Jan. 14, 1999, at B14 [hereinafter San Diego Community Policing].
16. POLICE DEP'T, CITY OF SAN DIEGO, NEIGHBORHOOD POLICING: BUILDING A
PROBLEM SOLVING PARTNERSHIP (Nov. 1, 2000), http://www.sannet.gov/police/crime-
prevention/np.shtml.
17. Martinez, supra note 9; San Diego Community Policing, supra note 15.
18. MAYOR GIULIANI DELIVERS KEYNOTE ADDRESS AT THE INTERNATIONAL
COMPSTAT CONFERENCE: INNOVATIVE COMPUTER MAPPING PROGRAM HAS
REDUCED CRIME TO ITS LOWEST LEVELS IN 30 YEARS (May 13, 1997), http://
www.ci.nyc.ny.us/html/97/sp268-97.html.
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Before I call on the next speaker, I want to read excerpts from
two pieces. One is a March 4, 2000 New York Times front-page
article entitled, Cities Reduce Crime and Conflict Without New
York-Style Hardball.19 It discusses San Diego and Boston. One of
the things it says about Boston is that David Kennedy of the John
F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard advised changing
the focus from gangs and drugs to gun violence. A team of Boston
police officers and representatives of the District Attorney's
Office, the United States Attorney's Office, the FBI, the Drug
Enforcement Administration, and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco,
and Firearms began tracing how guns got into the hands of
criminals and who the most serious offenders were. They then
consulted black ministers to win their cooperation in going after
the ring leaders. The team, including the ministers, began inviting
known criminals, drug dealers, and young gang members to "call-
ins"-meetings at which the invitees were warned that the violence
had to stop or there would be federal prosecutions. The few who
did not heed the warnings have been arrested and are now facing
long federal sentences. The number of arrests and confrontations
on the street with the police were minimal. The program has been
so successful that in the past two-and-a-half years, only one
juvenile has been killed by gunfire in Boston.2" This same program
has now been followed in several other cities.21
At this point, our next scheduled speaker was Robert C. Davis,
one of two authors of a March 1999 report of the Vera Institute of
Justice, Respectful and Effective Policing-Two Examples in the
South Bronx.22 Because Mr. Davis fell ill earlier today, I am going
to read a few excerpts so you can get a flavor of what he would
have said had he been able to attend. The report reads:
Serious crime in New York City has declined dramatically since
1990, and the decline has accelerated since the introduction of a
set of new police strategies beginning in 1994. The number of
civilian complaints against the police, however, rose dramati-
cally after 1993, remaining 40 percent above the 1993 level in
1998. These two trends.., have led many to speculate that the
inevitable price of the dramatic drop in crime is an aggressive
19. Fox Butterfield, Cities Reduce Crime and Conflict Without New York Style
Hardball, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 2000, at Al.
20. Id.
21. San Diego Community Policing, supra note 15.
22. ROBERT C. DAVIS & PEDRO MATEU-GELABERT, VERA INST. OF JUSTICE,
RESPECTFUL & EFFECTIVE POLICING: Two EXAMPLES IN THE SOUTH BRONX (1999)
[hereinafter VERA REPORT].
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police force that generates more anger and resentment. This
study by researchers at the Vera Institute of Justice refutes such
speculation, showing that police commanders in at least two
neighborhoods have been able to reduce complaints against
their officers below the 1993 levels while experiencing the same
dramatic decline in crime characteristic of the city as a whole.
The study shows that large reductions in crime can be achieved
while practicing respectful policing.2 3
The Vera researchers found that in these two South Bronx
precincts:
[T]he most likely explanation for the decline in civilian com-
plaints against police is the particularly effective manner in
which the precinct commanders implemented departmental pol-
icies. Other possible explanations ... cannot account for the
substantial decline in complaints, particularly in 1997 and 1998.
Although they adopted contrasting styles of management, both
commanding officers improved the way the precinct personnel
were supervised, and both improved community relations. They
ensured that department-wide training was reinforced with
training within their precincts. They administered the depart-
mental monitoring programs for recidivist officers [officers who
had many complaints against them by civilians] with zeal, attach-
ing real consequences to the receipt of civilian complaints.24
The Vera report discusses the NYPD's citywide attempt, starting
in 1994, to pinpoint down to the block level what was going on with
crime. 5 Precinct commanders were called upon to account for
crime and asked to develop detailed strategies in their precincts.26
The report notes that our next speaker, Commissioner William J.
Bratton, was a proponent of the "Broken Windows" theory of po-
licing,27 and set out to enforce statutes to curb quality of life of-
fenses such as public drinking, subway farebeating, and vandalism,
which had often been overlooked in the past.28 According to the
Broken Windows theory, adopting a tough stance against these rel-
atively minor forms of antisocial behavior sends a signal to the
community that law-breaking of any kind will not be tolerated. 9
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 1.
26. Id.
27. Id.; James Q. Wilson & George L. Kelling, The Police and Neighborhood
Safety: Broken Windows, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Mar. 1982 (coining the phrase "Bro-
ken Windows" and announcing the theory of policing for which it has come to stand).
28. VERA REPORT, supra note 22, at 1.
29. Id.; Wilson & Kelling, supra note 27, at 32.
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According to the Vera report, the objective of the Broken Win-
dows strategy-which had been instituted in the previous adminis-
tration-shifted in 1994 from simply reducing public signs of
disorder to concentrating on strategies to improve intelligence
gathering and increase arrests. 30 The report adds:
[T]here is no question that crime in New York City has plum-
meted. By 1997, homicides had declined 65 percent from their
peak in 1990 .... [Tjotal index crimes also have declined sub-
stantially each year starting with 1991 ... [T]he rate of decrease
in crime complaints accelerated in 1994. By 1997, index crimes
had fallen to less than half of their 1990 peak.3'
The report goes on to show that civilian complaints rose at the
same time that the new policing strategies were introduced.32 Ci-
vilian complaints rose sharply in 1994 and again in 1995, and then
declined somewhat from their new plateau in 1997.11 The report
says:
So many forces conspired to drive up civilian complaints be-
tween 1993 and 1995 that it is unreasonable to conclude that the
more aggressive style of policing adopted in 1994 was the pri-
mary cause. However, reasonable people may still wonder
whether police misconduct may be the price to be exacted for
controlling crime.34
The Vera analysts state that their investigation tested the idea
that crime control and police misconduct necessarily move in oppo-
site directions.35 They saw that not all police precincts experienced
a significant increase in civilian complaints in 1994, and that some
precincts have shown a substantial decline in civilian complaints
during the latter part of the 1990s.
These precincts used the same crime-fighting tactics as the rest
of the police force and demonstrated the same major decline in
crime reports. If these precincts achieved substantial declines in
crime without increased civilian complaints, then we have evi-
dence that crime control and police misconduct are not inextri-
cably linked.36
30. VERA REPORT, supra note 22, at 1.
31. Id. at 2.
32. Id. at 4.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 5.
35. Id.
36. Id.
370 FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXVIII
The precincts to which the Vera researchers refer are the 42nd
and 44th Precincts, two of a handful of precincts in New York City
where both crime and civilian complaints declined substantially in
1997 and 1998. Civilian complaints in these two precincts were,
respectively, fifty-four percent and sixty-four percent below their
1993 levels, whereas citywide the complaints rose by thirty-nine
percent.37 These two precincts include two miles of waterfront and
the neighborhoods of Highbridge, Grand Concourse, Mount Eden,
Concourse Village, the Bronx Terminal Market, Yankee Stadium;
the Bronx House of Detention, Crotona Park, Claremont Village,
and Morissania.
The Vera analysts, after interviewing numerous people within
these two precincts, found that the following was clear:
The commanding officers in the 42nd and 44th precincts took a
strong interest in managing community perceptions of the po-
lice. Each had made community relations a priority and was re-
sponsive to community needs. Both commanders attend
precinct community council meetings regularly and address
community concerns and follow up at subsequent meetings.38
A community affairs officer in the 42nd Precinct said that his
precinct commander "gets the highest degree of respect from the
community because he maintains the same good rapport with com-
munity leaders that he has established with his officers" and "tells
the truth about what he can and cannot accomplish.
39
The Vera analysts said that although the style of the two precinct
commanders differed, both made clear to the officers under their
command that they considered attention to civilian complaints a
high priority.40 Both made clear to their supervising officers and
those who supervised them that civilian complaints should be re-
duced to a low level. Both initiated their own training programs to
ensure that these points were driven home. Both spoke at training
sessions regularly, emphasizing this.4 1 Both created pairs of of-
ficers in which a younger officer with an attitude problem worked
with a more experienced officer who did not have an attitude prob-
lem. One commander stressed to officers on special assignments,
37. Id. at 5-6.
38. Id. at 15.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 18.
41. Id.
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such as community policing or narcotics, that they would be "out"
if complaints of abuse were lodged against them.4 2
The commanding officers also had common styles of dealing
with officers on the recidivist list for civilian complaints. Both
COs talked to officers on the list personally when they received
complaints, rather than leaving these matters to their ICO [In-
tegrity Control Officer].13
Both commanding officers acted decisively when recidivist of-
ficers repeated their misbehavior. For example, one was reas-
signed to be the driver for his Sergeant. Several others were
reassigned from patrol to desk duty. Some officers in one of these
two precincts were passed over for promotions and new assign-
ments because they had received multiple civilian complaints.
The Vera researchers found that:
Data... indicate that the attention to recidivists yielded results
in the 42nd and 44th precincts. The number of civilian com-
plaints received by officers who had never had any before de-
clined in 1997 and 1998. But the number of complaints received
by recidivist officers declined even faster during the same two
years. ... [In these two precincts] the message resonated clearly
to officers on the beat that getting civilian complaints would re-
duce opportunities for advancement.4 '
The Vera analysts, noting that their conclusions could only be
"educated guesses," concluded that:
The reduction in complaints against the police while the crime
rate was dropping was the result of the actions by the two pre-
cinct commanders, taken within a context that supported a re-
duction in complaints. n5
Whereas citywide, there was only an 11% reduction in civilian
complaints from 1996 to 1997, and no reduction from 1997 to 1998,
the difference in these precincts, the 42nd and 44th, was that the
management styles of the precinct commanders was such-and
their interest in promoting respectful policing was such-that there
was an improvement in the way that precinct personnel and com-
munity relations were managed. They ensured that the citywide
policies of training were reinforced by ongoing training within their
precincts. They administered the departmental monitoring *pro-
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 20.
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grams for recidivist officers with zeal, attaching real consequences
to receiving civilian complaints. In both precincts, officers got the
message that abusive behavior could be hazardous to their careers.
In effect, these commanding officers took a departmental policy
and used it to further their vision of how police ought to interact
with the public. They not only managed their officers well, but
they also dealt well with community relations, demonstrating that
police were responsive to community concerns.46
Now, to give you a broader context-not only regarding New
York City as a whole, but also Boston and elsewhere, we are
honored to have as our next speaker, Commissioner William J.
Bratton. Commissioner Bratton is a consultant, public speaker,
columnist, and commentator on issues of public safety, security,
and criminal justice throughout the United States and abroad. He
is now in the private sector after decades of leading and re-engi-
neering five major police agencies, including service as the police
commissioner in New York City and Boston. These experiences
are described in his acclaimed autobiography, The Turnaround:
How America's Top Cop Reversed the Crime Epidemic, published
by Random House.4 7 He is widely recognized for advocating prob-
lem-oriented community policing. He is a research fellow at
Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Government. He
is also on the Board of the Washington, D.C.-based advocacy
group, "Fight Crime, Invest in Kids."
COMMISSIONER BRATTON: Thank you. It is a pleasure to
be here with you this evening. Thank you all for coming out to talk
about this very, very critical and important issue. I am going to
have to apologize. I'll be leaving before the program concludes,
due to a prior commitment.
In a democratic society, the principal role of the police is to con-
trol behavior. That's why police exist. It has been entrusted to the
police to control behavior that is regulated by our constitutions,
ordinances, and laws. The challenge has been, is, and should be,
for the police to do it constitutionally, consistently, and
compassionately.
The discussion this evening focuses on the question, "Can the
police do both?" where doing both involves (1) controlling behav-
ior to such an extent that we can prevent and reduce crime, and at
the same time, (2) winning the respect and trust of the citizens
46. Id.
47. WILLIAM BRATTON & PETER KNOBLER, THE TURNAROUND: How
AMERICA'S Top Cop REVERSED THE CRIME EPIDEMIC (1998).
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with whom we work. I believe that civil liberties and civil police
are not incompatible goals. In fact, one is essential to the other.
You've heard discussion earlier, and I am sure you'll hear more
tonight from other panelists, about activities in San Diego and Bos-
ton.48 I am very, very intimately aware of the activities in the City
of Boston, having served as the superintendent, chief and police
commissioner in that department; I started my career there in 1970.
The Boston Police Department of the early 1970s was one of the
most brutal, racist, and corrupt in the United States-so much so
that I almost left that department in 1973 because of the things
taking place. But a reformer, Robert DiGrazia, was brought in, in
1972, as the new commissioner and began to change things in that
department.
I left that department in the mid 1980s and ran several other
Boston-area police departments, and came here to New York in
1990 to serve as chief of the Transit Police Department. The Bro-
ken Windows concept that was mentioned earlier was a key part of
how we won back the subways of the City of New York. Those of
you who use those subways remember what they looked like in
1990, versus the way they are today.
In 1991, I was asked to come back to the City of Boston, whose
police department, I am proud to see, read, and hear, is now being
celebrated as one of the best in the United States in the area of
race relations. As a former member of that department, it's mind
boggling to hear that department described as such.
In 1991, when I returned to Boston, I had to deal with the after-
math of the Stuart case, in which a young white man shot and
killed his pregnant wife and then claimed that a black man in the
Mission Hill Projects had kidnapped them, and murdered his
wife.4 9 The then mayor, Ray Flynn, and his police commissioner
Mickey Roache had, according to the residents of the Mission Hill
development, unleashed the Boston Police on that development, to
conduct stop and frisks and illegal searches in a widespread, abu-
sive, and racially insensitive manner.
As a result, the St. Clair Commission was formed to investigate
not only the Stuart incident but also the general practices of the
Boston Police Department. James St. Clair, one of the attorneys
48. Martinez, supra note 9; San Diego Community Policing, supra note 15. ,
49. See generally Peter J. Howe & Jerry Thomas, Reading Woman Dies After
Shooting In Car: Husband, Baby Termed Critical. BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 25, 1989, at
Metro 1; See also Robert L. Kierstead, A Story Weaved By a World-Class Con Man,
BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 15, 1990, at OP-ED 19.
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who represented President Nixon in the 1970s, headed the commis-
sion. When I became the Boston Police commissioner, the Boston
Police Department was planning its response to the St. Clair Com-
mission's report.5 0
The Commission's primary recommendation was the removal of
the police commissioner.5 1 Even after significant changes, by a ra-
cially sensitive Commissioner, Mickey Roache, the Boston Police
Department was thought to have been very racist in its activities.
The moderator mentioned that David Kennedy from Harvard's
Kennedy School came to the Boston Police Department with a
proposal to look at the relationship between guns, drugs, and youth
violence. I was the police commissioner to whom he made that
presentation and who authorized Kennedy's study. I was superin-
tendent and police commissioner during the period from 1991 to
1993 before coming back here to New York as police commissioner
in 1994. So, I am very intimately familiar with what's going on in
Boston.
I am also very intimately familiar with the work of, and very
friendly with, Jerry Sanders, the former chief of police in San Di-
ego, California. He recently retired and is now heading up the
United Way in that city.
I've learned, in twenty-five years of policing in Boston and New
York City, and now in consulting literally around the world, partic-
ularly in emerging democracies in South America, Eastern Europe
and South Africa, that there are no two police departments, no two
cities, no two countries that are alike. So while you can compare
San Diego, Boston, and New York all you want, to learn of good
things and bad things and to shape your initiatives, every city is
different. Every city's problems are different. Every city's police
force is different. And every city's population is different.
The one common denominator that you will find in any success-
ful venture or in any unsuccessful venture, and in the continuing
criticism of what's going on in New York, is leadership. Leadership
makes all the difference.
While I don't think the Vera Institute prepared a very good re-
port, in that it was too anecdotal and not substantive in much of its
analysis, its findings were correct, in that it focused on leadership
and the difference that leadership can make.5 2 Many of the con-
50. BRATrON & KNOBLER, supra note 47, at 183; ST. CLAIR COMM'N, REPORT OF
THE BOSTON POLICE DEPARTMENT MANAGEMENT REVIEW COMMITTEE (1992).
51. BRATrON & KNOBLER, supra note 47, at 181.
52. See generally VERA REPORT, supra note 22.
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cerns in this city right now are focused on the leadership of the
mayor and the police commissioner, my successor. The mayor and
police commissioner are continuing and expanding on policies that
I, as police commissioner, authorized by the same mayor, devel-
oped with my- team in 1994 to deal with the City of New York as it
existed in 1994.
The New York City of 1994 was very different than the New
York City of 1999 and 2000. The city has changed, much as its
subway system in 1990-with 250,000 fare evaders every day was
very different from its subway system today-with about 20,000
fare -evaders a day.
Great changes occurred. But there has not been leadership that
understood that the city had changed and that the tactics and the
strategies which were necessary in 1990 in the New York City sub-
ways, were necessary in Boston in the mid 1990s, and were cer-
tainly necessary in New York City in 1994, 1995, and 1996, were
not changed thereafter. The tragedy we are discussing is that the
strategies designed for the city when it was much different than it is
now did not change. And the more forceful and assertive aspects
of that strategy-the stop and frisk tactics, specifically-were in-
creased, rather than adjusting for the changed' city. Stop and frisk
tactics are an essential tool of police in a democratic society as long
as they are done constitutionally, compassionately, and consist-
ently. But we must ensure that they are not used in a manner that
seemingly allows the thresholds of the Constitution to be lowered,
or gives that appearance.
The idea that to get crime down you have to increase arrests is
clearly wrong. But unfortunately this mayor and this police com-
missioner deeply believe in that philosophy. It is not a philosophy
in which I have ever believed.
There is a point in time when you need more arrests. There is a
point in time when you need more assertive policing. There is a
point in time when you need to be much more intrusive in the lives
of citizens. This point in time varies from city to city and from state
to state. New York's government has not taken into account the
fact that if you are going to advertise that New York is the safest
large city in America, if not the world, then you have to police it as
if it is the safest large city in the world and not one of the most
dangerous, as it had been in 1990 and again in 1994.53
53. Id.
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376 FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXVIII
So, it is not rocket science to find solutions. You have a Consti-
tution. You have laws. What you have to look to is leadership that
appreciates that policing needs to adjust to changing circumstances
and that in the 1990s, America benefitted from the concept of com-
munity policing, which is the fundamental reason, along with lead-
ership in San Diego, Boston, and New York, why crime went down.
Partnership, problem solving, prevention are the keys. There
must be partnership between the community and the police. That
is what the Vera study found in the two precincts it looked at,54 and
what you can find in most precincts in New York City: precinct
commanders who go out there and work very hard, but who are
also pressured from their leadership to keep up the arrests, to keep
up the stop and frisks.
That type of pressure in the city that New York is today is no
longer appropriate. It is no longer appropriate for the much safer
city that we live in.
What we need to focus on is the idea of leadership, tactics, and
strategies that have to continually change-but, while changing,
must at all times stay constitutional, compassionate, and consistent.
MR. TABAK: Thank you Commissioner Bratton. On May 9,
2000, The New York Times carried a story entitled, Los Angeles to
Work With U.S. on Police. It reported that Bill Lann Lee, the
Acting Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights, briefed local
officials in Los Angeles on the results of the Justice Department's
four-year investigation into allegations of abusive behavior and ra-
cial discrimination by Los Angeles officers.56 Mr. Lee stated that
the inquiry had found enough evidence of civil rights violations to
file a so-called "pattern and practice" discrimination suit, alleging
systemic failings, but that the Justice Department was prepared to
defer filing such a lawsuit in order to allow the City of Los Angeles
the opportunity to work toward a voluntary settlement.57 The
Times stated that Mr. Lee came to Los Angeles with a letter out-
lining the Justice Department's findings, which were similar to
what the Justice Department has found elsewhere in the country
where it has sued and entered into consent judgments.58 The Times
noted that Los Angeles would be the biggest city to come under
54. See generally VERA REPORT, supra note 22.
55. Todd S. Purdum, Los Angeles to Work With U.S. on Police, N.Y. TIMES, May 9,
2000, at A16.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
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such direct federal scrutiny, but added that "the United State At-
torney's Office in Brooklyn has amassed what officials call evi-
dence of system-wide problems in the New York Police
Department's handling of brutality complaints and is pressing New
York for changes with a threat of a similar suit."59
Our next speaker is the United States Attorney for the Eastern
District of New York, Loretta E. Lynch. In that capacity, she over-
sees an office of more than 150 attorneys who represent the federal
government in matters both civil and criminal. From March 1998
until being named the United States attorney, Ms. Lynch served as
the chief assistant United States attorney for the district. She pre-
viously served as chief of the Long Island Office of that district
from 1994-98. Before that, she served as deputy chief of general
crimes and chief of intake and arraignments for the Eastern Dis-
trict. A graduate of Harvard Law School, Ms. Lynch initially prac-
ticed at the law firm of Cahill, Gordon and Reindel. She has been
in the U.S. Attorney's Office since 1990. She was the lead prosecu-
tor in a series of trials involving allegations of public corruption in
Brookhaven, Long Island. While chief assistant, she was a member
of the trial team in United States v. Volpe et aL, a five week civil
rights case involving allegations of police brutality, excessive force,
and false statements.6" Ms: Lynch has been a frequent instructor
for the Department of Justice at its Criminal Trial Advocacy Pro-
gram. It's my pleasure to welcome her here tonight.
U.S. ATTORNEY LYNCH: Good evening. I was asked to
touch upon the federal government's role in dealing with the issue
of law enforcement as it relates to community relations-the kinds
of cases that we do and the powers and the abilities that we have-
and then to touch upon the final question of the evening: whether
or not effective law enforcement is inconsistent with good police-
community relations. And then I was told I had five minutes. So
I'll do a very short tour around those. I think that the questions
and answers will probably help us to elucidate and focus on this a
little bit better.
As has been mentioned before, the federal government's role in
the area of police misconduct, and particularly police-community
relations, has grown tremendously over the last several years, pri-
marily because of the current focus of the Department of Justice.
Again, this is a function of leadership, and is very important to the
59. Id.
60. United States v. Volpe, 78 F. Supp. 2d 76 (E.D.N.Y. 1999), affd in part, dis-
missed in part, 224 F.3d 72 (2d Cir. 2000).
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current Administration. Also, the federal government's role has
expanded because of the climate and certain flash point issues that
have arisen.
The federal government can look at a matter from two vantage
points: criminal or civil. When we look at a matter criminally, we
obviously look at it on a case-by-case basis. Some of the cases that
you've heard about tonight fall into that category. The Volpe
case, 61 also known as the Louima case, is one of the better-known
examples from my district. The last trial in that series of cases be-
gan today, involving an officer charged with obstructing the investi-
gation by lying during his questioning by federal investigators.
That is a larger issue than the actual assault, but a very, very impor-
tant one nonetheless.
Dealing with these issues criminally is important. Certainly, it's
been very gratifying to me, and hopefully very effective for the vic-
tims of actual incidents of police misconduct. But there are certain
limitations with that. Dealing on a case-by-case basis, you may
have issues of proof. Quite frankly, one of the main problems that
you often have in police misconduct cases is the reluctance of wit-
nesses-both victims and law enforcement-to come forward. But
the real problem, from my perspective and the Justice Depart-
ment's perspective, is that you are coming into an event after it has
already occurred-whereas the real goal here is to effect some sort
of systemic change that will prevent such incidents from occurring
in the first place.
That is where the Department of Justice works within the civil
context. New statutes have been passed that help in this regard.
One of the more effective ones, which has been used in the Los
Angeles case that's been referred to, as well as in New York, is
commonly known as "Section 14141. "62 It is colloquially referred
to as the "pattern or practice" statute. Essentially what it does is to
give the federal government the power to review a police depart-
ment's activities and determine if there is a pattern or practice of
behavior that leads to constitutional deprivations. It can be in the
area of racial profiling; it can be in the area of excessive force, as is
the focus of the investigation that my office is conducting; indeed,
it can touch upon a myriad of things.
This is important because this new law that is about six years old
has real force and real power for change. We believe that if the
Department of Justice can in fact show that such a pattern or prac-
61. Id.
62. 42 U.S.C. § 14141 (2000).
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tice of Constitutional deprivations exists, court-ordered remedies
can be achieved and real change can be effected in police
departments.
What's actually happening in this area, in addition to the Los
Angeles situation and the ongoing matter in New York? The De-
partment has successfully settled a number of these matters. The
police departments in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania and Steubenville,
Ohio, as well as the New Jersey State Police, have all worked with
the Department to settle investigations and, in fact, to review their
practices. The New Jersey State Police situation involved racial
profiling that was very prominently in the news a while ago.63 In
Steubenville and Pittsburgh, there were problems of racial profiling
and excessive force. Negotiations have effected systemic change
within those police departments.
Again, the real problem that all lawyers have is that we get to
the scene after the event has occurred and the person has been
harmed. Even if we have a successful pattern or practice lawsuit,
that means that we have found years of abuses and years of
problems.
The goal is to set in place a format for change so that the police
departments can operate effectively, protect individuals, and carry
out their law enforcement mandate without violating constitutional
rights. It's our view that it can be done because it is being done.
You've heard some examples of Boston and San Diego, as well
as the two precincts in New York discussed in the Vera Institute
report. So you might say, "Well, why isn't that enough? Why do
you need the federal government to come in if there are police
commanders out there who will maintain and uphold the police
department's existing practices, and discipline officers who abuse
citizens and gather too many complaints?"
The real problem, as has been touched on by a number of speak-
ers, and I think we'll hear more about later, is that the type of
effective management that does reduce crime as well as reduce ci-
vilian complaints, should not and cannot be simply a matter of the
personality of the individual commander; it must be a function, and
a practice, and a procedure of an entire police department. It is
wonderful when a commander takes the initiative and sets forth on
his own programs like we've heard about. But for there to be de-
partmental change, that must, as Commissioner Bratton said, come
from the top down.
63. Iver Peterson, Whitman Says Troopers Used Racial Profiling, N.Y. TIMES,
April 21, 1999, at Al.
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What we've seen in situations where police departments have
entered into settlements and have changed their procedures is that
they are, in effect, becoming successful at the very goals of law
enforcement. They are still reducing crime, and they are reducing
citizen complaints and improving their relationship with the
community.
What it requires is that the department as a whole adopt this as a
goal. It simply cannot be left to the individual commander, be-
cause then you will only have pockets of this kind of superb per-
formance that should be, and in our view, can be carried out
throughout the entire city.
As I mentioned, the federal government's role has increased in
this. Quite frankly, our goal is to try and get ahead of the curve. It
is to our advantage to enter into more of a partnership model with
the police, so that problems of excessive force-the individual inci-
dents as well as patterns of abuse that affect the entire city-don't
occur.
Really, it's an issue of professionalism. It's an issue, as those
police commanders that you heard about in the Bronx recognize,
of pride in the people who work for you, pride in the people that
you protect, and a desire to do your job without violating the Con-
stitution, which can be done. When it's placed in that context, we
find departments very responsive and very willing to change.
In answering the question that was put forth tonight, "Is effec-
tive law enforcement inconsistent with good police-community re-
lations?" I say no, for two main reasons. First, one of the most
effective tools of law enforcement, in this or any city, is the volun-
tary compliance of citizens with the law. For people to continue to
do that, they have to have a level of trust and respect in the law,
and feel that it works for them. Second, the community wants a
positive relationship with the police. That's one of the reasons that
you all are here tonight. That's one of the reasons that when the
police department holds borough-wide meetings to talk about the
issues, people are turning out. Sometimes, these meeting are loud
and people vent. But the police need to hear what people are actu-
ally thinking and saying about them.
The reality is that when people, as they have in this city, say that
they are afraid of the police, that is on its surface a terrible thing.
What they really are expressing is an even deeper fear: that if they
ever need help, if a criminal element in our society ever comes into
contact with them, they will have no one to call, nobody to protect
them. That is the worst feeling in the world. That's why it's a fed-
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eral issue, spanning the city and this country. The Justice Depart-
ment thinks it's uniquely positioned to work with this issue, in
conjunction with other offices. You'll hear from the State Attor-
ney General's Office about the excellent work it's doing in this
area. From our view, this effort can't succeed without community
involvement.
MR. TABAK: Thank you very much. Our next speaker will,
indeed, tell you about what the state government can do. He's
right at the center of the activity.
Andrew G. Celli Jr., is Chief of the Civil Rights Bureau in the
Office of the New York State Attorney General. The Civil Rights
Bureau conducts affirmative litigation, investigations, and policy
initiatives in various areas including reproductive rights, disability
rights, police misconduct, discrimination in employment, mortgage
lending, housing, public accommodations, and other sectors. The
Bureau does impact litigation. It drafts and proposes civil rights-
related legislation. It releases reports such as New York City Police
Department's Stop-and-Frisk Practices: A Report to the People of
the State of New York, issued on December 1, 1999.64 It also assists
the New York Solicitor General in preparing and submitting ami-
cus briefs in civil rights cases.
Before joining the Attorney General's Office, Mr. Celli was a
partner in the firm of Emery, Celli, Brinckerhoff & Abady PC, a
firm that handles plaintiffs' civil rights, police misconduct, First
Amendment, and related matters. Prior to that, he was at Cravath,
Swaine & Moore, and was a law clerk to Judge Sifton in the East-
ern District.
I would note that since the esteemed President of The Associa-
tion of the Bar of the City of New York, Evan Davis, is here, we
hope Mr. Celli will not only tell us what the Attorney General's
Office found in the study, but also what he views the jurisdiction of
the Attorney General's Office to be in the area of civil rights rela-
tive to police conduct.
MR. CELLI: The first thing I want to do is thank the Civil
Rights Committee for conducting this program; that's partially
thanking myself, because I was on the subcommittee that put this
panel together. The second thing I'll do is criticize myself. I think
the question that we pose tonight, "Is effective law enforcement
inconsistent with good police-community relations?" is the wrong
question. Everyone knows that the answer to that is "no," or at
64. A.G. REPORT, supra note 4.
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least we certainly hope so. The better question is, "How do we
ensure that effective law enforcement and police-community rela-
tions go hand and hand?" The New York City Police Department,
which is the subject of our eight-month investigation in the report
to which Ron referred,65 is an entity that we need and that will be
around as long as there is a City of New York. We must coexist
with it as civil rights lawyers and civil liberties advocates, and it
must coexist with us. So I'm going to direct my remarks a little bit
at the "how" as opposed to the "whether."
First, some introductory points about the Attorney General's Of-
fice. This is the first attorney general's administration that has
taken on the issue of police misconduct. We brought to the issue
three different perspectives (as does Ms. Lynch's Eastern District
U.S. Attorney's Office). We are the chief civil rights enforcer for
the State of New York; we are a prosecutorial and law enforcement
agency with police officers who work in our office; and we are also
a public interest law firm that is charged with defending police
agencies, particularly the State Police and other state police agen-
cies, such as the Park Police, when they are sued for misconduct,
whether on a individual level or a systemic level. So, the Attorney
General's Office, like the Department of Justice, can bring these
different perspectives to bear on issues of police misconduct.
We tried to do that in our eight-month investigation into stop-
and-frisk practices in New York City. We took a holistic approach
to studying this very narrow subject, because we correctly hypothe-
sized that the tactic of stop and frisk was affecting large numbers of
people.
We looked at all seventy-six precincts within the department and
all units within the department. We did a major outreach effort in
which, for example, we wrote and spoke to most of the organiza-
tions that put in The New York Times ad to which Professor
Chevigny referred. We solicited stories from the public. Very cru-
cially, we attended to the philosophy that underlies policing in New
York, and to the strategies and tactics that the New York City Po-
lice Department publishes in writing.
Basically, what we found is that during the period of January 1,
1998 to March 31, 1999, the New York City Police Department
pretty much did what it said it was going to do. It carried out cer-
tain philosophies-community policing is a term you've heard, and
65. Id.
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the Broken Windows theory is another term that is out there and
part of it-and it carried out very specific crime-fighting strategies.
A word about the philosophy. Basically, it boils down to. a few
core principles: proactive policing; putting officers in close contact
with the community; and policing at the lower levels of misconduct
on the street, based on the hypothesis that I think has proven true
over time, that folks who commit major crimes also commit minor
crimes, and that if you enforce with discretion and to an appropri-
ate degree at the minor levels, you will often find people who are
major criminals. This is not to say that the Broken Windows the-
ory or the New York City Police Department's version of that in
certain years is the same as zero tolerance. That is very important
to understand.
This was the philosophy that drove the New York City Police
Department during the period we studied. The strategies and tac-
tics were in writing. The two chief policy documents we looked
were Reclaiming the Streets of New York,66 which was aimed at
ending disorder on the streets-the low level kinds of graffiti and
quality of life violations about which we hear a lot; and Getting
Guns Off the Streets of New York.67 The department could not have
been more clear about what its goals were.
So, with this background, we looked at 175,000 UF-250 forms,
stop and frisk forms, filled out by members of the New York City
Police Department, which basically documented 175,000 street en-
counters. These forms tell you who got stopped, when he/she got
stopped, the person's race, the reason for the stop, what happened,
what the suspected charge was, and whether there was an arrest.
It's a short form with a great deal of information. Partially due to
cooperation under pressure, the New York City Police Depart-
ment, gave us that information on a disk. We turned it over to, and
worked very closely with, the Columbia Center for Violence Re-
search and Prevention, and we began to analyze the data.
During the period we studied, the New York City Police Depart-
ment had 40,000 uniformed officers.68 This department is larger
than all but five standing armies in the world. In the fifteen-month
period that our data set covered, 20,280 different officers engaged
in the stop and frisk tactic and reported it on this form. 69 Thus,
approximately half of the department was involved in this activity
66. Id. at 53 n.29.
67. Id. at 53 n.29.
68. Id. at 68 n.70.
69. Id. at 66 n.63.
2000] 383
384 FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXVIII
during that period. On average, during that period, 375 people
were stopped and detained by the New York City Police Depart-
ment per day, of whom 197 were African American, 128 were La-
tino, and about fifty-plus were white and a variety of other
nationalities that did not amount to a sufficient number to be stati-
cally measurable or significant.7°
Were the officers getting it right when they were attempting to
determine whether somebody was engaged in criminal activity?
One way to measure that is whether an arrest resulted. Internally,
we called this the "efficiency rate." In general, one-in-nine stops
during this period led to an arrest. For the Street Crime Unit-a
citywide unit focusing on weapons and serious crimes-one-in-9.6
stops of whites led to an arrest, while one-in-16.3 stops of African
Americans led to an arrest. This is not interpretation, this is just
math and running the data.7 '
With regard to getting guns, only one-in-forty weapons-related
stops led to an arrest.72 Thus, thirty-nine weapons-related stops out
of forty did not lead to an arrest.
Our study tested the Department's publicly stated hypothesis
that the reason why African Americans and Latinos were over rep-
resented relative to the population in the group of people stopped
and frisked was that African-Americans and Latinos were over-
represented in the population of people arrested for crimes and in
the population of people who lived in so-called high-crime neigh-
borhoods. We tested that through a variety of social science tech-
niques, including multivariate regression analysis, using these
175,000 forms.
We determined that, African Americans are twice as likely as
whites to be stopped for violent crimes and weapons crimes, even
after you control statistically for their representation in the popula-
tion in "high crime precincts" and for their representation in the
population of persons arrested-which is one indicator of the so-
called crime rate. These are the kinds of data and this is the kind
of attention to policy, strategy, and tactics that are necessary to
begin to answer what I think is the right question: "How do we go
about having effective policing and good community relations?"
Information, participation, pressure from government, from the
private sector, from the private bar, and leadership at the top, are
essential.
70. Id. at 95 n.10.
71. Id. at 117.
72. Id. at 117 n.23.
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Commissioner Bratton is to be congratulated for changing the
culture of the New York City Police Department in so many ways.
But not only is leadership at the top essential; so is commitment in
the ranks. That's a harder thing to achieve, but it begins with lead-
ership at the top.
MR. TABAK: Thank you. Don't think I haven't noticed that
you didn't discuss the jurisdiction of the Attorney General's Office,
but we'll get back to that later.
In opening up the new issue of the National Law Journal today, I
saw that our next speaker, Johnnie L. Cochran Jr., is listed as one
of the 100 most influential lawyers in the country. The National
Law Journal notes that Mr. Cochran has long been a leading trial
attorney, winning substantial verdicts and settlements arising out of
police misconduct. He keeps breaking his own records for the big-
gest settlements and the biggest verdicts ever gotten. He has be-
come the attorney of choice for litigants suing with regard to racial
profiling, police brutality, and other law enforcement issues. His
current cases include a wrongful death action in Providence,
Rhode Island over the shooting death of a black off-duty police
officer,73 and representing Abner Louima in a lawsuit against this
city over Mr. Louima's treatment by police.74 Mr. Cochran is also
a leading entertainment lawyer and has long been involved in civic
affairs. On a pro bono basis, he secured reversal and release for
Black Panther Geronimo Pratt, for whom he helped arrange a $4.5
million settlement.75 So, I am pleased to introduce Johnnie
Cochran, for his perspectives derived from his extensive experience
in this area of the law.
MR. COCHRAN: Thank you, Ron. It's a pleasure for me to be
with you this evening to discuss this very, very important topic. I
have been asked to speak from the standpoint of my experience
regarding what private counsel can do in this area.
After the Civil War, certain civil rights statutes were enacted that
gave private counsel the right to be like private attorneys general.
So, here we are, logically speaking. We have heard from the U.S.
Attorney, we have heard from the State Attorney General, and
now you'll hear from private counsel.
73. Jonathan D. Rockoff, Providence Police: A Department Under Siege, PROVI-
DENCE J. BULL., Apr. 27, 2000 at Al.
74. David Rhode, Cochran TV. Ad Sells His Firm's Legal Stardom, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 28, 2000, at B3 (mentioning Cochran's representation of Louima).
. 75. George Meyer, Era's Last Political Prisoner Becomes Positive Force After Re-
lease, TAMPA TRIB., Oct. 8, 2000, at 4.
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Private counsel has that right. It was very, very important in
those days for lawyers to bring these actions when, very often, at-
torneys general were reluctant to enforce the rights of newly freed
men and women. Those of us who've studied that and understand
and appreciate that understand the importance of doing that even
today. Here we are in America, at a great time in a new millen-
nium. But too often our nation's greatness is diminished by too
many facts and figures on racism and injustice.
For example, we all cherish the right to travel freely within our
borders. But how universal is that right when a recent study of
police stops on Maryland interstates shows that African Americans
accounted for 80% of all police stops and searches although they
were really about 20% of the drivers? 76 Or consider New Jersey,
where African Americans are five-to-six times more likely to have
been stopped in that state by officers on that turnpike, and that
state's reluctance to ever admit that this situation ever existed.77
I'm fairly new to New York, having come from Los Angeles
where we have similar problems. But I know about that kind of
reluctance. So when I arrived on the scene here, I decided to try to
use these civil rights laws from a private standpoint, to see how I
could cooperate and see about effecting some change.
It has been a real pleasure to work with Loretta Lynch and her
predecessor Zachary Carter, and with Eliot Spitzer and Andrew
Celli, in trying to. effect these things. As a private counsel, you
need to work closely with the U.S. Attorney's Office and the State
Attorney General's Office, which both have the staff and a com-
mitment to bringing about change.
The best example I can give you is that of Abner Louima. From
the standpoint of cooperating with that office and making our cli-
ent available, and trusting, and moving forward, we've seen some
remarkable changes in this area. I think it becomes very important
for us to do that.
The same thing is so with regard to the "New Jersey Four. 78 I
represent these four young men who were on their way to try-out
for basketball scholarships at North Carolina Central College.
76. Data Collection: The First Step in Racial Profiling: Hearing on the Constitution,
Federalism and Property Rights Before the Senate Judiciary Comm., 107th Cong.
(2000) (testimony of David A. Harris, Balk Professor of Law and Values, Univ. of
Toledo College of Law, and Soros Senior Justice Fellow, Center on Crime, Communi-
ties and Culture).
77. Id.
78. David Glovin, Injured Men Seek Speedy Trial, BERGEN REC., Sept. 9, 1999, at
Al (detailing the story of the "New Jersey Four").
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While riding down the interstate in New Jersey, they ended up be-
ing shot ten, eleven times by New Jersey State Troopers, who fired
willy-nilly into the vehicle, but later pretended that they had been
the ones being fired upon.79 These kids were stopped because
there was a black driver, along with an Hispanic young man in the
right front seat.
We worked very closely again with the U.S. Attorney's Office
and Chuck Gerout in New Jersey. This resulted in indictments of
the police and also, for the first time, ghosting charges,80 after we
went back to try to find out why these police officers would do this.
We looked at the couple of hours before these kids were stopped
that particular night. The police were stopping cars with black citi-
zens, and would write on their reports the license number of a car
of white people who happened to be going by. After checking, it
was learned that the white people weren't even stopped. So, the
police were indicted not only for the ghosting but for attempted
murder. Our cooperating with the U.S. Attorney's Office brought
to light these kind of things.
We also can bring a civil lawsuit to try to bring about the requi-
site changes.
When we look at the progress we've made in society, how can we
say we've legitimately evolved when in the last couple of years our
nation's largest city has been rocked by the brutalization of Abner
Louima and by the killing of Amadou Diallo-both of whose
"crimes" were having a dark skin shade? 8' In California, I re-
present Tyeisha Miller, gunned down by police officers, shot
twenty-seven times in Riverside, California, while sitting in a car.82
These offenses are reminiscent of mob lynchings some fifty years
ago, except they're being carried out by law enforcement officers.
So, clearly tonight's question is a burning one for all of us. What
can we do about it from the standpoint of private attorneys?
When I first started trying these kinds of cases, there was a great
reluctance on the part of lawyers to get involved. They never
thought you could beat City Hall. They thought it was impossible
79. Id.
80. "Ghosting charges" is used to describe the process of police officers using the
license plate number of white motorists who were not stopped on reports of black
motorists who were stopped for no violation. David Kocieniewski, Trenton Charges 2
Troopers with Falsifying Drivers' Race, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 3, 2000, at B1.
81. Joyce Purnick, Metro Matters: 2 More Voices in Dissonance Over Police, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 3, 2000, at Bi.
82. Scott Gold, Tentative Award OK'd In Slaying of Tyisha Miller, L.A. TIMES,
July 27, 2000, at Al.
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to do this. Nobody wanted to do it. But if you really cared about
your community, if you really wanted to bring about change, you
knew that someone had to do it. You had stand up and try to do it.
We've been trying to encourage lawyers all around this country to
stand up and do that, because it's the right thing to do.
Our citizens deserve the same kind of law enforcement through-
out all these communities, and it has to be equal, it has to be fair.
No one is anti-police, but we want the police to be fair in their
treatment of the citizens.
So many times in Los Angeles, I get the right results for the
wrong reasons. If I saw the choke hold being used and sued the
police department to stop the choke hold and got a big verdict,
they would stop it because they didn't want to pay the amount of
money-not because it was wrong and they were killing people.
But the result was still the same. Similarly, I demonstrated in a
civil rights lawsuit that Los Angeles officers were not properly
trained to use the hog-tying maneuver, and we stopped that and
saved lives-again, for the wrong reason.
It's a question of educating the public to bring about these kind
of changes. Ron asked me to give you some examples of the kind
of things that can really happen. This morning I was looking at The
New York Times. One of the large cities chosen for an annual
honor for exhibiting innovative ways to solve problems like crime
and racism was Montgomery County, Maryland. I kind of smiled
at myself when I saw that, because last year I had a case in Mont-
gomery County, Maryland involving a police officer who shot a dis-
abled black man.83 The officer tried to pull the man out of the car
with his left hand, while holding his gun in the right hand. The
officer shot the man in the back. There was no indictment. We
went into that community and brought a civil rights action. After
we litigated that case, the authorities did step forward, and we re-
solved the case for the largest sum in the history of Maryland.84
But that wasn't enough. I drew up my own consent decree, stat-
ing, "What happened here is wrong, and if you really want to
change this, let's do something else." So the clients got a certain
amount of money, but I got the clients to agree to have the govern-
ment put up another $1,000,000 in Montgomery County, which was
used for a pilot program for cameras in cars, to hire more minori-
83. Slain Black's Family Wins Settlement, WASH. TIMES, Aug. 7, 1999, at A9.
84. Michael James, Settlement Reached in Fatal Police Shooting; Montgomery Co.
Officials to Pay $2 Million to Family of Man Killed in Traffic Stop, BALT. SUN, Aug.
10, 1999, at 5B.
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ties, and to have sensitivity training. They hired a black police
chief from Portland and bought him in there.
This consent decree became something very unique-so much so
that Bill Lann Lee of the Justice Department asked to see my con-
sent decree that we used in that case. Now, it turns out that that
community now is now one of the all-American cities, maybe be-
cause they stood up and did the right thing. This case is an exam-
ple of the fact that you can fight City Hall: the case of Junius
Roberts.
Another case in which we were recently involved was in Blue-
field, West Virginia, a very small community. The title of a June 1,
2000 news story on this is something like "Bluefield to Pay Para-
lyzed Man One Million Dollars. '8 5 This little town is so small that
all the insurance it had was a million dollars; anything more would
have broken the entire town.
In this case, a young kid was paralyzed after an encounter with a
police officer in which his neck was broken. Our settlement wasn't
just about the money and trying to get the youngster some care for
the rest of his life. We negotiated not only the monetary settle-
ment, but once again also a consent decree crafted by both sides as
part of the settlement.86 In this consent decree, we got the city to
agree for the first time to a civilian review panel to look into allega-
tions of police misconduct and to find ways to attract more minori-
ties to the police force. Per capita, Bluefield, West Virginia, has
the largest minority community of any city in West Virginia, though
it has only one African American in its thirty-three member police
force.
So, the client will get a million dollars, and we got a consent
decree, a civilian review board, and a public apology.87 I've never
secured a public apology before, in any city, anywhere.
This points out what you can do, and what we must do, if we are
going to change these police departments. It is, in fact, a new day,
and it does require some daring. It's not just about money. It re-
quires you to go and do these things.
Finally, perhaps the greatest example I can give you is the exam-
ple of Geronimo Pratt. For twenty-seven plus years, we fought to
get this man free who, we said, was wrongfully convicted by not
only the LAPD but also the FBI. It's a very difficult thing to fight
85. E.g., Malia Rulon, Robert Ellison Meets Famed Civil Rights Attorney Who
Represents Him, ASSOCIATED PRESS NEWSWIRES, June 16, 2000.
86. Id.
87. Id.
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the FBI. Ultimately, we got a hearing and got him out.8 8 The most
difficult thing in my career was to get the FBI to admit that it basi-
cally framed an innocent man for all these years through a program
called Cointelpro.89 But within the last two or three months, we
were able to do that also. Geronimo Pratt is now a free man, a free
wealthy man, but none of us would take $4.5 million in return for
giving up twenty-seven years of our life.
The point we try to make in these cases is that we need the po-
lice, and the police need us. We can work together to make this a
better society so that people will all be judged equally. So when we
go in and deal with these problems, it is incumbent upon us to get
police forces to become diverse.
Clearly, Bill Bratton is right. We need leadership, because these
are paramilitary organizations. They will lead from the top. The
officers will do what they are told, and it's set by the tone of the
person at the top. People who go into law enforcement, by and
large, want to do the right thing, but they need leadership.
They also need, however, effective controls within the depart-
ment. You can't have a system where everybody looks the other
way when a police officer does something. Yet that's what we
found happening in Los Angeles, and that's why there's going to be
a consent decree out there. For years, the police there have done
exactly what they wanted to do because, make no mistake about it,
the single most powerful figure in the justice system is not Chief
Justice Rehnquist or any Supreme Court justice or any court; it's
the police officer on the beat. He's the one who can take your life
or your freedom. And very little will be done about it unless we
change things. Thank you.
MR. TABAK: Thank you very much Mr. Cochran. The last
panelist is Michael Meyers, who has been, since 1991, the executive
director of the New York Civil Rights Coalition, which he co-
founded in 1986 to bring people of all colors together to work in a
nonpartisan way toward a racially-integrated society and oppose all
forms of racial violence and separatism. Mr. Meyers is a long-time
civil libertarian, and is vice president of the American Civil Liber-
ties Union, serving on its executive committee and board. He's
been on the board of the New York Civil Liberties Union since
1976. He speaks and writes widely.
88. Neal Gabler, A Political Verdict PRATT A Reminder of the Old FBI, L.A.
TIMES, June 8, 1997, at M1.
89. Id.
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While on the national staff of the NAACP, Mr. Meyers edited,
for the NAACP's National Study on Police Violence,90 a manual for
addressing police-community conflicts. In 1997, Mayor Giuliani
appointed Mr. Meyers to a thirty-three-member task force on po-
lice-community relations, formed in the aftermath of allegations of
police torture of Abner Louima. Mr. Meyers and two other mem-
bers of the task force issued a minority report asserting systemic
patterns of police misconduct and pointing out difficulties they ex-
perienced in getting the mayor to acknowledge core problems of
race and policing in New York City.91
Here is Michael Meyers.
MR. MEYERS: Thank you. I don't have time to develop my
themes, but I will sketch them for you. One theme is that there is
nothing really new to talk about here. In 1968, the "Kerner Com-
mission" stated:
[We] heard complaints of harassment, of police breaking up so-
cial street gatherings and the stopping of blacks on foot or in
cars without obvious basis. These stops, together with contemp-
tuous and degrading abuse, have great impact in the ghetto.
Some conduct, breaking up of street groups, indiscriminate
stops and searches, is frequently directed at youths, creating spe-
cial tensions in areas where youths spend much time on the
street.
92
The three dissenters on the 1997 Mayor Giuliani's Task Force on
Police/Community Relations found essentially the same thing.93 So
there is nothing new.
My prediction, because there is nothing new-despite what
you've heard about the San Diego model and Boston model-
there is not going to be a stampede to San Diego and Boston by
the powers, makers, and guardians of our law. They know the
problems and they already know the solutions.
Another theme is that, if you really look at this, there is a war
going on. We have substituted a War on Poverty with a war on the
poor. There are many things they can do in the war on the poor
that are constitutional, that have been upheld by the United States
90. NAACP's NATIONAL STUDY ON POLICE VIOLENCE.
91. N.Y. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, DEFLECTING BLAME: THE DISSENTING REPORT
OF MAYOR RUDOLPH W. GIULIANI'S TASK FORCE ON POLICE/COMMUNITY RELA-
TIONS (MARCH 1998), http://www.nyclu.org/blamel.html.
92. NAT'L ADVISORY COMM'N ON CIVIL DISORDERS, REPORT OF THE NATIONAL
ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS (1968). The Commission is popularly
known as the "Kerner Commission," named after its Chair, Governor Otto Kerner.
93. N.Y. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, supra note 93.
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Supreme Court. In law enforcement matters, the so-called Broken
Windows theory is the linchpin of the war on the poor; the war on
the homeless; the war on the vagrants; the war to bring decent citi-
zens back to "our public spaces"; the war to "take back the streets"
and subways; the war to make sure that "aggressive panhandlers"
are not hanging around the ATM when you withdraw money,
whether or not they intend to rob you; the war against truancy by
picking up students on their way to school, even if they are just
stragglers, rather than truants; and the war on squeegee people.94
When you have 38,000 or 40,000 NYPD cops on the problem of
squeegees, the cops win.
I have been in other cities, including Montreal, Canada, that still
have squeegee people in public places, because there is no policy or
law that comands that they get rid of such people. Here, we've got
38,000 cops who are enforcing the declared law and policy.95
I am not going to go into any detail about all the swirling and
vexing civil liberties questions and violations, because I don't have
time. But, if I had the time, we could talk about the phony war on
prostitution. We could talk about the phony war on drugs, which
pushes these police officers to be aggressive. If night clubs don't
have cabaret licenses, you can't dance to the music they are play-
ing. Law-abiding people in this city feel they are being surveilled
by the police if they sit on their stoops or enter their apartment
buildings.
My next theme is that we have minorities at risk: a black child
sitting on his stoop; a black man entering his apartment building
and being shot by cops; a young black artist on the subway being
beaten to death by cops; 96 young black and Hispanic men being
suspiciously stopped and/or beaten and killed by cops; 97 students
on the highways being stopped by cops and shot at;98 a man coming
from a social club being tortured in the 70th Precinct by cops;99 a
94. Suzanne Fields, New York, New York Really is a Wonderful Town, TIMES
UNION, Feb. 20, 1998, at All; Evelyn Nieves, Is a Crackdown the Answer? SCHOLAS-
TIC UPDATE 11 (Jan. 2000).
95. Jimmy Breslin, Rudy's the Champion of... Rudy Pounces On Powerless,
NEWSDAY, May 24, 1998, at A3.
96. Anita Gates, The Volatile Search for Truth and Blame, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 14,
1998, at E5.
97. Salim Muwakkil, Are Blacks Sitting Out on Marche? CHI. TRIB., Sept. 11, 2000,
at 11.
98. John Rifner & David M. Herszenhorn, Racial 'Profiling' at Crux of Inquiry
Into Shooting By Troopers, N.Y. TIMES, May 8, 1998, at B1.
99. Devlin Barrett, Louima Tells His Tale of Torture-Takes Stand to ID Volpe as
Cop With Stick, N.Y. POST, May 7, 1999, at 5.
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man leaving work who "says no to drugs" being shot dead in an
altercation with plain-clothes cops, and then being smeared by the
mayor, who announced that the dead man had a juvenile arrest
record. 100
This same Mayor says there are just a few bad apples in the po-
lice department. My next theme is that the few bad apples analysis
is not true. There is a police culture-the Blue Wall of Silence-
that protects and covers up for bad cops. There is something insidi-
ously wrong when we who point out these problems are called cop-
bashers, especially when no one loves law-abiding cops more than
I.
My next theme is that we need cops, and that police are at risk as
well. Why else would they need and get hollow-point bullets and
9mm weapons? Cops are at risk because they don't feel they enjoy
the support of the community.
Another theme is that we are losing our freedom. In the balanc-
ing of law enforcement versus the rights of the individual, there are
many people in this society who aren't certain anymore about the
societal fabric of freedom, of individual dignity, the right to be left
alone and not bothered by cops without probable cause or reasona-
ble suspicion. This rending of the fabric of freedom should not be
happening in our communities.
Every generation needs a report, for posterity. That is why the
three dissenters on Mayor Giuliani's Task Force, of which I was
one, prepared the minority report. The dissenting report made
findings about NYPD's "quality of life" crackdowns. I will tell you
about our findings, since the paternalistic New York Times, the
newspaper of record, did not report on the minority report, despite
all its space and all its editors who believe in pretending to be ob-
jective. Why? One possible explanation is that the cleaning up of
Times Square, named because The New York Times is in that
square, benefited The Times real estate.
First, however, I will discuss briefly the way in which the Mayor
dealt with the Task Force. He made a mistake putting me on the
Task Force. Mayor Giuliani had read my newspaper columns, but
he didn't read between the lines. He didn't get my longstanding
analysis of police abuse problems.
The first day that we went to the task force meeting, I said to the
Mayor:
100. Dan Janison, Mayor Says Shooting a Cause for Concern, NEWSDAY, Mar. 25,
2000, at A5.
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We don't want to reinvent the wheel. Let's get all the reports
that have already have been done. Let's agree on our mission
statement, but also let's do something about the problem. And,
we want you to sit with us. Let this be a task force, one that gets
his attention and commits his, who has the power and the au-
thority to change things and get them done.
What did he do? After we unanimously adopted the mission
statement, he then walked away from the task force. He didn't
fund it as he had promised. He didn't regularly meet with us. And,
when we decided to have our own meetings to take care of our
business, he assailed us, as did Commissioner Safir. Yet, we are
people whom the Mayor put on the Task Force as healers.
When we gave our report to the Mayor, did he thank us for it?
No. He criticized us for it, and said that most of the new things in
the report were silly and unnecessary, and that the rest of the re-
port consisted of things he had opposed in the past and would con-
tinue to oppose.101 And all of that he said in response to the
majority report, much of which the three dissenters informed and
crafted. But since the majority didn't go far enough, we wrote a
minority report
What did we state in the dissenting report? We found that the
NYPD was routinely violating minorities' civil rights. 10 2 This was
not a new problem. The NYPD was routinely violating minorities'
civil rights during Ed Koch's and David Dinkins' administrations
also. 10 3 The Broken Windows theory is a new slant on an old prob-
lem. Our finding of the routine violation of minorities' civil rights
prompted Police Commissioner Safir to accuse the three dissenters
of having "a racial agenda."
Mayor Giuliani and Commissioner Safir denied that the NYPD
routinely violates minorities' rights. Any police commissioner in
office would not believe it, because there is a self-interest in not
acknowledging the extent of the problem and, apparently, a self-
interest in not doing anything about the problem other than engag-
ing in double talk, using cosmetic approaches like CPR ("Courtesy,
Professionalism, and Respect"), and invoking Civilian Complaint
Review Board's low rate of substantiation of alleged misconduct as
a tactic to deny an extensive problem. We-the minority commu-
nity, the civil liberties and civil rights community-helped to create
and to put into place the Civilian Complaint Review Board and
101. N.Y. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, supra note 93.
102. Id.
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want it to work. But, when it did not work, it was because it was
subverted, especially when the administration, hostile to civilian re-
view, put in its own people.
The dissenting report also found that the representation of mi-
norities in the NYPD was inadequate.1 °4 The supervisory ranks of
NYPD were primarily white. 0 5 Among cops ranked higher than
Captain, only 3.5% were Latino, 4.4% were black, 0.9% Asian, and
4.4% were women. 106 These are appalling statistics.
The dissenting report found that minorities, by and large, were
disproportionately excluded from the Police Department by ques-
tionable psychological tests used to screen candidates.'0 7 Yet, of
nineteen psychologists on the NYPD's staff, sixteen were white,
two black, and one Asian. Moreover, notwithstanding these psy-
chological screening tests, all those police officers who have been
accused of, charged with, and convicted of abuse and misconduct
and maybe more serious crimes, each and everyone of them had
passed their entry-level psychological tests.' 8 So, the questions
are: "What are these tests for? Are they valid? Are they reliable?
Is psychological test ongoing?"
The dissenting report also found that the NYPD's cultural diver-
sity training and curriculum manual -contained "false information
and insidious racial and cultural stereotypes.' 10 9
The dissenting report further found that systemic patterns of po-
lice misconduct were a substantial part of the police culture, and
that the NYPD's Internal Affairs Bureau did not deal effectively
with these patterns of misconduct."0 Although Mayor Giuliani be-
lieves that cops can effectively police cops, we've seen no evidence
that the Internal Affairs Bureau can police the cops.
Finally, the dissenting report points out that the Mayor turned a
deaf ear toward many citizens who wanted to talk with him directly
during the task force's public and private meetings."' Especially
offensive and unacceptable was the open contempt the Mayor ex-
hibited in 1997 towards the weeping mothers who had lost children
to police violence. The three dissenters reported that the Mayor
neglected to take the minimum steps required to comfort them in
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. at Part 7.
108. Id.
109. Id. at Part 6.
110. Id.
111. Id.
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their grief, which was possible without jeopardizing any police of-
ficer's civil rights or due process rights." 2 Particularly Unnerving to
the minority of three on the task force was the Mayor's skipping a
session at City Hall with minority youth who had been told that
they would have a chance to talk with the Mayor about their exper-
iences with, and concerns about, the police. 113 But the Mayor
didn't meet with them, and made no apologies about it. He didn't
even send a note to explain his absence. Where did he go? To
Yankee Stadium for a baseball game.
Another of my themes is that all these reports are eventually
shelved. The Kerner Commission report was shelved. Our dissent-
ing report was shelved before it was read by Mayor Giuliani.
The Attorney General's report has been shelved. I accuse the
Attorney General's Office of shelving its own report. As I told
Attorney General Eliot Spitzer, we don't need a sociological study
from the Attorney General; we need a legal complaint. He can
bring a legal complaint in conjunction with Johnnie Cochran, in
conjunction with the Center for Constitutional Rights, in conjunc-
tion with the New York Civil Liberties Union, in conjunction with
the NAACP, or on his own. But he should bring it! There is no
good reason for his delay, if his sociological study which confirms
racial profiling is as accurate and valid as he says it is.
The last of my themes that I have time only to mention briefly is
that if the systemic patterns of police misconduct that we have seen
in New York City were happening in upper-middle-class communi-
ties, it would be stopped. Lawsuits would be brought. Attorneys
general would lose elections if they failed to stop it. Mayors would
be recalled, or, if you didn't have recall provisions, such provisions
would be created overnight. The City Council would be held ac-
countable, whereas now it is not held accountable. Here the City
Council looks more diverse, but its members play the game. They
have become part of the establishment, part of the problem rather
than the solution. Delay and inaction is inexcusable in any form,
color, or guise.
MR. TABAK: Thank you very much. For those who arrived
late, I want you to know that Commissioner Bratton had to leave
early. I had hoped that he would be able to react to some of the
statements of other speakers, but that became impossible. I would
like now to first invite any of the panelists who wish to respond to
anything that any other panelist has said.
112. Id.
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MR. CELLI: Since my office has been attacked, I am glad that
Johnnie Cochran is here to defend us if needed. But I don't think
we need him because I believe that Michael Meyers and Norman
Siegel, dissenters always, understand that there's more than one
way to bring about change.
For the record, neither the ACLU, the NYCLU, nor the New
York Civil Rights Coalition have filed a lawsuit against the NYPD.
Why? Because they understand, as we do, that there is more than
one way to bring about change.
If the Attorney General wanted to shelve the report, he would
not have sent me here to talk about it, to publicize it, and to con-
tinue the dialogue-which is difficult at times but continues-with
the New York City Police Department. We are talking about
changing the behavior-or, even more difficult, the attitudes-of
40,000 uniformed officers. Without ever ruling out any option, I
have not found in the statute book a remedy in court for attitude
change. It's important that we focus on attitudes, although we can
also change behavior and have attitudes follow.
MR. TABAK: What powers do you think the Attorney General
of the state has, even if he may not at the moment choose to exer-
cise them, to deal with police conduct?
MR. CELLI: We have the power to do what we have already
done and more. We have the power to litigate. We have the power
to subpoena. We have the power to investigate and bring about
remedial change with the Department of Justice, or on our own, or
with private parties. I think that all of those powers fall under the
Executive Law § 63, which is our basic jurisdictional hook.114
The issues are how do we use these powers? When do we use
them? What is the best way to bring about change?
I largely agree with Mr. Meyers that there's nothing new under
the sun here. But I disagree in the following sense: We've brought
light and science to an issue that many people understood in their
guts. We are trying to change behavior in a very large organiza-
tion, and you need science for that. We had to get to that point
before we could get to anything beyond that.
PROFESSOR CHEVIGNY: The Center for Constitutional
Rights brought a case before the Attorney General's report was
finished, based upon these very facts.' 15 The complaint's been up-
held, and the case is pending. I don't understand why another
114. Id.
115. See case cited supra note 6.
20001
398 FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXVIII
complaint should be brought by anybody. The report that the At-
torney General could be reshaped so as to be evidence.
Moreover, there is something new under the sun: the "pattern
and practice" civil jurisdiction of the federal government, which
the courts had previously held did not exist and had to be created
by Congress. It is potentially an enormously powerful tool for a
reform. I don't know whether it's going to be used in New York,
but it ought to be.
MR. MEYERS: I don't want to have a back and forth between
me and the Attorney General's Office, and I am not going to tell
you what the NYCLU and NYCRC are prepared to do or prepar-
ing to do either. But I will say this: Yes, the Center for Constitu-
tional Rights has filed a litigation. But the issue is what will
government do? I warned Attorney General Spitzer not to get in-
volved with this subject unless he was serious about it and prepared
to bring a lawsuit. He has the power and the resources to do so.
Civil rights organizations are not as resourced as government
agencies.
In terms of having a constitutional system and a legal framework
for justice, we look to the law enforcers to enforce the law. We
can't be doing your work and everybody else's work, although we
often have to do that. As Johnnie Cochran said, sometimes we
have to do so.
When Zachary Carter was the U.S. Attorney, I read in The New
York Times that his office had done a report on this subject. I saw
him soon thereafter at a dinner party and said, "Zack, I've known
you for a long time. How come I didn't get a copy of your report?"
He said, "Michael, there is no report. Don't believe everything
you read in the newspapers." Maybe there is or isn't.
But it's been a long time now, and all I get from reading the
newspapers and trying to figure out intelligently what's going on is
that the U.S. Attorney's Office is negotiating with the Giuliani ad-
ministration. I suggest that the time for negotiation is over. The
Giuliani administration is coming almost to an end and you could
be negotiating through the end of his term. Maybe that's what is
expected. That would feed into the political cynicism and the
Mayor's accusation that this is all political.
I hope that's not the case. So do I accuse the state Attorney
General's Office of inaction? Do I accuse the U.S. Attorney Gen-
eral's Office? Yes, I accuse them.
MR. TABAK: I will turn it open to audience questions now.
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MS. COWAN: I am an associate at Debevoise & Plimpton, and
we're co-counsel with the Center for Constitutional Rights. The
complaint is just against the Street Crime Unit, not against the en-
tire Police Department.
With regard to Professor Chevigny's point about § 14141: in its
motion to dismiss our complaint, the city argued that that section
has removed jurisdiction for private suits based on police miscon-
duct. The court rejected that argument, but it's an interesting argu-
ment. It may be a future barrier to private suits.
MR. COCHRAN: I'm not surprised they would make that argu-
ment. But I think we have to continue to resist.
We should watch very closely over the next couple of months
because, both here and in Los Angeles, we may see the federal
government move towards these consent decrees. That would be
very important. In Los Angeles, there is a great resistance. The
police chief, the police and the mayor do not want to have any kind
of consent decree, or any court telling them what to do. Their re-
sponse is, "We can take care of this ourselves." But that's what
they've always said.
They cannot take care of it themselves. It is not within them to
properly police themselves. The question is a rhetorical one of
who polices the police. They cannot police themselves very well.
A better job of policing the police must be done.
AUDIENCE: I was just curious, was the New York City Police
Department invited to take part in this program?
MR. TABAK: Yes they were. Commissioner Safir and the Po-
lice Benevolent Association's leadership were both invited. They
claimed on several occasions they never received our invitations.
So, we then faxed, re-faxed, and re-re-re-faxed them. Last week,
we got a polite letter from Commissioner Safir saying that neither
he nor anyone else from the NYPD would be available.
MR. BUSH: I go to a lot of these panels and I hear a lot of these
discussions and I still do not understand why in this state we do not
have independent prosecutors with their own independent arm of
investigators, so that victims' families don't have to rely on the fed-
eral government. As victims, we want the people who are prose-
cuting to be independent of the Police Department. Second, why
do we have these paper tigers? The Civilian Complaint Review
Board really is a paper tiger in my opinion.
MR. TABAK: Before others answer, I note that this Association
has been on record for several years in supporting a permanent
Special Prosecutor's Office, not just for police matters, but in gen-
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eral. It wasn't the result of action by the Committee on Civil
Rights, but it is still the Association's policy. I think Mr. Meyers
wants to comment.
MR. MEYERS: We used to have a statewide post of Special
Prosecutor in New York State, created by an executive order that
placed that authority and power in the Attorney General's Office.
Interestingly, the very liberal Governor Cuomo abolished that
office.
To answer your question as to why don't we have these things:
theoretically, people in power believe that you do have indepen-
dent checks on police power. They see that as being lodged with
the district attorneys' offices. And the district attorneys jealously
guard their jurisdiction. They are the first to reject any allegation
that they are playing "footsie" with the Police Department, or that
they are not serious about checking and curbing police abuse and
brutality when the evidence leads them in that direction. They be-
lieve that they do credible investigations and prosecutions in cases
against police officers.
The general community believes, with a cynical perception, that
somehow in the whole theoretical framework in which a district
attorney can as they say, "indict a ham sandwich," that nonethe-
less, it's very difficult for district attorneys to get indictments in the
cases of police officers. When they do get indictments, the cyni-
cism level rises even higher, such as during the state prosecution of
the Diallo cops.
People in the civil rights community didn't think that was an ef-
fective, credible prosecution. This is what drives and empowers the
demagogues who rush in with demonstrations and civil disorders.
(Of course, demonstrations are constitutionally protected.) It also
drives the cynicism and the lack of trust in the Police Department
and the DAs when DAs who do bring prosecutions are then ac-
cused of ineffective, lackluster, or incompetent prosecution.
So, yes, we need an independent prosecutor at the state level. In
addition, the federal government can provide an additional check
under its authority to bring about the prosecution of civil rights
violations. But I can't say that the federal government, even under
President Clinton, has been aggressive and satisfactory in this re-
gard, because I haven't seen evidence of effective prosecution.
I say, "Give me evidence-at the state level, at the federal level,
at the local level." But nobody gives me the evidence. They just
give me rhetoric.
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MR. COCHRAN: Michael, I would say that on" the federal level
in Brooklyn, the U.S. Attorney's Office has been much more effec-
tive than in other jurisdictions. The Louima case is a classic exam-
ple of what that office has done. It has gone the extra mile. This
has sent a message that has a profound deterrent effect upon the
police.
One of the issues here, which is a major problem throughout the
country, is that it takes another level of government to maintain a
special prosecutor. That is clearly difficult. State prosecutors rely
upon the police to make their cases. When they try to prosecute
the police, it takes them forever. If you or I committed the same
acts as police officers, the investigation would be resolved in a
week. But when those under investigation are police officers, it
takes months. And then nothing happens, and as Mike says, there
is no indictment. The state prosecutors say it's very difficult to pro-
ceed against police officers, even with a grand jury. If there are
twenty witnesses, these prosecutors will put on all twenty witnesses
and then say that the case is so confusing that they can't figure out
what to do.
It's as though they are talking to a bunch of people who fell off a
truck. If they want to indict somebody, they could do it right off
the bat, on the state level.
That's why we feel very strongly that the federal government has
the expertise and the laws, and should have the resolve, to prose-
cute these cases. Federal judges serve for life and presumably are
not driven by the whims and vagaries of what's going to take place.
So that's the closest we have to independence in prosecution, be-
cause you're probably not, at this point, going to have another, to-
tally independent level of government put into place.
PROFESSOR CHEVIGNY: I'm not opposed to independent
state prosecutors for police violence. But you should realize you
can't set police policy by prosecuting people. The level of proof
required, the chances of catching someone, the haphazard nature
of whether you've got the evidence in a case or not, the standard of
proof, and the level of violence ordinarily required to get an indict-
ment do not reach down to the mass of problems in a department.
Those problems have to do with so-called street justice, roughing
people up, and also with these stop and frisks and the zero-toler-
ance type of abuses.
Those abuses require good governance. I don't believe that
leadership alone is enough. You need an outside body that over-
sees the department and has the power to suggest and perhaps dic-
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tate policy and changes. I don't mean a Civilian Complaint Review
Board, because it takes cases on a case-by-case basis. You need an
auditing body or an oversight body.
But those bodies can be turned into police buffs. For example,
in theory, Los Angeles has civilian control of the police through
the Police Commission. It's always been, in my working life,
staffed by people a majority of whom love everything the police
do.
That brings us back to the point of the original discussion. So
long as people believe that you have to kick butt in order to keep
order, we can't do anything. We have to adopt the belief in this
country that the Constitution is paramount and that the police
must comply with it. Most people in the United States don't be-
lieve that, and most police don't believe it. The Police Commission
in Los Angeles doesn't believe it, and I don't think most of the Los
Angeles City Council believes it. Not to say that they believe it in
New York City, either.
My point is that, unfortunately, institutions can't do it all. The
issue that you raised here is really of paramount importance. We
have to enforce these values, and that requires the will of the peo-
ple, I suppose.
MR. COCHRAN: We also have to change the culture of these
police departments, so that the bad officers fear the good officers,
and not vice versa. Now, the good officers fear the bad officers.
Professor Chevigny is absolutely right, and Los Angeles is a clas-
sic example. For years and years and years and years, we've been
talking about the LAPD and what it's gotten away with. But
you've got to understand, the LAPD was put out there, first of all,
to deal with the labor unions, the Communists, the zoot-suiters, or
whatever happened to be viewed as the problem in Los Angeles.
Everybody else looked the other way and said, "Take care of this
problem."
This same attitude prevails even now, after the exposure of ram-
pant corruption, with close to 100 cases being dismissed.1 16 It may
cost the City of Los Angeles one billion dollars to compensate peo-
ple who've been framed and maimed and killed. Every day, more
cases are dismissed. People in prison are getting out, because cases
were created against them. Many of them are Hispanics and Afri-
can Americans.
116. James Sterngold, 3 of 4 Officers Convicted In Police Corruption Case, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 16, 2000, at A20.
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But there's no outrage by the body politic, whose only concerns
are, "Why do we have to be bothered by this? Why are you bring-
ing this to us? Let's get this over with." That's the general atti-
tude. Meanwhile, the police commissioner says, "We can take care
of this. Give us a chance to take care of this." But it all happened
on their watch!
People have been trying to tell the body politic there that the
problem is that they'd rather not be bothered. That's why we've
got to have some outside influence come in. Otherwise, the situa-
tion won't ever change.
The City of Los Angeles would like to pay some money and get
this over with. But if that's all that happens, the culture will remain
the same. The good cops will stand there silently and look the
other way while the bad cops do improper things. The supervisors
won't do anything about it. The police chief will go on talking
about it and will say that crime is down. And the people will say,
"Gee, we're safe in our homes." You're right; it's a culture thing.
MR. CELLI: I'm not an unalloyed advocate of leadership as the
answer to everything. I think the change has to come from deep
within the organization and be brought about by pressure from the
outside. But I wish Commissioner Bratton were still here, so he
could talk about culture change. For years, one of the complaints
in minority communities about the NYPD was that it did not police
enough, that the police did not get out of their vehicles and police
the streets because they were afraid to do so. Through Commis-
sioner Bratton's leadership and through the leadership of the peo-
ple under him, it basically became impossible for officers and their
commanders at the precinct level to get away with not policing the
neighborhoods.
Maybe the police have gone to the other extreme. But if you can
convince beat officers to get out of their police cars and put them-
selves in harm's way, you can change attitudes dramatically from
the top. So, we've seen an example of being able to change the
police culture in New York.
The question is: Change it for what purpose? We're talking
about instilling the values of the Constitution in police officers.
That's a tall order, but it can be done.
AUDIENCE: I've been to a number of these types of events,
and I am just bewildered by the fact that we can't get a senior rep-
resentative from the NYPD to participate. The City Bar Associa-
tion, on April 1, had an invitation-only event, which was probably
an attempt to sanitize the environment so that there would be
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more of an opportunity for a frank, civilized discussion with the
Police Department. Howard Safir was invited, but he didn't show
up.
The New York City Council has been holding meetings through-
out the city. The senior representatives from the department are
there and are questioned by the City Council members. Then they
officially walk from the stage before there is any opportunity for
people in the audience to actually engage in conversation with
someone from the Police Department.
I'm of mixed minds as to whether or not litigation is the right
strategy, or open dialogue, or scientific studies are the right strat-
egy. But I'm convinced that no matter what, step one has to be
some frank discussions with the senior members of this Police De-
partment. The Association of the Bar of the City of New York is
an august institution. If it can't get representatives of the Police
Department here for some form of discussion, we are really in a
sorry state of affairs.
I totally agree with the notion that we have to have some sense
of citizen participation. Without it, we're not going to get much
change. One of the things we have to demand is that we have some
form of frank discussion with the current members of this Police
Department.
Former Commissioner Bratton was very eloquent in making
some strong criticisms. He can do that, as a former commissioner.
Former Commissioner Ray Kelly, who was here on April 1, did the
same thing, but he is also a former commissioner.
We don't have anybody who's currently serving who has the po-
litical will to come forward and have a discussion. But without a
discussion with the Police Department, litigation isn't going to
work; speaking to each other in these forums is not going to work;
another report is not going to work. We have to find a way to sit
down and talk frankly to each other. Without that, we're not going
to solve this problem.
MR. COCHRAN: What's going to work is an agency like the
U.S. Attorney's Office bringing an action, getting the Police De-
partment into court.
The point you make is bewildering. If you have occasion to even
appear on a program with Mayor Giuliani or Commissioner Safir,
he will not appear on the same segment with you. If you are on
Larry King and the issue is police abuse, the Mayor or Police Com-
missioner will negotiate it so he has to be in a special segment.
LAW AND DISORDER
You can't ask them any questions. You cannot debate with them.
They're either above the law, or they're afraid.
MR. MEYERS: I want to second. I thought we had a free press,
but these guys get very intimidated by people who are in power.
Television reporters feel they need to get the position of City Hall.
As a result, the City Hall reporters get compromised, in terms of
reporting the real situation, because they need to get a quote from
the Giuliani administration.
Johnnie Cochran is absolutely right. They negotiate with these
producers to make sure they get a special segment, separate from
the activists-they call them the cop-bashers.
And there is something else that they do. If they do go on a
show, they pick and choose for the producers which community
activists or civil rights leaders are acceptable. For example, they'll
tell the producers that certain people are just cop bashers, but that
if the producers get Dennis Walcott [of the National Urban
League], we'll think about coming on the show.
This is very dangerous for a so-called free society and free press.
Finally, with respect to the previous question about an indepen-
dent auditing body, the City Council in New York did create an
independent audit board regarding police brutality and corrup-
tion.1 7 The mayor vetoed this, but the veto was overridden by the
City Council. Guess what? This matter is in litigation.
PROFESSOR CHEVIGNY: The Police Department has used
the approach mentioned by Johnnie Cochran all my working life.
Its leaders think that if they keep a low profile and keep their
mouths shut, the situation will blow over and they will be able to
do exactly as they have always done. That's why they do it.
And up to this point, their policy is actually a wise one, from
their point of view. Because they are not interested, really, in hav-
ing any contact with community forces in this city. They want to do
everything themselves.
What is the solution? I'm afraid that an oversight body is about
the only thing there is, although without leadership, it's not going
to work very well. But given the present leadership, which barely
amounts to leadership, it seems to me there is no alternative.
117. MAYOR GIULIANI AND DISTRICT ATTORNEY MORGENTHAU ANNOUNCE
LAWSUIT AGAINST CITY COUNCIL'S INDEPENDENT POLICE INVESTIGATION AND AU-
DIT BOARD: CHARGE THAT BOARD VIOLATES CITY CHARTER AND PREVIOUS
COURT RULING THAT FOUND BOARD INVALID (Mar. 25, 1998), http://www.ci.nyc.ny.
us/html/om/html/98a/pr137-98.html.
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MR. TABAK: Do any of the panelists have an concluding com-
ments they'd like to make?
MR. MEYERS: Yes. I have one concluding remark.
You have to remember that the Giuliani administration did not
even respect its own Task Force on Police/Community Relations.
It stopped talking to us once it was clear that it was not going to be
a one-way dialogue.
In a free society, we have to start asserting our rights to free
speech more. We also must look at the policies that give credence
to this so-called crackdown on quality of life offenses-a "crack-
down" that disproportionately affects young minority children and
minority people. Unless we look at the policy, the solutions will
not come. All those reports that have been shelved say the same
thing.
MR. TABAK: I will just note that the Mayor didn't like the ma-
jority report of the mayoral task force much better than he liked
the minority report.
Thank you very much to all the panelists for a very stimulating
discussion, and thank you all for coming.
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THE NEW POLICING
Philip B. Heymann*
The purpose of this article is to examine a remarkable develop-
ment in law enforcement: the exploration of new forms of policing
by combinations of police leaders and academics. This examina-
tion focuses on three major cities-New York, Chicago, and Bos-
ton-that have developed three different combinations of
problem-solving and new forms of relationships with neighbor-
hoods that are often called "community policing." As a result of
these immense undertakings, we have seen a change in belief in the
efficacy of policing. But the changed attitudes towards police func-
tions are accompanied by certain risks.
I. THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE NEW POLICING
I will begin by describing the weaknesses and the strengths of the
argument that new forms of policing have had a major effect on
fear and safety in our cities and, through that, on the quality of life
for millions of people. But wholly aside from the amount of evi-
dence for this belief, it exists and that in turn has changed the atti-
tudes toward policing of citizens and political leaders alike.
It is important to look at New York, Chicago, and Boston sepa-
rately, for they represent somewhat different approaches based on
different theories supported by different police leaders and schol-
ars. Their apparent successes explain the change in attitude toward
police, but the approaches differ along the two dimensions that
many consider most important: reduction of crime and disorder
and an increase in trust in the police.
I will describe generally the practices and theories of policing in
each of these three cities and provide some evidence as to what
each is doing better or worse. But then it is worth departing from
the broad models, each of which may hide too much that is impor-
tant and particular under a single theory that seems almost as copi-
ous as an ideology. We should look much harder at the underlying
operations of each cities' police department. And, finally, we
should consider the values affected by, and the risks associated
with, the different forms of policing.
* Philip B. Heymann is the James Barr Ames Professor of Law at Harvard Law
School.
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A. The National Decline in Crime
Before turning to the changes in theory and practice of policing
and their consequences, we should note the importance of the new
belief that policing can make a big difference in the amount of vio-
lent crime, property crime, and troublesome disorder. In focusing
on the new belief, I am not trying to raise doubts about the reduc-
tion in fear and the increase in safety that have occurred through-
out the United States. There may be some questions as to the role
of policing in bringing this about-though these questions do not
trouble most of our politicians and citizens-but there is little
doubt about the fact of these changes, particularly the actual and
significant reduction in fear and increase in safety in most places
throughout the United States and particularly in two of the cities
which we will be examining.
Figures on reported crime and surveys of citizens tell identical
stories. After a rapid increase during the 1960s, there was long-
term stability in crime rates in the United States during the follow-
ing quarter century.' That stability included a homicide rate in the
United States that was three or four times as high as those of other
Western democracies.2 It was also widely believed that non-lethal
violent crime greatly exceeded that of comparably advanced
countries.3
Within this long-term trend, something dramatic first happened
in the mid-1980s when the amount of youth violence, particularly
killing, shot up dramatically, while violence by those over twenty-
five was declining. Then, in the early 1990s, the direction of change
reversed and for the rest of the twentieth century, crime, including
violent crime, declined radically to levels we had not seen since the
1960s.4 Arrests of males under age eighteen for violent crimes de-
clined 26% between 1994 and 1999.5 The trend has continued into
1. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, HOMICIDE TRENDS
IN THE UNITED STATES § 2 (2000), http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/homicide/hmrt.htm
[hereinafter HOMICIDE TRENDS].
2. OFFICE FOR DRUG CONTROL & CRIME PREVENTION, UNITED NATIONS,
GLOBAL REPORT ON CRIME AND JUSTICE 312-14 (Grame Newman ed., 1999) (listing
homicide rates for more than three dozen industrial countries as reported in five
United Nations surveys between 1974 and 1993).
3. Id.
4. HOMICIDE TRENDS, supra note 1, at § 3.
5. Keith Bradsher, Fear of Crime Trumps the Fear of Lost Youth, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 21, 1999, at D3.
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the current year, although some major cities, including Boston, ex-
perienced an ominous spike in the first few months of 2000.6
Between 1993 and 1998, property crimes declined in the United
States by 32% and violent crimes declined by 27%. The decline
has been spectacular with regard to such non-violent crimes as mo-
tor vehicle theft or ordinary thefts of less than fifty dollars. Moreo-
ver, this decline has been about equally sharp for males and
females, black and white, urban, suburban, and rural. 7
One area of great public concern did not appear to follow this
general course. Although the use of illicit drugs had peaked in the
late 1970s, and the decline that followed in the mid-1980s was re-
versed by an epidemic of smokable crack cocaine, there was a great
decline in overall use in the 1980s and, except for marijuana use,
prevalence of use in the population continued at a relatively low
level into the 1990s. 8 However, there is little, if any, indication that
the price of illicit drugs has risen or that their purity has declined,
nor is there any reason to think that their availability has lessened. 9
The crack cocaine epidemic has greatly abated; but that seems to
have far more to do with the natural course of a drug epidemic,
including the growing desire of young people to avoid the conse-
quences they see in their addicted elders, than with any success in
6. E.g., Tom Farmer, Violent Crimes Plunge in U.S., BOSTON HERALD, Aug. 28,
2000, at 1 (noting that Boston had already surpassed its 1999 murder total, and that
police had reported a 13% increase in shootings); Brett Martel, Murder on Rise in
Major Cities, CHI. SUN-TIMES, June 23, 2000, at 26 (reporting that murders had in-
creased over 1999 murder rates in Baltimore, Boston, Dallas, Los Angeles, New Orle-
ans, New York, and Philadelphia); Don Terry, In a Turn of the Tide, Bloodshed Rises
in Los Angeles, N.Y. TIMES, July 11, 2000, at A14 (reporting a 7.5% increase in vio-
lent crime over 1999 in Los Angeles, including more murders, rapes, and robberies,
but noting that "with only a few exceptions, violent crime is down nationwide"). But
see, e.g., Eric Lipton, Giuliani Pulls His Charts Out for a Review of New York, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 15, 2000, at B9 ("In the first six months of this year, crimes in the seven
major categories fell 7.8%" in New York City).
7. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, NATIONAL CRIME
VICTIMIZATION SURVEY, CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION 1998, CHANGES 1997-98 WITH
TRENDS 1993-98, at 9 tbl.7, 11 tbl.8, http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/cv98.pdf (re-
porting sharp declines in property crimes and declines in violent crimes for specific
demographic groups between 1993 and 1998) [hereinafter VICTIMIZATION SURVEY].
8. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF
CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 1997, at 245 tbl.3.83 (1998).
9. OFFICE OF NAT'L DRUG CONTROL POLICY, DRUG DATA SUMMARY 4 (1999)
(explaining the increase in purity and decrease in price for four types of drugs be-
tween 1981 and 1998), available at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/pdf./
95253.pdf.
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policing, despite mammoth increases since 1980 in expenditure and
in rates and duration of imprisonment.10
Returning to the sudden reduction in violence, particularly in le-
thal violence, since the early 1990s, a number of consequences
should be noted. Evidence ranging from the self-reports of
mothers and children in Boston to the immense increase in opti-
mism and tourism in New York documents the change in the qual-
ity of life that has been brought about by reduced violence, and
perhaps also by reduced property crime and disorder. Leaders in
cities as far away as Johannesburg, Moscow, and Buenos Aires
want to learn whatever there is to learn about the relationship of
new forms of policing to a wonderfully improved quality of life in
many American neighborhoods and cities.
If policing really is making the difference, we should acknowl-
edge that fact in terms of a variety of decisions about the expendi-
ture of resources. Resources should be moving toward police from
the immense human and dollar costs of the present rush towards
ever longer sentences that have made us one of the world's two
leaders in percentage of population behind bars.' At the same
time, the general public may be willing to bear new personal costs
associated with intrusive policing measures, if the benefits are as
great as they seem. In Chicago, for example, tenants of housing
projects have voted to authorize apartment searches without the
prerequisites of the Fourth Amendment, a move rejected by a fed-
eral court.12
B. Are the Increase in Safety and the Reduction in Fear
Results of the New Forms of Policing in the United States?
The accelerating reduction in violent and other crime beginning
in the early 1990s plainly coincided with a series of major changes
in policing. The three cities we are examining, New York, Chicago,
10. E.g., Richard Curtis, Symposium, The Improbable Transformation of Inner-
City Neighborhoods: Crime, Violence, Drugs, and Youth in the 1990s, 88 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 1233, 1260 (1998) (stating that many African American youth through-
out New York City have avoided heroin and crack in the 1990s because of such factors
as the AIDS epidemic and the increased death toll from drug dealer turf wars).
11. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH WORLD REPORT 1999, at
387 (1998); see also BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 1996, at 528 tbl.6.30 (1997) (noting
that the number of prisoners in custody of federal and state authorities was 1,037,686
in 1995).
12. Pratt v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 848 F. Supp. 792 (N.D. Ill. 1994); Tracey L.
Meares & Dan M. Kahan, When Rights Are Wrong, BOSTON REV., Apr./May 1999, at
4 (providing an overview of the incident).
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and Boston, all began new programs shortly before 1995. As we
shall see, there are common-sense and theoretical reasons to be-
lieve that the forms of policing have made a difference; but before
awarding the credit to policing, we should recognize the claims of
other contenders in explaining reduced crime.
1. Some Other Explanations for Declining Rates of Crime
There are reasons to look for alternative explanations. Violent
and other crime is decreasing in many cities throughout the United
States, including in cities where policing strategies are very differ-
ent from those of New York, Chicago, or Boston. New York and
Boston have enjoyed remarkable rates of decline, but so have sev-
eral other cities, which are implementing quite different ap-
proaches a3 Moreover, other factors unrelated to policing, but
highly correlated with the conditions we associate with crime, are
changing at the same time. Teenage pregnancy has gone down
steadily during the last six or seven years." The decline in birth
rates between 1991 and 1996 among black teens between the ages
of fifteen and nineteen is particularly striking.1 5 There seems to be
no obvious relationship between policing and teenage pregnancies,
although there has always been a close relationship among crime,
violence, teen pregnancy, drug use, and other forms of social
breakdown.1 6 That suggests that an additional factor-other than
policing-may be at work.
Several candidates seem obvious. First, the drop in crime could
be tied to the sustained economic boom. Not only has poverty
been declining since 1993 for juveniles under the age of eighteen,
but the proportion of black juveniles (whose involvement in dan-
gerous violence as victim or perpetrator has been much the high-
est) living in poverty has also been declining sharply during that
13. Compare BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CRIMINAL
VICTIMIZATION AND PERCEPTIONS OF COMMUNITY SAFETY IN 12 CITIES, 1998, at 9(1999) (reporting that New York's murder rate fell 65.8% between 1990 and 1997)
[hereinafter COMMUNITY SAFETY], with id. (reporting that San Diego's murder rate
fell 53.3% during the same period), and id. (reporting that Los Angeles's murder rate
fell 42.2% during the same period).
14. Marc Lacey, Teen-Age Birth Rate in U.S. Falls Again, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 27,
1999, at A16.
15. Judith Havemann, Birthrate Drops for Teens of All Races, WASH. POST, May 1,
1998, at Al (reporting a 20.6% drop for black teens during that period).
16. E.g., JAN M. CHAIKEN & MARCIA R. CHAIKEN, VARIETIES OF CRIMINAL BE-
HAVIOR: SUMMARY AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 25 (1982) (noting that "[d]rug use is
one of the major factors associated with virtually every type of crime [ ] studied, and
specific forms of drug use correlate strongly with crime types and rates").
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period. 17 Unemployment is at near-record lows; and by 1996, 86%
of black young adults were completing high school. 18
There are a number of other available explanations, besides new
forms of policing, which supporters would claim have led to the
reduction of crime and the fear of crime. During the last few years,
we have seen the end of the crack epidemic in most cities,19 an
epidemic which spawned drug-selling gangs and the varieties of vi-
olent crime that we associate with the Prohibition era of the 1920s.
Drug markets have stabilized. Dealers in stabilized industries do
not kill each other; thus, dealers in illicit drugs may be particularly
violent only at the early stages of a rapidly expanding market.2 °
Just as the use of crack declined when successive generations
witnessed the degrading experiences of older brothers and sisters,
the same learning-but this time about guns-may have happened
as a result of the violence of the late 1980s. 2 1 A very high percent-
age of young people in disadvantaged neighborhoods had friends
who had been killed.22
Efforts of people other than the police to deal with youth vio-
lence also played a role. Prevention efforts by committed members
of the community, including organizations such as churches and
schools, increased immensely in response to the burst of youth vio-
lence, and helped make a difference.23
Another quite provocative explanation, recently advanced in a
leading economics journal, is the rise of legalized abortion some
17. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU
HISTORICAL POVERTY TABLES-PEOPLE tbl.3, available at http://www.census.gov/
hhes/poverty/histpov/hstpov3.htm (current through Nov. 30, 2000).
18. NAT'L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, DIGEST OF EDUCATION STATISTICS 17
tbl.8 (1998).
19. E.g., Alexandra Marks, Teens Drive Decline of "Crack" Craze, CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR, Jan. 6, 1999, at 1; Lance Williams, Crime Drop Mirrors Falling Popularity
of Crack Cocaine, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, Nov. 29, 1998, at A14.
20. Fox Butterfield, Drop in Homicide Rate Linked to Crack's Decline, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 27, 1997, at A12 (reporting on a Justice Department study finding that the
"waning of the crack cocaine epidemic" was the "most important reason" for the drop
in homicide rates through the 1990s).
21. E.g., Fox Butterfield, Scared Straight; The Wisdom of Children Who Have
Known Too Much, N.Y. TIMES, June 8, 1997, at D1 (discussing how inner-city youth
are "recoil[ing] from the gun culture" because many have witnessed shootings or seen
relatives or friends incarcerated).
22. E.g., id.
23. See generally John Buntin, A Community Responds: Boston Confronts an Up-
surge of Youth Violence (1999) (unpublished manuscript written for John F. Kennedy
School of Government Case Program).
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twenty years prior to the beginning of the decline in crime rates. 24
Indeed, the article attributes roughly half of the decrease in crime
to the government's newfound protection of the right to choose.
Finally, there are those who would argue passionately, and per-
suasively, that the reduction in violent crime was traceable far less
to policing and any increase in the numbers of arrests than to legis-
lation and the longer prison sentences it imposed, along with the
consequent prolonged incapacitation of violent offenders. A rela-
tively small proportion of the people born in any given year is
likely to commit a high percentage of the crimes and a very high
percentage of the violent crimes. When we lock up a higher and
higher proportion of the population for longer periods of time, a
very high proportion of this particularly dangerous group is impris-
oned because they offend and risk arrest so often. This reduces the
level of violence on our streets, albeit at great cost. And, some-
what less plausibly, believers in increased deterrence resulting from'
the perceived threat of a very long sentence for those who are suc-
cessfully caught and prosecuted have argued that the reductions in
crime are directly traceable to that deterrent.
2. The Case for New Forms of Policing as a Major Cause of
Reduced Crime
With so many other explanations, why is there reason to believe
that new forms of policing are playing a significant role in the re-
duction of violence and fear? For one thing, some of the sharpest
reductions in crime have taken place in Boston and New York
where the new forms of policing have been the most thoroughly
explored and most enthusiastically implemented. For another,
some of the connections between the new forms of policing and the
reduction in violence are so plausible that it is hard to imagine that
they have not had a major effect. Finally, some fairly rigorous
evaluations of recent policing tactics support the hypothesis of
effectiveness.
We know, for example, that the increase in youth homicide was
almost entirely attributable to homicides with guns; there has been
24. John J. Donohue III & Steven D. Levitt, Legalized Abortion and Crime, 115
Q.J. ECON. (forthcoming 2000), at http://www.mitpress.mit.edu/journals/QJEC/
forthcoming.html.
25. See, e.g., Daniel Kessler & Steven D. Levitt, Using Sentence Enhancements to
Distinguish Between Deterrence and Incapacitation, 42 J.L. & ECON. 343, 346 (1999)
(employing a novel approach to separating incapacitation effects from deterrence ef-
fects, and finding that the latter had a "nontrivial" effect on a series of 1982 sentence
enhancements in California).
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no significant increase in homicide with other weapons.26 And
both trends have worked in reverse. As Professor Alfred Blum-
stein of Carnegie Mellon University and Professor Richard Rosen-
feld of the University of Missouri-St. Louis have pointed out, the
reduction in national homicides in the mid-1990s was very close to
the reduction in the number of gun homicides, suggesting again
that control of guns has been an important tactic. 7 We also know
that many homicides occur because of quarrels and other events
taking place on the streets. Policing strategies like those of New
York that greatly increase the risk of arrest for carrying a gun on
the street, particularly for gangs or other groups that have more
frequently engaged in violence, should therefore lead to reduced
homicides with guns. In fact, those are the homicides that have
been declining rapidly.
Similarly, we have believed for centuries that certainty and swift-
ness of punishment are critical to the effectiveness of deterrence.
In Boston, the police are using their powers in new ways to ensure
that the deterrent threat to particularly dangerous individuals is
very certain and prompt, targeted specifically to a particular type
of conduct such as violence, and directly communicated to those
most likely to use violence. To determine who is most likely to use
violence, Boston police have analyzed data from reports or investi-
gations and have used computers to compile information available
by observation of associations on the street. Strategies, like those
adopted in Boston, to assure that speed and certainty of punish-
ment are known to those likely to engage in violence seem almost
certain to reduce violence.
In both New York and Boston, creating social control and, relat-
edly, reducing fear, have been -accomplished by using the powers of
the police to take back the street from gangs. The Department of
Justice's Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention es-
timates that, in 1996, almost 3000 homicides in large cities and sub-
urban counties were attributed to gang members.2 8 Reducing the
apparent street power of gangs competing for status, turf, or drug
profits seems likely to reduce gang homicides.
26. Alfred Blumstein & Richard Rosenfeld, Explaining Recent Trends in U.S.
Homicide Rates, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1175, 1196 (1998); see also id. at 1194
fig.6b, 1195 fig.6c.
27. Id. at 1196.
28. OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE & DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, 1996 NATIONAL
YOUTH GANG SURVEY 32 (1999).
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3. A Closer Look at What We Know About Police Tactics and
Reduced Crime
There is another way to look at developments in policing-one
that does not rely so exclusively on the theories of a few academics
and police commissioners. The broad models of policing in cities
like Chicago, New York, and Boston, can be usefully disaggregated
by first identifying the critical powers of the police and then analyz-
ing the innovative ways these powers are being used. It is useful to
begin with a reminder of the powers, legitimate and borderline le-
gitimate, granted to the police in the United States. It is through
the use of those powers in a particular set of tactics that street
crime may be reduced, either by creating deterrence, gathering in-
telligence, or establishing a feeling of police or neighborhood con-
trol of the streets. What we know about the use of these powers to
reduce crime should be reviewed, before turning to the broader
and more complex strategies that have characterized policing in
Chicago, New York, and Boston. The present powers of the police
are relatively well known:
1. To arrest, search, or engage in electronic surveillance if
there is probable cause to conclude that the person has com-
mitted a crime.29
2. To seek or give a suspect concessions in exchange for infor-
mation or evidence useful against others.3 °
3. To "stop" if there is reasonable suspicion to believe that the
person is about to commit a crime or has just committed a
crime, and to frisk if there is reason to fear the person may
be armed.3'
4. To "stop" cars on the ground that they are being operated in
any way, however minor, in violation of local ordinances or
state laws.32
5. To seek consent to search the stopped car or, alternatively,
to search without consent by either arresting the driver for a
traffic violation or developing a reasonable suspicion that
the driver might be armed.33
6. To take advantage of even obvious confusion by a suspect
about whether he has a right to say "no" to a search of his
29. Dalia v. United States, 441 U.S. 238, 256 (1979).
30. United States v. Baldwin, 60 F.3d 363, 365 (7th Cir. 1995).
31. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 24 (1968).
32. Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 412 (1997).
33. Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 147 (1972).
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home, car, or person, or to refuse to answer questions when
not formally under compulsion to remain.34
7. To imply, deceitfully, that they intend to exercise powers of
arrest or restraint that they in fact do not have, in order to
gain leverage to force a recalcitrant witness or suspect to
cooperate.
8. To suggest a possible use of force even though its use would
be illegal.
3 6
9. To engage in any of these activities in a way that is designed
to interfere with the subject's personal or business
relations.3 7
10. To analyze material obtained in reports or investigations of
individual crimes and to gather useful intelligence from
these reports.38
Police in the United States have long had a tool kit that includes
at least the powers described above. Exceeding these considerable
powers by imposing summary punishment, using unnecessary force
to arrest, or disregarding someone's privacy and property rights
without probable cause is generally a violation of local and federal
law. To ignore the limitations on the use of these powers-even by
actions that would not be criminal if carried out by ordinary citi-
zens but which misuse the apparent powers and authority of the
police-is an occasion for department discipline.
What do we know about the success of various tactics using these
powers, reserving for later a discussion of the broad strategies that
are a collection of tactics in Chicago, New York, and Boston?
There is much guesswork in this. Fairly rigorous recent experi-
ments clarify a good deal about what forms of policing actually re-
duce crime. A review of evaluations done by a team at the
University of Maryland for Congress and the Department of Jus-
tice tells us a good deal about what "works. '39
34. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 224 (1973).
35. Green v. Scully, 850 F.2d 894, 903 (2d Cir. 1988).
36. E.g., Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560 (1958) (excluding a confession coerced
with the threat of mob violence). Contra Green v. Scully, 850 F.2d 894 (2d Cir. 1988)
(holding a confession voluntary even though the police officer threatened the suspect
with the death penalty, which was not used in New York State at the time).
37. See, e.g., Dalia v. United States, 441 U.S. 238, 248 n.8 (1979) (upholding elec-
tronic surveillance of all oral communications taking place within a suspect's place of
business).
38. E.g., United States v. McKinnon, 721 F.2d 19, 22-23 (1st Cir. 1983) (affirming a
firearms conviction based on evidence obtained in a drug investigation).
39. Lawrence W. Sherman, Policing for Crime Prevention, in LAWRENCE W. SHER-
MAN ET AL., PREVENTING CRIME: WHAT WORKS, WHAT DOESN'T, WHAT'S PROMIS-
ING: A REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS (1997).
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In Policing for Crime Prevention, Professor Lawrence W. Sher-
man of the University of Maryland analyzes the evaluations of po-
licing strategy. He concludes first that, although the evidence is
inconsistent, the more convincing studies show that an increase in
the number of police causes reductions in crime in the following
year, especially in larger cities with higher crime rates.40 This is
supported by the evidence of epidemics of crime when the police
are on strike41 and by the obvious logic that the presence of more
police increases the risk that an individual committing a crime will
be apprehended, resulting in both a deterrent and an incapacitative
effect.
On the other hand, Sherman finds that rapid response to calls
from victims does not have a significant effect on crime reduction,
when measured against the resources it requires. Too many crimes
are discovered after the fact and even a crime that is discovered
promptly is not affected by rapid response if the time between the
commission of the crime and the initial contact with the police ex-
ceeds nine minutes. Indeed, the average reporting time for such
crimes was forty-one minutes later.42 Nor did random patrol deter
crime by creating a sense of police omnipresence. Among a group
of studies, none of which Sherman deemed especially rigorous, the
stronger studies suggest that there is no such effect.43
What does make a difference, careful evaluations show, is focus-
ing patrol resources on places and times that have the most crime.
The idea is supported by epidemiological research that has shown
that crime tends to be very localized 4 and by careful studies in
Minneapolis suggesting that doubling the police presence led to a
50% decrease in crime in the hot spots, even when the police were
not present.45 It also often led to increased neighborhood calls for
service in the "hot spot" areas.46 As to curfews, not enough is
40. Id. at 8-1.
41. E.g., SANFORD H. KADISH & STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, CRIMINAL LAW AND
ITS PROCESSES 117 (6th ed. 1995) (noting the looting that followed a police strike in
Liverpool in 1919).
42. Sherman, supra note 39, at 8-2.
43. E.g., Robert Trojanowicz, Evaluating a Neighborhood Foot Patrol Program:
The Flint, Michigan Project, in COMMUNITY CRIME PREVENTION: DOES IT WORK?
(Dennis Rosenbaum ed. 1986), cited by Sherman, supra note 39, at 8-3.
44. Sherman, supra note 39, at 8-3 - 8-4 (citing epidemiological studies showing
that crime is localized).
45. Id. at 8-15 (citing Lawrence W. Sherman & David A. Weisburd, General De-
terrence Effects of Police Patrol in Crime "Hot Spots": A Randomized, Controlled
Trial, 12 JUST. Q. 625 (1995)).
46. Sherman, supra note 39 (indicating that crime-related calls for service in-
creased in hot spots as a result of increased police presence).
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known yet to determine whether they are an effective way of re-
ducing crime, particularly among juveniles.
In a related way, concentrating limited police resources on an
identified band of particularly dangerous individuals or crimes also
reduces crime. We know that a small fraction of a total birth co-
hort commits a very high percentage of crimes perpetrated by
members of that cohort. Targeting the more dangerous people had
the hoped-for effect of reducing crime in Washington and Phoe-
nix.47 The case is less clear with regard to targeting dangerous
crimes, with two notable exceptions: seizing guns and drunk driv-
ing.48 Efforts to detect and seize guns have proven to be im-
mensely effective in Kansas City. When gun seizures in a target
area rose by 60%, gun crime dropped by almost 50%. 4 9
There are at least some positive short-term effects of focusing
policing on activities that create a sense of disorder in a neighbor-
hood-tending to support the "Broken Windows ' 50 theory that is
described later.51 But, as in the case of making additional arrests
for misdemeanors and for other crimes for which an individual
might not previously have been arrested (even if caught in the act),
the deterrent and incapacitative effects may be significantly offset
by countervailing long-term effects. Studies show that recidivism
of juveniles increases following arrest.52 The same is true of some
other categories of offenders, such as unemployed men guilty of
domestic violence. 3 There is a reminder in all these statistics that
the long-term effects of invoking the criminal justice system for rel-
atively minor behavior can be to increase rather than reduce crime
through its effect on the life prospects or psychology of the ar-
rested individual.
47. Id. at 8-20 - 8-21 (citing Susan Martin & Lawrence W. Sherman, Selective Ap-
prehension: A Police Strategy for Repeat Offenders, 24 CRIMINOLOGY 55 (1986); Allan
F. Abrahamse et al., An Experimental Evaluation of the Phoenix Repeat Offender
Program, 8 JusT. Q. 141 (1991)).
48. Sherman, supra note 39, at 8-24 (citing James W. Shaw, Community Policing
Against Crime: Violence and Firearms (1994) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Univer-
sity of Maryland (College Park)); Ross Homel, Random Breath Testing and Random
Stopping Programs in Australia, in DRINKING AND DRIVING: ADVANCES IN RE-
SEARCH AND PREVENTION (R.J. Wilson & R. E. Mann eds., 1990)).
49. Sherman, supra note 39, at 8-31 (citing LAWRENCE W. SHERMAN ET AL., NAT'L
INST. OF JUSTICE, THE KANSAS CITY GUN EXPERIMENT (1995)).
50. James Q. Wilson & George L. Kelling, The Police and Neighborhood Safety:
Broken Windows, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Mar. 1982, at 29-38.
51. Infra Part III.A.2.
52. E.g., Malcolm Klein, Labeling Theory and Delinquency Policy: An Empirical
Test, 13 CRIM. J. & BEHAV. 47 (1986), cited by Sherman, supra note 39, at 8-16, 8-18.
53. Sherman, supra note 39, at 8-19 (citing several studies).
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As to the specific crime-reduction benefits attributed to consci-
entious efforts to improve police relations with neighborhoods,
Sherman explains: "Neighborhood watch" groups seem to be al-
most wholly ineffective, perhaps because cooperation is least likely
to be found in high crime areas where distrust is widespread, al-
though community meetings can help mobilize citizen participation
in reducing crime. Police visits to citizens' homes are also helpful,
at least among non-minority groups, because they facilitate intelli-
gence gathering and otherwise elicit support for police. Providing
information to the neighborhood rather than eliciting information
from the neighborhood showed no sign of affecting or reducing
crime when it was tried in Newark and Houston. 54 Finally, re-
search consistently demonstrates that individuals who believe that
the police treated them fairly and respectfully in their previous en-
counters are more likely to obey the law in the future.55
Such specific, fact-based arguments are more persuasive than ex-
clusive reliance on the broader contentions that significant changes
in violence must be attributable to changed policing simply because
there were no parallel changes in social conditions that could ex-
plain the drop in violence. In fact, as we have seen, there have
been dramatic changes in social and economic factors, from the
availability of jobs to an end to the growth of the crack market,
which could explain a rapid reduction in violent crime.
Moreover, even small changes in social conditions can result in
dramatic differences in crime or other social phenomena when
there is a contagion effect.56 A small increase in the availability of
guns, for example, could readily result in a geometric increase in
the number of young people feeling they need guns, and these in-
creases could in turn lead to still further geometric increases. We
simply cannot assume that big changes in criminal behavior can
only be brought about by dramatic changes of some other sort.
C. Changes in Public and Political Attitudes Toward Policing
However strong one may find the evidence that new forms of
policing are far more successful in reducing crime of almost every
sort, other than the sale of drugs, the case has been strong enough
and made persuasively enough to create a very substantial change
in expert, official, and public expectations about the crime-reduc-
54. Id. at 8-25 - 8-26.
55. Id. at 8-26, 8-29 (citing an unpublished study).
56. MALCOLM GLADWELL, THE TIPPING POINT: How LITTLE THINGS CAN MAKE
A BIG DIFFERENCE (2000).
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tion and other functions of policing. One way of illustrating that
change is to examine the change in notions about the types of ac-
tions for which the police should be held accountable.
South Africa is one of many countries that measures the effec-
tiveness of its police by their capacity to solve reported crimes and
the speed with which police respond to calls. 57 South African po-
lice claim, unreliably, to have reduced response time to an average
of a very few minutes.58 They are now concentrating on improving
what happens next: detective work relying extensively on ques-
tioning of witnesses and suspects and on forensics.59 In this frame-
work, it makes sense that, in late 1999, the South African police
would only reluctantly take a report from my friend, a driver
whose rear window had been smashed with a brick during an at-
tempted carjacking. Enough time had passed to ensure that the
perpetrators had fled, and my friend could not herself provide a
useful description of the suspects. There was simply no way to
solve such a crime, and, because the police in South Africa are con-
sidered accountable for solving all crimes that have been reported,
the police were not interested in recording information about the
crime.
Law enforcement officials in the United States have learned that
most victims do not call police promptly enough to enable them to
catch the perpetrator at the scene of the crime and that detective
work cannot be relied on to solve the great mass of street crimes.6 °
With that awareness, our policing strategies in the last decade have
turned heavily towards prevention of crimes, using the help of
those in a neighborhood and focusing on general problems rather
than individual events.
Faced with a situation like the attempted carjacking in South Af-
rica, a police department with a prevention-focused strategy would
57. See, e.g., COMM'R OF THE S. AFR. POLICE, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COMMIS-
SIONER OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN POLICE 95 (1993) (employing percentage of crimes
solved as the statistical gauge of police success).
58. See, e.g., Averil Millard, South Africa-Security Industry/CCTV, NATIONAL
TRADE DATA BANK MARKET REPS., Aug. 1, 1999, available in LEXIS, Middle East
and Africa Stories ("Many South Africans have said that they feel the police are too
slow in their response to calls, or they do not respond at all.").
59. See, e.g., Marina Bidoli, Scorpions' Hi-Tech Sting, FIN. MAIL (S. Afr.), June 23,
2000, at 43 (reporting on new technology to help police officers streamline their ef-
forts to track down suspects).
60. E.g., WILLIAM SPELMAN & DALE K. BROWN, CALLING THE POLICE: CITIZEN
REPORTING OF SERIOUS CRIME, at xxiv (1984) (reporting that, of those crimes in
which fast response could make a difference, "only 54 percent ... were likely to be
made in time enough, that is within five minutes, to afford police a reasonable oppor-
tunity to make on-scene arrests").
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want to record and analyze the information; together with informa-
tion on recent and similar events at nearby locations, it would sug-
gest a set of ways that the carjacking activity could be stopped.
Some of these would be imaginative devices for making arrests and
getting convictions, such as sending undercover operatives to the
location or using leverage on people arrested for other crimes in
that area to gather information. A problem-solving police depart-
ment would also consider changing traffic patterns, eliminating the
stop signs that make it possible to smash the window of a stopped
car and immediately reach inside. It might also try to build a com-
munity's support for lawfulness, trust in the police, internal coher-
ence, and "social capital"'6 1 to the point that bystanders in the
neighborhood would help deal with the problem.
Problem-solving policing has received a great deal of credit for
reduced crime. As this has happened, elected officials and the pub-
lic have come to hold the police responsible for reducing crime,
and particularly violence, by dealing with the problems that create
the opportunity or temptation to safely commit crimes that are
dangerous and create fear. In terms of accountability, we have
come to assume that the work of the police can be measured by the
crime rate, not the arrest or conviction rate. Both New York and
Boston have met that standard of accountability remarkably.
If the police are indeed coming to be held accountable for reduc-
ing crime, there is disagreement with regard to another question: to
whom are they accountable? The South African Constitution re-
quires a national police force, accountable to the nation as a
whole.62 In the United States, city police departments are held ac-
countable for the crime figures of cities as large as Boston, Chi-
cago, and New York. But we also believe that they are accountable
to local communities and for developing ways that local communi-
ties can impose social control themselves, assist the police, and fo-
cus the efforts of police and neighborhoods on issues that concern
the neighborhood most. New York attempts to focus responsibility
at the level of each of its seventy-five precincts. Chicago tries to
devolve responsibility down to the level of a beat officer within a
precinct. In short, we are coming to accept the fact that police are
accountable to neighborhoods as well as to cities, and responsible
61. E.g., ROBERT D. PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL
OF AMERICAN COMMUNITY (2000) (describing social capital as the collective value of
all social networks and the norms of reciprocity that arise from those networks).
62. S. AFR. CONST. ch. 14, § 214.
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for providing what the neighborhood wants as well as for assuring
reduced danger and fear in the city at large.
II. THE NEW POLICING STRATEGIES
All this is the setting for a more detailed exploration of what is
changing in policing, with a particular focus on three major cities at
the forefront of change: Chicago, New York, and Boston. Each
has developed its own variation of the new strategies of policing.
Each has claimed that its variation is best and deserves the most
credit either in terms of reduced crime, increased public acceptabil-
ity of the police, or reduced fear. I will explore each of these strat-
egies and compare their effectiveness with contemporary
developments in the United Kingdom.
A. Chicago and New York
Chicago and New York have taken dramatically different direc-
tions in policing. It is revealing that both would claim to be operat-
ing in the mode of "community policing," a claim that is required
for a city is to get funds from the federal government to increase
the number of its police.63 Both cities' models of policing grow out
of the same historical rejection of three approaches to policing that
had taken on primary importance: random car patrol, rapid re-
sponse to calls for assistance, and skilled investigation of individual
crimes. 64 Both reject what had become the accepted measure of
success: arrest rates.
Not everything about the older model of policing is, in fact,
wrong. Rapid response is necessary when the danger of violent
crime is continuing. Reactive policing and skilled detective work
are, in fact, necessary if the same perpetrator is likely to attack the
same or related victims again. One of the top priorities of policing
is, in the language of Scotland Yard, "preventing repeat victimisa-
tion. ''65 Some significant measure of success in solving dramatic
crimes is important to maintaining social mores, public morale, and
confidence in the police and government. Still, conceding all this,
the limits of reactive policing, and particularly the failures of ran-
63. 42 U.S.C. § 3796dd (1994).
64. George L. Kelling & Mark H. Moore, The Evolving Strategy of Policing,
PERSPS. ON POLICING, Nov. 1988, at 1, 7-9 (identifying these approaches as pillars of
the "reform era," and explaining the reasons why they fell into disfavor in the 1960s
and 1970s).
65. REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONER OF POLICE OF THE METROPOLIS 6 (1998-
1999).
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dom patrol, rapid response, and detective work to meet expecta-
tions required that new strategies be adopted.
I have traveled with the police rapid response team ("flying
squad") in Johannesburg as it rushed from emergency call to emer-
gency call, usually in response to reports of burglaries. There, as in
the United States, the perpetrator was always gone by the time the
few minutes it took the police to arrive was added to the few min-
utes it took the householder to call after the departure of the bur-
glar. Just as the South African police could not use detective work
to solve the attempted carjacking described supra in Part I.C., they
could not use it to solve these burglaries, or, in fact, many other
crimes. Therefore, a different approach to policing is needed.
In the United States, an understanding of the ineffectiveness of
traditional modes of policing, which had been established by
careful experiments,66 came to be reflected in experiments in
neighborhood-based crime control. 67 These neighborhood-based
approaches also addressed the dangers of friction between police
and youth in crime-infested areas, dangers that had exploded in
riots in the late 1960s. The new movements were conceptualized in
1979 in a seminal article by Professor Herman Goldstein calling for
the police to go beyond merely fighting crime and responding to
emergency calls for help and assume the responsibility for finding
solutions to help prevent and reduce a broad range of problems
faced by the community. 68 Communities across the country began
experimenting with various applications of problem-solving
policing.
In the 1980s, three other scholarly developments encouraged the
problem-solving aspect of what was to become the new policing:
the development of clear evidence linking disorder to fear of crime,
the concept of "situational prevention," and the notion of "hot
spots." The first will be discussed infra in connection with New
York. The concept of situational prevention, which originated in
England, is that implementing measures, tailored to particular
66. E.g., GEORGE L. KELLING ET AL., THE KANSAS CITY PREVENTIVE PATROL
EXPERIMENT: A SUMMARY REPORT 1-3 (1974) (recounting an empirical study that
demonstrated, contrary to conventional wisdom of the period, that changes in police
patrol policy had no effect on crime).
67. This sense that traditional modes of policing were ineffective also coincided
with the rise of privately funded security. The causal link between the former and the
latter is certainly open to question, however, as privately funded security has grown
inexorably for many years now. David A. Sklansky, The Private Police, 46 UCLA L.
REV. 1165, 1175 (1999).
68. Herman Goldstein, Improving Policing: A Problem-Oriented Approach, 25
CRIME AND DELINQUENCY 236 (1979).
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crimes and locations, that make the commission of the particular
crime more difficult, risky, or less rewarding, will discourage the
commission of that crime.69
The theory of hot spots developed from research and observa-
tions indicating that a disproportionate percentage of crime is usu-
ally concentrated in small geographical areas, even specific
addresses or locations.7° Identifying hot spots was found to have
two benefits. First, identifying hot spots may allow police to apply
the concept of situational prevention to increase the stakes for
criminal or disorderly behavior in the hot spots, through increasing
police presence in a particular area or increasing community efforts
to watch an area. Second, identifying hot spots allows policing ana-
lysts to use computer technology that can combine the hot spot
locations with detailed maps of the surrounding area to attempt
identification of location features that may help explain the reason
for the high rate of crime.71
Beginning in 1988, under the leadership and sponsorship of Pro-
fessor Mark Moore and then-Attorney General Edwin Meese, a
distinguished group of police chiefs, mayors, academics, and others
met for five years and further developed the "twin poles of modern
policing": (1) encouragement of the participation, at every stage
and in almost every way, of the neighborhood being policed; and
(2) addressing crime as a problem to be solved prospectively, not
as an event to be explained historically by retrospective investiga-
tion and, to whatever extent possible, then remedied by trial and
punishment. 72
1. Chicago
The Chicago Alternative Policing Strategy ("CAPS") started op-
erating in prototype districts in April 1993. Chicago emphasized
the first pole-neighborhood involvement-more completely and
enthusiastically than almost any other city. The immediate schol-
arly background for this neighborhood focus has been the work of
69. Ronald V. Clarke, Situational Crime Prevention: Its Theoretical Basis and
Practical Scope, in 4 CRIME AND JUSTICE: AN ANNUAL REVIEW OF RESEARCH 225
(Michael Tonry & Norval Morris eds., 1983).
70. Lawrence W. Sherman et al., Hot Spots of Predatory Crime: Routine Activities
and the Criminology of Place, 27 CRIMINOLOGY 1 (1989).
71. WESLEY G. SKOGAN ET AL., ON THE BEAT: POLICE AND COMMUNITY PROB-
LEM-SOLVING 16-18 (1999).
72. George L. Kelling, Police and Communities: The Quiet Revolution, PERSPS. ON
POLICING, June 1988, at 1, 8 (describing the Executive Session on Policing and its
members and noting a "quiet revolution" in American policing rooted, in part, in
community involvement and prospective tactics).
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Professor Wesley G. Skogan.73 The more remote scholarly support
is the Chicago criminological tradition of emphasizing the relation
of the demographic and sociological conditions of a neighborhood
to its rate of crime. 4
Current studies by Robert J. Sampson and Felton Earls have ad-
ded greatly to this tradition .7  The studies show convincingly that
the disparity in crime rates within areas of Chicago can be largely
accounted for by measurable neighborhood differences, including,
prominently, differences in those forms of social capital reflected
by constructive involvement in the concerns of neighbors-particu-
larly the willingness to assist in the upbringing of children. The
development of social capital can be encouraged by working with
neighborhood organizations or helping to develop them. It can be
discouraged by allowing fear to force individuals to retreat into
their own houses, away from groups and public places.
The form of policing in Chicago relies extensively on the neigh-
borhood to define the focus of police activities as the police at-
tempt to support social control. If the neighbors are most
concerned about gangs gathering on the street or noise at night,
then these should become police priorities. There is, of course, a
risk that the concerns expressed by the neighbors are shaped by
assumptions about what the police can and cannot do, including
doubts about police capacity to reduce many forms of violence.
Still, there is a powerful democratic claim that neighborhood con-
cerns should be respected as well as an instrumentalist argument
that respecting them empowers the neighborhood, building social
capital and, with that, social control.
This has not been just philosophy. One of CAPS' unique charac-
teristics was the extent to which there was actual, sustained police-
community involvement in identifying problems of concern to the
73. E.g., WESLEY G. SKOGAN & MICHAEL G. MAXFIELD, COPING WITH CRIME:
INDIVIDUAL AND NEIGHBORHOOD REACTIONS (1981); WESLEY. G. SKOGAN, DISOR-
DER AND DECLINE: CRIME AND THE SPIRAL OF DECAY IN AMERICAN NEIGHBOR-
HOODS (1990).
74. E.g., CLIFFORD R. SHAW & HENRY D. McKAY, JUVENILE DELINQUENCY IN
URBAN AREAS 108 (1942); Robert E. Park, Human Ecology, 42 AM. J. Soc. REV. 1
(1937); Ernest Burgess, The Growth of the City: An Introduction to a Research Project,
in THE CITY 47 (Robert E. Park et al. eds., 1925).
75. R. J. Sampson et al., Neighborhoods and Violent Crime: A Multilevel Study of
Collective Efficacy, SCIENCE, Aug. 15, 1997, at 918-24; R. J. Sampson et al., Beyond
Social Capital: Spatial Dynamics of Collective Efficacy For Children, 64 AM. Soc.
REV. 633 (1999).
2000] 425
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXVIII
community.76 Community involvement took two forms. The most
fundamental form of neighborhood involvement was the formal
practice of regular meetings between residents and police officers
in every police "beat. '' 77 The practice of regular neighborhood
meetings was taken far more seriously in Chicago than in most cit-
ies with community policing, where public meetings were limited
mostly to initial, kick-off meetings and occasional, poorly-attended
successors.
78
Beat meetings, designed to identify problems of concern to the
particular community and formulate solutions, generally were held
once a month in church basements and park buildings. 79 The
CAPS program encouraged participation of neighborhood organi-
zations such as block clubs, community organizations, client-serv-
ing organizations, churches, and merchants' associations in the
monthly beat meetings, as well as participation by individual re-
sidents. Research on the CAPS program indicates that different
communities do, in fact, have different priorities and concerns.80
Communities also differed significantly in their willingness to be-
come engaged with the CAPS efforts.81
Another way CAPS attempted to use the community to identify
problems, define priorities, identify resources and solutions, and
evaluate the effectiveness of local CAPS efforts was through estab-
lishment of district advisory committees.82 In addition to meeting
with district commanders and staff on a monthly basis, committees
were intended to establish subcommittees to help with the identifi-
cation and evaluation roles of the committees, concentrating on
76. In the CAPS model, a "problem" is understood as a recurring situation or
series of related incidents (unlikely to be resolved on their own) that affect a signifi-
cant portion of the community and can possibly be affected by the resources of the
community and the police. SKOGAN ET AL., supra note 71, at 35.
77. For CAPS purposes, the city's twenty-five police districts were divided into 279
beats, with nine to fifteen beats per district. In 1990, the average beat included 3600
households, or about 9500 residents. Id. at 58.
78. WESLEY G. SKOGAN & ELIZABETH M. HARTNETr, COMMUNITY POLICING,
CHICAGO STYLE 113 (1997).
79. Id. at 55.
80. SKOGAN ET AL., supra note 71, at 30.
Latinos were distinctly concerned about gangs and poor people about the
physical decay of their neighborhoods. Concern about social disorder was
highest in the middle of the income distribution-above the neighborhoods
that were blighted by drugs and gangs but below the best-off places, which
had fewer problems of all kinds to report.
Id.
81. Id. at 30-31.
82. Id. at 29.
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specific needs or areas. In keeping with the flexible, community-
tailored focus of the CAPS vision of community policing, the
makeup of the committees was not established centrally. Rather,
committees were established by district commanders, based on
their view of the most appropriate membership for the district.
Committee members included those active in neighborhood
schools, businesses, churches, and other institutions active in each
neighborhood. Procedural guidelines such as those governing se-
lection of officers, term limits, and voting rights, however, were es-
tablished by the CAPS management team.
There are organizational implications of emphasizing accounta-
bility to neighborhoods. The Chicago policing pushes much of the
responsibility in the organization down to the beat officer, with an
expectation that other department resources and personnel will as-
sist beat officers in their new role.8 3 One of the first responsibili-
ties of the "beat team'"" is to collect beat-specific information,
known as a "beat profile," that is compiled as a tool for problem-
solving and new officer orientation. A beat profile includes infor-
mation on community organizations and resources; descriptions of
problem areas and abandoned buildings; identification of twenty-
four hour businesses, bars, banks, and schools; and other relevant
information gathered from specialized units, such as special gang
units, with knowledge of the beat.
Another new responsibility shared by a beat team is docu-
menting in a "beat plan" the three or four key problems they will
concentrate on in a particular beat. This focuses attention on the
issues until they are resolved, as well as the officers' plans for solv-
ing the problems.86 In formulating the beat plans, officers are ex-
pected to consider resident input that the officers gather from
attendance at beat meetings (another new responsibility). Al-
though the advantages of the beat focus are obvious, one great dis-
advantage, when compared to the New York system, is that
resources at the beat officer's disposal may be too limited to ad-
dress a crime problem that may be much larger than a single beat.
At the same time, the Chicago approach invites the police to ad-
dress non-crime problems as well as crime. The beat officer and his
83. TOGETHER WE CAN: A STRATEGIC PLAN FOR REINVENTING THE CHICAGO
POLICE DEPARTMENT 17 (1993); SKOGAN ET AL., supra note 71, at 59.
84. Beat teams consist of the officers who work in the same beat covering all
three, eight-hour shifts. Each team has roughly nine officers. SKOGAN ET AL., supra
note 71, at 60.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 41, 47.
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superiors focus on problem-solving, including community problems
that are not initially the responsibility of the police, but are within
the control of the city government. The police officer is akin to an
ambassador from the central government of Chicago, able to call
on other parts of the government for a variety of services that can
improve the quality of life in the neighborhood and build social
capital at the same time.87
This notion of problem-solving, which is addressed to a wide
range of problems of the neighborhood as defined by those living
there, contrasts importantly with a strong emphasis on rates of
crime. A broader focus would likely have a less dramatic effect on
violent crime rates, but more satisfactory effects in terms of com-
munity acceptance and, through that, on rates of fear. However,
evidence measuring acceptance by the community and the effec-
tiveness of the CAPS program is mixed. Wesley G. Skogan led a
research effort to evaluate the CAPS program, focusing on fifteen
of the 279 police beats.88 In terms of implementation of problem-
solving, the overall assessment by the evaluation team determined
that of the fifteen beats, "four were doing an excellent job, five
were fielding reasonable programs, two were struggling to make
the grade and four failed to implement much problem solving at
all."8 9 The reasons for relative success or failure seem inextricably
connected to factors such as the personalities, enthusiasm, and
leadership capabilities of the officers.
The variations between the attitudes and efforts of the officers in
the "worst" and "best" beats, in terms of implementation of prob-
lem-solving, are dramatic. The officers and sergeant in the beat
that the evaluation labeled as the "best" actively participated in
beat team and community meetings; developed, implemented, and
followed through with problem-solving strategies; utilized CAPS
procedures and city resources; and responded to community priori-
ties. Interestingly, this beat's population ranked last of all the
beats in terms of being supportive of the police.90 In great contrast,
the "worst" beat team's sergeant and officers had negative or apa-
thetic perspectives on their capacity to effect change, the role of
community beat meetings (seeing them as a forum for complaining
about the police), CAPS paperwork requirements, and community
policing in general (viewing it as public relations). Participation
87. See id. at 36.
88. Id. at 30.
89. Id. at 191.
90. Id. at 192-94.
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and attendance at beat team meetings were sparse and unproduc-
tive; and the officers and sergeant did not utilize the resources
available to them, and utilized CAPS procedures only nominally, if
at all.91 These patterns are consistent with the other "best" and
"worst" beats.92 Other evidence of citizen reactions is discussed
after describing New York's new policing strategies.
2. New York
Wesley G. Skogan also had played an important role as an intel-
lectual father of one of the three central characteristics of New
York's policing. It was his argument in the 1990 book Disorder and
Decline93 that gave credibility to a groundbreaking article by James
Q. Wilson and George L. Kelling, The Police and Neighborhood
Safety: Broken Windows, published in the Atlantic Monthly almost
two decades ago.94 The central argument of Broken Windows was
that disorderly conduct on public streets, something which the po-
lice certainly can control, can undermine social control by frighten-
ing, or otherwise discouraging, responsible citizens from being in
public places and, at the same time, can encourage criminals to be-
lieve that crime would be safe because "obviously, no one at the
scene of disorder cares. ' 95 The exaggerated perceptions of danger
created by disorder were, in themselves, a costly source of fear that
disturbed urban living.
As a matter that was secondary in theory but, perhaps, primary
in practice, "Broken Windows" policing also justified very large
numbers of "frisks" and misdemeanor arrests, which had the twin
benefits of making the illegal carrying of guns far more risky and
increasing stops of dangerous people who were wanted for other
reasons. The case for Broken Windows policing thus relies on both
the fact that disorder creates fear and fear eliminates social control,
inviting activities that may only take place in the absence of social
control, and the fact that focusing on disorderly offenses allows and
invites aggressive street policing.
This model is a form of problem-solving policing, intended to
build social control as well as to use the capacities that the police
already have to deal with dangerous people. At the same time, it is
unlike the Chicago plan in its lack of dependence on any form of
91. Id. at 194-95.
92. See id. at 195-205.
93. SKOGAN ET AL., supra note 71.
94. Wilson & Kelling, supra note 50.
95. Id.
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fact-finding to determine a neighborhood's definition of problems
or any major effort to encourage community participation in their
solution. The New York style of policing involves far more inde-
pendent problem-solving by the police than Chicago's policing, al-
though one of its pillars is the belief, deeply embedded in the
Broken Windows theory, that disorder is a major concern of most
responsible people in any neighborhood.96
While the Broken Windows theory that undergirds this strand of
New York's strategy has won nearly universal acclaim among
scholars, 97 it has not been without detractors. One especially effec-
tive critic has been Professor Bernard E. Harcourt. In a 1998 arti-
cle in the Michigan Law Review, Harcourt replicated Skogan's
analysis and took issue with many of his conclusions. Specifically,
he found that certain types of crimes, including rape, purse snatch-
ing, and pickpocketing, are simply not significantly related to levels
of disorder.98 Moreover, most other types of crime were not re-
lated at a statistically significant level when poverty, stability, and
race were held constant.99 Harcourt similarly took issue with other
empirical evidence cited by proponents of the Broken Windows
theory,100 concluding that the data simply do not support the
hypothesis.'
A second major strand in New York's policing strategies is the
energetic, imaginative use of the full range of police powers and
96. E.g., Randy Kennedy & Alan Feuer, Watchful vs. Worried; Crime Evokes
City's Bad Old Days, But Not Old Fears, N.Y. TIMES, May 28, 2000, § 1, at 27 (noting
that the Broken Windows theory, which posits a close link between crime and low-
level civic disorder, has been a "big influence on the style of policing that evolved
under [Mayor Rudolph] Giuliani").
97. Bernard E. Harcourt, Reflecting on the Subject: A Critique of the Social Influ-
ence Conception of Deterrence, The Broken Windows Theory, and Order-Maintenance
Policing New York Style, 97 MicH. L. REV. 291, 293 (1998) (stating that "it is today
practically impossible to find a single scholarly article that takes issue with the quality-
of-life initiative. It stands, in essence, uncontested-even in the legal academy").
98. Id. at 327.
99. Id. at 327-28 (finding no significant relationship between disorder and both
burglary and physical assault). Indeed, robbery was the only crime significantly re-
lated to disorder, once poverty, race, and stability were held constant. But, when Har-
court removed a cluster of five Newark neighborhoods from the data, and held
poverty, race, and stability constant, he found no relationship between disorder and
robbery victimization. Id. at 328-29.
100. Id. at 329-31 (finding inconclusive a similar study on the relationship between
crime and disorder) (citing Robert J. Sampson & Jacqueline Cohen, Deterrent Effects
of the Police on Crime: A Replication and Theoretical Extension, 22 L. & Soc. REV.
163 (1988)); Harcourt, supra note 97, at 331-39 (suggesting a number of factors, as
alternatives to the quality of life initiative, that explain the decline in New York City's
crime rates).
101. Harcourt, supra note 97, at 331.
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capacities to deal with crime problems as they arise. Deputy Com-
missioner Jack Maple described the four crucial steps of an effec-
tive police strategy as accurate and timely intelligence, rapid
deployment, effective tactics, and relentless follow-up and assess-
ment. 10 2 A crime problem might be solved by moving more of-
ficers into the area, by addressing its causes, by putting pressure on
people subject to arrest and conviction to provide evidence, by re-
ducing safe opportunities for crime, or in any of a dozen other
ways. The object of this second strand of New York policing is to
ensure that every alternative use of every available police capacity
is considered in order to promptly address what has been identified
as a significant crime problem.
The third notable strand of New York policing is the much ad-
mired and, in fact, remarkable system of management by results
called Compstat. °3 To ensure the conditions of the second
strand-early identification of the problems, careful and imagina-
tive review of tactics involving all police capacities, and very
prompt response-requires assisting precinct commanders with
ideas and, in the New York strategy, powerfully motivating them
with the risk of embarrassment or, worse, loss of the command of a
precinct. Both of these objectives are accomplished by requiring
each of the seventy-five precinct commanders to appear at a very
large meeting of headquarters staff, other precinct commanders,
and prosecutors and be prepared to be examined on any adverse
change in crime statistics in the precinct and to discuss what is be-
ing done about it.' 04 The pressure is substantial, and may be un-
necessary. °5 Part of New York's message may be simply that the
precinct commander should take steps to release and encourage
the natural inclinations of the police officers to go after crime
aggressively.
Although close cooperation with neighborhood groups and reli-
ance on neighborhood leadership has not been a focus of the new
policing in New York, there occasionally have been experiments in
these areas. Even at its most responsive to communities, however,
102. Jack Maple, Editorial, Brutality Isn't Part of New Tactics, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 21,
1997, § 13, at 17.
103. David C. Anderson, Crime Stoppers, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Feb. 9, 1997, at 47
(describing how each precinct's crime statistics are electronically inputted into the
Compstat system each week, allowing senior officials to analyze police and criminal
activity throughout the city in a timely fashion).
104. Id.
105. Boston's management system examines what is happening and what could be
done in a far less confrontational way.
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it has never approached the aims or practices of Chicago's CAPS
program.
3. Results in New York and Chicago
What do we know about the results in New York and Chicago?
The experiences in both cases remind us that results on the street
may depart from strategies. Sometimes Chicago could not develop
neighborhood policing in one beat, although it was successful in an
adjacent beat. New York has experienced a number of very dra-
matic and inflammatory instances of police abuse, which were cer-
tainly not planned as part of its strategy, °6 and its efforts at
developing creative community relations in the 75th Precinct also
seem exceptional and far from integral to its core strategies. 10 7
Moreover, in each case, the studies evaluating each city's new po-
licing approach were conducted within a very few years of the initi-
ation of the strategy; that may be too soon to know the long-term
consequences. But it is important to look at what we know now
about two dimensions: effectiveness in reducing crime and the abil-
ity of the police to develop trust within the community being
policed.
In 1998, two arms of the Department of Justice (the Office of
Community-Oriented Policing Services and the Bureau of Justice
Statistics) produced a groundbreaking victimization survey of re-
sidents of twelve cities, including Chicago and New York. °8 Ques-
tions went both to the level of crime, fear, and disorder and to the
attitudes of citizens toward the police.
New York had more serious crime problems than Chicago but
was making more progress in dealing with them. In 1998, Chicago
106. E.g., Jeffrey Rosen, Excessive Force, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Apr. 10, 2000, at
2427 (suggesting that defenders of the zero tolerance policy against crime believe that
it has an inevitable side effect of aggressive policing); George L. Kelling, Policing
Under Fire, WALL ST. J., Mar. 23, 1999, at 22 (suggesting that "root-cause liberals"
feel that police perhaps can reduce crime, but only at a cost of abusing citizens); Jack
Newfield, Rudy, It's Time to Listen to This Voice of Reason, N.Y. POST, Feb. 16, 1999,
at 20 (quoting Urban League President Dennis Walcott as saying that "there needs to
be a balance between aggressive police work and respect for civil liberties and dignity
of the people who get stopped and searched"); Liza Mundy, Broken Windows, WASH.
POST MAG., June 11, 2000, at 4 (commenting that ordinary citizens are appalled at
how aggressive policing led to the shooting deaths of two unarmed black men).
107. Harvey Simon & John Buntin, The East New York Urban Youth Corps and
Community Policing: A New Initiative in the "Dead Zone" (1999) (unpublished man-
uscript written for John F. Kennedy School of Government Case Program); John
Buntin, The Community Security Initiative Gets Underway (1998) (unpublished man-
uscript written for John F. Kennedy School of Government Case Program).
108. COMMUNITY SAFETY, supra note 13.
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had 68 violent victimizations per 1000 residents twelve-years-old or
older; in New York, there were far more, with a rate of 85 per
1000.109 The black violent victimization rate in Chicago in 1998
was 50 per 1000 citizens for violent crime; in New York it was 123
per 1000.110 A violent victimization in New York was almost twice
as likely to involve a weapon.111 But during the period 1993-97,
homicides in Chicago decreased by about 10%.112 In New York,
homicides declined by more than 60% from 26.5 per 100,000 to
10.5 per 100,000.113
In both Chicago and New York in 1998, residents were far more
likely to fear crime in their city than in their neighborhood or on
their street.'14 Obviously, the likelihood fears are exaggerated in-
creases as firsthand evidence declines. Both in respondents' neigh-
borhoods and in their cities, there was slightly more fear in
Chicago than in New York.115 Moreover, 25% of the respondents
in Chicago said they were more frightened than they had been a
few years earlier while only 15% in New York were more
frightened. 116
As might be expected with Broken Windows policing, a slightly
smaller percentage of the population in New York reported public
drinking or drug use, public drug sales, vandalism, graffiti, prostitu-
tion, and panhandling in their neighborhood. 117 In Chicago, 36%
of the residents said that conditions of disorder or activities of the
sort I have just described made them feel less safe." 8 This was true
of only 29% in New York.119
Meanwhile, 74% of the residents in Chicago reported themselves
either very or somewhat fearful of crime in their city. 120 Only a
somewhat smaller figure, 68%, reported the same in New York.' 2 '
While most people in both cities felt that their fear had not
109. Id. at iv.
110. Id. at 3 tbl.1.
111. Id. at 5 tbl.5.
112. Id. at 9.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 10.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 12 tbl.1M.
117. Id. at 15 tbl.16.
118. Id. at 16 tbl.17.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 18 tbl.20.
121. Id.
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changed much, there was a somewhat greater percentage of those
who felt reduced fear in New York. a1 2
Reports on trust-building relations with the police were also re-
vealing, but cut the other way: 67% of residents in Chicago and
only 51% of New York residents said the police were doing com-
munity policing. 123 Perhaps relatedly, 38% of Chicagoans, com-
pared to 23% of New Yorkers, had heard about a meeting
concerning crime in their neighborhood in 1998.124 Along all the
following dimensions, a somewhat higher percentage of those from
Chicago, than from New York, had contact with the police: casual
conversation, calling the police for service, providing information
to the police, reporting a crime to the police, asking for advice
from the police, and participating in community activity with the
police.125 A significantly higher percentage of New York residents
felt there was an increased police presence in their neighborhood;
it just took a different form.12 6
The Chicago police elicited more satisfied reactions from the vic-
tims of violent crimes than New York police and a significantly
higher percentage of Chicago residents said that the police were
doing a lot of work with the neighborhood residents to prevent
crime and safety problems. 27 This is far more at the heart of the
Chicago strategy than the New York strategy. In Chicago, 73% of
city residents were familiar with the term "community policing, 1 28
as compared to just 50% of New Yorkers, a revealing fact in
itself.' 2
9
One survey question combined concern about crime and concern
about the police. Residents in both cities were very satisfied with
local police.130 Not surprisingly, blacks in both Chicago and New
York were less satisfied with the local police than were whites. 31
But despite several notorious incidents of police brutality in New
York, blacks there were more satisfied with the local police than
were blacks in Chicago, by a margin of 77% to 69%.132
122. Id.
123. Id. at 28.
124. Id. at 22 tbl.26.
125. Id. at 23 tbl.20.
126. Id. at 24 tbl.31.
127. Id. at 24 tbl.32.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF
CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 1998, at 110 tbl.2.27 (1999).
131. Id.
132. COMMUNITY SAFETY, supra note 13, at 25 tbl.34.
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B. Boston
Boston was not part of the Department of Justice survey of
twelve cities. Its strategies are different from those of both New
York and Chicago-different not only in attempting to combine
parts of the strategies of each other city, but also in making very
different use of problem-solving than New York and a very differ-
ent use of neighborhood cooperation than Chicago. The rate of
homicide reduction in Boston in the 1990s was nearly as dramatic
as that in New York.133
It is worth reviewing the events that led Boston to embrace the
community-policing model. Already widely criticized for overly
aggressive street patrols, in the late 1980s the Boston Police De-
partment encountered public outrage when it was revealed that of-
ficers, faced with the sudden emergence of crack cocaine, were
indiscriminately stopping and searching young black men. The
"stop and frisk" scandal came to a head in the fall of 1989, when,
based on widespread suspicion that police routinely used unconsti-
tutional searches and seizures, a Dorchester judge suppressed evi-
dence he believed had been obtained improperly.1
3 1
That same year, Carol Stuart, a pregnant white woman, was mur-
dered near a largely African American part of Boston.135 Her hus-
band Charles, a witness to the crime, reported that an African
American male committed the murder. Based on this account, the
Boston Police Department aggressively pursued suspects from the
area, eventually eliciting witness statements that incriminated a lo-
cal black resident. These charges were shown to be false when
Charles Stuart was later implicated as the murderer. Stuart killed
himself before the investigation could be completed. The wide-
spread reports of police abuse, coupled with the appearance of ra-
cism within the department, exacerbated public hostility towards
the police, particularly within the African American community.
133. Fox Butterfield, Cities Reduce Crime and Conflict Without New York-Style
Hardball, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 2000, at Al (noting that, according to Professor Blum-
stein, New York's homicide rate fell 70.6% from 1991 to 1998, while Boston's rate fell
69.3% during the same period).
134. E.g., Doris Sue Wong, Search-on-Sight Judged Illegal, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug.
30, 1989, at B1 (reporting that Suffolk Superior Court Judge Cortland A. Mathers
dismissed weapons possession indictments against two suspected gang members, be-
cause the evidence seized pursuant to the search-on-sight policy had been illegally
obtained).
135. E.g., Michael Rezendes, Mayor's Reputation as Racial Healer Gets Some Tar-
nish, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 10, 1991, at 1.
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Recognizing that it needed approaches that were more effective
and less divisive, the Boston Police Department implemented a va-
riety of problem-solving and community-policing strategies. The
most notable problem-solving strategy in Boston is what David
Kennedy, of Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Gov-
ernment, has called "Pulling Levers. ' 136 In contrast to Broken
Windows, it has not made misdemeanor arrests or stop and frisks a
key to reduced homicides by increasing the risks of carrying guns,
the most lethal weapon. Pulling Levers is instead based on a form
of deterrence that is new and yet grounded in a very old theory.
For some centuries, it has been accepted that certainty and swift-
ness of punishment are more likely to be effective in changing con-
duct than longer penalties imposed without certainty or speed.
This may be particularly true for youthful, violent offenders who
are likely to discount sharply both the chance of getting caught and
the costs of future punishment and who may know little about ac-
tual punishments. Working with the Boston police, Kennedy
found, from a careful review of homicide files, that violence in Bos-
ton was heavily concentrated, on both the perpetrator's and the
victim's side, in gang members and among those with long arrest
records.137 Kennedy also found, not surprisingly, that the identities
of youth with these characteristics were well-known to the po-
lice.1 38 (In fact, police in many cities believe that the number of
dangerous perpetrators is relatively small and that their identities
are known.)
The Boston police discovered that youth in the dangerous cate-
gories potentially were subject to a large number of sanctions and
inconveniences of one sort or another. In Kennedy's words:
The Boston Gun Project Working Group observed that gangs
and gang members left themselves open to an enormous range
of sanctions, exactly because they were so highly criminal. Gang
members committed large numbers of crimes that were open to
ready police enforcement: they sold drugs on the street and they
committed large numbers of disorder offenses like drinking and
using drugs in public, trespassing, and the like. Gangs and gang
members were often the subject of longer-term enforcement at-
tention, such as undercover drug investigations .... They were
frequently on probation, sometimes on parole, and they rou-
tinely violated their conditions of probation and parole, which
136. David M. Kennedy, Pulling Levers: Chronic Offenders, High-Crime Settings,
and a Theory of Prevention, 31 VAL. U. L. REV. 449 (1997).
137. Id. at 452.
138. Id.
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could include curfews, area restrictions, restrictions on how
many and which people they could associate with, abstinence
from alcohol and other drugs, and the like. They were often out
on bail awaiting trial or sentencing, with similar conditions
which were similarly frequently violated. Juvenile offenders
were often under formal Department of Youth Services (DYS)
supervision but still living in the community. And gangs and
gang members were often implicated in large numbers of "cold"
cases such as unsolved assaults and homicides.' 39
Therefore, the threat of swift and certain sanctions could be con-
veyed in person to the individuals whose conduct had to be
changed. Absent evidence of a serious crime, which could be diffi-
cult to find, the police otherwise might not be able to prevent all
the anti-social or criminal conduct of an individual specifically
warned of the amount of attention and the range of sanctions to
which he would be subject. But the sanctions proved adequate to
prevent any particular type of conduct, for example, violence. In-
deed, violence often may be something that young people would
like to avoid if it would be possible to do so without losing face. In
any event, violent activity was less important and more easily aban-
doned than profit-making activities, which would be threatened by
police attention.
Thus, the overall strategy is clear and persuasive. If, as was true
in Boston, an identifiable group of individuals is known or reasona-
bly believed to be responsible for a large percentage of a particular
type of crime, and if they are individually subject to a wide range of
sanctions, then it should be possible to prevent them from engaging
in any type of criminal behavior that is not of central importance to
them by making clear, in face-to-face contact, that all available
sanctions will be brought to bear if they engage in the prohibited
conduct. Violent youth fall within that category, as do the crimes
of violence that Boston was determined to stop. The strategy
would work so long as the critical neighborhoods-those that were
home to the youth subject to highly specific and threatening orders
to give up violence-were supportive and did not regard the polic-
ing strategy as unfair or discriminatory. Finding that support,
which New York had done much less well, was one of the objec-
tives of the other, neighborhood-based, part of Boston's policing
strategy.
Crucial to Boston's efforts to develop community support was
the police department's partnership with the Ten Point Coalition
139. Id. at 461 (citation omitted).
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(the "Coalition"), a prominent group of local black clergy, mem-
bers of which had made a name for themselves by taking their min-
istries to Boston's most dangerous streets.' 40 Despite historically
tense relations, the two groups began to work together once they
recognized their mutual need: the ministers' attempts to reach at-
risk youth were undermined by committed offenders who contin-
ued to run the streets, while the police department's plans to im-
plement community-based strategies depended on the
participation and acceptance of community members who did not
trust them. Much of Boston's success in lowering crime and devel-
oping community support arises from the credibility the depart-
ment developed by virtue of its association with the Coalition. This
credibility has endured in large part because the Coalition, while
cooperative, has remained a distinct entity not afraid to criticize
police action.141 As a community watchdog, the Coalition has
helped keep the police accountable and deterred abuses akin to
those that have plagued New York in recent years.
The community-based activities, which are an integral part of
Boston's strategy, can be illustrated by practices in the Dorchester
neighborhood, a policing precinct of which the Boston police are
particularly proud. They take two forms: (1) modes of serious and
continuous consultation with citizens; and (2) demonstrations of
concern for the well-being of young people getting in trouble, in-
stead of just recrimination.
Serious consultation began with citywide strategic planning with
local priorities to be set by teams in each police district that were
led by the district commander, but the membership of which was
divided between police and concerned, involved citizens. Real
power was devolved from headquarters so that the district com-
mander could work in close association with citizen stakeholders.
In the Dorchester district, for example, Captain Robert Dunford
gives his neighborhood advisory council significant influence, even
over budget allocations and patrol plans. 142 Within each district,
140. E.g., Charles A. Radin & Jamal E. Watson, Activists Revisit Gang Strategy:
Some See Complacency As Youth Violence Increases In Boston, BOSTON GLOBE, Sep.
5, 2000, at Al.
141. E.g., Judy Rakowsky, Black Leaders Assail Martin, Urge Tougher Hate-Crimes
Efforts; DA Defends Office's Record, Rebuts Report, BOSTON GLOBE, June 14, 2000,
at B3 (explaining that Coalition member Rev. Eugene Rivers criticized police for a
1997 change of policy in classifying hate crimes).
142. The two paragraphs that follow draw on Evan S. Reynolds, Neighborhood Po-
licing in Boston: A Dorchester Case Study 9-13, 23-36 (Apr. 30, 1999) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with author).
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"team leaders" are assigned specific responsibility for the unique
problems of a particular beat.
The neighborhood orientation in Dorchester is maintained on a
daily basis by four community service officers, each of whom is as-
signed to interact with neighborhood groups in a particular beat-
explaining, learning, relaying concerns, and recruiting participation
in a shared "Project Safeguard" to provide neighborhood safety.
Finally, even prosecution is made subject to community influence
in still another program, the Dorchester Safe Neighborhood Initia-
tive, which is counseled in part by an advisory board consisting of
local residents as well as police and prosecutors.
The second strand of Boston's strategy is a demonstrated con-
cern for the well-being of youth already getting into trouble. What
the Boston police avoid is a sense that they are the dangerous ene-
mies of all but the well-behaved among youth in struggling neigh-
borhoods. Adopting the mixed concerns of relatives of youth who
form much of the community, the police are determined to make
the life of salvageable youth better, not harder. Thus, Commis-
sioner Paul Evans uses a federal block grant to pay for clinical so-
cial workers, who are attached to police districts such as
Dorchester, to advise, support, and introduce to useful programs
those youth who have been referred to them by police.143 They
maintain confidentiality and appear in court for the youth where
this seems appropriate to the case. Districts like Dorchester also
have juvenile justice "roundtables" that involve the police, district
attorney, schools, social services, and others in regular discussions
of what is happening in the lives of certain troubled youth in an
effort to find help for them and to coordinate governmental
responses. 144
The Boston strategy had organizational implications. While
some New York precinct commanders found Compstat meetings
harsh and threatening, Commissioner Evans expected district com-
manders in Boston to carry out their plans in highly decentralized
ways, and that was communicated through meetings that were less
confrontational than those in New York.1 45 His role was to decide
whether to approve a plan and then support and monitor it.
143. Id. at 14-15.
144. Id. at 20-23.
145. Id. at 3 (reporting that Commissioner Evans pursued decentralization as an
avenue toward accountability).
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In sum, by taking a hard line against those individuals who com-
mit most crime, and working in tandem with critical neighbor-
hoods, Boston was able to achieve dramatic crime reductions.
C. England and Wales
One final strategy, distinct but related to those I have described,
deserves attention as well, for it combines central elements of all
three strategies discussed thus far. Like Chicago's strategy, the
crime legislation introduced by British Prime Minister Tony Blair's
Labour Party relies powerfully on the wishes of neighborhood re-
sidents and depends upon them to initiate action. 146 Like New
York, Britian focuses attention on disorderly and fear-generating
actions that are threatening to individuals; but instead of using stat-
utes that broadly prohibit a type of conduct (such as drinking alco-
holic beverages on the street), Britain has turned to far more
specific requirements that are addressed only to certain named in-
dividuals.1 47 Like Boston's strategy, the new provisions specifically
target troublesome individuals who are not subject to present pros-
ecution because of lack of evidence of an immediate crime.148 But
the British prohibitions include efforts to deter behavior far less
serious than the lethal violence that was the target of Boston's
strategy. 149
England and Wales' Crime and Disorder Act of 1998150 creates
something called an "anti-social behavior order." Either the police
or the local government can apply for such an order from a magis-
trate's court. The defendant does not have to be present at the
proceedings, which are civil rather than criminal and operate under
a preponderance of the evidence rule. If the defendant is found to
have acted "in a manner that caused, or was likely to cause harass-
ment, or alarm, or distress to one or more persons not of the same
household as himself" and if the defendant cannot establish that
his or her behavior was reasonable in the circumstances, a court
order to protect the people in the local government area for a mini-
146. Andrew Rutherford, An Elephant on the Doorstep: Criminal Policy Without
Crime in New Labour's Britian, in CRIMINAL POLICY IN TRANSITION 36, 64 (P. Green
& A. Rutherford eds., forthcoming 2000).
147. Id. at 37.
148. Id. at 66-67.
149. E.g., Russell Jenkins, Peeping Tom Jailed Under New Law, TIMES (London),
June 23, 2000, at 7 (describing a mandatory jail sentence for subsequent crimes com-
mitted by sex offenders, who are required by the Crime and Disorder Act to register
with law enforcement).
150. Crime and Disorder Act 1998, Royal Assent 27 (1999).
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mum of two years (with no maximum) is to be issued, prohibiting
the individual from doing anything or being anywhere described in
the order. Violating the order without a reasonable excuse is an
indictable offense, which carries as much as a five-year prison term.
There is no requirement that the defendant have intended to
harass or to cause alarm and distress. Nor is there any requirement
that the alarm or distress be "serious." Moreover, the activities
giving rise to the order are intended to be broader than the acts
prohibited by the criminal law. In effect, a magistrate's court can
deal with people it determines to be engaged in frightening behav-
ior by developing an injunctive law of its own, a violation of which
is punishable criminally. The primary explanation for bypassing
general requirements of the criminal law in this way is that there
are courses of conduct that involve an accumulation of events,
none of which is itself criminal but which together warrant severe
measures.' The resulting deterrence is even more specific and fo-
cused than Boston's Pulling Levers.
HI. THE PROBLEM OF LEGITIMACY
How could anyone complain about such imaginative and appar-
ently successful policing as has taken place, for example, in New
York? The answer is that, in exchange for quite remarkable im-
provements in personal security, we are accepting reductions in
democratic control and thus the legitimacy of the purposes for
which the powers of the police can be used. We are endorsing sig-
nificant reductions in control over the discretion of the police in
choosing specific targets. We are moving toward a regime of polic-
ing where the notions of equal protection have limited force on the
ground. We also increasingly are finding that probable cause and
reasonable suspicion as predicates for detention and search are be-
ing eroded, and that the very determination of what conduct will
be permitted and what form of disorder is subject to prompt sanc-
tions is left in far larger part to the police. Therefore, this evalua-
tion must count the costs as well as the considerable benefits of the
new policing.
A. The Problem of the Democratic Legitimacy of the Goals for
which Police Powers are Used
In describing the successes of the new policing, I have implicitly
assumed that its goal was to reduce serious crime on a citywide
151. Rutherford, supra note 146, at 63.
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basis. It is time to examine whether this is, in fact, accepted as the
goal of the new policing and, if not, what is? Indeed, a prior ques-
tion remains unanswered: who is to set the goals?
1. The Inevitability of Discretion
To be clear at the start, the police have many responsibilities be-
yond reducing crime. They prevent fights, regulate demonstra-
tions, enforce traffic regulations, engage in rescue or other
assistance, and much more. I have focused on the crime reduction
benefits of the new policing and the neighborhood trust that it can
induce because these have been the major subjects of attention in
bringing about the changes that have occurred since 1990, not be-
cause they are the only significant functions of a modern, urban
police department. Second, unavoidably there are critical choices
to be made as to goals, even in the more limited area of dealing
with the effects of crime on continuing danger, public fear, social
control in neighborhoods, and public resentment of disorder.
Governments of civil law countries from Argentina to France
and Germany sometimes act as if there is not a serious question as
to the purposes for which police powers like those described above
can be used, contending that the police officer is obligated to arrest
whenever he sees a crime and then to take investigative steps at the
order of a judge whom the officer, carrying out another legal obli-
gation, must notify immediately of the crime and the suspect. 152
Thus, in 1999, Klaus Hubmann, the senior public prosecutor in Nu-
remberg, Germany, explained that he had no choice but to investi-
gate a failed attempt fifty-three years earlier by two Jewish
survivors of the Holocaust to poison members of Adolf Hitler's
SS,153 Hubmann explained that political or moral aspects could
play no part in the decision. Civil law countries deny that their
police have the discretion, so readily accepted in the United States,
not only to decline to arrest in very sympathetic situations but also
to develop imaginative uses of police powers for such purposes as
reducing disorder, preventing violence, building social control, and
152. E.g., Richard S. Frase & Thomas Weigend, German Criminal Justice as a
Guide to American Law Reform: Similar Problems, Better Solutions?, 18 B.C. INT'L &
COMP. L. REV. 317, 337 n.135 (1995) (noting that "German police have no legal dis-
cretion to drop or to refrain from investigating arguably criminal cases").
153. Louise Potterton, Germany Pursues Holocaust Avengers, SUN. TELEGRAPH
(London), Oct. 10, 1999, at 7.
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carrying out whatever are the wishes of members of .a
community.154
This denial of discretion is surely a fiction in almost every coun-
try in the world. The police officer is forced to decide on what
occasions he or she should use these powers for two major reasons.
First, in every country, what crimes an officer will be in a position
to act upon depend upon where the officer is and what he or she is
looking for, and this involves discretion. Second, if the officer
comes upon a minor matter that is criminal, he has to decide
whether it is worth his time, and the time of prosecutors and judi-
cial officials, to process the matter. In the United States, we are
very frank about such uses of judgment or discretion by individual
police officers or, sometimes, by the police department in the form
of directives to officers.
In short, it is wholly implausible to assume that the goal in the
United States is to enforce all the criminal statutes enacted by state
and federal legislatures. The larger part of violations of the law by
270 million Americans must be ignored by the fewer than one
million police, who do not have time to investigate matters they
consider unimportant. 55 Moreover, these officers know that pros-
ecutors and judges will lack the capacity to try cases if all the small
matters are brought to court, and that juries are likely to reject as
excessive the use of the criminal law in those cases. We have come
to assume that even statutes recently passed by a concerned legisla-
ture will be applied with discretion as to their use.156
2. Traditional Understandings and New Choices
It is how this discretion is used-not any novelty or recognition
of the need for it-that has taken new shape as policing has
154. E.g., Richard S. Frase, Comparative Criminal Justice as a Guide to American
Law Reform: How Do the French Do It, How Can We Find Out, and Why Should We
Care?, 78 CAL. L. REV. 542, 555-57 (1990) (noting that France requires "supervisory-
level approval" for certain creative uses of police power "which American law gener-
ally permits any police officer to undertake on his or her own").
155. Cf U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, Population Clocks, http://www.census.gov/popula-
tion/www (providing the population of the United States as 276,351,651) (current
through Dec. 19, 2000); U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, SURVEY OF PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT
AND PAYROLL 1999, U.S. SUMMARY TABLE (providing the total number of police in
the United States), http://www.census.gov/govs/www/apesst/99.html.
156. E.g., Task Force on Federalization of Criminal Law, The Federalization of
Criminal Law, 11 FED. SENTENCING REP. 194, 194 (Jan./Feb. 1999) ("[The Task Force]
looked systematically at whether new federal criminal laws, which were popular when
enacted, are being enforced. It determined, based on obvious data, that in many in-
stances they are not.").
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changed. Until a few decades ago, it was understood that police
discretion-use of limited police resources-would be rationed by
the seriousness of the conduct that was being investigated. This
seriousness was in turn dictated by the people's representatives in
the legislature, who used sentencing levels to express their relative
disapproval of criminal conduct. The assumption, in other words,
was that there was a direct correlation between the sentence im-
posed and the citizenry's view (as expressed through its elected
representatives) of the relative seriousness of the conduct. As long
as police relied upon sentences as guidelines to seriousness-and,
for the most part, they did-there was a strong democratic compo-
nent to their enforcement decisions. Thus, police ignored minor,
regulatory offenses or left them underpoliced and, therefore, un-
derdetected. The measures of police performance we developed,
focusing on FBI statistics as to a few serious crimes, also reflected
that judgment. In recent decades, the focus has come to include,
besides punishing individual crimes, incapacitating dangerous crim-
inal groups ranging from organized crime to terrorists to street
gangs. But what qualified a group for attention was still the seri-
ousness of the conduct in which it engaged: political violence, or-
ganized street violence, corruption of officials, intimidation, and
extortion.
Both traditional assumptions about the goals or ends of policing
and assumptions about how the available means or powers will be
used to accomplish whatever goals are chosen have been brought
into question by the new policing. Leaving changes in assumptions
about means until later, we should focus first on the question of
legitimacy of goals.
Consider the issues presented by problem-solving policing.
What problems should be given priority? The menu of possible
"problems" of street crime the police might decide to address
includes:
1. Forms of particularly harmful violence such as homicides,
rape, or regular intimidation by organized crime, gangs, or
individuals;
2. All violence;
3. Activities that create fear in many people or otherwise dis-
courage social control, such as the disorder coming from
open-air drug markets;
4. All forms of drug trafficking; or
5. The security of property against even non-violent theft.
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Moreover, these and perhaps other categories of crime are more
or less important, depending on the place, time, and victims of the
crime. So, the choice is among at least five categories of crime with
at least three variations of each. In fact, after some discussion, one
might well want to increase the number of choices to well beyond
these fifteen variations.
3. Whose Views Should Priorities Reflect?
With these reasonable contenders for priority in policing, a criti-
cal question becomes: whose views of the importance of each cate-
gory should control? Again, there are a number of alternatives.
Whatever category the police leadership considers most important
might be critical. To set limits on acceptable goals, we might want
to forbid decisions that seem intended to favor or disfavor the in-
terests of an identifiable group or class, such as failing to investi-
gate powerful political figures or concentrating police effort in
wealthy neighborhoods and failing to provide adequate policing in
poor neighborhoods, or-a contentious issue-projecting the views
of the police, without any popular basis for the choice, as to such
issues as fear of crime or what suppressing disorder requires.
A second alternative is the prioritization of categories of crime
according to whatever the police think that the majority of the citi-
zens of the city want addressed, regardless of the views of the peo-
ple in the immediate neighborhood where the problem exists and
the policing is to occur. A closely related alternative is that priority
should go to whatever problems the mayor wants addressed, for he
or she is the duly elected supervisor of the police.
Another alternative is to give priority to whatever problems the
police believe the people in the particular neighborhood want ad-
dressed. This could be defined in several different ways: "the re-
spectable leadership of the neighborhood" (where the definition of
respectable may amount to police selection of acceptable behav-
ior); those in the neighborhood who volunteer to work with the
police; or the majority of residents of the neighborhood, although
there is generally no available process for determining majority
views in a neighborhood.
Some of these ways of setting priorities are more democratic
than others, either in the effort by the police to decide whose con-
cerns are to be valued or in the making of the actual choice by one
or another of different groups. But even in the more democratic
methods, deep problems lurk. For example, the police may not be
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very good at determining the views of the majority of the public,
however we define the relevant public.
As always, the size of the constituency also matters. We know
from surveys that people generally believe their own neighbor-
hoods to be far safer than they believe the entire city to be.'57 The
people outside a neighborhood area are thus more likely to be in-
fluenced by fear, even if exaggerated, and by the immense effect of
rare but dramatic crimes as described by the media. Neighborhood
majorities are likely to have different attitudes than majorities of a
far larger, citywide jurisdiction.
Even if the decision is made to focus on the views of local com-
munities that are smaller than entire cities, the result is likely to
depend on how one defines a neighborhood. But the hardest prob-
lem is deciding whose views matter. The fact is that different
groups want different things. The young and the old are likely to
have different attitudes toward disorder. Minorities in a city are
likely to have different attitudes than majorities. Most dramati-
cally, the problem can be illustrated by the question: what value
should be given to the concerns of rebellious minority youth in an
urban slum? Some have treated this group as entitled to concern;
others have regarded this group as the object, not the beneficiary,
of policing.
In sum, problem-solving policing, whether or not it takes its
goals from those living in a particular neighborhood, requires
choice among a variety of goals. Even assuming that the objective
is to choose goals democratically, so that the police are acting in
the name of those affected by their policing, there is no agreed-
upon definition of whose concerns are to be valued, how they are
to be determined, and what is to be done when those affected have
inconsistent concerns.
It may not be possible to resolve these questions persuasively in
terms of some political philosophy. But it is certainly dangerous, in
terms of democratic values, to leave these questions unaddressed.
That is a dangerous characteristic of the new policing.
B. The Risk of Misuse of Police Powers
For many people, the police represent not only protection
against the predatory conduct of one's neighbor, but also a source
of fear themselves. The fear may be of brutality by the only legiti-
mate armed force in the community or of the embarrassment of
157. COMMUNITY SAFETY, supra note 13, at 18, 25.
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being treated, particularly in public, without dignity or respect by
members of an organization that represents the authority and the
power of the state. Or the fear may be of intrusiveness into areas
of privacy that one prefers to reserve for oneself and intimates.
Because of these fears, we have come to expect more from the po-
lice than effectiveness in pursuing even carefully chosen goals.
We expect, first, a concern about maintaining a healthy relation-
ship between the citizen and the authority and power of the state;
in other words, a respect for the liberty and privacy of individuals.
Second, we demand an absence of bias in the use of the powers I
have described, for assertions of police authority and force that are
systematically biased against a racial, religious, or ethnic group
convey a powerful message of second-class citizenship. Bias
against political opponents of the police or their political supervi-
sors is also a terrible threat to a vital democracy. We expect, third
and most broadly, to be accorded the respect that a citizen de-
serves in a citizen-ruled democracy-respect displayed in the way
individuals are addressed and handled, particularly in front of
others. To protect all these expectations, we depend on the visibil-
ity and reviewability of significant decisions by police officers.
In some conflict with these three expectations, the new policing,
in many of its manifestations, involves tactics and strategies which
are likely to: increase the power of the state at the expense of the
capacity of citizens to avoid or resist that power; invite the use of
discretion in ways that are more likely to reveal bias than the older
forms of policing; and increase the likelihood of particular groups
of people being subjected to embarrassment, and treated without
respect on the streets. At the same time, the new forms of policing
almost are designed to be carried out beneath the radar of visibility
on which accountability depends. Thus, there is a price to be paid
for the great potential of the new forms of policing, but the price
can be reduced by carefully addressing issues of accountability.
1. Citizen and State: Civil Liberties
Consider the effect of the new policing on the efforts of the last
half-century to control the relationship of the state to the individ-
ual and, in particular, of a police officer to a citizen. The specific
fears during that period focused on police abuse of the powers to
search, arrest, and interrogate. In the 1960s, the United States Su-
preme Court insisted that all of these powers, even when exercised
by local police officers, must satisfy specific conditions-probable
cause or reasonable suspicion and the Miranda rules-or else any
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evidence flowing from the action would be excluded from trial. 158
The assumption was that there would be little incentive to violate
the Court's rules if the information could not be used at trial. A
somewhat more lenient standard was sufficient to justify a stop or
frisk of an individual (reasonable and articulable suspicion),'159 and
a somewhat stricter standard was applicable to electronic
surveillance. 160
Because these standards required the police to show that, before
acting, they had evidence of a crime (and since the focus of policing
was on very serious crimes), there has been practically no use of
the Equal Protection Clause to guarantee that minorities are not
treated differently; after all, citizens could not be subject to these
police powers at all unless there was an adequate basis to believe
they had committed what was generally a serious crime. And there
was a final protection of which we were very proud: the police
could not arrest or search at all if the basis for that activity-the
definition of the criminal conduct of which the police needed evi-
dence-was so general and encompassing in its coverage or so
vague in what it forbade that it left the police officer with the wid-
est discretion in deciding whose conduct and what conduct should
be made the basis of arrest and, perhaps, trial.' 6 1
It is true and important that these efforts to limit the powers of
the police and regulate the relations between citizen and state in a
way that respects the primacy of the citizen were based on two sup-
positions that were, at least, shaky. The first was that police con-
duct on the street would largely be motivated by the desire to
gather evidence for trial, and thus could be regulated by excluding
evidence obtained in violation of the restrictions on police behav-
158. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961). The later Burger and Rehnquist
Courts hedged the exclusionary rules crafted by the Warren Court in the 1960s. For
example, evidence seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment or the Miranda rules
can be introduced at trial to impeach a defendant's testimony. E.g., United States v.
Havens, 446 U.S. 620 (1980) (permitting impeachment with evidence seized in viola-
tion of the Fourth Amendment); Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971) (permitting
impeachment with a confession obtained in violation of Miranda). Such evidence is
also admissible in proceedings outside the context of the criminal trial. E.g., United
States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974) (grand jury proceedings); United States v.
Janis, 428 U.S. 433 (1976) (civil tax proceedings). The Court has reasoned that the
rule of exclusion is grounded in a policy of deterrence, which is satisfied by the exclu-
sion in the prosecution's case-in-chief, and should not be applied where principles of
deterrence will not be furthered. E.g., United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268, 279-80
(1978); United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 906 (1984).
159. United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 6 (1989).
160. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 354-59 (1967).
161. Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 162 (1972).
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ior. Second, and equally important, the rules did not provide pro-
tection against, or regulate in any significant way, some very
powerful investigative techniques: informants; grand jury powers
to compel testimony prior to trial; offers by police to engage in
illegal transactions in order to develop evidence; various types of
physical surveillance; a variety of techniques for eliciting "consent"
to a form of detention or search; threats to prosecute an individual
who has committed a crime in order to get evidence; and, perhaps
most dramatically, the constitutional power to arrest some individ-
uals, and not others, for minor offenses in order to take advantage
of the power to search, within a limited area, in connection with an
arrest.162 Seeking greater freedom of action, a police officer or de-
partment could emphasize these unregulated powers. Even the
regulated powers could be violated without much fear of conse-
quences if the purpose was not to suppress evidence.
The new policing is intended, in many instances, to greatly in-
crease the effectiveness of these unregulated powers and to find
ways to avoid judicial enforcement by the exclusionary rule of even
such regulated powers as stop and frisk. Findings by the attorney
general of the State of New York suggest that there has not been
an adequate effort by the New York police to restrict frisks or stops
to the situations where the Constitution permits them.163 The re-
sult of many tens of thousands of such stops has undoubtedly been
a sizeable reduction in the carrying of guns and thereby of homi-
cides, but there is a price for abandoning this part of the system of
accountability for detentions and searches. A rapid increase in
misdemeanor arrests or the use of a variety of other formal or in-
formal sanctions in situations where the average citizen would not
be subjected to that police power recreates the very capacity to
target specific individuals, gangs and other groups-particularly
minority youth-that the Supreme Court had tried to forbid by
outlawing the use of vague statutes.
In a number of situations in a number of cities, a major compo-
nent of the new policing strategy is to rely more and more on that
set of police powers that are substantially unregulated by law and
to take advantage of the inability of courts to hold the police ac-
countable by recourse to the exclusion of evidence-all in order to
162. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 226 (1973).
163. CIVIL RIGHTS BUREAU, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GEN. OF THE STATE OF
N.Y., THE NEW YORK CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT'S "STOP & FRISK" PRACTICES: A
REPORT TO THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK FROM THE OFFICE OF THE
ATTORNEY GENERAL, 69-72, 160-74 (Dec. 1, 1999) [hereinafter OAG REPORT].
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focus unreviewable police discretion on those forms of conduct and
those individuals that the police somehow determine are most dan-
gerous. This conscious use of the weaknesses in the control system
built up since 1950 has had dramatic and beneficial results in han-
dling crime, but not without significant risks of changing the rela-
tionship of the citizen to the state, and of the police to individuals
on the street. It may well be that most people in most neighbor-
hoods regard the tradeoff as highly favorable to the new polic-
ing. It is nonetheless dangerous to democratic values.
2. Equal Protection: Civil Rights
There has been only extremely rare use of the Equal Protection
Clause to regulate police conduct, on the theory that important in-
trusions such as arrest and search are adequately regulated by the
requirements of probable cause and that minor intrusions, which
have not been regulated by the Constitution or statute, hardly de-
serve special attention. But the second part of this judgment has
proven to be inadequate in a number of ways. Stopping more
blacks and Hispanics than non-Hispanic whites either without the
justification of reasonable suspicion or with the justification of hav-
ing observed a violation of the law-albeit one that is generally
ignored in the case of others-may have relatively minor immedi-
ate effects on an individual, but immense importance in what it
says about the place of black or Hispanic Americans in society and
in terms of the felt reality of the promise of equal protection of the
laws that they have been given by the U.S. Constitution. Moreo-
ver, it may be the embarrassment and resentment of being singled
out as a suspect, far more than the intrusion on one's privacy, that
needs protection, as Chief Justice Earl Warren recognized in writ-
ing the opinion in Terry v. Ohio sustaining stop and frisk.165 Fi-
nally, what may be a minor intrusion, if it occurs on a single
occasion, may be a major problem if it occurs regularly enough to
fuel the fears and affect the conduct of members of a suspect class
(for example, minority youth in a high-crime area).
Beyond the costs of these largely unreviewable uses of powers
against those the police believe, often correctly, to be more likely
to be engaged in a particular type of crime, there is the problem of
spillover to clear violations of the rules with respect to arrest,
search, or interrogation. The brutality and excessive force dis-
164. Tracey L. Meares & Dan M. Kahan, Laws and (Norms of) Order in the Inner
City, 32 L. & Soc'y REV. 805, 830 (1998).
165. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 15, 24-26 (1968).
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played in the Abner Louima and Amadou Diallo cases in New
York City bolster African Americans' sense of insecurity, as well as
their reluctance to enjoy the basic civil liberties accorded to all
citizens.' 66
To the extent that the new policing encourages the police to fo-
cus investigative attention on the earliest signs of criminal behavior
or even on disorder alone, it invites using even weak evidence as a
basis for finding reasonable suspicion and for the invocation of
powers that do not ordinarily require any justification or form of
accountability. Thus, a review by New York State Attorney Gen-
eral Eliot Spitzer of 175,000 forms detailing stop and frisk activity
in New York City showed that even police records reflect about
nine stops of blacks and Hispanics and eight stops of whites for
each resulting arrest. 167 In its focus on problem-solving, the new
policing also emphasizes the steps that can be taken against an in-
dividual without any individualized basis in fact. A common exam-
ple is stopping a driver and searching his or her car for drugs under
the pretext of concern that the car's taillight is not working or that
its speed is excessive and that the car is thus being operated in
violation of a local ordinance. Such forms of policing allow and
encourage the use of guesses and probabilities that are far less de-
pendent on evidence, compared to what has traditionally been re-
quired for a stop, an arrest, or a search to gather information.
Weaker requirements of justification for police action almost in-
variably invite more bias. The Spitzer study showed that "even
when crime is accounted for statistically, minorities still were being
'stopped' at a higher rate than whites;" blacks were 23% more
likely and Hispanics 39% more likely than white non-Hispanics to
be stopped by police.168 Generalizations about the greater likeli-
hood that a particular group will be involved in a particular crimi-
nal activity, such as dealing crack cocaine, are now more likely to
be made the basis for substantial disparities in treatment than they
were before strategic emphasis was put on the unregulated areas of
police conduct.169 Then, even if members of a hypothetical group
166. See Joseph P. Fried & Blaine Harden, The Louima Case: The Overview-Of-
ficer is Guilty in Torture of Louima, N.Y. TIMES, June 9, 1999, at Al; see also Jane
Fritsch, The Diallo Verdict: The Overview-4 Officers in Diallo Shooting Are Acquit-
ted of All Charges, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 26, 2000, at Al.
167. OAG REPORT, supra note 163, at 111.
168. Id. at 119, 123.
169. E.g., Dan Weikel, War on Crack Targets Minorities Over Whites, L.A. TIMES,
May 21, 1995, at Al (reporting that evidence in southern California and throughout
the U.S. indicates that the vast majority of crack offenders prosecuted in federal court
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X were more likely than others to be selling crack cocaine, the like-
lihood of any particular member of X being engaged in that con-
duct is generally so small that it could not satisfy probable cause or
reasonable suspicion standards.
Questioning someone (for example, a Hispanic youth) on a cor-
ner in a way that suggests he is not free to leave, which the Su-
preme Court has allowed, 7 ° or searching a car, or making a street
stop of a pedestrian are all likely to be based, to some extent, on
the racial or ethnic characteristics that the police believe more fre-
quently accompany crimes of concern. 171 A focus on types of dan-
gerous or criminal behavior, rather than on the behavior of specific
individuals, invites these generalizations. It is also at the heart of
much of the new policing. It is in this context that we should un-
derstand the debate about racial profiling.
3. Respect and Civility
Sara Stoutland argues, on the basis of an ethnographic study of
the reactions of youth and their older family members in Boston,
that neighborhoods subjected to the new policing in Boston are
pleased with the safety it has provided but concerned about the
absence of respect shown to the citizens it confronts. 72 One also
can detect this disparity in the review of attitudes towards policing
in New York and Chicago.
This issue is related to, but different from, concerns about equal
protection and legally defined civil liberties. An absence of respect
may be the source of much of the offense given by a failure to treat
certain stigmatized groups of citizens equally with other groups;
but the issue of respect is broader and is applicable to police inter-
actions with any group of citizens. The difference in treatment be-
tween groups may be attributable to differences in political clout,
as the influence of one group may elicit respectful handling by the
police while the absence of such influence may invite less respect-
ful relations for the other. Ethnic or racial bias may not be the
are non-white people), cited by Symposium, Is Our Drug Policy Effective? Are There
Alternatives?, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 3, 79-83 (2000) (discussing the disproportionate
impact on African Americans and Hispanics of the disparity in length of prison terms
imposed for crack cocaine offenses versus those imposed for powder cocaine offenses
for like amounts of those drugs).
170. E.g., Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429 (1991); Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491
(1983); United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980).
171. United States v. Weaver, 966 F.2d 391, 394 (8th Cir. 1992).
172. Sara Stoutland, Trust, Legitimacy, and Efforts to Reduce Youth Violent
Crime: Community Perspectives from Boston 26 (March 1, 2000) (unpublished manu-
script, on file with author).
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issue. An absence of respect also often reflects a sense that the
individual is without rights against the state. But here, too, there is
a difference. An officer making a stop and then frisking a citizen
on a crowded street may be acting well within the parameters of
reasonable suspicion that the law imposes, yet the way the stop is
made may convey humiliating contempt for the suspect.
It is becoming very clear that the cause of much violence by
youth against other youth is a sense of being treated without re-
spect. The resulting attack is a distorted form of insistence on be-
ing treated with dignity and as an important person. Distinguished
police commissioners, such as Commissioner Evans in Boston, con-
tend that even forcible encounters like a stop or arrest can, in most
cases, be handled in a way that reflects respect for the suspect.17 3
Police officers in the housing projects of Chicago report that they
can make arrests without danger to themselves or others if they
treat the suspect with respect. 174 All these beliefs are practical rea-
sons, from the point of view of law enforcement, for insisting on at
least the appearance of a respectful attitude toward those who are
confronted with real or apparent powers of the police.
The issue is at least equally important from the point of view of
many law-abiding residents in a neighborhood for whom a continu-
ing question is whether the police are there to support them or to
protect people in other areas from them or their children. Citizens
who feel themselves and their children the object of policing in-
tended to protect others and who feel that the steps taken reflect a
lack of respect for them as citizens and individuals are made to feel
like second-class citizens, used rather than valued. They are also
taught to fear the police rather than to value their services, an atti-
tude that creates sympathy for youth in revolt and frustration for
their elders who need protection but insist on respect.
Some significant forms of the new policing involve dealing with
individuals through implicit coercion. In New York, signaling that
it is the police who control the streets by zero tolerance policing,
claiming to decide what is acceptable conduct and what is disor-
derly behavior, and gathering information by "leaning on" those
who are vulnerable to revocation of parole or probation-all these
173. First Safety, Then Civility: Boston and New York, ECONOMIST, May 1, 1999, at
25 (citing Commissioner Evans' statement that many of the problems associated with
the stop and search of suspects disappear when "there is mutual respect" and "the
police explain why the search is being done").
174. E.g., Jerry Lawrence, Officers' Class Focused on Race Relations, CHI. TRIB.,
June 19, 2000, at 1 (describing a seminar offered by a former police officer on the
need to treat citizens, especially racial and ethnic minorities, with respect).
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may be extremely useful steps in creating security but extremely
costly in denying respect. In Boston, the gathering of information
by relatively coercive questioning on the streets, accompanied by
conveying some notion of the power of computerized retrieval of
such information, can have the same beneficial and harmful effects.
All these activities are designed to take place beneath the radar
of judicial review, another consequence that Chief Justice Warren
anticipated when reviewing powers to stop and frisk. The effects
on the citizens in the neighborhood and on their attitudes towards
the police are captured in the statistical assessments of policing in
Chicago and New York. 75
4. The Task of the Future: Maintaining the Security Advantages
of the New Policing while Reducing its Risks to Civil Liberties
There is every reason to believe that the great majority of people
in almost every city and the clear majority of those in the neighbor-
hoods most threatened by both insecurity and the risks to civil lib-
erties would, if forced to choose, prefer the new forms of policing.
The advantages of personal security are that great. Indeed, as
noted above, a majority of the residents of some Chicago housing
projects were prepared to give up their right to refuse to have their
apartments searched without probable cause in the interests of
greater personal security. 176
But the choice should not be so stark. Uses of discretion that are
beneath the level of visibility to courts could be the subject of de-
partmental regulation. The reliance on the exclusionary rule as a
primary sanction need not mean that it is the exclusive sanction.
What we need, in short, is a regulatory system with other sanctions
and new rules. We must find ways to have both civil liberties and
security.
Consider some examples of new forms of regulation. The prob-
lem of changed relationships between the citizen and the state, be-
tween the resident and the police officer, could be addressed, in
part, by requiring the police to make clear when they are asserting
authority and when they are simply making a request to stop or
submit to a search. The Supreme Court has ruled that this is not
required by the Constitution.177 But the practice of taking advan-
tage of a citizen's ignorance of constitutional rights or his un-
175. Supra Part II.A.3.
176. See Meares & Kahan, supra note 12.
177. Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429 (1991); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S.
218 (1973).
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founded fears remains subject to political review and it is unwise in
light of an increasing emphasis on control of the streets and the
gathering of information by informal means. Efforts to keep track
of the percentage of black, Hispanic, and white, non-Hispanic driv-
ers of cars that are stopped and to make those figures available
publicly are regulatory steps that can have major consequences on
a sense of discrimination.178 Keeping track of the number of com-
plaints against any officer for disrespectful behavior can be an
important step in encouraging respect, particularly if it is accompa-
nied by appropriate remedial training.
Most rules require some sanctions if they are to be taken seri-
ously. For behavior that is not generally designed to elicit evidence
for criminal trials-the situation with regard to much of the new
policing-the exclusionary rule is plainly an inadequate sanction.
Nor is there much promise in the form of civil lawsuits, which are
likely to be much too costly for remedying the risks to civil liberties
in the multitude of low visibility occurrences that are at issue. Ad-
ministrative discipline under rules that are more manageable is one
likely solution.
Regulatory schemes require credibility and credibility often re-
quires some form of external oversight, not of individual adminis-
trative determinations but of the adequacy of the functioning of the
administrative system, as New York's "Mollen Commission" sug-
gested some years ago.179 In the past decade, independent partner-
ships like that between the Boston Police Department and the Ten
Point Coalition have benefited both the organizations and the city
as a whole. By blending criticism with approval, the Coalition has
helped cultivate the police programs that are responsible for Bos-
ton's remarkable success. Significantly, the fruits of this effort-
the drop in youth homicide, drug use, and overall crime-are no-
where more apparent than on the streets of Dorchester and
Roxbury, where furor over police abuse first erupted.
Relationships like this one help fill the void left by the erosion of
judicial oversight. They are, however, comparatively rare. An un-
fortunate series of events, coupled with an unprecedented willing-
178. Police Tactics in Question: 'Stop and Frisk' in New York, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4,
1999, at A16.
179. CITY OF N.Y. COMM'N TO INVESTIGATE ALLEGATIONS OF POLICE CORRUP-
TION & THE ANTI-CORRUPTION PROCEDURES OF THE POLICE DEP'T, REPORT OF
NEW YORK COMMISSION TO INVESTIGATE ALLEGATIONS OF POLICE CORRUPTION
AND THE ANTI-CORRUPTION PROCEDURES OF THE POLICE DEPARTMENT (1994). The
Commission is popularly known as the "Mollen Commission," after its chair, the Hon.
Milton Mollen.
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ness by Boston's police chiefs and black ministers to work together,
brought about this unlikely partnership. Its enduring nature testi-
fies to their commitment and mutual dependence. As in other cit-
ies, there are still tensions between officers and the minority
residents whom the Coalition represents. This friction assures each
organization's independence. What remains to be seen is whether
cities like New York, in the wake of outrage over assaults like
those on Abner Louima and Amadou Diallo, will be willing to
reach out as Boston did following the Carol Stuart murder and the
stop and frisk scandal in the early 1990s.
These suggestions are meant to be illustrative, and they are far
from comprehensive. The central idea is that new rules are re-
quired to regulate the new policing and that these cannot take the
form of judicial review of the admissibility of evidence. They prob-
ably cannot depend primarily on any form of judicial sanctions for
violations of the rules, both because the rules will be developed
administratively and because they will regulate forms of behavior
that have long been considered too subtle to justify judicial review.
What we need is the acceptance of new forms of responsibility for
civil liberties by police agencies involved in the forms of new polic-
ing. Credible oversight must involve those outside of the police
but it should be of processes and structures, not of individual cases.
STREET STOPS AND BROKEN WINDOWS:
TERRY, RACE, AND DISORDER IN
NEW YORK CITY
Jeffrey Fagan and Garth Davies*
Patterns of "stop and frisk" activity by police across New York
City neighborhoods reflect competing theories of aggressive po-
licing. "Broken Windows" theory1 suggest that neighborhoods
with greater concentration of physical and social disorder should
evidence higher stop and frisk activity, especially for "quality of
life" crimes.2 However, although disorder theory informs quality
of life policing strategies, patterns of stop and frisk activity sug-
gest that neighborhood characteristics such as racial composition,
poverty levels, and extent of social disorganization are stronger
predictors of race- and crime-specific stops. Accordingly, neigh-
borhood "street stop" activity reflects competing assumptions and
meanings of policing strategy. Furthermore, looking at the rate at
which street stops meet Terry standards of reasonable suspicion3
in various neighborhoods provides additional p&spective on the
social and strategic meanings of policing. Our empirical evidence
suggests that policing is not about disorderly places, nor about
improving the quality of life, but about policing poor people in
poor places. This strategy contradicts the policy rationale derived
from Broken Windows theory, and deviates from the original em-
phasis on communities by focusing on people. Racially disparate
policing reinforces perceptions by citizens in minority neighbor-
hoods that they are under non-particularized suspicion and are
therefore targeted for aggressive stop and frisk policing. Such
broad targeting raises concerns about the legitimacy of law,
threatens to weaken citizen participation in the co-production of
* Jeffrey Fagan is a professor at the Mailman School of Public Health, Columbia
University, and a visiting professor at Columbia Law School. Garth Davies is a doc-
toral candidate, School of Criminal Justice, Rutgers University. All opinions are those
of the authors. Peter K. Manning provided helpful comments on this article. Bran-
don Garrett provided timely and thorough research assistance.
1. James Q. Wilson & George L. Kelling, The Police and Neighborhood Safety:
Broken Windows, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Mar. 1982, at 29-38 (using the analogy of a
broken window to describe the relationship between disorder and crime).
2. Id.
3. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (establishing reasonable suspicion, as opposed
to the higher quantum of proof of probable cause, as the constitutional standard to
govern stop and frisks).
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security, and undercuts the broader social norms goals of contem-
porary policing.
When it comes to debating theories of crime and law, some peo-
ple pretend that race does not matter at all, while others accord it
undue, if not determinative, significance. Unfortunately, recent
events in policing seem to tip the balance of reality toward the lat-
ter view. There is now strong empirical evidence that individuals
of color are more likely than white Americans to be stopped, ques-
tioned, searched, and arrested by police.' This occurs in part be-
cause of their race, in part because of heightened law enforcement
intensity in minority communities, in part because of the tempta-
tion among law enforcement officers to simply "play the base
rates" by stopping minority suspects because minorities commit
4. See generally RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME, AND THE LAW (1997) (ex-
ploring the impact of race relations on criminal law and criminal justice ); see also
Kim Taylor-Thompson, The Politics of Common Ground, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1306
(1998) (emphasizing the role of race in criminal justice issues through a critical review
of RACE, CRIME, AND THE LAW).
5. United States v. New Jersey, No. 99-5970 (MLC) (D. N.J. Dec. 30, 1999) (con-
sent decree) (establishing the state of New Jersey's consent to comply with various
procedures and policies to remedy racial profiling by the state police), http://
www.usdoj.gov/crt/split/documents/jerseysa.htm; U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
RACIAL PROFILING LIMITED DATA AVAILABLE ON MOTORIST STOPS, GAO-GGD-
00-41, 7-13 (2000), available at http://www.gao.gov/AlndexFYO0/title/tocR.htm; CIVIL
RIGHTS BUREAU, OFFICE OF THE ATrORNEY GEN. OF THE STATE OF N.Y., THE NEW
YORK CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT'S "STOP & FRISK" PRACTICES 89 (1999) [hereinaf-
ter OAG REPORT]; DAVID COLE, No EQUAL JUSTICE: RACE AND CLASS IN THE
AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM, 34-41 (1999) (describing the explicit use of
race in criminal profiles by police departments in Maryland, Colorado, Louisiana, and
New Jersey); Sean Hecker, Race and Pretextual Traffic Stops: An Expanded Role for
Civilian Review Boards, 28 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 551, 551 (1997); Kris Anto-
nelli, State Police Deny Searches are Race-Based; ACLU Again Challenges 1-95 Stops,
BALT. SUN, Nov. 16, 1996, at 18B; David Kocieniewski & Robert Hanley, Racial Pro-
filing Was The Routine, New Jersey Finds, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 28, 2000, at Al; Barbara
Whitaker, San Diego Police Found to Stop Black and Latino Drivers Most, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 1, 2000, at A31; Jim Yardley, Studies Find Race Disparities in Texas Traf-
fic Stops, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 7, 2000, at A12. Similar patterns of stops, searches, and
arrests of citizens have been observed in London. See generally DAVID SMITH ET AL.,
POLICE AND PEOPLE IN LONDON: VOLUME I: A SURVEY OF LONDONERS 89-119,
tbl.IV.3 (1983) (showing racial disparity in police contacts with black citizens in
London). The London survey was conducted in 1981-82, with a stratified random sam-
ple of 2420 Londoners ages fifteen and older. Minorities were over-sampled to en-
sure adequate representation in the study. Overall, 16% of Londoners were stopped
in the twelve months preceding the survey. West Indians were slightly more likely to
be stopped than whites (18% as compared with 14%), and Asians were least likely to
be stopped (5%). The average number of stops was twice as high for West Indians
(0.56) compared with whites (0.21) or Asians (0.8). The average number of arrests per
person stopped was also far greater for West Indians (3.19) than for whites (1.46) or
Asians (1.59). Id.
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more crimes, and in part because of the tacit approval of these
practices given by their superiors.6
Whether the legal system should consider race in its every day
decision-making is a hotly contested and much-litigated issue.7 Yet
the modern practice of racial policing should surprise no one. Ra-
cial profiling is often defended as a useful means to detect criminal
behavior.8 The legal system has long used race as a signal of in-
creased risk of criminality. Examples include: immigration exclu-
sion and other discrimination against Chinese immigrants in the
19th century;9 the racialization of the debate on the passage of the
Harrison Narcotics Act;10 the internment of the Japanese during
World War II;11 border interdictions to halt illegal immigration; 12
6. See generally STATE POLICE REVIEW TEAM, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GEN.
OF THE STATE OF N.J., INTERIM REPORT OF THE STATE POLICE REVIEW TEAM RE-
GARDING ALLEGATIONS OF RACIAL PROFILING (1999) (admitting that New Jersey
State Police officers engaged in racial profiling, but also that profiling is part of the
culture of the State Police), available at http://www.state.nj.us/lps/intm_419.pdf (Apr.
20, 1999); see generally Jeffrey Goldberg, The Color of Suspicion, N.Y. TIMES MAG.,
June 20, 1999, at 51 (examining various perspectives on racial profiling).
7. Brandon Garrett, Standing while Black: Distinguishing Lyons in Racial Profil-
ing Cases, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1815, 1816 n.5 (2000) (reviewing recent lawsuits and
investigations of racial profiling). Consent decrees stemming from racial profiling
have been signed in many cases. E.g., United States v. New Jersey, No. 99-5970
(MLC) (D. N.J. Dec. 30, 1999) (consent decree entered); Memorandum of Agree-
ment, Between the United States Department of Justice, Montgomery County, Mary-
land, the Montgomery County Department of Police, and the Fraternal Order of
Police, Montgomery County Lodge 35, Inc., Jan. 14, 2000, http//www.usdoj.gov/crt/
cor/Pubs/mcagrmt.htm; United States v. City of Pittsburgh, No. 97-0354 (W.D. Pa.
Apr. 16, 1997) (consent decree entered); United States v. City of Steubenville, C2-97-
966 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 3, 1997) (consent decree entered), http://usdoj.gov/cit/split/docu-
ments/steubensa.htm; United States v. City of Los Angeles, No. 00-11769 (C.D. Cal.)
(consent decree entered). For reviews of consent decrees involving police depart-
ments generally, see Debra Livingston, Police Reform and the Department of Justice:
An Essay on Accountability, 2 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 815 (1999); Myriam E. Gilles,
Reinventing Structural Reform Litigation: Deputizing Private Citizens in the Enforce-
ment of Civil Right, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1384 (2000).
8. KENNEDY, supra note 4, at 145-46 (discussing race as a predictor of criminal-
ity). For a review of the historical uses of ethnic and racial exclusion in the United
States based on attributions of greater danger to ethnic minorities, see generally SA-
MUEL WALKER ET AL., THE COLOR OF JUSTICE: RACE, ETHNICITY AND CRIME IN
AMERICA (2d ed. 2000).
9. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886) (inferring intentional discrimination
against Chinese citizens from disparate enforcement of an ordinance banning
laundries).
10. Harrison Narcotics Act, ch. 1, 38 Stat. 785 (1914); see also DAVID F. MUSTO,
THE AMERICAN DISEASE 65 (1973) ("Cocaine raised the specter of the Wild Negro,
opium the devious Chinese .... ").
11. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (finding forced internment
troubling but ultimately upholding its constitutionality).
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racial components of drug courier profiling;13 and the so-called
Carol Stuart stops in Boston.14
Generally, courts have refused to disallow the use of race as an
indicia of criminality.1 5 Most courts have accepted this practice, so
long as (1) race alone is not the rationale for the interdiction, and
(2) it is not done for purposes of racial harassment. 6 This practice
has been reflected in case law as the sound exercise of "profes-
sional judgment" by police officers. 7
12. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 556-57 (1976) (affirming the
U.S. Border Patrol's right to conduct checkpoint stops of vehicles near the Mexican
border with or without reasonable suspicion).
13. United States v. Harvey, 16 F.3d 109, 115 (6th Cir. 1994) (Keith, J., dissenting)
("African-Americans are more likely to be arrested because drug courier profiles re-
flect the erroneous assumption that one's race has a direct correlation to drug
activity.").
14. MASS. ATTORNEY GEN.'S OFFICE, REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S
CIVIL RIGHTS DIVISION ON BOSTON POLICE DEPARTMENT PRACTICES (Dec. 18, 1990)
(reporting results of an investigation into allegations that, in violation of constitu-
tional mandates, the Boston Police Department "rounded up" African American men
in the wake of the murder of Carol Stuart, a white woman).
Shortly before this article went to press, a sharply-divided United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit declined to reconsider its ruling upholding its dismis-
sal of Brown v. City of Oneonta, 221 F.3d 329 (2000). The plaintiffs in Brown alleged
that police unconstitutionally swept the 10,000-resident town and stopped and in-
spected the hands of black men after an elderly woman alleged she had been attacked
in her home by a young black male who cut his hand during a struggle.
The panel reaches a grave conclusion by holding that the police act constitu-
tionally under the Fourteenth Amendment when, based on a witness's
predominantly racial description, they stop every young African American
male in town to determine whether he can exclude himself from a vague
class of potential suspects that has been defined in overwhelmingly racial
terms.
Brown v. City of Oneonta, - F.3d - (2d Cir. 2000), available in 2000 WL 1855047.
15. See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996). In Whren, the U.S. Supreme
Court ruled that as long as an officer observes a traffic violation, a traffic stop is
constitutional, even if the officer has no intention to enforce the law the driver vio-
lated. Even if purely pretextual, a racially-motivated stop is constitutional under the
Fourth Amendment if also motivated by a second, non-racial factor. The Court did
state, however, that a stop motivated by race alone would violate Fourteenth Amend-
ment protections. Id. at 813. COLE, supra note 5, at 39-40 (citing the extraordinarily
high concentration of minority complainants in unsuccessful federal appellate cases
involving pretextual traffic stops). See also Harvey, 16 F.3d at 115 (Keith, J., dissent-
ing); KENNEDY, supra note 4, at 14 ("Racist perceptions of blacks have given energy
to policies and practices (such as racial exclusion in housing, impoverished schooling,
and stingy social welfare programs) that have facilitated the growth of egregious
crime-spawning conditions that millions of Americans face in urban slums and rural
backwaters across the nation.") (citation omitted).
16. See Whren, 517 U.S. at 813.
17. Although courts may be reluctant explicitly to identify and endorse the use of
race as a proxy for criminal behavior, the factual underpinnings of many cases reveal
tacit judicial approval of racial profiling. E.g., Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405
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Contemporary criminal justice theory and practice accord with
this view, but substitute sociological language for the more formal
legal endorsement of race-based practices. In New York City, law
enforcement strategies emphasize the aggressive patrol of areas
containing manifestations of physical and social disorder. Thus,
police aggressively enforce laws on public drinking and loitering.
They also actively patrol neighborhoods with empty lots, aban-
doned cars, and dilapidated buildings. Collectively, these strategies
are based on the "Broken Windows" theory, named after the influ-
ential essay on the contagious effects of unchecked signs of
disorder.18
Beginning in 1994, officials altered the police strategies in New
York City to address low-level disorder problems that might invite
more serious crime problems.' 9 These signs of disorder often are
more prevalent in urban neighborhoods with elevated rates of pov-
U.S. 156 (1972) (reviewing the enforcement of a vague vagrancy ordinance against
two black men accompanied by two white females); Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266
(2000) (reviewing the adequacy of a stop and frisk based on an anonymous inform-
ant's description of a "young black male" wearing a plaid shirt and carrying a gun).
The "professional judgment" of Detective McFadden provided the basis for his stop
and search of the defendant in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 28 (1968). What has been lost
in the Terry discourse in the ensuing years is the explicit racial component of the
events. Terry was African American, McFadden was white. McFadden's "professional
judgment" concerning Terry was based on the racial incongruity of Terry being ob-
served outside a storefront in a commercial district far from the areas of Cleveland
where most African Americans lived. Anthony C. Thompson, Stopping the Usual Sus-
pects: Race and the Fourth Amendment, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 956, 966 (1999). But see
Terry, 392 U.S. at 5-7 (detailing the suspicious activity the Terry defendants engaged
in after Detective McFadden, a thirty-nine year veteran of the police department, first
observed them and felt "they didn't look right to [him] at the time").
In Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124 (2000), the Court noted that although an
individual's presence in a "high crime area" does not meet the standard for a particu-
larized suspicion of criminal activity, a location's characteristics are relevant in deter-
mining whether an individual's behavior is sufficiently suspicious to warrant further
investigation. Since "high crime areas" often are areas with concentrations of minor-
ity citizens, this logic places minority neighborhoods at risk for elevating the suspi-
ciousness of its residents. See e.g., DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON,
AMERICAN APARTHEID: SEGREGATION AND THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS
(1993).
18. Wilson & Kelling, supra note 1, at 31. See generally GEORGE L. KELLING &
CATHERINE M. COLES, FIXING BROKEN WINDOWS: RESTORING ORDER AND REDUC-
ING CRIME IN OUR COMMUNITIES (1996).
19. Bernard E. Harcourt, Reflecting on the Subject: A Critique of the Social Influ-
ence Conception of Deterrence, the Broken Windows Theory, and Order-Maintenance
Policing New York Style, 97 MICH. L. REV. 291, 292 (1998); Debra Livingston, Police
Discretion and the Quality of Life in Public Places: Courts, Communities, and the New
Policing, 97 Colum. L. Rev. 551, 556 n.14 (1997); Sarah E. Waldeck, Cops, Community
Policing, and the Social Norms Approach to Crime Control: Should One Make Us
More Comfortable with the Others?, 34 GA. L. REV. 1273, 1273 (2000).
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erty and social fragmentation.2 0 Accordingly, the implementation
of Broken Windows policies was disproportionately concentrated
in minority neighborhoods and conflated with poverty and other
signs of socio-economic disadvantage. Thus, what was constructed
as "order-maintenance policing" ("OMP") was widely perceived
among minority citizens as racial policing, or racial profiling. 21 The
fact that its principle tactic was an aggressive form of stop and frisk
policing involving intrusive Terry searches,22 and that at least two
deaths of unarmed citizens of African descent were linked to
OMP, 23 further intensified perceptions of racial animus.2 4
20. WESLEY G. SKOGAN, DISORDER AND DECLINE: CRIME AND THE SPIRAL OF
DECAY IN AMERICAN NEIGHBORHOODS 59 (1990); Robert J. Sampson & Stephen W.
Raudenbush, Systematic Social Observation of Public Spaces: A New Look at Disor-
der in Urban Neighborhoods, 105 AM. J. SOCIOLOGY 603, 622-30 (1999); Stephen W.
Raudenbush & Robert J. Sampson, Ecometrics: Toward a Science of Assessing Eco-
logical Settings, with Application to the Systematic Social Observation of Neighbor-
hoods, 29 SOCIOLOGICAL METHODOLOGY 1 (1999).
21. OAG REPORT, supra note 5, at 74; David Kocieniewski, Success of Elite Police
Unit Exacts a Toll on the Streets, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 1999, at Al (discussing reactions
of citizens to aggressive policing in New York City); Kit R. Roane, Minority Private-
School Students Claim Police Harassment, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 26, 1999, at B5 (citing
complaints by minority students of indiscriminate and frequent police harassment).
22. There is an irony here about the use of such citizen detentions and searches as
a crime fighting tool. The Terry decision itself located the frisk less as an investigative
aid than as a protection for the patrolling officer: "The frisk ... was essential to the
proper performance of the officer's investigatory duties, for without it the answer to
the police officer may be a bullet." Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 8 (1968) (citation omit-
ted). That the stop and frisk engenders animosity was made explicit in the original
Terry decision. The Supreme Court in Terry noted that a frisk "is a serious intrusion
upon the sanctity of the person, which may inflict great indignity and arouse strong
resentment, and is not to be undertaken lightly." Id. at 17. The Court also noted that
Terry stops had the potential to inflict psychological harm: "Even a limited search...
constitutes a severe, though brief, intrusion upon cherished personal security, and it
must surely be an annoying, frightening, and perhaps humiliating experience." Id. at
24-25.
23. David Jackson, Winning War on Crime Has a Price Giuliani Alienates Many in
New York City's Black and Hispanic Communities, DENVER POST, Apr. 20, 2000, at
A23 (discussing the shootings by the New York City Police Department ("NYPD") of
Amadou Diallo and Patrick Dorismond); Symposium, Is Our Drug Policy Effective?
Are There Alternatives?, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 3, 95 (2000) ("[A] team of under-
cover police approached a man [Patrick Dorismond] . . .even though they had no
reason to believe that he was involved in any criminal activity.").
24. Citizens who are stopped and frisked based on a profiling or racial policing
strategy understand that they have been singled out because of their race. These en-
counters have been termed "race-making situations." David R. James, The Racial
Ghetto as a Race-Making Situation: The Effects of Residential Segregation on Racial
Inequalities and Racial Identity, 19 LAW & Soc. INOUIRY 407, 420-29 (1994). The out-
rage of many minority citizens over the NYPD's policing of aggressive stop and frisks
reflects not only the emotional harm from being targeted because of one's race, but
also the fear that such situations can escalate into dangerously violent encounters. See
generally David A. Harris, The Stories, the Statistics, and the Law: Why "Driving
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Moreover, by explicitly linking disorder to violence, OMP (as in-
formed by Broken Windows theory) further focused police re-
sources and efforts on the neighborhoods with the highest crime
and violence rates.25 That these were predominantly minority
neighborhoods further reinforced the disproportionate exposure of
New York City's minority citizens to policing. Thus, this construc-
tion of disorder broadened the concept to include places where vi-
olent and other serious crimes were most likely to occur. Those
places tended to be ones with the highest concentrations of so-
cially-disadvantaged minority populations.
In this paper, we assess empirical evidence designed to sort out
these competing claims about the underlying theoretical basis for
New York City's aggressive policing policy. We analyze patterns of
stop and frisk activity to assess whether practice reflected the
place-based strategies embodied in Broken Windows theory, or if
instead, practice was focused on the social markers of race and dis-
advantage. We ask whether, after controlling for disorder, the
city's stop and frisk policy is, in fact, a form of policing that dispro-
portionately targets racial minorities. We begin by reviewing the
history and evolution of these policies, showing the links between
race, Broken Windows theory, and aggressive policing. In Part II,
we review evidence of the racial skew in policing as reported in
recent studies. In Part III, we offer the results of empirical tests of
data conducted on trends and patterns of policing to resolve these
competing claims about the motivating theories for the observed
patterns. We find little evidence to support claims that policing
targeted places and signs of physical disorder, and show instead
that stops of citizens were more often concentrated in minority
While Black" Matters, 84 MINN. L. REV. 265, 273 (1999). The shared danger of profil-
ing encounters reflects the concept of "linked fate" among residents of minority
neighborhoods. "Linked fate" refers to the empathy that people have with family and
friends. It can also exist among strangers. In the African American community, linked
fate has its foundation in the fact that the life chances of African Americans histori-
cally have been shaped by race. MICHAEL C. DAWSON, BEHIND THE MULE: RACE
AND CLASS IN AFRICAN-AMERICAN POLITICS 77 (1994). Linked fate suggests that
when race over-determines an individual's life chances, it is much more efficient for
that individual to use the relative and absolute status of the group as a proxy for
individual utility. The long history of race-based constraints on life chances among
blacks generates a certain efficiency in evaluating policies that affect minority individ-
uals. Id.
25. OAG REPORT, supra note 5, at 53 (citing N.Y. CITY POLICE DEP'T, POLICE
STRATEGY No. 1: GE-rING GUNS OFF THE STREETS OF NEW YORK (1994) (explicitly
linking disorder to violence and rationalizing the concentration of order-maintenance
policing ("OMP") strategies in the city's neighborhoods with the highest crime rates)
[hereinafter POLICE STRATEGY No.1].
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neighborhoods characterized by poverty and social disadvantage.
In Part IV, we conclude by returning to the theoretical arguments
supporting current police policies. In this last section, we address
claims about the positive link between aggressive policing and the
prospects for creating social norms changes to restore social regula-
tion of behavior. The counterfactual of crises in legitimacy pro-
vides the context for concluding remarks on race and policing in
New York.
I. DISORDER AND AGGRESSIVE POLICING IN NEW YORK CITY
A. From Theory to Practice: Broken Windows and Order-
Maintenance Policing
As stated, the policy of aggressive stop and frisk practices re-
flects theoretical and strategic innovations derived from what has
become popularly known as Broken Windows theory. 26 The origi-
nators of the Broken Windows theory, James Q. Wilson and
George L. Kelling, argued that police should address minor disor-
ders to strengthen police-citizen interactions, and consequently, in-
formal social control.27 For Wilson and Kelling, signs of physical
and social disorder invite criminal activity.28 Disorder indicates to
law-abiding citizens that their neighborhoods are dangerous places,
leading to their withdrawal from informal social control and regu-
lation.29 The theory suggests that there is a tipping point at which
disorder trumps order by defeating the willingness of citizens to
interact with the police and with each other to co-produce security.
Accordingly, disorder invites more disorder in a contagious process
that progressively breaks down community standards and also sug-
26. Wilson & Kelling, supra note 1, at 31. For excellent reviews, see Livingston,
supra note 19, at 578 (discussing the relationship between Broken Windows theory
and current policing practices); Harcourt, supra note 19, at 301-08 (critiquing Broken
Windows theory and empirical research claiming to support the link between disorder
and crime); Tracey L. Meares & Dan M. Kahan, Law and (Norms of) Order in the
Inner City, 32 LAW & Soc'y REV. 805 (1998) (discussing the link between social
norms theory and law enforcement policies).
27. Wilson & Kelling, supra note 1, at 31; Livingston, supra note 19, at 576; Wal-
deck, supra note 19, at 1255.
28. Wilson & Kelling, supra note 1, at 32. They define "minor" disorder to include
such problems and crimes as littering, loitering, public drinking, panhandling, teenage
fighting on street corners, and prostitution. They also mention signs of physical disor-
der, including abandoned cars-with broken windows, naturally-and dilapidated
buildings, also with broken windows.
29. Id. at 33 ("In response to fear, people avoid one another, weakening
controls.").
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gests to would-be criminals that crime will not be reported. Disor-
der ultimately invites criminal invasion.
Broken Windows theory comports well with social norms theo-
ries. In this framework, individuals form social norms through in-
teractions with others in social spaces, creating norms of either
legal or illegal behavior in their communities.3 ° Wilson and Kelling
argue that when police focus on repairing or removing these disor-
der problems, they combat crime by promoting the types of social
interactions among law-abiding citizens that strengthen the dynam-
ics of social regulation and produce security and social control.31
To restate this in terms of Broken Windows theory, disorder con-
veys a social message that there is no effective social regulation of
behavior in a neighborhood with such visible and prevalent signs of
disorder.32 In turn, disorder communicates the absence of re-
straints to others who may interpret this as either tolerance of, or
an invitation to, criminal behavior. Thus, as both disorder and
criminal behavior spread, they communicate a mutually reinforcing
social norm regarding crime and social disorder, all the while com-
municating danger to those who would attempt to reinforce social
norms that oppose crime and disorder.
Empirical support for Broken Windows and disorder theories of
crime is reported by Wesley Skogan in an analysis of survey data
collected in 1977 and 1983 in six cities.33 Additional empirical sup-
port is reported by George L. Kelling and Catherine M. Coles.34
Bernard Harcourt, however, reanalyzed Skogan's data and failed
to replicate the results, citing numerous inconsistencies and errors
in measurement.35 Dan Kahan attributes New York City's crime
decline in the 1990s to the adoption by its police department of a
tactical strategy based on Broken Windows theory, although em-
30. Meares & Kahan, supra note 26, at 805. For an illustration based on ethno-
graphic research, see ELIJAH ANDERSON, CODE OF THE STREET (1999).
31. Wilson & Kelling, supra note 1, at 35; ANDERSON, supra note 30, at 32; see also
Harcourt, supra note 19, at 302-3. See generally Robert C. Ellickson, Controlling
Chronic Misconduct in City Spaces: Of Panhandlers, Skid Rows, and Public-Space
Zoning, 105 YALE L.J. 1165 (1996).
32. See generally Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. CHI.
L. REV. 943 (1995) (discussing the construction of social meaning); Ellickson, supra
note 31.
33. SKOGAN, supra note 20. Surveys were conducted in Atlanta, Chicago, Hous-
ton, Newark, Philadelphia, and San Francisco. His basic model was a regression analy-
sis predicting robbery rates from measures of social and physical disorder, controlling
for characteristics of the cities derived from social disorganization theory: poverty,
residential stability, and racial heterogeneity.
34. See generally KELLING & COLES, supra note 18.
35. Harcourt, supra note 19, at 312-39.
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pirical and conceptual assessments of the crime decline contest that
view. Empirical work by Robert Sampson and Jacqueline Cohen
provide indirect support for a Broken Windows model of policing
by focusing on factors that influence perceptions of the tolerance
of disorder, especially higher arrest ratios (relative to the crime
rate). 37 Despite the implicit developmental and deontological un-
derpinnings of Broken Windows theory (and corresponding social
norms theories), none of the supportive studies included prospec-
tive tests of the effects of disorder on changes in crime rates in
subsequent periods. In fact, all these studies rely on cross-sectional
research that is unable to determine whether the observed relation-
ships are temporally-ordered and therefore causally related, or if
they are simply correlations whose causal order is unknown. 38
The most comprehensive empirical test of the underlying pre-
mise of Broken Windows theory-that disorder gives rise to higher
crime rates-was a study of disorder in Chicago neighborhoods by
Robert Sampson and Stephen Raudenbush. 39 Rather than rely on
either official records or self-reports, the researchers constructed
highly reliable measures of social disorder from a randomized
schedule of videotaping of locations. They combined these disorder
measures with reports of social control mechanisms from a random
sample of 3864 residents in 343 neighborhoods, and both self-re-
ported and official records of crime. Sampson and Raudenbush re-
36. Dan M. Kahan, Between Economics and Sociology: The New Path of Deter-
rence, 95 MICH. L. REV. 2477, 2488 n.63, n.65 (1997). Kahan states that the decline in
crime must be attributable to the new policing strategy: order-maintenance policing.
Id. But see Jeffrey Fagan et al., Declining Homicide in New York City: A Tale of Two
Trends, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1277, 1285-86, 1289-91(1998) (claiming that
changes in crime rates are actually predictable cyclical changes in violence rates, and
that only gun crime rates have changed); ANDREW KARMEN, NEW YORK MURDER
MYSTERY 13-24 (2000) (discussing competing causal claims for the decline in New
York City's homicide rate from 1991-98, but finding insufficient evidence to support
any single explanation).
37. Robert J. Sampson & Jacqueline Cohen, Deterrent Effects of the Police on
Crime: A Replication and Theoretical Extension, 22 LAW & Soc. REV. 163, 175-79
(1988) (reporting that more aggressive stop and frisk enforcement produces higher
arrest ratios that, in turn, communicate a high punishment likelihood to would-be law
violators).
38. For a general discussion of this type of validity threat in cross-sectional, non-
experimental research designs, see generally THOMAS D. COOK & DONALD T. CAMP-
BELL, QUASI-EXPERIMENTATION DESIGN AND ANALYSIS ISSUES FOR FIELD SETTINGS
(1979); KENNETH ROTHMAN, MODERN EPIDEMIOLOGY (1986); LEON ROBERTSON,
INJURY EPIDEMIOLOGY (1992).
39. Sampson & Raudenbush, supra note 20 (reporting results of an observational
survey of physical and social disorder in Chicago neighborhoods and its weak associa-
tion with crime rates).
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ported that social interactions and social controls among neighbors
are more closely related to crime than is disorder, while these so-
cial processes-which they term "collective efficacy"-are unre-
lated to disorder. Similar to Harcourt's re-analysis of the Skogan
data, Sampson and Raudenbush also discredit the relationship be-
tween crime and disorder.4 °
These empirical doubts about the efficacy of Broken Windows
theory have not stopped its influence on American policing. The
development of police strategies that operationalize Broken Win-
dows theory proceeded apace in the past two decades.41 It was
widely translated into a police strategy known as "order-mainte-
nance policing," or OMP.42 At the same time, Broken Windows
theory stimulated a body of academic writing on the subject of or-
der maintenance.43
Under OMP, police aggressively enforce laws against social dis-
order with "zero tolerance" that requires arrest for any law infrac-
tion.44 Widely viewed as an adaptation of an earlier movement
40. Id. at 603.
41. For example, Commissioner William Bratton had earlier implemented an
OMP strategy while head of the New York City Transit Police, called the Clean Car
Program ("CCP"). The strategy focused on ridding New York City's subway cars of
graffiti. Maryalice Sloan-Hewitt & George L. Kelling, Subway Graffiti in New York
City: "Gettin' up" vs. "Meanin' it and Cleanin' it," in SITUATIONAL CRIME PREVEN-
TION: SUCCESSFUL CASE STUDIES 242, 244-45 (Ronald V. Clarke, ed., 2d. ed. 1997).
42. Livingston, supra note 19, at 632.
43. E.g., George L. Kelling, Order Maintenance, the Quality of Urban Life, and
Police: A Line of Argument, in POLICE LEADERSHIP IN AMERICA 296 (William A.
Geller ed., 1985); Carl B. Klockars, Order Maintenance, the Quality of Urban Life,
and Police: A Different Line of Argument, in POLICE LEADERSHIP, supra, at 309; Carl
B. Klockars, Street Justice: Some Micro-Moral Reservations: Comment on Sykes, 3
JUST. Q. 513 (1986); Gary W. Sykes, Street Justice: A Moral Defense of Order Mainte-
nance Policing, 3 JUST. Q. 497 (1986) [hereinafter Street Justice]; Gary W. Sykes, The
Functional Nature of Police Reform: The "Myth" of Controlling the Police, 2 JUST. Q.
51 (1985). But see generally Jack R. Greene & Ralph B. Taylor, Community-Based
Policing and Foot Patrol: Issues of Theory and Evaluation, in COMMUNITY POLICING:
RHETORIC OR REALITY, 195, 201-03 (Jack R. Greene & Stephen D. Mastrofski eds.,
1988) [hereinafter COMMUNITY POLICING].
44. Definitions of the crimes that constitute disorder vary, but generally include:
unlicensed peddling and vending, public drunkenness and open drinking, vandalism
(including graffiti), public urination, loitering, littering, panhandling, prostitution, and
menacing misbehavior. The latter often is symbolized by "squeegee" men who solicit
money in return for unsolicited cleaning of motorists' windshields at stop lights.
Cracking down on squeegee men represents the type of OMP enforcement that most
closely expressed popular conceptions of the policy. KELLING & COLES, supra note
18, at 14-15; Livingston, supra note 19, at 553-54; Harcourt, supra note 19, at 297;
Wilson & Kelling, supra note 1; WILLIAM BRATTON & PETER KNOBLER, TURN-
AROUND: How AMERICA'S Top Cop REVERSED THE CRIME EPIDEMIC 214 (1998)
(discussing the NYPD's policy to rid the city of the squeegee people); William J. Brat-
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toward "community policing, ' 45 OMP advocates active engage-
ment with and arrest of law violators. In more traditional commu-
nity policing, police pursued ameliorative measures that also were
consistent with Broken Windows theory, but avoided coercive en-
counters with citizens on the street.46 These ameliorative measures
were consistent with Broken Windows tenets that police should fo-
cus equally on protecting communities as well as protecting indi-
viduals.47 Although community policing and OMP both derive
from a social norms basis, the implementation of OMP in New
York moved in a very different direction, exchanging amelioration
of physical disorder for interdiction of social disorder.
Sarah Waldeck claims that this exchange resolved a conflict that
arose in the occupational subculture of policing with the advent of
community policing. 48 In addressing non-crime problems, police
were reluctant to adhere to a new set of markers for performance
and competence based on social interactions with law-abiding citi-
zens. 49 By emphasizing the aggressive pursuit of social disorder, or
disorderly persons, police returned to the more comfortable per-
formance indicators of stops and arrests, while restoring to the
workplace their traditional cultural dichotomy of "disorderly peo-
ple and law abiders."50 Thus, for example, while New York City
police identified only seventy-five "squeegee" people, 5' the ex-
panding definition of disorder meant that more and more people
were disorderly and subject to aggressive police attention.
ton, The New York City Police Department's Civil Enforcement of Quality-of-Life
Crimes, 3 J.L. & POL'Y 447, 447-48 (1995); N.Y. CITY POLICE DEP'T, POLICE STRAT-
EGY No. 5: RECLAIMING THE PUBLIC SPACES OF NEW YORK 10-12 (1994) [hereinafter
POLICE STRATEGY No. 5].
45. Livingston, supra note 19, at 562-91. While OMP emphasizes arrest, other
forms of community policing eschew arrest in favor of building community contacts.
E.g., WESLEY G. SKOGAN & SUSAN M. HARTNETT, COMMUNITY POLICING, CHICAGO
STYLE 8, 55-56 (1997).
46. These include, for example, cleaning up trash-strewn lots, painting over graf-
fiti, and assisting housing inspectors to address code violations. E.g., Livingston, supra
note 19, at 584 (citation omitted); HERMAN GOLDSTEIN, PROBLEM-ORIENTED POLIC-
ING 134 (1990); George L. Kelling & Mark H. Moore, From Political to Reform to
Community: The Evolving Strategy of Police, in COMMUNITY POLICING, supra note 43,
at 3 (Jack R. Greene & Stephen D. Mastrofski eds., 1988); Stephen D. Mastrofski,
Community Policing as Reform: A Cautionary Tale, in COMMUNITY POLICING, supra
note 43, at 47, 67.
47. See Livingston, supra note 19, at 583 n.162.
48. Waldeck, supra note 19, at 1267-69.
49. See id. at 1267.
50. Id. at 1268, 1278.
51. BRATTON & KNOBLER, supra note 44, at 214.
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It is important to remember that Wilson and Kelling's original
social science construction of Broken Windows theory had little to
do with social disorder, especially with the aggressive interdiction
of disorderly persons. Thus, as we shall see next, the evolution of
OMP in New York resulted in a policy and style of policing that
violated the subtle connection that Wilson and Kelling drew be-
tween crime and disorder, and that deviated in many important
ways from its underlying social norms paradigm. As we show be-
low, the exchange of physical disorder for social disorder signified
nothing less than a theoretical paradigm shift from the original
construction of Broken Windows theory to the more traditional
and problematic policing of social disorganization.
B. Violence, Disorder, and Order-Maintenance Policing in
New York City
Many observers have noted that OMP in New York City has es-
chewed (what is for police) the more esoteric dimensions of com-
munity policing targeted at physical disorder, for an aggressive
policy of arrest and other traditional law enforcement tactics aimed
squarely at social disorder. While remaining true to the origins of
Broken Windows theory, there were strategic and tactical reasons
to reconstruct the Broken Windows theory in this way.
Whereas community policing implies a partnership between po-
lice and community, the interpretation of community needs is one
of the wild cards of the theory.52 The partnership required that the
parties respond both to a neighborhood's priorities regarding crime
and to the more traditional police functions of detecting and deter-
ring criminal behavior.5 3 Community policing, then, often ap-
peared to be a Solomonesque split between traditional police goals
focusing on major crimes (e.g., murder and armed robbery) and the
goals of community residents concerned with chronic low-level
crimes and disorder problems.54
However, in shifting from community policing to OMP, police
strategy in New York City redirected its strategic focus from reme-
dying physical disorder to policing social disorder. The rationale
for this shift from physical to social disorder was the theory that
low-level crime-social disorder-nurtures and facilitates more se-
rious crime.55 George L. Kelling and Catherine M. Cole conceptu-
52. See Skogan & Hartnett, supra note 45, at 8.
53. BRArrON & KNOBLER, supra note 44, at 94-95.
54. See generally Goldstein, supra note 46.
55. Wilson & Kelling, supra note 1, at 34.
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alized OMP as a cooperative variant on community policing: the
enforcement of standards of conduct jointly defined by citizens and
police 6.5  Even so, this strategic shift did not necessarily imply a
tactical change toward aggressive policing. Moreover, this tactical
shift departed sharply from the Wilson and Kelling and the Kelling
and Coles models of Broken Windows, as well as most contempo-
rary models of community policing. 57 As conceptualized by Kel-
ling and Coles, OMP involved the enforcement of these standards
"through non-arrest approaches-education, persuasion, counsel-
ing, and ordering-so that arrest would only be resorted to when
other approaches failed. 58
The origins of the tactical shift are revealed in strategy docu-
ments issued by the New York City Police Department ("NYPD")
in 1994.59 According to the analysis by the Office of the Attorney
General of the State of New York ("OAG Report"), these policies
remain in effect today.60 First, Police Strategy No. 5, Reclaiming the
Public Spaces of New York,61 articulates a reconstructed version of
Broken Windows theory as the driving force in the development of
policing policy. It states that the NYPD would apply its enforce-
ment efforts to "reclaim the streets" by systematically and aggres-
sively enforcing laws against low-level social disorder: graffiti,
aggressive panhandling, fare beating, public drunkenness, unli-
censed vending, public drinking, public urination, and other low-
level misdemeanor offenses.62
Second, Police Strategy No. 1, Getting Guns Off the Streets of
New York,63 formalized the strategic focus on the eradication of
gun violence through the tactical measure of intensifying efforts to
seize illegal firearms. Homicide trends in New York City since
1985 provided strong empirical support for emphasizing gun vio-
lence in enforcement policy.64 Nearly all the increases in homi-
56. KELLING & COLES, supra note 18, at 22-23.
57. See SKOGAN, supra note 20; Goldstein, supra note 46.
58. KELLING & COLES, supra note 18 at 23.
59. OAG REPORT, supra note 5.
60. Id. at 56-59.
61. POLICE STRATEGY No. 5, supra note 44.
62. This aggressive approach to low-level disorder was "the linchpin of efforts now
being undertaken by the New York City Police Department to reduce crime and fear
in the city." Id.
63. POLICE STRATEGY No. 1, supra note 25.
64. See ROBERT C. DAVIS & PEDRO MATEU-GELABERT, VERA INST. OF JUSTICE,
RESPECTFUL AND EFFECTIVE POLICING: Two EXAMPLES IN THE SOUTH BRONX 2, 3
fig.la (1999) (charting "Homicides (Murder & Non-Negligent Manslaughter), 1978-
1997") [hereinafter VERA REPORT].
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cides, robberies, and assaults during this period were attributable
to gun violence.65 The political fallout of the homicide crisis lasted
for several years more. The homicide crisis was a critical theme in
the mayoral election campaign of 1993, and focused the attention
of the incoming Giuliani administration's crime-control policy on
gun violence.66
These two policies, articulated within a relatively brief period in
the first few months of the new administration, explicitly cemented
the marriage of OMP and "gun-oriented policing '67 within policy.
The logic of this approach was articulated in a series of documents
and statements. "By working systematically and assertively to re-
duce the level of disorder in the city, the NYPD will act to under-
cut the ground on which more serious crimes seem possible and
even permissible. 68 These tactical shifts were intended to raise the
stakes for criminals who carried guns: "Stopping people on minor
infractions also made it riskier for criminals to carry guns in pub-
lic."'69 The policy assumed, quite explicitly, that would-be offend-
ers would be deterred from carrying guns since they would be more
likely to be stopped for minor crimes or infractions.
The net effect of this marriage was that Broken Windows theory
was implemented out of context. Not only was Broken Windows
theory recast from physical to social disorder, but community po-
licing and disorder policing both were separated from the theory,
reinvented, and implemented with very different tactics.7v
First, the NYPD version of disorder policing rejected the empha-
sis on alternatives to arrest and prosecution-essential tenets of
the original Broken Windows theory.71 Although correcting disor-
der was the focus of policing, the tactic to achieve it was arrest, the
most traditional of law enforcement tools. People who committed
disorder offenses were questioned and checked for outstanding
65. Fagan et al., supra note 36, at 1289, 1298, 1304.
66. See ELI SILVERMAN, NYPD BATTLES CRIME: INNOVATIVE STRATEGIES IN PO-
LICING 95 (1999); BRATrON & KNOBLER, supra note 44, at 219-20. See generally
KARMEN, supra note 36.
67. Fagan et al., supra note 36, at 1322.
68. POLICE STRATEGY No. 5, supra note 44.
69. VERA REPORT, supra note 64, at 1.
70. Waldeck, supra note 19, at 1274-75 n.89; see also Bratton, supra note 44, at
463-64. This version of community policing eschewed social work functions antitheti-
cal to the traditional definition of policing. These tactics robbed rank-and-file police
of the activities-searches and arrests-that not only were the staple of police pro-
ductivity, but also the stepladder to status on the force and advancement within the
department. Among police administrators, the emerging paradigm of community po-
licing took away their primary method of keeping order.
71. Waldeck, supra note 19, at 1274.
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warrants. Those without identification were taken to a precinct,
and many were held until fingerprint checks were completed.72 In
other words, disorder policing was used not to disrupt the develop-
mental sequence of disorder and crime, but instead disorder of-
fenses became opportunities to remove weapons and wanted
criminals from the streets.
Second, community policing also was reinvented in this mar-
riage. Community standards were no longer identified through
structured and systematic interactions between police and commu-
nity leaders. Instead, the NYPD turned to its sophisticated data-
driven management accountability system-Compstat-to identify
community needs. The result was that the locus of the standard-
setting process shifted from police-community partnerships to pre-
cinct commanders.73 Presumably, precinct commanders were still
involved in their communities, developing plans and setting priori-
ties for enforcement.74 However, the precinct commanders, who
continued to meet with community groups, were now accountable
to the NYPD's operational hierarchy for both their successes and
their failures to produce declining crime rates.75 As a result, pre-
cinct commanders set the crime-fighting priorities for that precinct
and developed overall plans of action, based on meeting NYPD
priorities, rather than the standards set in cooperation with
communities.76
C. Disorganization and Disorder: Competing Theories of
Place and Crime
For decades before Broken Windows, criminological theories
emphasized the notion of "place. ' ' 77 In the 1920s, Clifford Shaw
72. Id. at 1279. These tactics were developed and widely implemented in the
transit police under Bratton's leadership in the early 1990s. BRATrON & KNOBLER,
supra note 44, at 152.
73. BRATrON & KNOBLER, supra note 44, at 233.
74. See id.
75. Id.
76. OAG REPORT, supra note 5, at 54-56. According to the Report, accountability
was implemented through Compstat meetings. Compstat ("comparison statistics") is a
system of electronic computer mapping of weekly crime statistics within precincts and
larger police commands. Monthly Compstat sessions focus on analysis of specific
crime issues of any of the eight patrol boroughs. Each patrol bureau spans eight to ten
precincts. Commanders are asked to explain, often on the spot and in front of an
audience of the commissioner and other high ranking department personnel, changes
in crime trends in their areas. Id.
77. "Place" in the criminological literature is an enduring concept that alternately
refers to neighborhoods, larger sections of cities, or other aggregates of areas. See
generally CLIFFORD R. SHAW & HENRY D. McKAY, JUVENILE DELINQUENCY AND
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and Henry McKay showed that high rates of juvenile crime were
persistent in specific neighborhoods over time, despite changes in
the racial and ethnic composition of the persons who lived there.
Shaw and McKay concluded that place, not the characteristics of
the persons who live there, is implicated in crime. Factors such as
poverty rates, a downward skewed age distribution, racial and eth-
nic heterogeneity, and population turnover (residential mobility)
explain variations in crime rates across neighborhoods. Shaw and
McKay defined the conditions that produced persistently elevated
juvenile crime rates as social disorganization. 78
Recent revisions to this theory emphasize the social organiza-
tion-the actions of residents within neighborhoods to produce so-
cial control and realize their shared values-as protective against
high crime rates. Robert Sampson, Stephen Raudenbush, and Fel-
ton Earls reported in a study of residents in 343 Chicago neighbor-
hoods that social cohesion among neighbors is linked to lower
levels of violence, net of poverty rates, demography, or other socio-
economic factors.79 This dynamic conceptualization of neighbor-
hood emphasizes social interactions among neighborhood re-
sidents, including:
(1) the strength and interdependence of social networks; (2) the
efficacy of collective supervision that residents exercise; (3) the
personal responsibility they assume in addressing neighborhood
problems; and (4) the level of resident participation in formal
and informal organization such as churches, block clubs, and
URBAN AREAS: A STUDY OF RATES OF DELINQUENCY IN RELATION TO DIFFEREN-
TIAL CHARACTERISTICS OF LOCAL COMMUNITIES IN AMERICAN CITIES (rev. ed. 1969)
(presenting data on the stability of delinquency rates in Chicago neighborhoods
across generations of residents of changing composition); ROBERT J. BURSIK JR. &
HAROLD G. GRASMICK, NEIGHBORHOODS AND CRIME: THE DIMENSIONS OF EFFEC-
TIVE COMMUNITY CONTROL (1993) (articulating a systemic theory of delinquency that
includes elements of the physical attributes of neighborhoods, their social composi-
tion and demography, and the institutions that are influential for the people who live
there); Robert J. Sampson & Janet Lauritsen, Violent victimization and offending: Indi-
vidual-, Situational-, and Community-Level Risk Factors, in UNDERSTANDING AND
PREVENTING VIOLENCE 1 (Albert J. Reiss Jr. & Jeffrey A. Roth, eds. 1994) (review-
ing empirical studies that show a relationship between individuals and communities or
neighborhoods and delinquency rates).
78. SHAW & McKAY, supra note 77, at 383-87. Recent studies show that these
factors are stable explanations over time of variations in crime and violence rates
across cities and larger ecological aggregates. Kenneth Land et al., Structural
Covariates of Homicide Rates: Are There any Invariances Across Time and Space?, 95
AM. J. Soc. 922 (1990).
79. Robert J. Sampson et al., Neighborhoods and Violent Crime: A Multilevel
Study of Collective Efficacy, SCIENCE, Aug. 15, 1997, at 918 (examining neighbor-
hoods in a way that ensured diversity by race, ethnicity, and class).
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PTAs. The idea is that community-level social processes such as
the level of supervision of teenage peer groups, the prevalence
of friendship networks, and the level of residential participation
in formal organizations, mediate the link often noted between
individual-level factors, such as race and socioeconomic status,
and crime.80
As Tracey Meares and others point out, the conditions that char-
acterize poor, minority, inner-city communities generally conform
to a place-based social organization model of crime. In urban ar-
eas, many poor people of color live in conditions of residential seg-
regation, concentrated poverty, and unemployment that predict the
81 ibreakdown of community social processes, which in turn predict
elevated crime rates.8 2 For example, many poor African Ameri-
cans live in the overwhelmingly poor communities marked by un-
employment, family dislocation, and high residential turnover.8 3
The challenges to social control in socially disorganized neighbor-
hoods are greater for blacks and Hispanics than for whites.8,4
Social disorganization also predicts social and physical disorder.
Both theoretically and empirically, disorder and disorganization
are confounded. In the study of Chicago neighborhoods by Samp-
son and colleagues, they included in regression models measures
traditionally associated with social disorganization theory to pre-
dict disorder in census tracts .8  Neighborhood characteristics in-
cluding concentrated disadvantage 86  and weak social ties
(collective efficacy) were significant predictors of the rates of disor-
der. Disorder, however, did not predict rates of homicide, and only
80. Tracey Meares, Place and Crime, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 669, 673 (1998); see
also Robert J. Sampson & William Julius Wilson, Toward a Theory of Race, Crime,
and Urban Inequality, in CRIME AND INEQUALITY 37, 45-48 (John Hagan & Ruth D.
Peterson eds., 1995); Sampson et al., supra note 79.
81. MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 17, at 130-31.
82. Sampson & Wilson, supra note 80; see also Robert J. Sampson, Urban Black
Violence: The Effect of Male Joblessness and Family Disruption, 93 AM. J. SOCIOLOGY
348 (1987) (discussing the effect of family disruption on crime independent of jobless-
ness and welfare receipt).
83. MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 17, at 166-67; WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, THE
TRULY DISADVANTAGED: THE INNER CITY, THE UNDERCLASS, AND PUBLIC POLICY
20-62 (1987); JAMES SHORT, POVERTY, ETHNICITY AND VIOLENT CRIME (1997).
84. Meares, supra note 80, at 673-74; Sampson & Wilson, supra note 80, at 42
("[R]acial differences in poverty and family disruption are so strong that the 'worst'
urban contexts in which whites reside are considerably better than the average con-
text of black communities."). See generally Sampson et al., supra note 79.
85. Sampson & Raudenbush, supra note 20, at 633-36, and tbl.6.
86. Id. This measure included tract-level rates of poverty and unemployment, sin-
gle parent households, and receipt of public assistance. Racial concentration of blacks
was a moderate contributor to the empirical derivation of this construct.
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weakly predicted rates of robbery. After controlling for these
neighborhood characteristics, the relationship between disorder
and crime disappeared for four of their five empirical tests.87
Accordingly, social disorganization predicts crime and disorder,
but disorder does not predict crime after controlling statistically for
the effects of social disorganization. Sampson and colleagues con-
clude that: "Contrary to the Broken Windows theory ... the rela-
tionship between public disorder and crime is spurious" for most
crimes, and is weakly associated only with the crime of robbery.88
Disorder is only a moderate predictor of robbery, and it co-varies
with other neighborhood characteristics such as concentrated dis-
advantage. Disorder may have a cascading effect on antecedents
of crime-encouraging business migration, for example-but it has
very weak indirect effects on crime itself. Sampson and colleagues
concluded that disorder takes a back seat to other factors, includ-
ing structural disadvantage and social ties, in explaining crime
rates. Controlling crime through disorder policing is, in their
words, "simplistic and largely misplaced." 89 Disorder policing, or
OMP, leaves the causes of crime untouched.
H. AGGRESSIVE POLICING: OMP, STREET STOPS, AND RACE
Under the tactical shift to order-maintenance policing in New
York City, patrol was reinvented to include pro-active interdiction
of persons suspected of violating both minor and serious crimes.90
The importance of stop and frisk interventions to crime fighting
was never formally acknowledged in official documents, but has
been discussed in detail by the policy's architects and theorists.
Kelling and Coles claim that for OMP to be successful, patrol of-
ficers should intervene in observed or suspected low-level
disorder.91
Critics claim that OMP tactics increased the opportunity for
pretextual stops leading to searches and arrests.92 Stops for minor
87. Id. at 637.
88. Id. at 603, 636-37.
89. Id. at 638.
90. OAG REPORT, supra note 5, at 56-57.
91. KELLING & COLES, supra note 18, at 243-48; OAG REPORT, supra note 5, at
57; Waldeck, supra note 19, at 1282-83; accord James Q. Wilson, Just Take Their Guns
Away, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Mar. 20, 1994, at 47 (stating that police should make street
stop and frisks in order to find persons carrying illegal weapons, without stating a
legal or practical rationale for these stops).
92. Waldeck, supra note 19, at 1282 ("Nor is there any doubt that the police use
quality-of-life offenses as excuses to fish for drugs, guns, or evidence of a more serious
crime.").
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crimes or infractions were easier to justify under a lower constitu-
tional standard (i.e., "reasonable suspicion") than stops for more
serious offenses. Accordingly, OMP stops provided opportunities
for police to check for warrants, and, again under reasonable suspi-
cion standards, search suspects for contraband or weapons, and
make arrests. Many such offenses-such as public drinking or loi-
tering-take place in public, making their observation easier and
an encounter with the putatively offending citizen more likely.
The result was a vast increase in misdemeanor arrests, but also a
sharp decline in their quality and sustainability in court. OMP has
been activated through vast increases in misdemeanor arrests of
adults, increasing from 129,404 in 1993 (the year prior to OMP im-
plementation) to 181,736 in 1996, and 215,158 in 1998.93 But the
evidentiary quality of arrests suffered as their number rose. As ar-
rests increased under OMP, the rate at which prosecutors declined
to pursue these cases rose dramatically. In 1998, prosecutors dis-
missed 18,000 of the 345,000 misdemeanor and felony arrests, ap-
proximately twice the number dismissed in 1993.9' Overall, more
than 140,000 cases completed in 1998 ended in dismissals, an in-
crease of 60% compared with 1993.95 Prosecutors say that refusals
to prosecute as well as the high dismissal rate can indicate a decline
in the quality of arrest.9 6 Many of the declined cases, known as
"declined prosecutions" or "D.P.s" in the court, came from
predominantly minority neighborhoods, the focus of OMP ef-
forts.97 The punitive component of the D.P.s. and dismissed ar-
rests-being taken into custody, handcuffed, transported, booked,
often strip-searched, and jailed overnight-impregnates these
events with its own social meaning quite different from the origins
of Broken Windows theory.
93. Div. OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE SERVS., STATE OF N.Y., CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN-
DICATORS: NEW YORK CITY, 1995-1999, at http://criminaljustice.state.ny.us/crimnet/
cjsa/areastat/areastat.htm (using search parameters: "Region: New York City," years
1995-1999) [hereinafter CJI: NEW YORK CITY].
94. Ford Fessenden & David Rohde, Dismissed Before Reaching Court: Flawed
Arrests Rise in New York, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 23, 1999, at Al (citing the sharp rise in
the number of arrests that prosecutors declined to prosecute in 1998). The number of
cases rejected by prosecutors rose by 41% in the Bronx and 23% in Manhattan, even
as the crime rate declined sharply in the same year. Approximately fifty persons each
day were arrested and booked, but then released-many spending a night in jail
before their cases were dismissed. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
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Analyses of 1998 police stop and frisk reports-UF-250s-
showed that OMP policing had drifted from street stops in quality
of life crimes to widespread stops of citizens in search of guns.98
Stop and frisk actions became the primary method for removing
illegal handguns from the street. The OAG Report showed that
from January 1998 through March 1999, weapons possession was
suspected in more than one-third of documented stop and frisk
encounters. 99
The OAG Report also showed that the reconstructed OMP pol-
icy was implemented in a manner that was not race-neutral. The
OAG Report showed that stops were disproportionately concen-
trated in the city's poorest neighborhoods, neighborhoods with
high concentrations of racial minorities. Table 1 below shows the
percentage of stops, according to the distribution of minority popu-
lations in the precincts. In precincts with the highest concentra-
tions of minorities, stops of black and Hispanic suspects were
highest (by percentage), as might be expected. However, in the
thirteen precincts with the lowest minority populations, 100 stops of
blacks and Hispanics were well above what their population per-
centage would predict. In those precincts, 30% of the persons
"stopped" were black, more than ten times greater than their per-
centage of the overall population of those precincts. 10 1 Hispanics
comprised 23.4% of the persons "stopped," more than three times
their population share. Whites make up 80% of the population of
those precincts, but only 41.5% of the persons "stopped." Even in
precincts where neighborhoods had the lowest minority concentra-
tion, whites were stopped less. The pattern invokes an enduring
empirical fact in criminological research: police officers are more
likely to treat as suspicious persons who seem out of place from
their surroundings. 1°2 To police officers, race serves as a marker of
98. OAG REPORT, supra note 5, at tbl.I.B.3.
99. Id. The Street Crime Unit was disproportionately responsible for the use of
stop and frisk actions to search for guns. During the fifteen month study period in the
OAG Report, the Street Crime Unit ("SCU") had a "particular emphasis on recover-
ing illegal firearms." Its 435 officers (out of nearly 40,000 in the NYPD) effected more
than 10% of all documented stop and frisk encounters citywide. Id. at 58-59.
100. Id. at tbl.I.A.2.
101. Id. The OAG Report established the population of each precinct, using census
data for day and night populations. Id. at 96.
102. JONATHAN RUBINSTEIN, CITY POLICE 225 (1973); John van Maanen, Working
the Street: A Developmental View of Police Behavior, in THE POTENTIAL FOR REFORM
OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 83, 118 (Herbert Jacobs, ed. 1974).
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where people "belong," and racial incongruity as a marker of
suspicion. 10 3
TABLE 1. DISTRIBUTION OF STOPS BY RACE OF SUSPECT AND
RACIAL COMPOSITION OF PRECINCT (MANDATED REPORT
STOPS ONLY) 104
% Hispanic
Population in Precinct % 'Black Population in the Precinct
Over 40% 10% to 40% Under 10%
Over 40% 57.0 38.0 17.1
38.8 55.1 67.0
3.3 4.9 10.1
(4) (11) (3)
20% to 40% 74.6 31.6 29.5
19.2 52.0 40.8
2.9 12.7 22.3
(2) (6) (6)
10% to 20% 84.8 56.9 22.9
11.0 22.2 40.1
2.9 18.2 26.3
(8) (9) (5)
Less than 10% 91.6 74.7 30.0
4.6 8.0 23.4
2.0 15.4 41.5
(6) (2) (13)
Legend % Black Suspects
% Hispanic Suspects
% White Suspects
(Number of Precincts)
Racial incongruity is one of several patterns observed in the
OAG Report that depict the racial component of OMP in New
York. The ratio of 9.5 stops of black citizens for each arrest made
was 20% higher than the 7.9 ratio for whites.10 5 Such higher stop-
arrest ratios suggest either that stops for blacks were pretextual
and largely unfounded, or that police were less discriminating or
skillful in assessing "suspicion" for minority citizens.
Stops, alone or in proportion to the population, tell only part of
the story. The NYPD points out, for example, that the higher stop
103. Stephen Mastrofski et al., Race and Every-Day Policing: A Research Perspec-
tive, Presented at the 12th International Congress on Criminology, Seoul, Aug. 24-29,
1998. Anthony C. Thompson reminds us that racial incongruity was one of the mark-
ers that aroused the suspicion of Officer McFadden in the original Terry case. See
generally Thompson, supra note 17, at 962-73 (discussing the racial dimensions of the
original Terry case and the centrality of race to Fourth Amendment jurisprudence).
104. OAG REPORT, supra note 5, at tbl.I.A.2.
105. Id. at tbl.I.B.2.
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rate for minorities reflects higher participation of blacks and His-
panics in crimes, especially in the city's highest crime neighbor-
hoods. Using crime data on race- and crime-specific arrest rates
within precincts, the OAG Report estimated the extent to which
race- and crime-specific stops were predicted by crime, or whether
actual stop rates exceeded the predicted stop rates. The results
show that crime rates only partially explain stop rates overall, and
fail to explain the rates at which minority citizens are "stopped" by
the NYPD. After controlling for race- and crime-specific crime
rates and the population composition of the precinct, the results
showed that black and Hispanic citizens were significantly more
likely to be stopped than were white citizens. °6 The overall differ-
ences between races were statistically significant, and were signifi-
cant specifically for stops where the suspected crime was either
violence or weapons possession. 10 7
Table 2 illustrates the exponentiated coefficients-or compara-
tive odds-from these models, showing the magnitude of the dif-
ferences for each race- and crime-specific stop rate. This table only
includes stops where reports were mandated by NYPD policy. The
results are divided into three sections, according to the precinct's
black population. This display illustrates the importance of con-
centration effects. Each coefficient shows the stop-rate adjusted
for the crime rate, disaggregated by race of suspect and suspected
crime. In other words, each table shows the rate at which blacks,
Hispanics, and whites were "stopped" in proportion to the rate at
which they were arrested for each crime type. Comparing the coef-
ficient by race illustrates the magnitude of the differences between
races.
106. Id. at tbl.I.C.1.
107. Id.
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TABLE 2. LOG ODDS OF RACE- AND CRIME-SPECIFIC STOP
RATES, CONTROLLING FOR 1997 RACE- AND CRIME-SPECIFIC
ARREST RATES, BY BLACK POPULATION IN PRECINCT
(MANDATED REPORT STOPS ONLY)' 0 8
Black Population in Precinct: Less Than 10%
Suspected Crime
Race of Suspect Violent Weapon Property Drug
Black 0.37 2.17 0.26 0.10
Hispanic 0.32 1.87 0.39 0.11
White 0.11 0.97 0.33 0.10
Black Population in Precinct: From 10% to 40%
Suspected Crime
Race of Suspect Violent Weapon Property Drug
Black 0.36 2.12 0.25 0.09
Hispanic 0.31 1.83 0.38 0.10
White 0.17 0.95 0.32 0.10
Black Population in Precinct: Greater Than 40%
Suspected Crime
Race of Suspect Violent Weapon Property Drug
Black 0.30 1.76 0.21 0.08
Hispanic 0.26 1.52 0.31 0.09
White 0.14 0.79 0.27 0.08
For example, Table 2 shows that in precincts where the black
population was less than 10%, blacks were 2.17 times more likely
to be stopped for weapons offenses compared to the arrest rate for
blacks for that crime. Whites were 0.97 times more likely to be
stopped compared to the arrest rate for whites for that crime.
Comparing the coefficients, blacks were more than twice as likely
(2.17/0.97) to be stopped as whites for weapons offenses, relative to
their race-specific arrest rates for that crime.
The comparisons throughout this table show the elevated rates at
which blacks and Hispanics were stopped for suspected violence
and weapons offenses as compared to stop rates for whites. In pre-
cincts with more than 40% black population, the black-white ratios
were still more than twice as high for violent crimes (0.3/0.14) and
nearly three times higher (1.76/0.79) for weapons offenses. The
Hispanic-white ratios in these precincts were comparably dispro-
portionate for stops for violent crimes (0.26/0.14) and for weapons
offenses (1.52/0.79). The disparities were confined to these two
crime types. The coefficients were either comparable or lower for
108. See id. at Appendix tbl.l.C.1.
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whites where stops related to alleged drug or property crimes, re-
gardless of precinct demography.
The higher-than-predicted stop rates of minorities suggest that
the police had cast suspicion more often-than would be predicted
by their crime participation-on the city's minority population.10 9
Although race may not be determinative in the decision to stop a
suspect, race certainly appeared to be a motivating factor in the
patterns of stop. and frisk interventions. The prominence of race in
the decision to stop citizens may not rise to the threshold of racial
profiling, but it does seem to create a racial classification of
"suspicion."
To assess whether that suspicion met Terry standards of "reason-
able suspicion," the OAG Report examined the stop rationales ar-
ticulated by police officers on the UF-250 stop report form. The
researchers examined the reasons that police officers provided for
"stopping" civilians, and estimated the rate at which the reasons, as
stated, met Fourth Amendment standards of "reasonable suspi-
cion." The narrative rationales for "stops" came from a citywide
sample of 10,000 coded and analyzed UF-250 forms from eight pre-
cincts plus a supplemental sample of cases across all precincts. 110
The narratives were coded into sixty-seven categories, and the
OAG staff then determined whether the stated rationale in each
category met Terry standards of "reasonable suspicion.""' These
codes were then collapsed into seven categories, or rationales,
which were determined as either meeting or failing to meet Terry
standards." 2
Table 3, adopted from the OAG Report, shows that in nearly
two-thirds of the stops, the articulated "reasonable suspicion" for
the stop met Terry standards, and that racial disparities were small.
However, stops of black suspects more often failed to meet Terry
109. Id. at 126-27.
110. Id. at 135-36. The researchers coded rationales for a citywide sample plus a
supplemental sample of specifically chosen precincts. For the individual precinct sam-
ple, a purposive sample of eight precincts was selected-the 79th, 42nd, 30th, 43rd,
33rd, 107th, 72nd, and the 19th-based on variation in stop rates and population pa-
rameters. For each precinct, approximately half of the UF-250 forms were randomly
sampled. In all, 4383 UF-250 forms were randomly sampled for the citywide analysis,
including 3282 stops where reports were "mandated." Id. at 158-60.
111. Id. at 145, tbl.II.A.1.
112. Id. at 135-60, tbl.II.A.2. Categories where rationales were sufficient to meet
Terry standards were: (1) crime observed, (2) suspect fit description, (3) weapon ob-
served, (4) suspicious activity plus other criterion behavior. Categories where ratio-
nales failed to meet Terry standards included: (1) suspicious activity and (2) suspect in
wrong place. Id. at tbl.II.A.2.
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standards (15.4%) than did stops of whites (11.3%). In contrast,
there were only minimal differences between stops involving His-
panic and whites suspects.
TABLE 3. ASSESSMENT OF TERRY RATIONALES FOR STOPS BY
RACE OF SUSPECT, CITYWIDE SAMPLE (MANDATED REPORT
STOPS ONLY) 1 1 3
Assessment of Reasonable
Suspicion Standard Race of Person Stopped
Black Hispanic White Other Total
Facts, as stated, articulate 1,172 690 192 60 2,114
reasonable suspicion 64.3% 65.4% 60.4% 69.8% 64.4%
Facts, as stated, do not articulate 281 133 36 9 459
reasonable suspicion 15.4% 12.6% 11.3% 10.5% 14.0%
Insufficient information 370 232 90 17 709
20.3% 32.7% 28.3% 19.8% 21.6%
Total 1,823 1,055 318 86 3,282
The pattern of evidence in the OAG Report suggests that race
evidently became a factor in "everyday policing" in New York City
under OMP. Working within a legally permissible but lower stan-
dard of "reasonable" racial discrimination, where a second moti-
vating factor (such as "reasonable suspicion") may be present,
police over-stopped black and Hispanic citizens relative to their
crime participation, well in excess of their white neighbors, and
more often without constitutional justification. Black citizens in
particular tend to generalize these experiences, with potentially
toxic consequences for their perception of the legitimacy of the
law. 114 Disproportionate stops of black citizens is an important
"race-making" factor, 115 generalized through the sense of linked
fate that many blacks share." 6 It conveys social stigma and under-
113. See id. at tbl.II.B.4.
114. Tracey Maclin, Race and the Fourth Amendment, 51 VAND. L. REV. 333, 386
(1998) ("Blacks correctly see pretextual traffic stops as another sign that police of-
ficers view blacks, particularly black males, as criminals who deserve singular scrutiny
and treatment as second class citizens."). See generally David A. Harris, "Driving
While Black" and All Other Traffic Offenses: The Supreme Court and Pretextual Traf-
fic Stops, 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 544, 571 (1997).
115. This term is borrowed from Professor David James, who has written of the
ghetto as a "race-making situation." James, supra note 24, at 420-28.
116. DAWSON, supra note 24, at 77 (using the "linked fate" concept to explain the
way that African Americans perceive what is in their individual self interest). Exper-
iences such as "stop and frisk" encounters could easily undermine the social meaning
of the OMP strategy. Id. at 80-84; see also JEFFREY FAGAN & TRACEY L. MEARES,
PUNISHMENT, DETERRENCE AND SOCIAL CONTROL: THE PARADOX OF PUNISHMENT
IN MINORITY COMMUNITIES (2000) (discussing how the perceived illegitimacy of the
criminal justice system in the African American and Hispanic communities has kept
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mines the perceived and attributed legitimacy of law and legal in-
stitutions necessary to promote compliance with the law. The harm
to individuals stopped but not arrested cannot be discounted in a
social framework where events and experiences are linked in this
manner.
117
HI. RESOLVING COMPETING THEORETICAL CLAIMS ABOUT
STOP AND FRISK ACTIVITY: EMPIRICAL RESULTS
Returning to OMP in New York City, then, we can ask whether
the emphasis on disorder was, in fact, a strategy focused on polic-
ing poor people rather than disordered places. Of course, at the
neighborhood level, race interacts with other neighborhood fac-
tors, ones that also correlate with social and physical disorder." 8
In the reconstructed Broken Windows theory that informed OMP
in New York City, social disorder, or person-focused tactics, re-
placed physical disorder, or place-based tactics.. Empirical evi-
dence shows that the epidemiology of stop and frisk actions in turn
was concentrated among minority persons in poor neighbor-
hoods. 9 Accordingly, it appears that place was, switched for race
in the reality of OMP. Thus, what began as policing informed by a
nuanced Broken Windows theory, in fact reflects criminological
theories focused on social disorganization.
This raises two questions for understanding the racial patterns of
policing. First, what are the net effects of race on patterns of polic-
ing after we control for disorder? If OMP was in fact targeted at
disorder, race differences at the neighborhood level should disap-
pear after we introduce measures of disorder. Unlike, for example,
race-explicit drug-courier profiles, OMP should be racially and
facially neutral once we control for the level of disorder in the
neighborhood.
crime rates steady despite harsher sentencing), http://papers2.ssrn.com/paper.
taf?abstract-id=223148.
117. William J. Stuntz, Terry's Impossibility, 72 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 1213, 1218
(1998) (summarizing harms from encounters of innocent citizens with police, includ-
ing violations of privacy, public shame at being singled out and treated like a criminal
suspect, the emotional damage of discrimination, and the potential for police violence
and physical injury).
118. Sampson & Raudenbush, supra note 20. See generally ROBERT J. BURSIK, JR.
& HAROLD GRASMICK, NEIGHBORHOODS AND CRIME: THE DIMENSIONS OF EFFEC-
TIVE COMMUNITY CONTROL (1993).
119. OAG REPORT, supra note 5, at 92-94 (citing New York City Police Commis-
sioner Howard Safir's statement that minorities are more likely to be "stopped" be-
cause they live in high crime neighborhoods with an increased police presence).
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Second, if disorder itself is predicted by neighborhood or ecolog-
ical characteristics, factors that also are correlated with race, are
these other factors significant predictors of stop and frisk patterns
after we control for disorder? While some neighborhood charac-
teristics are correlated with disorder, these factors also are part of
competing theoretical explanations, explanations that are based on
characteristics of persons, rather than places. Accordingly, we
question whether OMP produces the dramatic racial disparities re-
ported in the OAG Report because of the characteristics of people
who live in the neighborhood, or whether these disparities reflect
policing targeted in fact at disorder. Analytically, we can compare
these two explanations to estimate the ecological locus of racial
policing. The results of this competition follow, where we present
findings of empirical tests designed to assess these competing
claims about the theoretical meaning of OMP in New York City.
A. Social and Physical Disorder
Data on the social organization and physical characteristics of
neighborhoods were obtained from the 1999 New York City Hous-
ing and Vacancy Survey ("HVS").120 The HVS is sponsored by the
New York City Department of Housing Preservation and Develop-
ment ("HPD") 12 1 to comply with New York State and New York
City's rent regulation laws. It is conducted every three years with
respondents in a stratified random sample of New York City hous-
ing units. The sample is based on housing units recorded in the
decennial census, and updated every three years as part of the enu-
meration process preceding the HVS. The HVS emulates the pop-
ulation dimensions of the decennial census and generates measures
of household and person characteristics for the city.122
120. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, DEP'T OF COMMERCE, 1999 NEW YORK CITY HOUSING
AND VACANCY SURVEY (1999), at http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/nychvs.html
[hereinafter NYC HOUSING SURVEY].
121. THE GREEN BOOK: OFFICIAL DIRECTORY OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK (2000)
(providing names and contact information for HPD). The Department of Housing
Preservation and Development is responsible for setting and administering housing
policy in the city, including development of urban renewal programs, enforcement of
civil codes for housing, management of city-owned properties, rehabilitation of aban-
doned buildings, and construction of low-income housing.
122. NYC HOUSING SURVEY, supra note 120, at Overview, http://www.census.gov/
hhes/www/housing/nychvs/overview.html. Differences between the 1999 HVS and the
1990 census include interviewing procedures, staff experience and training, processing
procedures, sample design, the sampling variability associated with the HVS and the
sample data from the census, and the non-sampling errors associated with the HVS
and the census.
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The sample includes "vacant available for rent" units as well as
occupied units. Both public and privately owned housing units, as
well as in rem units,'123 are included. The public-use data set is
made available by the U.S. Census Bureau, and includes weights to
generate estimates of households and persons for the city. The re-
sponse rate in the 1999 survey sample of 18,180 was 94%. Inter-
views were conducted between January and May, 1999 by "field
representatives" hired by HPD. 24
Measures of physical disorder and social structure were aggre-
gated from individual-level responses in the HVS to sub-boroughs.
The residential location of each respondent is coded to the bor-
ough (county) and the community district ("CD"), or sub-borough.
CD's are administrative units of each borough; there are fifty-five
in the city. Members of the councils of each CD meet periodically
to assist city agencies in zoning and other regulatory planning func-
tions. Sub-boroughs include one or two police precincts.
Measures of physical disorder in the sub-borough were com-
puted from responses to items regarding the physical condition of
the dwelling and the neighborhood. Respondents were asked to
report whether there was damage or disrepair in the exterior walls
and windows, stairwells and stairways, and floors. Respondents
also were asked to report generally on the condition of other dwell-
ings in their neighborhood: the presence of broken or boarded up
windows, and whether the building was "deteriorated" or "dilapi-
dated.' 12' Responses were aggregated to the sub-borough level to
measure the percentage of housing units with these characteristics.
To avoid redundancy among the disorder variables, a principle
components factor analysis with varimax rotation 26 was completed
to reduce the variables to a single dimension. The model yielded
123. In rem housing units are housing units that are acquired and owned by the
City of New York following tax forfeitures or failure to pay other charges such as
correcting violations of the housing codes. NYC HOUSING SURVEY, supra note 120, at
H-2, Definitions of Rent Regulation Status, http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/hous-
ing/nychvs/defin99.html.
124. NYC HOUSING SURVEY, supra note 120, at Overview. Interviews were con-
ducted to elicit information about the demographic characteristics of each household
member, and the housing characteristics of the dwelling.
125. NYC HOUSING SURVEY, supra note 120, at Glossary, http://www.census.gov/
hhes/www/housing/nychvs/gloss99.html. For vacant units, responses were recorded by
the HPD field representatives.
126. "Varimax rotation" is a statistical procedure that permits the extraction of dis-
tinct factors or dimensions from a set of highly correlated variables, and assumes that
the factors do not overlap statistically or conceptually. GERHARD ARMINGER ET AL.,
HANDBOOK OF STATISTICAL MODELING FOR THE SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL SCI-
ENCES 205-6 (1995).
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one factor explaining 85.9% of the variance. Factor coefficients
ranged from 0.865 to 0.959, indicating uniform loading and high
multicollinearity. Because of its conceptual clarity and importance
to the construction of "physical disorder," we used the "broken
windows" variable as the measure of disorder.127
Measures of social disorganization were computed using similar
procedures. Both household and person characteristics were con-
structed by aggregating individual responses to sub-boroughs.
Means and variances for the measures are shown in Appendix A,
infra. A principle components factor analysis with varimax rota-
tion was again completed and yielded three factors that explained
74.0% of the variance. The first factor describes neighborhoods
characterized by concentrations of persons with low education,
persons under- or unemployed, households receiving public assis-
tance, households with Hispanic residents, and female-headed
households. These neighborhoods also were characterized by low
white population. The second factor describes neighborhoods with
high racial fragmentation (racial heterogeneity) 128 and high con-
centrations of male population. These neighborhoods also were
characterized by low black population. The third factor describes
neighborhoods characterized by high concentrations of immigrants
and residential mobility. 29
These three factors reflect the classic dimensions of social disor-
ganization. 130 The variables within factors were highly correlated,
again permitting selection of specific variables to represent each
factor. For conceptual clarity and theoretical specificity, we chose
specific variables as measures of social disorganization: the percent
of households with one or more persons receiving public assis-
tance, racial fragmentation, and residential mobility.' Because of
the importance of immigration to the social composition of New
York City, 3 2 we included as a predictor the percentage of house-
127. Analyses available from authors.
128. See CHARLES LEWIS TAYLOR & MICHAEL C. HUDSON, WORLD HANDBOOK
OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL INDICATORS 216 (2d ed. 1972). Racial fragmentation is a
measure of the racial heterogeneity within an area, and is computed as:
1 - ((P)2)
Where P = proportion of each race within the spatial unit.
129. Id.
130. SHAW & McKAY, supra note 77, at 183-89; SHORT, supra note 83, at 55; see
Sampson & Lauritsen, supra note 77, at 1, 51-75; Meares, supra note 80, at 673.
131. SHAW & McKAY, supra note 77, at 32, 37, 205.
132. I. M. Miyares & K. S. Gowen, Recreating Boundaries: The Geography of
Latin American Immigrants to New York City, CLAG YEARBOOK 2431 (1998); see
Arun Peter Lobo et al., Immigration to the New York Metropolitan Region in the
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hold heads who were born outside the U.S. We also included two
additional measures that are predictors of crime rates at the com-
munity level: the housing vacancy rate133 and the percentage of
housing units in the area that are public housing.1 34
Finally, we included a global measure of crime in the sub-bor-
ough: the count of 1997 arrests within each precinct, aggregated to
the sub-borough. Arrest counts, published in the GAG Report,135
were obtained by the GAG from the New York State Division of
Criminal Justice Services. State crime counts include "finger-print-
able" crimes, or crimes that are punishable by jail or prison
sentences.
B. Stops and Arrests
Counts and rates of stops and arrests within precincts were com-
piled from data published by the GAG.136 In addition to stop
counts, the ratio of stops to arrests was computed for each precinct
and each type of crime. Cases involving stops that occurred from
January 1998 - March 1999 were included. The data tables were
compiled by the GAG from files created by the NYPD from UF-
250 forms. 137 UF-250 forms are completed by officers following
1990's, in MIGRATION WORLD, Volume XXVII, No. 5. (1999); ARUN PETER LOBO ET
AL., THE NEWEST NEW YORKERS 1990-1994: AN ANALYSIS OF IMMIGRATION TO
NYC IN THE EARLY 1990s (1996); I. M. Miyares, Little Odessa: Brighton Beach,
Brooklyn: An Examination of the Former Soviet Refugee Economy in New York City,
19 URB. GEOGRAPHY 518 (1998).
133. See Ralph B. Taylor, The Impact of Crime on Communities, 539 THE ANNALS
OF THE AMER. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCIENCE 28 (1995).
134. E.g., TAMARA DUMANOVSKY ET AL., THE NEIGHBORHOOD CONTEXT OF
CRIME IN NYC's PUBLIC HOUSING PROJECTS (1999) (manuscript on file with author);
TERENCE DUNWORTH & AARON SAIGER, NAT'L INST. OF JUSTICE, SUMMARY:
DRUGS AND CRIME IN PUBLIC HOUSING: A THREE-CITY ANALYSIS, at viii (1994);
Harold Holzman, Criminological Research on Public Housing: Toward a Better Un-
derstanding of People, Places and Spaces, 42 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 361 (1996).
135. OAG REPORT, supra note 5, at tbl.I.C.3; see also id. at 120 n. 25 (explaining
that arrest counts for 1997 were used-instead of 1998 arrest data-to avoid autocor-
relation between stops and arrests that both occurred in 1998). Arrest counts are pref-
erable to crime complaint data, since many types of crime (such as drug crimes or
minor property crimes) are not reported in citizen complaints to the police. Id. at 121.
In addition, complaints often include crimes with no suspect information, while ar-
rests include information on the demographic characteristics of the suspect. See id.
136. Id. at tbl.I.C.3. Race-specific rates for the total number of stops were com-
puted from the percentages included in the table. The race-specific ratios of stops to
arrests were computed from data in tbl.I.B.1 and I.B.2, and Appendix tbl.I.B.1 and
I.B.2. tbl.I.B.2 also included data on weapons stops by race.
137. Id. at 88.
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each stop event.13 8 Both global stops and arrests were analyzed, as
well as stops where the suspect was alleged to have a weapon.
Weapons stops were analyzed separately because of the heavy em-
phasis on the control of gun violence in the formulation and imple-
mentation of NYPD policy. 139
The analyses included only stops where a UF-250 form was man-
dated. NYPD policy mandates that officers complete a UF-250
under four specific circumstances: when (1) force is used in the
course of the stop; (2) the suspect is frisked (i.e., pat down) and/or
searched during the course of the stop; 140 (3) the suspect is ar-
rested; or (4) the suspect refuses to identify him or herself.14' Non-
mandated reports also were submitted during this time, but compli-
ance with reporting requirements when reports were not mandated
was uneven, raising reliability problems in assessing the consistency
of these reports across precincts. 142
138. Id. at 63 (describing the UF-250 form and the NYPD policies regulating the
filing of these reports). Although initially designed as a tool for investigation, comple-
tion of the UF-250 form has been required by the NYPD Patrol Guide since 1986. Id.
at 65. In 1997, the police commissioner assigned a high priority to filing UF-250s. N.Y.
CITY POLICE DEP'T, PATROL GUIDE: PROCEDURE No. 116-33 (effective Nov. 14,
1986) (detailing policy police officers, in certain circumstances, to document stop and
frisk street encounters on the UF-250 form) [hereinafter PATROL GUIDE].
139. For a discussion of the policy, see POLICE STRATEGY No. 1, supra note 25, and
OAG REPORT, supra note 5, at 53. The memo described the NYPD's plan to reduce
gun violence by intensified efforts to find and seize illegal firearms. Guns and violent
crime also were a primary focus of the NYPD's Street Crime Unit ("SCU"), an elite
unit of plain-clothes officers tasked to "hot spots" of concentrated criminal activity.
The SCU's "mission" is to "effect the arrests of violent street criminals, with a particu-
lar emphasis on recovering illegal firearms." OAG REPORT, supra note 5, at 53 n.32
(citing Police Commissioner Howard Safir, Statement Before the New York City
Council Public Safety Committee (Apr. 19, 1999)) [hereinafter Safir Statement].
140. That is, searches inside his or her clothing.
141. PATROL GUIDE, supra note 138; OAG REPORT, supra note 5, at 63-64.
142. Analyses in the OAG Report show that whites were over-represented in cases
involving non-mandated reports. OAG REPORT, supra note 5, at 95 n.9. Although
whites comprised 12.9% of all cases and 10.4% of cases where reports were required,
whites comprised 19.3% of cases where a form was not mandated. However, comple-
tion of non-mandated reports varied from precinct to precinct, when compared as a
ratio to the number of stops with mandated reports. See id. at tbl.I.A.1. The OAG
Report constructed two scenarios to explain the racial disparity in non-mandated re-
ports. In one scenario, "the police completed non-mandated UF-250's for 'stops' of
minorities and non-minorities at the same rate, but [found] that 'stops' of whites were
less likely to rise to the more intrusive level of force, a frisk or an arrest." Id. at 95 n.9.
In the second scenario, "the police were more likely to ... complet[e] a UF-250 form
... in a non-mandated situation when the person 'stopped' was white." Id. In either
scenario, analyzing only mandated report cases-which by definition are more intru-
sive-would show greater racial disparity than would an analysis of all cases. Id.
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C. Results
Two dimensions of police stops of citizens were computed to test
the hypothesis that crime rates alone do not explain differences in
stop rates by race or type of crime. First, comparisons of stop rates
by race and type of crime are shown in Table 4.143 Stop rates by
race and type of crime are shown, and the overall race-specific
crime rate is shown as a basis of comparison. We used the 1997
race-specific crime counts to compute a per capita stop rate over
the fifteen month interval. The results show large disparities by
race. Stop rates were nearly five times higher for blacks compared
to non-Hispanic whites, and four times higher for Hispanics. 44
The citywide stop rate is heavily weighted by the concentration of
stops among blacks and Hispanics. The disparities by race are con-
sistent across crime types, and the heaviest disparities between
stops of black and white citizens. For violence and weapons, stops
of blacks occur at a rate ten times higher than the rate for whites,
and more than twice as high as the rate for Hispanics. Disparities
remain for other crime types, but are narrower. Comparisons of
race-specific stop rates per 1000 population to arrest rates per 1000
population show that blacks and Hispanics were stopped at rates
higher than their arrest rates.
143. Id. at 120 n.25 (describing types of crimes). Crimes were reported using four
generic crime categories. Violent crimes included robbery, assault, homicide, kidnap-
ping and sex crimes. Weapons crimes included arrests for both gun and other illegal
weapons. Property crimes included larceny and burglary. Drug crimes included both
possession and sale offenses. Id.
144. The OAG analysis constructed four categories of race from the eight recorded
on the NYPD documentation in the UF-250 data: white, black, Hispanic white, Asian,
American Indian, other, unknown. OAG REPORT, supra note 5. We use four: black,
white, Hispanic, and other. The UF-250 form has no category for black Hispanics, so
we were unable to determine whether officers classified black Hispanics as black or
Hispanic, or whether officers were consistent in their classification decisions. Id. The
NYPD classification is based on officers' observations, the Census Bureau classifica-
tion is based on self-report. In constructing race-specific population rates from the
HVS for the sub-boroughs, we classified both white and black Hispanics as black,
consistent with classifications in the U.S. Census. The construction of the Hispanic
classification from census data involves a two-stage process regarding both race and
ethnicity. Once race is determined, a secondary question asks whether the individual
identifies himself or herself as a person of "Hispanic origin."
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TABLE 4. RACE-SPECIFIC AND CRIME-SPECIFIC STOP RATES PER
1,000 PERSONS, CRIME RATES PER 1,000 PERSONS, AND RACE-
SPECIFIC POPULATION CITYWIDE
14 5
Stop Rate: Stop Rate: Stop Rate: Stop Rate: Stop Rate:
Type of Crime Citywide Black Hispanic White Other
Violent 3.2 7.5 3.5 0.7 1.0
Property 2.0 3.1 2.6 1.1 0.9
Drug 1.4 2.7 1.8 0.6 0.3
Weapon 7.6 18.0 8.7 1.3 1.8
Quality of life offenses 1.3 1.8 1.5 0.1 0.5
All offenses 17.1 22.6 20.0 4.8 5.2
Total arrests 104,847 53,472 31,454 16,776 3,145
Arrest rate per 1,000
persons 14.1 29.0 15.1 6.0 4.4
1999 population 7,428,162 1,845,306 2,089,149 2,775,637 718,070
These differences are consistent with significant differences re-
ported in the OAG Report. 146 Controlling for race- and crime-spe-
cific crime rates and population, that report showed that stop rates
for blacks and Hispanics were significantly higher than the stop
rates for whites. 147 These effects were most acute for stops for
weapons and violent crimes. 148
The second measure of police stop activity is the ratio of stops to
arrests by race and type of crime. Once police officers decide to
stop a citizen, the outcomes of those stops-including whether a
frisk or search is conducted, and whether an arrest is made-
should not differ by race. Presumably, the "reasonable suspicion"
articulated in Terry v. Ohio and incorporated into both the formal
training and professional judgment of police officers,'49 should lead
to stops with race-neutral outcome probabilities. In other words,
there is no rationale for police to exercise discretion differently by
race that would lead to a higher rate of "false positives" for any
racial group. Accordingly, stop rates should reflect a similar effi-
ciency and strategic allocation of police efforts across races.
145. OAG REPORT, supra note 5, at tbl.I.A.1, tbl.I.A.5; DEP'T oF CITY PLANNING,
CITY OF N.Y., 1990-99 POPULATION CHANGE ESTIMATES, available at http://
www.ci.nyc.ny.us/html/dcp/pdf/9099pop.pdf.
146. OAG REPORT, supra note 5, at 94-95. Citywide, blacks constituted 50% of the
total "stops" and 51% of the arrests for the covered period. Hispanics constituted
33% of all "stops" and 30% of all arrests. Whites constituted 13% of all "stops" and
16% of all arrests. However, this evidence of proportionality masks differences by
neighborhood. Id. at 95 n.9, 123.
147. Id. at tbl.I.C.1 and I.C.2.
148. Id. at tbl.I.C.1 and I.C.2.
149. See Thompson, supra note 17, at 971.
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Table 5 shows.theratio of stops to arrests by race of suspect and
suspected charge. A higher rate indicates less efficiency in stops,
or an excessive rate of stops needed to affect an arrest. A high stop
rate may also indicate more indiscriminate stop practices, or simply
broadened suspicion of individuals based on race alone." ° Overall,
the total stop-to-arrest ratio of blacks (7.3 stops per arrest) is
58.7% higher than the ratio for non-Hispanic whites (4.6); the ratio
for Hispanics (6.4) is 39% higher than the rate for non-Hispanic
whites. For weapons stops, the stop-to-arrest ratio for blacks is
18.7% higher than the ratio for whites, but the ratio for Hispanics
is less than 23.0% higher.
TABLE 5. RACE- AND CRIME-SPECIFIC STOP-ARREST
RATIOS CITYWIDE
151
Type of Crime Citywide Black Hispanic White Other
Weapon 16.5 16.5 17.1 13.9 17.3
All Stops 6.5 7.3 6.4 4.6 5.5
To test whether stops were proportionate to crime rates, and to
assess factors that might explain stop rates higher than would be
predicted by crime rates, multivariate analyses were completed in-
corporating three potential explanations: the crime rate within the
sub-borough (or strategic theory), disorder (or place-based the-
ory), or social disorganization (or person-based theory). Trends in
both Tables 4 and 5 confirm the emphasis on weapons stops articu-
lated in NYPD strategy memoranda. Accordingly, separate analy-
ses were completed on the overall stop counts, and then on stops
where weapons were the suspected charge or rationale for the stop.
Table 6 shows the bivariate correlations-the correlation be-
tween two variables-among these predictors and the outcome
variables. 152 Correlations were statistically significant and in the
predicted directions for stops overall and stops involving non-white
150. One could also argue that a higher stop rate for one group may indicate
"under-stops" of other groups, or a reluctance to stop more often persons of one race
or another. That is an unlikely explanation, however, since the OAG Report shows
that the racial distribution of stops were consistent across precincts and stable over
the fifteen months. See OAG REPORT, supra note 5, at 92-110. It is unlikely that the
pattern of under-documentation or depressed stop rates for whites would remain so
consistent across the NYPD's many precincts and neighborhoods.
151. OAG REPORT, supra note 5, at tbl.I.C.1.
152. For example, stop rates for whites were negatively correlated with vacancy
rates, concentrations of public assistance recipients, and housing units with broken
windows.
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suspects. Stops involving whites either were not correlated with
the disorder or disorganization variables, or were correlated nega-
tively with disorganization variables. 153
Results of multivariate tests of the relative contributions of
crime, disorder, and disorganization to stop counts are shown in
Table 7. A fixed effects Poisson regression analysis was used, with
predictors from each of these three domains.1 54 The model esti-
mates the expected value of the number of events in relation to the
causal factors and other explanatory variables of interest. The
question in this analysis is whether the count of events (stops) in an
area (sub-borough) is predicted by factors that might influence
these events (arrest rates, social disorganization variables, and
physical disorder variables). The baseline model tests the hypothe-
sis that the race-specific stop count is proportional to the number
of arrests in the area. The full model assesses whether factors be-
yond the arrest count predict the stop count in the area.
153. Overall, whites in New York City live in neighborhoods that are marked by
the absence of social isolation or economic deprivation, as well as neighborhoods with
lower crime rates. See, e.g., JOHN MOLLENKOPF & MANUAL CASTELLS, DUAL CITY:
RESTRUCTURING NEW YORK 29-31, 304-05 (1991). However, the correlation of stops
of whites and crime rates in the neighborhood were not statistically significant. This
may reflect the fact that whites often were stopped when they were observed in non-
white neighborhoods, usually on suspicion of drugs. Id. This illustrates the "racial
incongruity" source of disparity, where a stop is triggered by a racial "mismatch" of a
person of one color moving through a neighborhood with population dominated by
persons of another color. In the case of whites in non-white neighborhoods, it is often
on suspicion of drug buying or possession. When black or Hispanic suspects are
stopped in predominantly minority neighborhoods, it often is on suspicion of violence
or weapons crimes. OAG REPORT, supra note 5, at 126-28, and tbl.I.C.1.
154. P. MCCULLAGH & J. NELDER, GENERALIZED LINEAR MODELS 193-08 (1989);
WILLIAM H. GREENE, ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS (2d ed. 1993); PETER KENNEDY, A
GUIDE TO ECONOMETRICS (3d ed. 1994). Poisson regression is an ideal method to
analyze factors that predict counts of events, and determining the relationship of
these counts to a set of explanatory or predictive variables. The loglinear Poisson
model is the one utilized for these analyses. Standard errors are corrected for over-
dispersion.
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The results confirm the claim that the arrest rate predicts both
total stops and weapons stops in the sub-boroughs. Arrests are a
significant predictor of the total number of stops, the total number
of weapons stops, and both total and weapons stops for black and
Hispanic suspects. However, arrests fail to predict stops for whites.
In part, this may reflect the low rate of stops of whites, or the het-
erogeneity of the locations of white stops. That is, stops of whites
may include both "racial mismatch" stops of whites in non-white
areas where crime rates may be elevated, but other types of stops
occur as well, most in neighborhoods of varying crime rates. Some
may simply be based on descriptions from complainants, and
others based on the reasonable suspicion grounds articulated in
Terry.
Crime rates should predict stop rates, and should take into ac-
count any differences by race in the likelihood that a citizen should
be stopped relative to his or her propensity for crime commission.
However, when factors other than crime rates affect stops, we attri-
bute these additional factors to policy, or to other tacit assumptions
about race, neighborhoods, and criminality. Table 7 shows that for
stops overall, factors other than crime in the neighborhood predict
the stop counts. For all suspects, after controlling for crime, stops
within the sub-boroughs were predicted by their poverty rates. Ac-
cordingly, policing in the city's neighborhoods appears to reflect
the economic status of people rather than the physical condition of
its buildings.
When race-specific stop counts are considered, both disorder
and disorganization variables predict stop counts for Hispanics, but
not for blacks. The concentration of dwellings with broken win-
dows, low vacancy rates, high concentration of persons in public
housing, and racial heterogeneity all predict the stop count for His-
panics. The diversity of this pattern of predictors for Hispanics re-
flects the heterogeneity of residential patterns and socio-economic
factors for Hispanics. For whites, stops are not predicted by crime,
but instead are predicted by the absence of poverty. Again, this
reflects the tendency for whites to live in areas that although not
necessarily affluent, are less likely to be poor.
Finally, Table 7 shows a different picture for weapons stops. For
weapons stops of all suspects generally and specifically of black
suspects, poverty rates predicted stop counts, after controlling for
crime. As above, policing weapons is concentrated in poor neigh-
borhoods. Stop and frisk activity targeted at weapons seems fo-
cused on the economic status of people in neighborhoods, not the
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physical condition of their buildings. For stops of Hispanic sus-
pects, weapons stops were predicted by both disorder and disor-
ganization variables.
These patterns suggest that stop and frisk strategies have de-
parted from their original Broken Windows underpinnings, and
more closely resemble policing of poor people in poor places. How
the policy in action evolved so far from its complex and nuanced
theoretical origins is a potentially important tale. It is important to
understand whether and how race became a marker of increased
risk of criminality in this hothouse policy context, the ways in
which race interacted with the social organization of policing to
produce greater intensity of enforcement and over-enforcement
against minority citizens, and the cultural and political dynamics
that allow the conflation of race, poverty, and disorder in policing
policy. These lessons await a different research paradigm, focused
on the hot cognitions of police-citizen interactions, and the social
contexts in which these events unfold.
IV. SOCIAL NORMS AND AGGRESSIVE POLICING
In New York, the application of Broken Windows theories
through OMP strategies and stop and frisk tactics produced a style
of racial policing with stigmatizing effects on minority communi-
ties. In fact, the implemented strategy departed sharply from the
original design of Broken Windows theory, focusing more on the
consequences of broken windows than their causes. The strategy
as implemented was intensified surveillance and proactive engage-
ment with citizens under a broad standard of "reasonable suspi-
cion." The emphasis on persons rather than place, and the racial
demography of places where OMP was most intense and active,
suggest that the cues to which police responded were primarily tied
to race as well as places that are defined by race. Not only is this a
long way from Broken Windows theory, but it invites constitutional
problems that can further distance police from minority citizens. 55
The drift from engagement with community in the co-production of
security reflects two different dimensions of social norms, dimen-
sions of both community and organization.
155. See generally OAG REPORT, supra note 5, at 15-44 (discussing Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendment issues related to stop and frisk activity and racial profiling,
respectively); Garrett, supra note 7, at 1829-34 (discussing equal protection issues in
racial profiling cases).
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A. Social Norms and Aggressive Policing Revisited
Although stop and frisk tactics likely contributed to the crime
decline in New York, the precise contribution of these tactics is
contested.156 But there also is little doubt that there were social
costs from the crackdown on crime that may compromise the origi-
nal intent to redirect and rebuild social norms. 57 If the mechanism
of decline is search, surveillance, and aggressive misdemeanor ar-
rests, there is no causal path to declining crime that runs through
order and social norms. As Harcourt observed, these efforts "have
little to do with fixing broken windows and much more to do with
arresting window breakers-or persons who look like they might
break windows, or ... strangers ... or outsiders."' 58
The social norms approach underlying Broken Windows theory
required that the cues of crime be removed and replaced with al-
ternative cues that signaled order and social regulation. In the
causal dynamic hypothesized by the theory, citizens engaged with
police to enforce norms of orderliness, conveying a social meaning
that influenced behavior of citizens in the orderly milieu. 159
This construction of social control comports well with the dy-
namics of collective efficacy discussed by Sampson, Raudenbush,
and Earls. 60 Citizen participation in the dynamics of informal so-
cial control, such as collective supervision of teenagers and citizen
interventions in low-level crimes, are manifestations of the neigh-
156. Fagan et al., supra note 36, at 1322 (crediting the decline in gun violence in
part to "gun-oriented policing" but acknowledging multiple causation by other social
factors); Waldeck, supra note 19, at 1283-84 (citation omitted) (suggesting that the
stop and frisk tactics produced a crackdown that deterred many from carrying weap-
ons or drugs); Harcourt, supra note 19, at 339-40 (claiming that the huge increase in
misdemeanor arrests under OMP produced a surveillance effect that depressed crime
rates). But see generally KARMEN, supra note 36 (citing interactions among multiple
causes for the crime decline that complicated attribution of effects to any single
cause).
157. See generally Tom R. Tyler, Public trust and confidence in legal authorities:
What do people want from the law and legal institutions?, in BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE
AND THE LAW (forthcoming) (arguing that public views are primarily shaped by eval-
uating the fairness of police and court procedures). Neighborhood residents in high
crime neighborhood often express satisfaction with the lowered crime rate, but
greater distrust of police when aggressive stop, search, and arrest tactics are used.
OAG REPORT, supra note 5, at 74-87.
158. Harcourt, supra note 19, at 342.
159. Kahan, supra note 36, at 2488; Meares & Kahan, supra note 26, at 823.
160. Sampson & Raudenbush, supra note 20, at 611-612 (discussing the link be-
tween disorder and "collective efficacy"); see also Robert J. Sampson et al., supra
note 79, at 919-21 (showing evidence that crime rates fluctuate according to the neigh-
borhood's collective efficacy, independent of poverty, racial composition, and other
socio-demographic factors).
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borhood's "collective efficacy" that reduces crime and disorder.'
Collective behavior of this type may involve citizen-police interac-
tions, but often these are citizen-initiated efforts, such as "phone
trees" among residents to call police and report either physical or
social disorder, citizen demands to enforce housing codes to rid
neighborhoods of crack houses, advocacy in court proceedings for
substantive punishment for chronic disorder offenders, and collec-
tive political activity on zoning and licensing.'62 However, neither
collective efficacy nor social capital is likely to be increased by po-
licing tactics that rely almost exclusively on stopping, searching,
and arresting people. Wilson and Kelling, in the original Broken
Windows essay, did not imagine a scenario where aggressive polic-
ing-in the absence of interaction with community groups or social
agencies-would create enduring forms of social interaction by citi-
zens to prevent and control crime.163
The incentives for people to engage with legal actors in social
regulation and the co-production of security may lie in their evalu-
ations of their treatment by the police. Fairness and crackdowns
may be inconsistent, but at least citizens know they are tradeoffs.
Recent work by Tom Tyler and colleagues in a survey of residents
in three Oakland, California neighborhoods suggests that citizens'
evaluations of legal actors are not linked to the outcomes of their
court cases or interactions with police, or on the crime rate in their
neighborhood.1 64 They focus instead on the fairness of their treat-
ment from those authorities. 65 Ronald Weitzer reaches the same
conclusion in a survey of residents of three neighborhoods in
Washington, D.C.166 He reports contrasting evaluations of police
services in two predominantly black neighborhoods. Proactive p0-
161. Sampson & Raudenbush, supra note 20, at 612.
162. Id.
163. The original Broken Windows theory recognized that a disorder-focused polic-
ing strategy would "only be effective if applied in conjunction with a wide variety of
other police tactics" and "pursued in partnership with ... other social agencies." Wal-
deck, supra note 19, at 1270 (citation omitted). Waldeck shows that the social norms
and tactics suggested by the original Broken Windows theory diverged sharply from
the traditional social norms of policing as "crime-fighters" where the officer's "basic
business" is arresting offenders. Id.; see George L. Kelling, Toward New Images of
Policing: Herman Goldstein's Problem-oriented Policing, 17 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 539,
540 (1992).
164. TYLER, supra note 157. Tyler also notes that some judgments are made on
vicarious experiences of neighbors and friends, an illustration of the importance of
linked fate. Id.
165. Id.
166. Ronald Weitzer, Racialized Policing: Residents' Perceptions in Three Neighbor-
hoods, 34 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 129, 150-52 (2000).
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licing of residents of a poor, high crime neighborhood elicited less
favorable reactions to police than did the more reactive and re-
spectful treatment of citizens in an "orderly" middle-class
neighborhood. 167
Such empirical findings suggest the viability and importance of
an approach to social regulation based on procedural fairness. Pro-
cedural fairness-or better treatment-promotes greater trust and
confidence in the law, and higher rates of compliance.
161
These perceptions of law and legal actors have important impli-
cations about popular attributions of legitimacy to law. People
who view the law as illegitimate are less likely to obey it, and peo-
ple who view police officers and judges as lacking in legitimacy are
less likely to follow their directives. 169  Although the law is based
on the implicit or explicit threat of sanctioning for wrongdoing, the
legal system depends heavily on voluntary compliance from most
citizens to set and enforce norms, and to engage with the police in
social control. Hence, lower levels of legitimacy make social regu-
lation more costly and difficult, both materially and politically.
The police depend heavily on the voluntary cooperation of citizens
to fight crime. Citizens report crime and criminals, informally help
to police their neighborhoods, and aid the courts as jurors and wit-
nesses. Without these cooperative acts from the public, the police
risk being seen as an intrusive force imposing order. And without
these acts, the meaning of order becomes detached from its social
basis and loses its moral weight to influence others in the
community.
A social norms approach would invite policing of public order
laws in the context of corresponding and contemporaneous extra-
legal social initiatives aimed at the same or parallel problems.
These efforts reflect a more complex view of the interaction of
crime and disorder, one that recognizes their spurious relationship
to broader underlying social and physical conditions within neigh-
borhoods. The legitimacy of the law benefits from the simultane-
167. Id. at 151. Weitzer's findings stand Broken Windows theory on its head by
suggesting that the police may be reacting to the visible cues of crime and disorder,
not just would-be criminals who might journey to a disorderly neighborhood to take
advantage of crime opportunities. Weitzer's findings suggest that in neighborhoods
with visible signs of disorder, police react with indiscriminate and widespread patterns
of aggressive stops and interdiction of citizens.
168. TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 172-73 (1990).
169. Id. at 172; Robert J. Sampson & Dawn Jeglum Bartusch, Legal Cynicism and
(Subcultural?) Tolerance of Deviance: The Neighborhood Context of Racial Differ-
ences, 32 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 777, 793-800 (1998); TOM R. TYLER ET AL., SOCIAL
JUSTICE IN A DIVERSE SOCIETY 86 (1997).
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ous and aligned actions of citizens and legal actors to promote
social norms. While OMP approaches might promote a temporary
reduction of crime through suppression, a legitimacy-focused ap-
proach promotes construction of social networks that integrate
community-level social processes with the regulation of crime and
disorder.
B. Organizational Norms
Explanations of the importance of race in police decision mak-
ing-up and down the hierarchy within police organizations-fo-
cus on both the occupational culture and social norms of
policing. 170 Although the empirical literature on police "subcul-
ture" offers inconsistent evidence of generalizable attitudes and
beliefs, several studies show that the dynamics and structure of the
police workplace may work to reinforce social (behavioral) norms,
perceptions, and beliefs. 7 ' The separation of the policing and non-
policing worlds is widely acknowledged, even in the era of reform
and innovation.'72 The insularity of the police workplace leads to a
closed system of ideas, a reluctance to question the statements or
actions of fellow officers, and "matter of fact prejudices" that are
reinforced through customs, rituals, and a shared language.173 If
the workplace is where citizens "acquire 'social capital' . and
develop ties of empathy and solidarity with their fellow citizens,' 74
then the workplace may be the appropriate locus for efforts to
change social norms supporting racial policing.
170. See e.g., STATE POLICE REVIEW TEAM, supra note 6, at 33-34 (1999). See gen-
erally Jeffrey Goldberg, supra note 6; OAG REPORT, supra note 5, at Ch. III, Part III
(discussing "Police Attitudes Toward Stop and Frisk"). "A recent survey of 650 Los
Angeles Police Department officers found that 25% felt that racial bias (prejudice) on
the part of officers toward minority citizens currently exists and contributes to a nega-
tive interaction between police and the community." REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT
COMMISSION ON THE Los ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT 69 (1991). But see Steve
Herbert, Police Subculture Reconsidered, 36 CRIMINOLOGY 343, 344 (1998) (claiming
that norms within police departments are influenced by bureaucratic structures).
171. See generally BITrNER, supra note 102; ANTHONY V. BOUZA, THE POLICE
MYSTIQUE: AN INSIDER'S LOOK AT COPS, CRIME AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYS-
TEM 6-7 (1990).
172. BITrNER, supra note 102, at 11; see also JEROME H. SKOLNICK & JAMES J.
FYFE, ABOVE THE LAW: POLICE AND THE EXCESSIVE USE OF FORCE 242 (1993) (cita-
tion omitted).
173. POLICING: A VIEW FROM THE STREET 267-70 (Peter K. Manning & John Van
Maanen, eds., 1978).
174. Cynthia L. Estlund, Working Together: The Workplace, Civil Society, and the
Law, 89 GEORGETOWN L. REV. 1, 4 (2000) (describing the workplace as performing
crucial functions of the civil society including fostering communication, connected-
ness, and empathy among diverse individuals).
2000] TERRY, RACE, AND DISORDER IN NYC 501
The skewed version of Broken Windows theory implemented by
the NYPD reinforced the crime-fighting image of policing rather
than the alternative norms about alternative solutions to crime
problems developed carefully in other community-policing mod-
els. 175 The "crime fighting" image included stereotypes of citizens
and criminals, stereotypes pregnant with racial meaning. 176 After
all, the emphasis on social manifestations of disorder, with its dem-
ographic and neighborhood correlates, confounded race and disor-
der, giving rise to broad suspicion of criminal activity and
intensified enforcement in minority neighborhoods. Despite rec-
ognizing that some citizens were law-abiding and welcomed police
presence, the broad reach of stop and frisk policing risked placing
many law-abiders under suspicion.
Efforts to reform the police workplace to modify social norms
that emphasize race as a risk factor for crime will require compli-
cated and sustained efforts to "admi[t] the workplace into the
realm of civil society .... 177 Policing as a workplace is at once
both regulated by the state but also subject to hierarchy, rules, co-
ercion, formal sanctions, and restraint. Is social norms theory ap-
plicable to changing the everyday logic and rules of policing? The
shift in police function to OMP did not significantly modify core
police functions, and in turn it was unlikely to modify the occupa-
tional "frame of reference" about crime and race. 178 Accordingly,
the older social norms that were reinforced by those police func-
tions and rewards that remained intact. How then, to change those
norms? 1
79
Many efforts to curtail racial profiling have increasingly focused
the role of statistics on police stops. Legislators in seven states
have passed laws requiring police to keep statistics, and similar leg-
islation is being considered in twenty-one additional states.180 Rep-
175. Waldeck, supra note 19, at 1269-70.
176. Thompson, supra note 17 at 987-89 (discussing the processes of racial and
other stereotyping that may unconsciously influence stop and arrest decision making).
177. Estlund, supra note 174, at 5.
178. POLICING: A VIEW FROM THE STREET, supra note 173, at 269.
179. Professor Waldeck suggests that changes in police functions, specifically a re-
turn to the original intent of community policing and its emphasis on alternatives, will
promote changes in social norms based on a different functional definition of policing.
Waldeck, supra note 19, at 1300-01. But we propose changes that do not necessarily
involve substantive modifications in police functions that are disruptive of the struc-
tural relationships within police hierarchies and workplaces.
180. An Act Concerning Traffic Stops Statistics, 1999 Conn. Acts 99-198 (Reg.
Sess.); An act concerning criminal procedure; relating to the collection of information
on traffic stops, 1999 Kan. Sess. Laws 2683; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 114-10 (1999); 2000
Mo. Legis. Serv. 1053 (West); An Act Relating to Motor and Other Vehicles, 1999
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resentative John Conyers, Jr. (D-MI) proposed similar legislation,
the National Traffic Stops Statistics Study Act of 1998, which
passed unanimously in the U.S. House of Representatives but was
rejected in committee by the U.S. Senate. 181 One rationale for the
emphasis on data collection is that statistics can lead to trans-
parency in policing,182 making decisions visible and publicly ac-
countable. Statistics may enable police departments to evaluate
their strategies, or assess whether there are disparity costs that
come with successes of particular strategies. Data also make of-
ficers' actions transparent, making them more accountable for their
decisions. As decisions and everyday actions become more demo-
cratic, social norms from community stakeholders will be infused
into police norms.
But the dynamics of organizational change following the intro-
duction of data raises several challenges. The organizational and
democratic structures within which data are introduced, how data-
driven facts are evaluated, and how their meaning is interpreted
require experimentation to develop open forums for both internal
organizational reflection and open policy debates. 183 How infor-
mation is shared with community stakeholders, whether the agenda
for analysis is shared with these groups, and how the findings of
data analyses are translated into concrete measures for organiza-
tional change are part of a process of community participation that
can "civilize" the police workplace through transparency, leading
to democratic interactions focused on data-driven facts.184 The ex-
R.I. Pub. Laws 7164; An Act Relating to reporting information on routine traffic en-
forcement, 1999 Wash. Legis. Serv. S.S.S.B. No. 6683 (SN); see also UNIV. Or MINN.
LAW SCH., INSTITUTE OF RACE AND POVERTY'S RACIAL PROFILING DATA COLLEC-
TION STATUS REPORT (indicating that bills have been introduced in Alabama, Arkan-
sas, Florida, Iowa, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Maryland, Massachusetts, New
Jersey, New York, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina,
Tennessee, Utah, Wisconsin, and Virginia), http://wwwl.umn.edu/irp/ARB%20.html;
Laura Gunderson, Bill Aims to Track Racial Profiling, PORTLAND OREGONIAN, Sept.
12, 2000 at B1 (describing proposed bill in Oregon, which following introduction, was
hailed by state police and several major local police departments expressing interest
in collecting data on stops).
181. See H.R. Rep. No. 105-435 (1998). The legislation passed unanimously in the
House, but was voted down in the Senate Judiciary Committee due to opposition
from police organizations. E.g., Robert Cohen, Racial profiling Allegations Spur
Lawmakers to call for U.S. Study, THE STAR-LEDGER, Apr. 14, 1999 at 7.
182. For illustrations of the uses of data to assess strategies, see Eric Luna, Trans-
parent Policing, 85 IOWA L. REV. 1108, 1167-94 (2000).
183. Susan Sturm & Brandon Garrett. Moving Beyond Racial Profiling in New
Jersey, PHILA. INQUIRER, Dec. 4, 2000, at A15.
184. Constructing these types of relationships is likely to be contested, even when
consent decrees set forth a framework for data collection on stops and monitoring of
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tent to which opportunities for community interaction with police
are routinized and institutionalized can break down the insularity
of police social norms at the top and bottom of its hierarchy.
statistical trends. National Public Radio ("NPR") reported that civil rights groups in-
cluding the American Civil Liberties Union of Southern California, and plaintiffs in
prior racial profiling litigation against the Los Angeles Police Department ("LAPD")
have filed motions to be included as monitors in the consent decree involving the
LAPD. Morning Edition (Nat'l Pub. Radio broadcast, Dec. 18, 2000) (discussing the
LAPD consent decree described supra note 7), audio clip of report available at http://
search.npr.org/cf/cmn/cmnps05fm.cfm?SegID=115661. In the wake of statements by
President-elect Bush in the second presidential debate questioning the federal role in
the reform of police departments, these groups are concerned that a court-appointed
federal monitor will not effectively enforce the city's agreement. The NPR report
quotes Mark Rosenbaum, legal director the Southern California ACLU, as stating
that "[t]he decree fences out those individuals who have the greatest interest in the
most conscientious enforcement .... "The NPR report quotes attorneys for the City
of Los Angeles, who counter that "involving more people will lead to too much legal
fighting and not improving policing. A federal judge will do the job on enforcing the
court order, so no outside parties are needed." Id.
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APPENDIX A. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR
NEIGHBORHOOD VARIABLES
Standard
Social Disorganization Mean Deviation
% Non-Hispanic White 36.71 28.77
% Hispanic 27.34 20.50
% Black 26.77 27.00
Racial fragmentation 0.51 0.14
% Living in neighborhood < 6 months 25.57 9.32
% Living in residence < 4 years 39.81 4.60
% Immigrants 82.97 10.58
% Households with public assistance 18.88 13.81
% Not in labor force 40.76 8.19
% Worked less than 26 weeks past year 11.54 2.91
% Unemployed since 1997 38.22 8.65
% Education < less than HS graduate 27.69 12.72
Sex ratio: males: females 0.87 0.10
% Female headed households 21.71 10.97
% Population < 15 years old 22.42 6.63
Disorder
% Dwellings with damaged exterior walls 3.24 17.71
% Dwellings with damaged exterior windows 2.80 19.11
% Dwelling with damaged stairways 5.69 23.17
% Dwellings with broken heat 13.58 34.26
% Dwellings with damaged floors 5.56 22.92
% Reporting any broken windows in neighborhood 8.89 28.46
% Reporting dilapidated buildings in neighborhood 7.78 26.79
EXTRA! EXTRA! READ ALL ABOUT IT:
WHAT A PLAINTIFF "KNOWS OR SHOULD
KNOW" BASED ON OFFICIALS' STATEMENTS
AND MEDIA COVERAGE OF POLICE
MISCONDUCT FOR NOTICE OF A § 1983
MUNICIPAL LIABILITY CLAIM
Jenny Rivera*
Although the plaintiffs § 1983 claim is a strong one . .. [the
plaintiffs] failure to file within the limitations period cannot be
excused. The [plaintiffs] cause of action is therefore dismissed as
to the municipal defendants.1
[W]hen commencing a [police misconduct suit] neither the plain-
tiff nor [the plaintiffs] attorney is likely to know much about the
relevant internal operations of the police department, nor about
the disciplinary history and record of the particular police officers
involved. In view of the strong policies favoring suits protecting
the constitutional rights of citizens ... it would be inappropriate
to require plaintiffs and their attorneys before commencing suit to
obtain the detailed information needed to prove a pattern of su-
pervisory misconduct ....
Recent revelations of police misconduct throughout the country
have sparked renewed demands for improved police accountability
* Associate Professor of Law, City University of New York School of Law at
Queens College. Columbia University School of Law, LL.M.; New York University
School of Law, J.D.; Princeton University, A.B.
My thanks to Jose Muniz, Esq. and Rudy Velez, Esq., attorneys of record for plain-
tiffs in Clinton v. City of New York, No. 99-7336 (2d Cir. Oct. 29, 1999), Clinton v. City
of New York, No. 98 Civ. 3810 (JSM), 1999 WL 105026 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 2, 1999), and
Monzon v. City of New York, No. 98 Civ. 4872 (LMM), 1999 WL 1120527 (S.D.N.Y.
Dec. 7, 1999), the cases discussed in this article. My thanks to the members of the
CUNY Law School community for their support of this work through their adminis-
trative and legal research assistance. Special thanks to Librarian Julie Lim, for her
tireless assistance with technical research, and Mary Nocella, for her administrative
help. My thanks also to those who read and commented on earlier drafts of this
article.
1. Clinton v. City of New York, No. 98 Civ. 3810 (JSM), 1999 WL 105026, at *2
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 2, 1999).
2. Oliveri v. Thompson, 803 F.2d 1265, 1279 (2d Cir. 1986).
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and supervision.3 As investigative committees have identified and
highlighted the link between police corruption and police brutality,
requests for external controls have increased. Indeed, calls for in-
dependent federal monitors in cases of police brutality reflect the
dissatisfaction with, and intolerance of, police misconduct and
abuse, as well as the growing recognition that local police depart-
ments do not or cannot police themselves. 4 As citizens' disaffec-
tion from law enforcement personnel and institutions grows, so
does the urgent need for change.
Unfortunately, change in the form of increased accountability
and reduced police corruption has proved elusive. Litigation, a
traditional vehicle for change, has had limited success in transform-
ing law enforcement at an institutional level.5 The overall costs to
the government and the public coffers have not stemmed police
misconduct at a level commensurate with the substantial judgments
3. E.g., Bruce Shapiro, When Justice Kills; After Years of Decline Police Brutality
Is on the Rise, Sparking a Reform Movement, THE NATION, June 9, 1997, at 21 (stating
that the emphasis of reformers is on independent review boards and special prosecu-
tors); Elizabeth Levitan Spaid, More Civilian Watchdogs Patrol Thin Blue Line, THE
CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Jan. 10, 1996, at 3 (discussing civilian complaint re-
view panels) [hereinafter More Civilian Watchdogs].
4. E.g., U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO REPORT, LAW ENFORCEMENT:
INFORMATION ON DRuG-RELATED POLICE CORRUPTION: REPORT TO THE HONORA-
BLE CHARLES B. RANGEL, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (1998) (noting that various
sources have recommended external oversight of police departments) [hereinafter
GAO REPORT]; CITY OF NEW YORK COMM'N TO COMBAT POLICE CORRUPTION, THE
NEW YORK CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT'S DISCIPLINARY SYSTEM: How THE DEPART-
MENT DISCIPLINES ITS MEMBERS WHO MAKE FALSE STATEMENTS (1996) [hereinafter
COMMISSION TO COMBAT POLICE CORRUPTION]; CITY OF N.Y. COMM'N TO INVESTI-
GATE ALLEGATIONS OF POLICE CORRUPTION & THE ANTI-CORRUPTION PROCE-
DURES OF THE POLICE DEP'T, COMMISSION REPORT (1994) (calling for independent
oversight commission) [hereinafter MOLLEN REPORT]; COMM'N TO INVESTIGATE AL-
LEGATIONS OF POLICE CORRUPTION & THE CITY's ANTI-CORRUPTION PROCEDURES,
THE KNAPP COMMISSION REPORT ON POLICE CORRUPTION 14-15 (1972) (calling for
independent investigator and prosecutor) [hereinafter KNAPP REPORT]; Neil Graves,
Louima Breaks Down in Tears at Support Rally, N.Y. POST, Aug. 10, 1998, at 6 (Public
Advocate Mark Green calls for federal monitor of police corruption); Bob Herbert,
The Stone Wall of Silence, N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 1998, at A25 (police oppose indepen-
dent agency to investigate police misconduct); David Kocieniewski, Mayor to Raise
Pay of Officers on City Beats, N.Y. TIMES, May 26, 1998, at B1 (discussing the recom-
mendation of certain members of Mayor Giuliani's Task Force on Police/Community
Relations to establish special prosecutor to investigate allegations of police wrongdo-
ing); Joseph P. Fried, U.S. Reviews Police Killing of Unarmed Man, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
3, 1998, at B3 (United States Attorney Zachary Carter monitors state investigation of
police shooting of unarmed person); More Civilian Watchdogs, supra note 3.
5. E.g., Comm. on New York City Affairs of the Ass'n of The Bar of the City of
New York, The Failure of Civil Damages Claims to Modify Police Practices, and Rec-
ommendations for Change, 55 THE REC. 533 (2000) (discussing failure of the tort sys-
tem to increase police accountability for violations of civil rights).
NOTICE OF A 42 U.S.C. § 1983 CLAIM
and settlements that have been paid by states and municipalities.6
To increase pressure for public accountability and decrease police
misconduct, victims of police misconduct must have greater access
to the legal system, and the availability of legal recourse through
civil rights actions must be improved. This is particularly true for
litigation against localities for poor or nonexistent supervision and
discipline of officers for police misconduct. While these actions are
the most difficult to prove, they are the most likely to bring about
change because they challenge institutional actors and problems,
rather than concentrating solely upon individual police officers and
their bad acts.'
More than two decades ago, the Supreme Court concluded in
Monell v. Department of Social Services" that cities are "persons"
subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 19839 for violations of rights guar-
anteed under the United States Constitution and laws.10 Pursuant
6. E.g., id. at 534 (noting that New York City paid $140 million in damages for
alleged police abuses in fiscal years 1994-95 and 1998-99).
7. Martin A. Schwartz, Section 1983 Claims Against Municipal Officer and Mu-
nicipality, N.Y. L.J., June 20, 2000, at 3 (discussing that municipal liability § 1983
claims "can be factually and legally complex, cumbersome, and very time consuming
for counsel and the court") [hereinafter Schwartz, Section 1983 Claims].
8. 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
9. The statute reads, in relevant part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person
within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party
injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for
redress ....
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000).
10. The Supreme Court's decision in Monell overruled its prior holding in Monroe
v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961), that local governments were not "persons" subject to suit
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Monell decision provided a new avenue of relief for
plaintiffs, but not without continuing uncertainty and conflict within the Supreme
Court and among the circuit courts concerning the parameters of claims against local
governments. See Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 430-31 (1997)
(Breyer, J., dissenting, joined by Stevens & Ginsburg, JJ.) (noting that § 1983 munici-
pal liability interpretive law is highly complex and difficult to apply); City of Canton
v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385-86 (1989) (determining existence of causal link between
policy and constitutional deprivation has left the Court "deeply divided in a series of
cases" decided after Monell ... and the Court has had difficulty "defining the con-
tours of municipal liability"); City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 124 (1988)
(plurality opinion) (referencing Courts of Appeals' divergent interpretations of prin-
ciples set forth in Supreme Court's § 1983 opinions); City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle,
471 U.S. 808, 820 (1985) (plurality opinion) (noting the murky state of the law of
municipal liability under § 1983 post-Monell). See generally 1 SHELDON H. NAHMOD,
CIVIL RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES LITIGATION: THE LAW OF SECTION 1983, ch. 6
(4th ed. West Group 2000) (digesting various cases from circuit courts addressing mu-
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to Monell and its progeny, a plaintiff can sue a municipality for its
direct actions, as well as for municipal policies resulting in a consti-
tutional tort.11 In the years following the watershed decision in
nicipal liability); [hereinafter NAHMOD, CIVIL RIGHTS] 1B MARTIN A. SCHWARTZ &
JOHN E. KIRKLIN, SECTION 1983 LITIGATION: CLAIMS AND DEFENSES, §§ 7.6-7.11 (3d
ed. 1997 & Supp. 2000) (tracing historical development of Supreme Court's analysis
of municipal liability) [hereinafter SCHWARTZ, SECTION 1983 LITIGATION].
11. Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit,
507 U.S. 163, 168-69 (1993) (holding that municipal liability suits are not subject to
heightened pleading requirement, and that immunity defense not available to munici-
pal defendant); Jett v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701, 733 (1989) (noting that
§ 1983 is the exclusive federal remedy for violations by state actors of rights guaran-
teed under 42 U.S.C. § 1981); Harris, 489 U.S. at 388 (holding that local government
may be liable where failure reflects "deliberate indifference to the rights of persons
with whom the police come into contact") (footnote omitted); Praprotnik, 485 U.S. at
112 (holding that actions of municipal employee with decisionmaking authority, as
determined by state law, may be basis for municipality's liability); Pembaur v. City of
Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469 (1986) (plurality opinion) (holding that a single act by a mu-
nicipal decisionmaker with final authority may constitute a municipal policy subject-
ing municipality to § 1983 liability); Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 650
(declining to extend the municipality qualified immunity since employee's good faith
is no bar to damages against municipality); Monell, 436 U.S. at 690-91 (declaring that
local governments are subject to suit under § 1983 for damages, and declaratory and
injunctive relief).
Plaintiffs do not have a § 1983 remedy against the states, however, because states
are not "persons" within the meaning of § 1983. Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police,
491 U.S. 58 (1989). In addition, the Eleventh Amendment bars suits for damages
against the states. Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332 (1979). See generally NAHMOD, CIVIL
RIGHTS, supra note 10, §§ 6:67-6:69, vol. 2, §§ 9:48-9:50; SCHWARTZ, SECTION 1983
LITIGATION, supra note 10, ch. 8. Plaintiffs initially sought to reach the states' deep
pockets by suing state officials in their official capacity-actions known as "official-
capacity suits." The Supreme Court put an end to these efforts when it concluded that
such suits must be treated as suits against the government entity the officials re-
present. Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165-66 (1985). As a consequence, state
officials in these suits are not liable for damages. Will, 491 U.S. at 71. Plaintiffs' persis-
tence paid off, however, when the Court subsequently held that state officials sued in
their personal capacity-"personal capacity suits"-are "persons" under § 1983, and
may be personally liable for damages. Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 27 (1991) (citing
Will, 491 U.S. at 371).
To the benefit of plaintiffs, states generally indemnify individual defendants in
these suits. E.g., Bd. of County Comm'rs, 520 U.S. at 436 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (cit-
ing states that indemnify employees for § 1983 liability, for actions within scope of
their employment); see also N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 50-K (McKinney 1999) (requiring
New York City pay civil damages imposed against employees); Comm. on New York
City Affairs of The Ass'n of the Bar of the City of New York, The Failure of Civil
Damages Claims to Modify Police Practices, and Recommendations for Change, 55
THE RECORD 533, 540 (2000) (discussing the failure of the current New York tort
system to "modify the conduct of persons and organizations found liable" in the New
York Police Department, despite the millions in settlement and judgment damages
paid by New York City in police abuse cases).
Moreover, plaintiffs also may affect state policy, protocols and other actions
through a § 1983 suit to the extent that plaintiffs may proceed against state officials in
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Monell, the Court has struggled intensely to define the parameters
of § 1983 municipal liability.12 The result has been a series of cases
that seemingly provide relief against localities, but based on a the-
ory of direct liability, which requires a plaintiff to show more than
that a municipality's employees acted badly. This requirement of
direct municipal action has proved to be a tremendous obstacle to
plaintiffs. Having eschewed a respondeat superior theory of liabil-
ity in actions against municipalities, the Court has given with one
hand and taken with the other.13
an official capacity suit for injunctive relief. In these actions state actors are treated as
individuals. Will, 491 U.S. at 71, n.10 (quoting Graham, 473 U.S. at 167 n.14).
12. E.g., Bd. of County Comm'rs, 520 U.S. at 404 (holding that the conduct attrib-
utable to municipality was insufficient to establish liability because plaintiff must es-
tablish municipal culpability and "a direct causal link between the municipal action
and the deprivation of federal rights"); City of Los Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796,
799 (1986) (per curiam) (holding that a municipality is not liable where a jury finds
the individual officer did not commit a constitutional injury); Harris, 489 U.S. at 388
(imposing a "deliberate indifference" standard in failure to train case); Praprotnik,
485 U.S. at 130 (declaring that failure to investigate "subordinate's discretionary deci-
sions" alone does not constitute delegation of municipal policymaking authority);
Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 483 (declaring that municipal liability requires decision of those
with final policymaking authority); City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S.
247, 271 (1981) (declaring that municipalities are immune from punitive damages
under § 1983); Tuttle, 471 U.S. at 823 (holding that the act of one employee without
policymaking power is insufficient to establish municipal policy of inadequate train-
ing). But see Tuttle, 471 U.S. at 830-31 (Brennan, J., concurring) ("A single police
officer may grossly, outrageously, and recklessly misbehave in ... a single incident...
attributable to various municipal policies or customs ... [that] were the 'moving force'
... or cause of the violation.") (internal citation omitted). See generally SCHWARTZ,
SECTION 1983 LITIGATION, supra note 10, ch. 7 (discussing municipal and supervisory
liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983). For a discussion and critique of the Court's holdings
on municipal policies and customs, see Myriam E. Gilles, Breaking the Code of Si-
lence: Rediscovering "Custom" in Section 1983 Municipal Liability, 80 B.U. L. REV. 17
(2000).
13. Monell, 436 U.S. at 691 ("[A] municipality cannot be held liable under § 1983
on a respondeat superior theory."). Members of the Court, in particular Justice Ste-
vens, and several commentators, have questioned the wisdom of the Court's rejection
of a respondeat superior theory in § 1983 municipal liability actions. E.g., Bd. of
County Comm'rs, 520 U.S. at 430-37 (Breyer, J., dissenting, joined by Stevens & Gins-
burg, JJ.) (arguing for reexamination of § 1983 and questioning soundness of Monell
principle rejecting vicarious municipal liability); Praprotnik, 485 U.S. at 148, n.1 (Ste-
vens, J., dissenting) ("Like many commentators who have confronted the question, I
remain convinced that Congress intended the doctrine of respondeat superior to ap-
ply in § 1983 litigation.") (citations omitted); Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 489-90 (Stevens, J.,
concurring in part and in the judgment) (advocating for application of respondeat
superior to municipal liability claims); Tuttle, 471 U.S. at 834-44 (Stevens, J., dissent-
ing) (arguing that respondeat superior was historically a part of the common law doc-
trine that is incorporated into § 1983); Paul Hoffman, The Feds, Lies, and Videotape:
The Need for an Effective Federal Role in Controlling Police Abuse in Urban America,
66 S. CAL. L. REV. 1453, 1518 (1993) (arguing that respondeat superior should apply
to police officers); Harold S. Lewis, Jr. & Theodore Y. Blumoff, Reshaping Section
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Although a Moneil-based municipal liability claim seems to pro-
vide tremendous opportunities for redress of injuries caused by
municipal government actions, it is no panacea for the neophyte
plaintiff who is unskilled in the intricacies of civil practice and civil
rights litigation. The plaintiff seeking to assert such a claim faces
myriad obstacles in filing, and eventually succeeding, against a mu-
nicipality. As with all other civil actions, such a claim must satisfy
general procedural and substantive requirements. Furthermore,
the claimant must meet certain evidentiary requirements unique to
§ 1983 municipal liability claims, and must also satisfy a direct cau-
sation requirement, which is onerous both in theory and practice.
Recognition of the plaintiff's injury and the source of that injury,
matters intricately tied to these same evidentiary requirements, can
have a significant impact on the viability of a municipal liability
claim. Notice of the injury commences the running of the statutory
time limit on the claim.' 4 As a consequence, a significant initial
hurdle is determining the durational limit for the timely filing of
the complaint. Should a plaintiff fail to file within the time limit,
the plaintiff is generally barred from ever seeking § 1983 redress
for the claimed injury, regardless of the merits of the underlying
claim. 5
Section 1983 does not contain a federal statute of limitations.'6
To fill this statutory lacuna, the courts turn to state law,' 7 and
1983's Asymmetry, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 755, 820-38 (1992) (recommending application
of a modified theory of respondeat superior against municipalities) [hereinafter Re-
shaping Section 1983].
14. Infra notes 21, 42 and accompanying text.
15. A § 1983 claim period, however, may be tolled pursuant to applicable state
tolling provisions, allowing a plaintiff to proceed with the action. Bd. of Regents v.
Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478 (1980) (applying both state statute of limitations and tolling
rules to § 1983 claim); Chardon v. Soto, 462 U.S. 50 (1983) (applying Puerto Rico's
tolling rules to § 1983 claims) (citing Bd. of Regents v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478 (1980)).
Moreover, a § 1983 claim is subject to equitable tolling principles. Holmberg v. Arm-
brecht, 327 U.S. 392 (1946). Hence, even a plaintiff whose action is barred by the time
limitations requirement may be the beneficiary of a toll of that period for various
reasons, including the existence of actions by the defendant which effectively under-
mine plaintiff's ability to file within the time limit. But see infra note 264, discussing
the circuit courts' reconsideration of the applicability of federal equitable estoppel
principles pursuant to Holmberg in § 1983 cases in light of the Court's subsequent
decision in Hardin v. Straud, 490 U.S. 536 (1989).
16. The absence of a federal statute of limitations is "a void which is commonplace
in federal statutory law." Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 266 (1985) (quoting Bd. of
Regents v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. at 483 (1980)).
17. Title 42 U.S.C. § 1988 permits application of state law to § 1983 actions
because,
[the federal civil rights statutes] shall be exercised and enforced in conform-
ity with the laws of the United States, so far as such laws are suitable to carry
NOTICE OF A 42 U.S.C. § 1983 CLAIM
"borrow" the state's limitations period."a The appropriate limita-
tions period is "the general or residual [state] statute for personal
injury actions."19
Although state statutory limitation periods apply to § 1983 ac-
tions, the accrual of such actions-the point at which the statutory
time commences-is governed by federal law.2 0 As a consequence,
a determination of the timeliness of a § 1983 claim may involve
consideration of both state and federal decisional and statutory
law.
The Supreme Court has calculated the accrual period from that
point in time when the plaintiff knew or should have known of the
injury that is the basis of the legal claim.21 This standard ostensibly
the same into effect; but in all cases where they are not adapted to the object,
or are deficient in the provisions necessary to furnish suitable remedies and
punish offenses against law, the common law, as modified and changed by the
constitution and statutes of the State wherein the court having jurisdiction of
such civil or criminal cause is held, so far as the same is not inconsistent with
the Constitution and laws of the United States, shall be extended to and govern
the said courts in the trial and disposition of the cause ....
42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1994) (emphasis added).
The Supreme Court has interpreted § 1988 as requiring a "'three-step process' in
determining the rules of decision applicable to civil rights claims." Wilson, 471 U.S. at
267. This test, as applied to statute of limitations questions under § 1983, requires
that,
First, courts are to look to the laws of the United States "so far as such laws
are suitable to carry [the civil and criminal civil rights statutes] into effect."
[42 U.S.C. § 1988.] If no suitable federal rule exists, courts undertake the
second step by considering application of state "common law, as modified
and changed by the constitution and statutes" of the forum state. A third
step asserts the predominance of the federal interest: courts are to apply
state law only if it is not "inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the
United States."
Burnett v. Grattan, 468 U.S. 42, 47-48 (1984) (second alteration added) (internal cita-
tions omitted).
18. See, e.g., Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 276-80 (1985) (holding that state per-
sonal injury statutes of limitations apply to § 1983 actions); Tomanio, 446 U.S. at 483-
84; Chardon v. Soto, 462 U.S. 650, 655 (1983) (applying Puerto Rican law).
19. Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235, 249-50 (1989).
20. See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994) (holding that a § 1983
claim for unlawful conviction and imprisonment accrues when the state declares such
conviction or imprisonment invalid); Pauk v. Bd. of Trs., 654 F.2d 856, 859 (2d Cir.
1981) ("Federal law determines when a claim accrues under § 1983.") (citation omit-
ted); Singleton v. City of New York, 632 F.2d 185, 191 (2d Cir. 1980) ("Federal law...
'establishes as the time of accrual that point in time when the plaintiff knows or has
reason to know of the injury which is the basis of his action."') (quoting Bireline v.
Seagondollar, 567 F.2d 260, 263 (4th Cir. 1977)); cf Del. State Coll. v. Ricks, 449 U.S.
250 (1980) (discussing accrual under § 1981).
21. See, e.g., Ricks, 449 U.S. at 258 (holding that the Title VII action limitations
period runs from when tenure decision is made and communicated to plaintiff, since
that is the discriminatory act); Chardon v. Fernandez, 454 U.S. 6, 8 (1981) (holding
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appears plaintiff-friendly because it seems to consider the possibil-
ity that a plaintiff's knowledge of events might be delayed, which
would impact the plaintiff's ability to recognize and act on a § 1983
claim. As a result, under certain circumstances, the plaintiff may
have more time, cumulatively, than would appear to be provided
for, chronologically, under the state's limitation statute. Plaintiffs
and their representatives may, however, have the impression-
often well founded-that the triggers for determining the point of
accrual are less salutary than initially suggested by the standard. In
practice, plaintiffs lack the necessary legal knowledge, familiarity
with the legal system, and facts about the municipality's actions
and policies to discern a legally redressable injury.22 In other
words, plaintiffs may have insurmountable difficulty in determining
that they have a claim against a municipality.23
A determination of when a plaintiff knew, or should have
known, that the defendant's conduct could be the basis of a
redressable § 1983 injury can be a complex inquiry. The inquiry is
complicated by the factual complexities inherent in a claim based
on an institutional "policy and practice" of a government entity,
rather than on direct malicious conduct by some individual "bad
actor." This article argues that the courts' rulings in two recent
that the limitations period runs from date when plaintiff received notice of termina-
tion of job appointment).
22. Cf. Oliveri v. Thompson, 803 F.2d 1265 (2d Cir. 1986). In Oliveri, the Second
Circuit recognized the access-to-information problem faced by plaintiffs and their at-
torneys, and held that plaintiffs need not secure detailed information otherwise neces-
sary to establish a pattern of actionable misconduct prior to commencement of an
action.
We recognize, however, that when commencing a [police misconduct] suit
... neither the plaintiff nor his attorney is likely to know much about the
relevant internal operations of the police department, nor about the discipli-
nary history and record of the particular police officers involved. In view of
the strong policies favoring suits protecting the constitutional rights of citi-
zens, we think it would be inappropriate to require plaintiffs and their attor-
neys before commencing suit to obtain the detailed information needed to
prove a pattern of supervisory misconduct in the form of inadequate train-
ing, improper policies, and toleration of unconstitutional actions by individ-
ual police officers.
Id. at 1279.
23. One scholar has commented on the difficulty prospective § 1983 plaintiffs have
in recognizing a claim. SCHWARTZ, SECTION 1983 LITIGATION, supra note 10, vol. 1C,
§ 12.4.
The fact that a person knows (or should have known) of her injury, however, is not
the same as knowing that her federally protected rights were violated. A layperson
may well know that she has been injured, but it often takes a lawyer with expertise in
constitutional law to evaluate whether federally protected rights were violated. Id. at
10.
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cases, 24 decided in the Second Circuit, equating knowledge of indi-
vidual officers' illegal and corrupt conduct with knowledge of an
injury due to a municipality's policy, custom, or practice, are legally
and factually unsupportable. The approach taken by the courts,
this article argues, serves to diminish the effectiveness of § 1983
against municipalities.
This article further argues that a judge's determination of un-
timeliness is an inquiry based on objective facts and a judge's per-
ceptions, influenced by the judge's individual experiences, as well
as the dominant cultural norms of behavior as to what constitutes
reasonable actions and knowledge on the part of a plaintiff. Thus,
the limitations period calculation has an element of subjectivity, as
seen through the lens of a culturally normative reality.
The standard of accrual that determines the timeliness of a
§ 1983 claim is extremely malleable and vulnerable to an individual
judge's socially constructed cultural values. This standard of ac-
crual essentially renders § 1983 almost useless against municipali-
ties for police misconduct claims based on policies, practices, and/
or customs because it adopts a cultural standard at odds with a
racialized societal reality.25 Two recent Second Circuit cases26 are
analyzed to demonstrate the difficulty potential plaintiffs and their
counsel face in determining the point of accrual for Monell-based
claims alleging police misconduct.27
The City of New York (the "City"), the municipal defendant in
these two cases, challenged the plaintiffs' municipal liability claims
as untimely, arguing that they were filed after the three-year appli-
cable statutory time period.28 The City argued that plaintiffs had
notice of their municipal liability claims from statements made by
24. The two cases are Clinton v. City of New York, No. 98 Civ. 3810 (JSM), 1999
WL 105026 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 2, 1999), affd, No. 99-7336 (2d Cir. Oct. 29, 1999), and
Monzon v. City of New York, No. 98 Civ. 4872 (LMM), 1999 WL 1120527 (S.D.N.Y.
Dec. 7, 1999).
25. TWo commentators have asserted that § 1983 "is almost entirely a judicial con-
struct." Reshaping Section 1983, supra note 13, at 760.
26. Clinton, 1999 WL 105026, affd, No. 99-7336 (2d Cir. Oct. 29, 1999); Monzon,
1999 WL 1120527.
27. The author participated in the litigation of both cases in the district and circuit
courts. The author drafted the plaintiffs' memoranda of law in Clinton and Monzon
and the Clinton appellate brief. The author also argued the Clinton appeal before the
Second Circuit.
28. Section 1983 claims filed in New York are subject to New York State's three-
year statute of limitations. Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235, 251 (1989); Murphy v. Lynn,
53 F.3d at 548 (2d. Cir. 1995); see also N.Y. C.P.L.R. 214(2), (5) (McKinney 1990)
(state's three year limitations period applicable to general personal injury claims); see
also discussion infra Part I.
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state actors and the ensuing extensive media coverage underlying
the police precinct scandal.29 In addition, the City claimed that the
plaintiffs' participation in the investigation and prosecution of the
individual police officers involved in the plaintiffs' illegal arrests,
prosecutions, and incarcerations belied any claims that they did not
have notice of a municipal liability claim. 30  The plaintiffs re-
sponded that their municipal liability claims based on police mis-
conduct and corruption were timely filed because accrual did not
occur upon their initial arrests and prosecutions, but later, when
they knew that their injuries resulted from the City's policies rather
than from the individual police officers' actions.31 The plaintiffs
argued that information about the corruption and the City's direct
role in sustaining and furthering the corruption, was essential to
their notice of the municipal liability claim. 32
This article discusses the impact of the plaintiffs' testimony, offi-
cials' statements, and media coverage of the underlying events of
the claim and subsequent events on the accrual period of Monell-
based claims.3 3 Part I sets forth the applicable substantive and pro-
cedural law in determining the timeliness of a § 1983 municipal lia-
bility claim, and the rules governing summary dismissal based on
untimeliness. Part II discusses the two cases filed in the Southern
29. Clinton, 1999 WL 105026, at *2; Monzon, 1999 WL 1120527, at *1.
30. See Municipal Defendants' Memorandum of Law in Support of Their Motion
to Dismiss at 4-7 & nn.5-6, Clinton v. City of New York, No. 98 Civ. 3810 (JSM), 1999
WL 105026 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 2, 1999), reprinted in Appendix at 52-55, Clinton v. City of
New York, No. 99-7336, (2d Cir. Oct. 29, 1999) [hereinafter Appendix]; New York
City Memorandum of Law in Support of Its Motion to Dismiss at 7-9, Monzon v. City
of New York, 98 Civ. 4872 (LMM), 1999 WL 1120527 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 7, 1999) (on file
with author). See discussion infra Part II, for a more detailed discussion of the munici-
pal defendant's arguments.
31. It was critical to the plaintiffs' actions that the limitations period be calculated
from some point later than their arrests since both actions were filed more than three
years after the police arrested them. Clinton filed his complaint five years and eight
months after his arrest, and four years and eight months after being sentenced to four
years to life in prison. Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to
Dismiss, Clinton v. City of New York, No. 98 Civ. 3810 (JSM), 1999 WL 105026
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 2, 1999), reprinted in Appendix, supra note 30, at 82-83. Monzon filed
his complaint six years after his arrest, and four years and three months after a jury
acquitted him of all charges. Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Motion to Dis-
miss, at 5-6, Monzon v. City of New York, 98 Civ 4872 (LMM), 1999 WL 1120527
(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 7, 1999) (on file with author) [hereinafter Monzon's Memorandum].
32. Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, Clin-
ton v. City of New York, No. 98 Civ. 3810 (JSM), 1999 WL 105026 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 2,
1999), reprinted in Appendix, supra note 30, at 89-91; Monzon's Memorandum, supra
note 31, at 10-17.
33. Portions of the discussions in Part II-IV of this article are adapted from the
author's memoranda of law and appellate brief filed in these cases.
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District of New York and the subsequent Second Circuit summary
order in one of these cases.
Part III considers the propriety of basing accrual of a § 1983 ac-
tion upon plaintiffs' testimony, the statements of state and local
law enforcement officials, and media coverage of municipal and
state employee actions. This section argues that the officials' state-
ments are insufficient as a matter of law, and that judicial reliance
upon them is in direct contravention of doctrine and precedent and
injects a contrarian analysis at odds with reality into § 1983 Monell-
based cases.
In addition, this section argues that reliance on "mainstream"
media coverage should be suspect because of its unreliability and
lack of credibility within communities suspicious of law enforce-
ment motives and actions. This section challenges the wisdom of
relying on mainstream English-language media coverage of police
misconduct in light of the often tortuous and hostile relationship
between law enforcement officials and people of color in general,
and between police and the specific communities at issue in the
litigation. The culturally and linguistically constructed normative
frameworks, as applied to Monell claims, are similarly discussed
and dissected.
Part IV discusses the equitable tolling arguments raised by the
plaintiffs and rejected by the courts. Part V recommends a stan-
dard for assessing "constructive knowledge" of § 1983 claims based
on state officials' statements and newspaper and other media cov-
erage. This part recommends that the courts adhere to a theory of
notice of a municipal liability claim built upon information con-
necting the municipal action to the plaintiff's injury, rather than
one based upon inferences about the connection between individ-
ual municipal actors and the municipality.
PART I
A. Limitations and Accrual Periods Applicable to
42 U.S.C. § 1983 Monell Claims
In Wilson v. Garcia,34 the Supreme Court held that, for limita-
tions period purposes, § 1983 claims were analogous to personal
injury claims and thus subject to a state's personal injury statute of
limitations.35 Then, in Owens v. Okure,36 the Court held that when
34. 471 U.S. 261 (1985).
35. Id. at 275-76.
36. 488 U.S. 235 (1989).
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there are multiple personal injury statutes of limitations, § 1983
claims are subject to the state's general personal injury limitations
period.37 Owens involved New York State's statute of limitations,
and the Court concluded that New York's three-year general per-
sonal injury statute of limitations applied.38 The Court further held
that a § 1983 damages action on the grounds of "an unconstitu-
tional conviction or sentence does not accrue until the conviction
or sentence has been invalidated. 39
Although § 1983 claims are subject to state statutory time limita-
tions they remain creatures of federal law and accrue pursuant to
federal law.4 ° The Supreme Court has determined that accrual oc-
curs when the claimant knew or "should have known of his in-
jury.''41 The circuits have uniformly adopted and applied this
standard to § 1983 claims.42
37. Id. at 249-50. For a table of state limitations periods applicable to § 1983
claims, including case citations, see SCHWARTZ, SECTION 1983 LITIGATION, supra note
10, § 12.9, Table of Limitations Periods, & Supp. 2000.
38. 488 U.S. at 249-51; see also Murphy v. Lynn, 53 F.3d 547, 548 (2d Cir. 1995)
(stating that the § 1983 statute of limitations in New York is three years); N.Y.
C.P.L.R. § 214(2), (5) (McKinney 1990). While § 1983 claims are subject to state stat-
utes of limitations, they are not subject to state notice-of-claim requirements. Felder
v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 140-41 (1988). Notice-of-claim requirements typically impose a
short time frame within which the prospective claimant must notify the government of
a potential lawsuit against public officers and/or public entities. For a discussion of
notice-of-claim requirements, see SCHWARTZ, SECTION 1983 LITIGATION, supra note
10, § 12.15.
39. Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 489-90 (1994).
40. See supra note 20.
41. Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163, 170 (1949).
42. Morales v. City of L.A., 214 F.3d 1151, 1154 (9th Cir. 2000) (declaring the
standard is when plaintiff "knew or had reason to know of the injury which is the
basis of his action"); Harris v. Hegmann, 198 F.3d 153, 157 (5th Cir. 1999) ("When a
plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis of the action.")
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted); Montgomery v. De Simone, PTL.,
159 F.3d 120, 126 (3d Cir. 1998) ("[When] plaintiff knows or has reason to know of
the injury which is the basis of the § 1983 action") (citation and internal quotation
marks omitted); Smith v. City of Enid, 149 F.3d 1151, 1154 (10th Cir. 1998) ("When
the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis of the ac-
tion.") (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); Carreras-Rosa v. Alves-Cruz,
127 F.3d 172, 174 (1st Cir. 1997) ("When the plaintiff knows, or has reason to know,
of the injury on which the action is based.") (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted); Collyer v. Darling, 98 F.3d 211, 220 (6th Cir. 1996) (when "plaintiff knows
or has reason to know that the act providing the basis of his or her injury has oc-
cuffed") (citation omitted); Brooks v. City of Winston-Salem, N.C., 85 F.3d 178, 182
(4th Cir. 1996) ("[When plaintiff] knew or should have known both of the injury...
and who was responsible for any injury."); Rozar v. Mullis, 85 F.3d 556, 561-62 (11th
Cir. 1996) ("[When] the facts which would support a cause of action are apparent or
should be apparent to a person with a reasonably prudent regard for his rights.")
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted); Sellars v. Perry, 80 F.3d 243, 245 (7th
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B. Motions to Dismiss Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b) and Summary Judgment Motions Pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 for Untimely Actions
Municipalities commonly seek summary, pre-trial dismissal of
municipal liability claims. Accordingly, in Clinton v. City of New
York and Monzon v. City of New York, the City moved for dismis-
sal pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure,43 and, in Clinton, succeeded in dismissing the actions against
it before discovery under Rule 56.
Summary dismissal requires the defendant to satisfy a strict stan-
dard. A court may dismiss a complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6)
only if "it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set
Cir. 1996) ("[When] plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury that is the
basis of his action.") (citation omitted); Pinaud v. County of Suffolk, 52 F.3d 1139,
1157 (2d Cir. 1995) ("When it is clear, or should be clear, that the harmful act [under-
lying the claim] is the consequence of a county 'policy or custom."'); Pauk, 654 F.2d
856, 859 (2d Cir. 1981) (when the claimant "knows or had reason to know" of the
injury) (quoting Singleton v. City of New York, 632 F.2d 185, 191 (2d Cir. 1980)).
For a comprehensive discussion of § 1983 claim accrual, and a synopsis of signifi-
cant recent decisions on this issue, see SCHWARTZ, SECTION 1983 LITIGATIO N, supra
note 10, vol. 1C, § 12.4. As Professor Schwartz indicates, notice of injury and notice of
a constitutional violation are not the same. Id. at 10. The Supreme Court and a major-
ity of circuits adopted notice of injury, not notice of the violation of a right as the
accrual benchmark. Id. Yet, parties and attorneys have difficulty distinguishing these
two.
Basing accrual on notice of injury is problematic precisely because constitutional
issues are complex and difficult to grasp. Whether an individual has been injured in
the constitutional sense and the source of that injury are difficult to determine. Some
problems include the herculean task of discerning municipal liability when police de-
partments and cities deny the existence of a municipal role in the officers' "bad acts,"
arguing that the individuals involved are "rogue officers." Cf newspaper articles set
forth, infra notes 86-87 (referring to "rogue officers" in corruption scandals). Munici-
palities also withhold documentation and information that goes to the municipality's
role in the individual actions. E.g., King v. Conde, 121 F.R.D. 180, 192 (E.D.N.Y.
1988) (police departments refuse disclosure of personnel and investigatory files be-
cause it inhibits collection of information from police officers, and refuse disclosure of
police procedural guidelines because it compromises effectiveness of law enforce-
ment). Another layer of complexity to the legal and factual inquiry comes from § 1983
itself which, unlike other statutes, "does not create substantive rights." City of
Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 816 (1985) (citing Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S.
137, 140, 144 n.3 (1979)).
43. Clinton, 1999 WL 105026, at *1; Monzon, 1999 WL 1120527, at *1. In Monzon,
the municipal liability claim survived a motion to dismiss, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6),
because the court could not determine, as a matter of law, the untimeliness of the
plaintiff's claim. Monzon, 1999 WL 1120527 at *1.
44. In Clinton, the court summarily dismissed, pursuant to Rule 56, concluding
that, on the record and under the law, the plaintiff was on notice beyond the time
when he filed his complaint. See infra Part II, for a discussion of the procedural his-
tory in these cases.
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of facts in support of [the plaintiff's] claim which would entitle [the
plaintiff] to relief."45 In considering the motion, the court must
treat all factual allegations as true and construe all reasonable in-
ferences in the plaintiff's favor.46
Summary judgment under Rule 56 is appropriate only where
"there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and ... the mov-
ing party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law."'47 A party
seeking dismissal based on summary judgment faces a high thresh-
old. The moving party bears the initial burden of establishing "the
absence of a genuine issue as to any material fact. ' 48 Moreover,
the movant's summary judgment materials "must be viewed in the
light most favorable to the opposing party. '49 Satisfaction of the
moving party's burden is essential, because summary judgment
cannot be granted unless such burden has been adequately satis-
fied, even when the opposing party does not adequately respond.
"Where the evidentiary matter in support of the motion does not
establish the absence of a genuine issue, summary judgment must
be denied even if no opposing evidentiary matter is presented. 50
The district court's task in considering summary judgment is nar-
row. The district "judge's function is not.., to weigh the evidence
45. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957). For a comprehensive discussion of
the Rule 12(b)(6) standard, and for citations to illustrative cases, see 2 JAMES WM
MOORE, ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 12.34 (Matthew Bender 3d ed.); 5A
CHARLES ALLEN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCE-
DURE § 1355-1358 (West Publishing Co. 1990 & Supp. 2000).
The Second Circuit has stated that this "principle is to be applied with particular
strictness when the plaintiff complains of a civil rights violation." Branum v. Clark,
927 F.2d 698, 705 (2d Cir. 1991).
46. Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit,
507 U.S. 163, 164 (1993). See generally MOORE, supra note 45, § 12.34; WRIGHT &
MILLER, supra note 45, § 1357.
47. FED R. Civ. P. 56(c). In the Clinton litigation the City initially filed a motion
to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), which the district court treated as a
motion for summary judgment under Rule 56, based on the appended supporting doc-
uments submitted by both parties. Clinton, 1999 WL 105026, at *1. The parties' at-
tachments consisted of published and unpublished judicial opinions, New York State
and federal court documents in the referenced criminal matters involving the plaintiff
and the former police officer defendants, and plaintiff's affidavit in opposition to the
motion to dismiss. Appendix, supra note 30, 36-185.
48. Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970); see also Celotex Corp.
v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-33 (1986) (discussing Rule 56(e)). For a general discus-
sion of summary judgment and standards of review, see WRIGHT & MILLER, supra
note 45, vol. 10A, §§ 2716, 2728, & vol. 10B, § 2732.2; MOORE, supra note 45,
§ 56.11[5].
49. Adickes, 398 U.S. at 157 (footnote omitted).
50. FED. R. CIv. P. 56(e) advisory committee's note on 1963 amendment (quoted
in Adickes, 398 U.S. at 160).
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and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether
there is a genuine issue for trial. '51 Thus, the inquiry under sum-
mary judgment is "whether the evidence presents a sufficient disa-
greement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-
sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law. ''52 To that
end, "[c]redibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence,
and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury
functions, not those of a judge .... The evidence of the non-mo-
vant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn
in his favor. ' 53
On appeal, the appellate "[c]ourt reviews the district court's de-
termination de novo . . . and reviews facts in the light most
favorable to the losing party. ' 54 The court must be convinced that
there is no "evidence in the record from any source from which a
reasonable inference could be drawn in favor of the nonmoving
party. ''5 5 Thus, summary judgment is limited to those cases in
which there are no disputed factual issues underlying a claim that
must be presented to a trier of fact.
C. Municipal Liability Claims
1. Pleading and Evidentiary Burdens
In Leatherman v. Tarrant,56 the Supreme Court rejected the ap-
plication of a heightened pleading requirement to § 1983 municipal
liability claims.57 The Court reiterated 8 that its reading of Rule
51. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986); see also Chambers
v. TRM Copy Ctrs. Corp., 43 F.3d 29, 36 (2d. Cir. 1994) ("[A] court 'cannot try issues
of fact; it can only determine whether there are issues to be 'tried."') (citations omit-
ted); Gallo v. Prudential Residential Servs., 22 F.3d 1219, 1224 (2d Cir. 1994) (The
court is "carefully limited to discerning whether there are any genuine issues of mate-
rial fact to be tried, not to deciding them. Its duty, in short, is confined at this point to
issue-finding; it does not extend to issue-resolution.").
For a general discussion of summary judgment and standards of review, see
WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 45, vol. 10A, §§ 2716, 2728, & 10B, § 2732.2; MOORE,
supra note 45, § 56.11[5].
52. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251-52.
53. Id. at 255 (citing Adickes, 398 U.S. at 158-59).
54. Cellular Tel. Co. v. Town of Oyster Bay, 166 F.3d 490, 492 (2d Cir. 1999) (cit-
ing D'Amico v. City of New York, 132 F.3d 145, 149 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 524 U.S.
911 (1998), Sullivan v. Town of Salem, 805 F.2d 81, 82-83 (2d Cir. 1986)).
55. Chambers, 43 F.3d at 37 (citing Brady v. Town of Colchester, 863 F.2d 205, 211
(2d Cir. 1988)).
56. 507 U.S. 163 (1993).
57. Id.
58. The Court's earlier reading of Rule 8(a)(2) is in Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41,
47 (1957).
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8(a)(2) requires "that a complaint include only 'a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to re-
lief."' 59 However, the Court limited its decision in Leatherman to
municipal liability claims, and specifically left open the question
whether heightened pleading applies to claims against individu-
als.6" Section 1983 scholars have noted that following this decision,
several lower courts have preserved pleading hurdles that increase
the burden on prospective plaintiffs. 61 For example, some lower
courts have concluded that heightened pleading requirements are
still applicable to qualified immunity claims and conspiracy
claims.62
The Supreme Court and the Second Circuit have made clear on
numerous occasions that municipal liability claims are independent
of individual claims and impose different evidentiary burdens on
the claimant.63 The standard for establishing a municipal policy or
custom places a significant burden on a claimant to establish that
the municipality itself has committed some act resulting in injury to
the claimant.64
59. Leatherman, 507 U.S. at 168 (quoting FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)).
60. Id. at 166-67; see SCHWARTZ, SECTION 1983 LITIGATION, supra note 10, § 7.21
(discussing Leatherman).
61. For a comprehensive discussion of the pleading issues and court decisions
post-Leatherman, see NAHMOD, CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 10, §§ 1:44-1.46;
SCHWARTZ, SECTION 1983 LITIGATION, supra note 10, vol. 1A, §§ 1.6 -1.7.
62. NAHMOD, CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 10, § 1:44 (citing cases); SCHWARTZ, SEC-
TION 1983 LITIGATION, supra note 10, vol. 1A, § 1.6 (citing cases).
63. See Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25 (1991); see also Pinaud v. County of Suffolk,
52 F.3d 1139 (2d Cir. 1995). See generally SCHWARTZ, SECTION 1983 LITIGATION,
supra note 10, §§ 7.7, 7.15-7.18.
In order to fully comprehend the Supreme Court's § 1983 case decisions, the
Court's construction of § 1983 must be considered in light of its application of com-
mon law tort doctrines to the statute. The Court has "repeatedly noted that 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 creates a species of tort liability." Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 483 (1994)
(quoting Memphis Community Sch. Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 305 (1986)) (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted), and as a consequence, common law tort rules, "'defin-
ing the elements of damages and the prerequisites for their recovery, provide the
appropriate starting point for the inquiry under § 1983 as well."' Id. (quoting Carey v.
Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 257-58 (1978)). However, the Court has not uniformly applied
common law tort rules to § 1983, but rather has looked to such rules for guidance in
construing § 1983 in light of the statute's history and legislative goals. The prime ex-
ample of the Court's unwillingness to adopt whole-heartedly common law principles
is its rejection of a respondeat superior theory as applied to municipal liability claims
under § 1983. E.g., Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978).
64. Indeed, plaintiff need not sue an individual to proceed on a municipal liability
claim. Only the municipality's policy, practice, or custom, which causes the violation
of the protected right, is needed to establish a municipal liability claim. Monell, 436
U.S. at 690; City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385-92 (1989); see Schwartz, Sec-
tion 1983 Claims, supra note 7, at 4.
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First, the plaintiff must assert a deprivation of a right protected
by the United States Constitution or a federal statute because
§ 1983 does not create "substantive rights; it merely provides reme-
dies for deprivations of rights established elsewhere."65 Second,
the municipality must have a policy that, as executed or imple-
mented, violates the claimant's rights.66 Such a policy may be
based upon either an official pronouncement or an act or series of
actions by municipal employees. 67 It may include a "policy state-
ment, ordinance, regulation or decision officially adopted and
promulgated by [the municipality's] officers, ' 68 those "edicts or
acts [that] may fairly be said to represent official policy," 69 or a
"governmental 'custom' even though such a custom has not re-
ceived formal approval through the body's official decision making
channels."7 In his succinct summary of a plaintiff's available theo-
65. City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 816. (1985) (citing Baker v.
McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 140, 144, n.3 (1979) (holding that because police officers in-
flicted no constitutional injury to respondent, they were not liable under § 1983)); see
also Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U. S. 115 (1992) (holding that because
city's conduct did not violate the Due Process Clause, § 1983 did not provide a rem-
edy to municipal employer); City of Los Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796 (1986) (per
curiam); Chapman v. Houston Welfare Org., 441 U.S. 600, 615-20 (1979); Michael S.
Bogren, Municipal Liability Under § 1983, in SWORD & SHIELD REVISITED: A PRAC-
TICAL APPROACH TO SECTION 1983, at 215, 227 (Mary Massaron Ross ed., 1998)
[hereinafter Bogren, Municipal Liability Under § 1983].
While the Court initially held in Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 4-8 (1979), that
§ 1983 "laws" encompassed all statutory violations of federal law, it later significantly
limited that holding. In Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1,
28 (1981), the Court pronounced the standard for exceptions to § 1983 "laws" claims:
when a federal statute does not confer rights, privileges, or immunities enforceable
pursuant to § 1983, and when Congress foreclosed a private remedy by virtue of the
statute. In Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453
U.S. 1, 20 (1981), the Court stated that where a federal statute's remedies "are suffi-
ciently comprehensive, they may suffice to demonstrate congressional intent to pre-
clude" § 1983 actions. See generally NAHMOD, CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 10, §§ 2:27-
2:37; SCHWARTZ, SECTION 1983 LITIGATION, supra note 10, vol. 1A, § 4.2.
66. Monell, 436 U.S. at 690-91. A municipality may be liable for an actual policy,
its own direct acts or failure to train, or for actions so pervasive that they rise to the
level of a custom. See generally, NAHMOD, CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 10, §§ 6:6-6:13,
6:33-6:34, 6:38-6:43.
67. In Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469 (1986), and City of St. Louis v.
Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112 (1988), the Court addressed the issue of which official could
be considered a decision-maker whose actions may be the basis for municipal liability.
The court concluded in these two cases that only actions attributable to those persons
who, under state law, have final policymaking authority could result in municipal lia-
bility. Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 481-82; Praprotnik, 485 U.S. at 124-27. See generally
SCHWARTZ, SECTION 1983 LITIGATION, supra note 10, §§ 7.8, 7.16-7.17.
68. Monell, 436 U.S. at 690.
69. Id. at 694.
70. Id. at 691.
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ries for the existence of a policy in satisfaction of the Court's pro-
nouncements, Justice Souter has stated that a policy may be
demonstrated:
[W]hen the appropriate officer or entity promulgates a generally
applicable statement of policy and the subsequent act com-
plained of is simply an implementation of that policy ....
... where no rule has been announced as a "policy" but fed-
eral law has been violated by an act of the policymaker itself...
[such that] the choice of policy and its implementation are one
... [and] in a third situation, even where the policymaker has
failed to act affirmatively at all, so long as the need to take some
action to control the agents of the Government "is so obvious,
and the inadequacy [of existing practice] so likely to result in the
violation of constitutional rights, that the policymake[r] ... can
reasonably be said to have been deliberately indifferent to the
need."71
Third, the plaintiff must establish causation. There must be "a
direct causal link between a municipal policy or custom and the
alleged constitutional deprivation. ' 72 The plaintiff must show that
the municipal policy "caused a constitutional tort. ' 73 A municipal-
ity is liable where its deliberate action is the "moving force" behind
71. Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 417-18 (1997) (Souter, J.,
dissenting) (citations omitted) (third alteration in original). As Justice Souter recog-
nized, Monell is the classic example of the first theoretical matrix. The Clinton and
Monzon cases are examples of the third.
The number of acts necessary to give rise to a policy or custom continues to chal-
lenge courts and plaintiffs. One legal expert has stated, "there must be more than one
event to give rise to a custom or practice." Bogren, Municipal Liability Under § 1983,
supra note 65, at 243. Further, "the practice must be 'longstanding' and 'pervasive."'
Id. A custom "must be persistent and well settled." NAHMOD, CIVIL RIGHTS, supra
note 10, § 6:10; see Singleton v. City of New York, 632 F.2d 185, 195 (2d Cir. 1980).
72. City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 375, 385 (1989); see also City of Oklahoma
City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 829-30 (1985) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and concur-
ring in the judgment) (finding that the causation element of a § 1983 claims requires
the plaintiff to show (1) action by the city, rather than unilateral action by a non-
policy making employee, and (2) that "this policy or custom 'subjected' or 'caused
[plaintiff] to be subjected' to a deprivation of a constitutional right").
73. Monell, 436 U.S. at 691. The plaintiff cannot proceed under a theory of respon-
deat superior against the municipal defendant. Id. See generally NAHMOD, CIVIL
RIGHTS, supra note 10, 88 6:12-6:13, 6:35 (summarizing the law on causation, the con-
stitutional violation requirement, and the need for plaintiff to show a causal relation-
ship between the custom and the constitutional deprivation); SCHWARTZ, SECrION
1983 LITIGATION, supra note 10, §§ 7.7, 7.12 (discussing whether plaintiff has to show
some level of fault in the municipality's adoption of the policy, and plaintiff's need to
show that the policy caused the constitutional deprivation).
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the plaintiff's injury.74 Lastly, the plaintiff must also establish cul-
pability of the municipality.75 Although § 1983 does not contain a
state of mind requirement, "[i]n any § 1983 suit ... the plaintiff
must establish the state of mind required to prove the underlying
violation. '76 Section 1983 only requires a plaintiff to establish the
intent required for proof of the constitutional violation
In asserting a claim based on inadequate training, this last crite-
ria requires the plaintiff to establish that the municipality acted in a
manner that constitutes "deliberate indifference. ' 77 This standard
is "a judicial gloss, appearing neither in the Constitution nor in a
statute,' 78 and is an objective standard. Consequently, it is one of
the most difficult theories under which a plaintiff may proceed.
Moreover, the Supreme Court has made clear that municipal liabil-
ity based on a policy of inadequate training cannot be based on a
single incident of police misconduct.79 In contrast, § 1983 action
against an individual requires that the plaintiff show a violation of
a federal constitutional or statutory right, proximately caused by
the actions of a person acting under color of law.8°
2. Accrual: Question of Law, Fact, or Mixed?
The Second Circuit has stated that, in certain circumstances, the
determination of when a claim accrues involves "factual issues re-
lated to statute of limitations [which] should be put before a
jury."'81 Several lower courts in the Second Circuit have noted that
74. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 520 U.S. at 404; Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312,
326 (1981) (quoting Monell, 436 U.S. at 694); see Collins v. City of Harker Heights,
Texas, 503 U.S. 115, 122 (1992).
75. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 520 U.S. at 405; see also Martinez v. California, 444
U.S. 277, 285 (1980) (finding no § 1983 liability where the harm to plaintiff was "too
remote a consequence" of the state action). The Court has stated that a § 1983 munic-
ipal liability claim is subject to a two part analysis: "(1) whether plaintiff's harm was
caused by a constitutional violation, and (2) if so, whether the city is responsible for
that violation." Collins, 503 U.S. at 120 (citing Tuttle, 471 U.S. at 817).
76. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 520 U.S. at 405.
77. Harris, 489 U.S. at 388; see also Bogren, Municipal Liability Under § 1983,
supra note 65, at 249-53 (reviewing the deliberate indifference standard).
78. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 840 (1994).
79. Tuttle, 471 U.S. at 821 (finding that a policy or custom of inadequate training
cannot be inferred from a single isolated incident of excessive force by a police of-
ficer, because such an inference would "allow a § 1983 plaintiff to establish municipal
liability without submitting proof of a single action taken by a municipal policy
maker").
80. SCHWARTZ, SECrION 1983 LITIGATION, supra note 10, vol. 1A, § 1.4, at 12.
81. Eagleston v. Guido, 41 F.3d 865, 871 (2d Cir. 1994) (citation omitted).
20001 523
524 FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXVIII
the moment of accrual involves some factual determinations. 82 Ac-
cording to one Connecticut district court, the date when the claim
accrues for statutory limitations purposes "is ordinarily a question
of fact for a trier; consequently, a court cannot grant summary
judgment for a defendant if there is a genuine dispute as to when
the limitation period began."83 As stated in a decision from the
Northern District of New York, the determination of when there
are sufficient facts to give the claimant "reason to know ... of
defendants' actions, is a factual question that must be resolved by a
jury. "84
PART H
A. Police Corruption Within New York City's 30th Precinct85
In the early 1990s, police corruption of epic proportion en-
veloped the 30th Police Precinct in New York City.86 This corrup-
tion lasted several years and eventually led to the worst and most
pervasive police corruption scandal in the history of New York
City-an era marked by perjury, drug sales, extortion, and theft
committed by numerous police officers.87 The officers involved in
82. E.g., West Haven Sch. Dist. v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 721 F. Supp.
1547, 1555-56, n.10 (D. Conn. 1988); see also Paige v. Police Dep't, No. 97-CV-0455,
slip op. at 11 (N.D.N.Y. May 7, 1998) (discussing whether certain facts provided a
basis for finding plaintiff had "constructive knowledge" of defendants' actions for
purposes of determining when action accrued is a factual question for the jury) (citing
Braune v. Abbott Laboratories, 895 F. Supp. 530, 556 (E.D.N.Y. 1995)); JWP Inc. Sec.
Litig. v. Dwyer, 928 F. Supp. 1239, 1248 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
83. West Haven Sch. Dist., 721 F. Supp. at 1556, n.10 (citations omitted); see also
Paige, No. 97-CV-0455, slip op. at 11 (discussing whether certain facts provided a basis
for finding plaintiff had "constructive knowledge" of defendants' actions for purposes
of determining when action accrued is a factual question for the jury).
84. Paige, No. 97-CV-0455, slip op. at 11-12 (citing Braune, 895 F. Supp. 530; JWP
Inc. Sec. Litig., 928 F. Supp. 1239).
85. Attorneys of record for plaintiff in Clinton, Jose A. Muniz, Esq. and Rudy
Velez, Esq., provided valuable assistance and feedback in developing the factual
description of the 30th Police Precinct corruption scandal included in the plaintiffs'
memoranda of law, which the author wrote, and upon which the text herein is based.
86. David Kocieniewski, Victim of Framing by 2 Police Officers Wins $5,000 in
Payments from Them, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12, 1998, at B3 [hereinafter Victim of Fram-
ing]; David Kocieniewski, New York Pays a High Price for Police Lies, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 5, 1997, at B1 [hereinafter New York Pays a High Price]; Andrew Jacobs, Bad
Cop, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 1996, at 1 [hereinafter Bad Cop]; Clifford Krauss, 14 More
Officers Arrested at a Shaken 30th Precinct, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29, 1994, at Al [herein-
after 14 More Officers Arrested]; Peter Pringle, Police Close in on "Dirty 30," THE
INDEPENDENT (London), Apr. 25, 1994, at 10 [hereinafter Police Close in].
87. Letter from Mary Jo White, United Sates Attorney, by Assistant United States
Attorney Michael Horowitz to United States District Judge Lawrence M. McKenna
(Apr. 2, 1997), reprinted in Appendix, supra note 30, at 102-03; see also Victim of
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the corruption acted both individually and with other members of
the precinct to steal drugs and stolen goods, and then to cover up
their actions by perjuring themselves before grand juries and in
court.88 The victims of this corruption were predominantly African
American and Latino.89
These actions were not aberrations, but were common occur-
rences perpetrated by a significant number of officers within the
precinct. According to one account, "one-sixth of the precinct's
officers had routinely stolen drug money, guns and cash." 90 Indeed,
the 30th Precinct gained the unique distinction of being known as
"the Dirty Thirty."' The corruption scandal in the 30th Precinct
was so pervasive and systemic that ultimately one-third of the pre-
cinct officials were implicated in the underlying illegal acts92 and
thirty-one police officials of the 30th Precinct were charged, con-
victed, or pleaded guilty.93
Framing, supra note 86; Bad Cop, supra note 86; George James, Officer Convicted of
Perjury in a Drug Case, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21, 1995, at B6 [hereinafter Officer Con-
victed]; George James, Ex-Officer Tells Court of Protection and Pay Offs, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 22, 1995, at B3 [hereinafter Ex-Officer Tells Court]; 14 More Officers Arrested,
supra note 86; Larry Elliot, New York Police Corruption Drive Extends its Inquiries,
THE GUARDIAN (London), May 9, 1994, at 12; Police Close in, supra note 86.
88. New York Pays a High Price, supra note 86; Victim of Framing, supra note 86;
Bad Cop, supra note 86; Officer Convicted, supra note 87; Ex-Officer Tells Court,
supra note 87; 14 More Officers Arrested, supra note 86; Police Close in, supra note 86.
89. See New York Pays a High Price, supra note 86; Victim of Framing, supra note
86; Bad Cop, supra note 86; Officer Convicted, supra note 87; Ex-Officer Tells Court,
supra note 87; 14 More Officers Arrested, supra note 86; Police Close in, supra note 86.
90. New York Pays a High Price, supra note 86; Victim of Framing, supra note 86;
Bad Cop, supra note 86; Officer Convicted, supra note 87; Ex-Officer Tells Court,
supra note 87; 14 More Officers Arrested, supra note 86; Police Close in, supra note 86.
91. New York Pays a High Price, supra note 86; Victim of Framing, supra note 86;
Bad Cop, supra note 86; Officer Convicted, supra note 87; Ex-Officer Tells Court,
supra note 87; 14 More Officers Arrested, supra note 86; Police Close in, supra note 86.
92. Letter from Mary Jo White, United Sates Attorney, by Assistant United States
Attorney Michael Horowitz to United States District Judge Lawrence M. McKenna
(Apr. 2, 1997), reprinted in Appendix, supra note 30, at 103. The 30th Precinct corrup-
tion involved "every tour of duty," and resulted in thirty-one members from the pre-
cinct being charged "for involvement in narcotics distribution, thefts of money and
property, unlawful searches and seizures, the use of excessive force, extortion, income
tax evasion and perjury." Id. See generally New York Pays a High Price, supra note 86;
Victim of Framing, supra note 86; Bad Cop, supra note 86; Officer Convicted, supra
note 87; Ex-Officer Tells Court, supra note 87; 14 More Officers Arrested, supra note
86; Police Close in, supra note 86; Clifford Krauss, More Officers Facing Arrest in
Corruption, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 15, 1994, at B1 [hereinafter More Officers Facing
Arrest].
93. Letter from Mary Jo White, United Sates Attorney, by Assistant United States
Attorney Michael Horowitz to United States District Judge Lawrence M. McKenna
(Apr. 2, 1997), reprinted in Appendix, supra note 30, at 103.
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The corruption Was entrenched and covert, necessitating the par-
ticipation of several law enforcement entities in the investigation
and eventual elimination of the corruption. Beginning about May
1993, the Manhattan District Attorney's Office, along with investi-
gators from the New York City Police Department's Internal Af-
fairs Bureau, the Internal Revenue Service's Criminal
Investigation Division, the Mollen Commission (a New York City
commission established to investigate police corruption),94 and the
United States Attorney's Office, undertook a collective investiga-
tion into allegations of corruption in the 30th Precinct, including
charges of rampant false arrests and perjury committed by precinct
officials.95 Based on the revelations from their investigation, the
District Attorney's Office reviewed well over 500 criminal cases. 96
Many cases were dismissed and vacated due to the perjury and
wrongful actions of the 30th Precinct officers.97
Hundreds of persons, the majority of which were African Ameri-
can and Latino, were wrongfully incarcerated, prosecuted, and/or
convicted as a direct consequence of the officers' unlawful ac-
tions.98 This compromised the social contract, seriously breached
the trust of the communities most affected by the officers' actions,
namely the black and Latino communities, and undermined the
trust in the New York City Police Department. It also took a heavy
94. Former Mayor David Dinkins appointed the City of New York Commission to
Investigate Allegations of Police Corruption and the Anti-Corruption Procedures of
the Police Department to investigate police corruption allegations in New York City.
This commission, popularly known as the "Mollen Commission" after its chair, Judge
Milton Mollen, issued a report that concluded there was corruption throughout New
York City's Police Department. MOLLEN REPORT, supra note 4.
95. Letter from Mary Jo White, United Sates Attorney, by Assistant United States
Attorney Michael Horowitz to United States District Judge Lawrence M. McKenna
(Apr. 2, 1997), reprinted in Appendix, supra note 30, at 103; More Officers Facing
Arrest, supra note 92.
96. Seth Faison, Case Review Under Way Due to Police In Scandal, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 19, 1994, at B2.
97. Letter from New York District Attorney Robert M. Morgenthau, by Assistant
District Attorney Emery E. Adoradio to United States District Judge Charles S.
Haight, Jr. (Feb. 26, 1997), reprinted in Appendix, supra note 30, at 118. The case
review was an enormous task, which the plaintiff in Clinton argued was incomplete.
Indeed, the plaintiff argued, upon information and belief, that there were still 1000-
2000 cases pending not yet dismissed by the City. Memorandum of Law in Opposition
to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, Clinton v. City of New York, No. 98 Civ. 3810
(JSM), 1999 WL 105026 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 2, 1999), reprinted in Appendix, supra note
30, at 79.
98. See New York Pays a High Price, supra note 86; Victim of Framing, supra note
86; Bad Cop, supra note 86; Officer Convicted, supra note 87; Ex-Officer Tells Court,
supra note 87; 14 More Officers Arrested, supra note 86; Police Close in, supra note 86.
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toll on police resources and cost taxpayers millions of dollars in
litigation costs, awards, and settlements.99
Indeed, several victims sued officers and the City. Some filed
§ 1983 actions against those officers who were primary participants
in the 30th Precinct corruption. Reynaldo Clinton and Robert
Monzon were two of these victims.1°° They sued Edward Checke,
Kevin Nannery, Joseph Walsh, and James Velez.' A jury con-
victed Velez of various criminal counts. Checke, Nannery, and
Walsh pleaded guilty in both state and federal court.0 2 All four
were sentenced for crimes associated with their unlawful and cor-
rupt practices during their tour at the 30th Precinct. 3 Ironically,
because of their extensive participation in the police corruption
and conspiracy to violate the law, the cooperation of Checke, Nan-
nery, and Walsh was critical to the investigation and provided them
with the leverage to negotiate pleas for relatively short
sentences.' n
99. Victim of Framing, supra note 86 (reporting that the New York City Law De-
partment paid more than two million dollars in settlements with fifteen civil suits still
pending); New York Pays a High Price, supra note 86 (noting that awards and settle-
ments totaled 1.3 million dollars to date, and legal experts estimated such costs could
rise to ten million dollars); see also Neil MacFarquhar, Torture Case Puts Officers on
Defensive, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 27, 1997, at Al (reporting that police credibility was "on
a knife edge in New York" due to police corruption and abuse); Jennifer Maddox,
Corrupt Police Taint Communities, THE STUART NEWS, Aug. 12, 1996, at Cl (explain-
ing that police corruption "contaminate[s] relationship with communities"); Kevin
Johnson, New Breed of Bad Cop Sells Badge, Public Trust, USA TODAY, Apr. 16,
1998, at A8 (discussing several police corruption cases nationally and their impact on
society); MOLLEN REPORT, supra note 4, at 4 (describing that perception of preva-
lence of police corruption and law enforcement's unwillingness to address this "poi-
sons relations between the community and the police").
100. Clinton, 1999 WL 105026, at *1; Monzon, 1999 WL 1120527, at *1.
101. Clinton, 1999 WL 105026, at *1; Monzon, 1999 WL 1120527, at *1.
102. Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, Clin-
ton v. City of New York, No. 98 Civ. 3810 (JSM), 1999 WL 105026 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 2,
1999), reprinted in Appendix, supra note 30, at 80-81.
103. Checke, Nannery, and Walsh pleaded guilty in federal and state court to vari-
ous counts of conspiracy to violate civil rights, tax evasion, and first degree perjury.
These pleas were entered pursuant to their respective plea agreements with the prose-
cutors. Id. at 80-81.
104. On September 27, 1994, defendant Walsh pleaded guilty in federal court to
conspiracy to violate civil rights and to tax evasion. He also pled guilty to first degree
perjury in state court. Id. at 125. On November 15, 1994, defendant Nannery pled
guilty in federal court to conspiracy to violate civil rights and to tax evasion. He also
pled guilty in state court to first-degree perjury. Id. at 102. On February 2, 1996, de-
fendant Checke pled guilty in state court to first degree perjury. Id. at 110. Of these
defendants, Checke was the first sentenced, on April 9, 1996, in state court to a condi-
tional discharge. Checke Sentencing Sheet, reprinted in Appendix, supra note 30, at
137. Defendant Walsh was sentenced in federal court on April 2, 1997, to nine months
imprisonment and two years supervised release, and in state court to nine months
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For example, as part of the sentencing phase, the federal prose-
cutor in Nannery's case noted that:
[D]espite serious concerns about Nannery's abuse of his posi-
tion of trust and leadership within the [New York Police Depart-
ment], and the devastating consequences of his actions, both
[the United States Attorney's Office and the District Attorney's
Office] agreed that he was a critical witness who should be
signed up as a cooperator.
In sum, the gravity of the crimes committed by Kevin Nannery is
clear, and no amount of cooperation can change that. Neverthe-
less, Kevin Nannery's willingness to cooperate with this investi-
gation assisted in the prosecution of several additional corrupt
officers for which he deserves consideration at the time of
sentencing.' 0 5
The federal court sentenced Nannery to five months imprison-
ment and two years supervised release. 1°6
Similarly, with respect to Walsh, who was secretly arrested and
then cooperated by recording other former officers' statements
that resulted in their arrests,10 7 the prosecutor stated:
At the time, the Government was unaware of most of Walsh's
perjuries, and it is unlikely that the Government ever would
have learned of them had Walsh failed to divulge them volunta-
rily. This information was particularly important because it ena-
bled the District Attorney's Office, first, to immediately identify
and vacate legally-flawed prosecutions and, second, to bring
criminal charges against those officers who participated in the
perjuries.
imprisonment, to be served concurrently. Walsh Sentencing Sheet, reprinted in Ap-
pendix, supra note 30, at 138-40; Ex-Officer Sentenced to 9-month Term, N.Y. L.J.,
Apr. 4, 1997, at 2. Defendant Nannery also was sentenced in 1997 in federal court to
five months imprisonment and two years supervised release, and in state court to one
to three years imprisonment, to be served concurrently. Nannery Sentencing Sheet,
reprinted in Appendix, supra note 30, at 141-44. The court sentenced James Velez to
several concurrent terms of one to three years incarceration.
In contrast, Reynaldo Clinton, the target and victim of Checke, Nannery, and
Walsh's corrupt actions, served almost two years in prison, more than any of the for-
mer police officers. Amended Complaint, Clinton v. City of New York, No. 98 Civ.
3810 (JSM), 1999 WL 105026 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 2, 1999), reprinted in Appendix, supra
note 30, at 5. Robert Monzon was wrongfully incarcerated and had to defend himself
at trial. Monzon's Memorandum, supra note 31, at 1.
105. Letter from Mary Jo White, United Sates Attorney, by Assistant United States
Attorney Michael Horowitz to United States District Judge Lawrence M. McKenna
(Apr. 2, 1997), reprinted in Appendix, supra note 30, at 112.
106. Nannery Sentencing Sheet, reprinted in Appendix, supra note 30, at 141-44.
107. Id. at 109, n.5.
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The gravity of the crimes committed by Joseph Walsh is clear,
and no amount of cooperation can change that. Nevertheless,
Joseph Walsh's willingness to cooperate with this investigation
assisted in the prosecution of several additional corrupt officers
for which he deserves consideration at the time of sentencing. 10 8
The federal court sentenced Walsh to nine months imprisonment
and two years supervised release. 10 9
B. Clinton v. City of New York: Factual and
Procedural Background
1. Reynoldo Clinton's Wrongful Arrest and Incarceration and
Participation in the Corruption Investigation
On or about September 29, 1992, former police officer Edward
Checke arrested Reynaldo Clinton."' Later, former police officer
Joseph Walsh falsely testified to the grand jury that he and former
police officer Kevin Nannery joined Checke in pursuing, appre-
hending, and recovering drugs from Clinton.' Clinton was subse-
quently indicted, convicted for possession of drugs, and sentenced,
on October 19, 1993, to an indeterminate prison sentence of four
years to life." 2
On November 4, 1994, pursuant to a motion for release under
New York's Criminal Procedure Law § 440.10,113 Clinton was re-
leased from prison after serving almost two years.114 The Supreme
Court of the State of New York vacated Clinton's wrongful convic-
tion and dismissed his unlawful indictment on December 13,
1994.115
108. Letter from Mary Jo White, United Sates Attorney, by Assistant United States
Attorney Michael Horowitz to United States District Judge Charles S. Haight, Jr.
(Feb. 25, 1997), reprinted in Appendix, supra note 30, at 136.
109. Walsh Sentencing Sheet, reprinted in Appendix, supra note 30, at 138-40.
110. Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant at 4, Clinton v. City of New York, No. 99-7336 (2d
Cir. Oct. 29, 1999).
111. Amended Complaint, Clinton v. City of New York, No. 98 Civ. 3810 (JSM),
1999 WL 105026 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 2, 1999), reprinted in Appendix, supra note 30, at 8;
Letter from New York District Attorney Robert M. Morgenthau, by Assistant Dis-
trict Attorney Emery E. Adoradio to United States District Judge Charles S. Haight,
Jr. (Feb. 26, 1997), reprinted in Appendix, supra note 30, at 116; Brief for Plaintiff-
Appellant at 4, Clinton v. City of New York, No. 99-7336 (2d Cir. Oct. 29, 1999).
112. Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant at 4, Clinton v. City of New York, No. 99-7336 (2d
Cir. Oct. 29, 1999).
113. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 440.10 (McKinney 1994).
114. Amended Complaint, Clinton v. City of New York, No. 98 Civ. 3810 (JSM),
1999 WL 105026 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 2, 1999), reprinted in Appendix, supra note 30, at 5.
115. Id.
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In 1994 and 1995, representatives from the District Attorney's
Office approached Clinton regarding his arrest and the wrongful
acts of the arresting officers. 16 Assistant District Attorney Emery
E. Adoradio interviewed Clinton in the presence of his attorney
and confirmed information that officers involved in Clinton's pros-
ecution had lied to the grand jury.117 Clinton was later approached
again by the District Attorney's Office to recount his version of his
arrest to a grand jury, which he did in March 1995.11
2. Plaintiff Clinton's 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Civil Rights Action
Clinton filed his amended complaint on June 16, 1998.119 He
charged defendants the City of New York, the New York City Po-
lice Department, and former police officers Walsh, Nannery, and
Checke, with federal and state civil rights violations arising from
his wrongful arrest, prosecution, and imprisonment. 20 Clinton's
claims were based on the illegal conduct and perjured testimony of
the officers, which, he alleged, were pursuant to an official custom
and practice permitting and facilitating such conduct.1 2 ' Specifi-
cally, Clinton alleged that the City was liable for official customs,
policies, and practices, and for failure to adequately select, hire,
train, supervise, and discipline the offices, all of which deprived
116. Affirmation in Support of Dismissal of Indictment (Dec. 10, 1994), reprinted in
Appendix, supra note 30, at 173.
117. Id.
118. Affidavit in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss (Aug. 28, 1998),
reprinted in Appendix, supra note 30, at 146. The record is unclear and undeveloped
regarding the exact dates of these events. It appears that Adoradio's interview oc-
curred before December 10, 1994 and the grand jury testimony occurred in March
1995. This information is gathered from the joint appendix as cited supra note 30, and
from conversations between the author and the attorneys of record in the Clinton
litigation. Thus, it appears that Adoradio interviewed Clinton just two years after his
arrest and incarceration, and he testified before the grand jury on or about four
months after his release from jail, and two-and-a-half years after his arrest.
119. Amended Complaint, Clinton v. City of New York, No. 98 Civ. 3810 (JSM),
1999 WL 105026 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 2, 1999), reprinted in Appendix, supra note 30, at 4.
120. Id. at 4-5.
121. Id. at 21-31. This article focuses solely on the municipal liability claims as-
serted against the City of New York and does not address the claims against the New
York City Police Department, because, under the laws of the state of New York, no
claims can lie directly against municipal departments, which are merely subdivisions
of the municipality and have no separate legal existence. Polite v. Town of Clarks-
town, 60 F. Supp. 2d 214, 216-17 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (dismissing suit as to the town police
department); Hoisington v. County of Sullivan, 55 F. Supp. 2d 212, 214-15 (S.D.N.Y.
1999) (dismissing action as to the county department of social services, and citing
FED. R. Civ. P. 17(b), which directs that federal courts must look to state law to
determine whether a government department may be sued).
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him of his rights and liberties, as guaranteed by'the United States
and New York Constitutions and federal and state laws.122
3. Procedural History
Clinton filed his action in the United States District Court for
the Southern District of New York, to redress the deprivation
under color of law, statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, and us-
age of a right, privilege, and immunity secured to plaintiffs by the
First and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution of the
United States. 3 The City moved to dismiss the municipal liability
claim, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), on the
grounds that Clinton's claim was statutorily time barred. 24
The district court treated the motion as a motion for summary
judgment, 25 which it granted in an unreported memorandum opin-
ion and order, dated March 1, 1999, dismissing Clinton's municipal
liability claim as time barred. 126 Clinton appealed, 27 and the Sec-
ond Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment in an unpub-
lished summary order, filed October 29, 1999, for substantially the
122. Id.
123. Id. at 5.
124. The City and the Police Department jointly filed the motion to dismiss and, in
addition to raising the statutory time bar, argued that the entire complaint should be
dismissed because the state law claims were barred for failure to file a timely notice of
claim, the malicious abuse of process claim was insufficient on its face, and, with re-
spect to the Department, that the Department was not a proper party suable in this
action. Municipal Defendants' Memorandum of Law in Support of Their Motion to
Dismiss, reprinted in Appendix, supra note 30, at 50.
With respect to these arguments, the district court held that the state law claims
were barred for failure to file a notice of claim and that the claims against the individ-
ual former police defendants were statutorily time barred. Clinton, 1999 WL 105026,
at *2-3.
125. The district court concluded that both parties had submitted supporting docu-
ments to their papers on the motion to dismiss, and therefore accepted and reviewed
the documents, and converted the motion to a summary judgment motion under
F.R.C.P. 56. Clinton, 1999 WL 105026, at *2.
126. Id. at *3. The district court entered judgment granting defendants summary
judgment and dismissing plaintiff's claims with prejudice, on March 3, 1999.
127. Plaintiff appealed, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, as an appeal as of right from a
final decision of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York. Plaintiff raised the following issues: (1) whether the district court improperly
granted summary judgment and dismissed the 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against The
City of New York as time barred; and (2) whether the district court improperly deter-
mined the date plaintiff's action accrued, based on statements set forth in an affirma-
tion by an assistant district attorney in plaintiffs criminal case, and based on media
coverage of various actions of New York Police Department and District Attorney's
Office officials. Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant, at 2, Clinton v. City of New York, No.
99-7336 (2d Cir. Oct. 29, 1999) (on file with author).
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same reasons set forth in the lower court's decision. 128 Pursuant to
the court's local rule and its pronouncement in the order, the Sec-
ond Circuit's decision has no precedential authority or other effect
beyond cases related to Clinton.129
C. Monzon v. City of New York: Factual and
Procedural Background
1. Plaintiff Robert Monzon's Wrongful Arrest and Prosecution
and Participation in the Corruption Investigation
On June 19, 1992, former 30th Precinct police officers James
Velez and Joseph Walsh arrested Robert Monzon.130 Monzon sub-
sequently was indicted and incarcerated for drug possession based
on their testimony. 31  Velez and Walsh falsely testified to the
grand jury, and at Monzon's trial, that they went to an apartment
128. Clinton v. City of New York, No. 99-7336 (2d Cir. Oct. 29, 1999) (unpublished
summary order).
129. The Second Circuit's Local Rule § 0.23 states, in relevant part, that since state-
ments appended to summary orders "do not constitute formal opinions of the court
and are unreported and not uniformly available to all parties, they shall not be cited
or otherwise used in unrelated cases before this or any other court." In accordance
with this Rule, the Court's Clinton order states that it:
will not be published in the Federal Reporter and may not be cited as prece-
dential authority to this or any other court, but may be called to the atten-
tion of this or any other court in a subsequent stage of this case, in a related
case, or in any case for purposes of collateral estoppel or res judicata.
Clinton v. City of New York, No. 99-7336, slip op. at 1 (2d Cir. Oct. 29, 1999). The
Rule has a longstanding history in the Second Circuit, following its adoption in 1973.
It survived a collateral attack in Furman v. United States, 720 F.2d 263, 265 (2d Cir.
1983), and recently the Court applied this rule approvingly, reasserting the no-prece-
dential value prohibition, in Franceskin v. Credit Suisse, 214 F.3d 253, 256 n.1 (2d Cir.
2000).
For the first time, however, another circuit court recently struck down a strikingly
similar local rule, declaring it unconstitutional. Anastasoff v. United States, 223 F.3d
898 (8th Cir. 2000). The Eight Circuit's local rule provided that:
Unpublished opinions are not precedent and parties generally should not
cite them. When relevant to establishing the doctrines of res judicata, collat-
eral estoppel, or the law of the case, however, the parties may cite any un-
published opinion. Parties may also cite an unpublished opinion of this court
if the opinion has persuasive value on a material issue and no published
opinion of this or another court would serve as well.
8TH CIR. R. 28A(i).
The Eighth Circuit found the rule "unconstitutional under Article III of the United
States Constitution, because it purports to confer on the federal courts a power that
goes beyond the 'judicial."' Anastasoff, 223 F.3d at 899.
130. Complaint paras. 8-9, 11, 14-15, Monzon v. City of New York, No. 98 Civ. 4872
(LMM), 1999 WL 1120527 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 7, 1999) (on file with author) [hereinafter
Monzon Complaint].
131. Id. paras. 16-18.
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in Manhattan in response to a call about a fight in the apartment.132
They claimed that they found Monzon, and recovered a bag of co-
caine, which they falsely alleged was in plain view. 133 The jury ac-
quitted Monzon of all charges on April 19, 1993. TM
As a consequence of the 30th Precinct's investigation, Walsh was
arrested on June 6, 1994, and thereafter implicated several other
officers from the precinct in charges of corruption and perjury, in-
cluding defendant Velez for his involvement in the wrongful arrest
and prosecution of Monzon. 35 Walsh admitted that he and Velez
had falsely arrested and lied about Monzon. 136 Walsh pled guilty as
part of an agreement with prosecutors, but defendant Velez went
to trial in state court where he was convicted on various counts of
perjury.137
The New York District Attorney approached Monzon and his
trial attorney on April 26, 1996, regarding the need for Monzon to
testify at defendant Velez's criminal trial. 38 Monzon and Walsh
both testified against Velez, and a jury convicted him on May 2,
1996, of numerous criminal counts. The court subsequently sen-
tenced Velez to several concurrent terms of one to three years
incarceration. 139
2. Plaintiff Monzon's 42 U.S. C. § 1983 Civil Rights Action
Robert Monzon filed a § 1983 action on July 9, 1998, against the
individual officers and the City of New York. 4 ° He alleged that
the defendants were responsible for his wrongful arrest, incarcera-
tion, and his prosecution secured as a result of the illegal conduct
and perjured testimony of the former police officers, now individ-
ual defendants. 141 He further alleged that the City of New York
was liable for official customs, policies, and practices, and for fail-
ure to select, train, supervise, and discipline officers and supervi-
132. Id. paras. 13, 18.
133. Id. paras. 11-20.
134. Id. para. 20.
135. Id. paras. 21-26.
136. Id. paras. 25-26.
137. Id. paras. 22-24, 28-29; Monzon's Memorandum, supra note 31, at 6.
138. Monzon Complaint, supra note 130 para. 28. This conversation occurred three
years and ten months after Monzon's arrest, and just one week short of three years
after his acquittal on all charges. Monzon filed his complaint less than three years
after the district attorney approached him.
139. Id. para. 29.
140. Monzon Complaint, supra note 130. The complaint also listed as a defendant
the New York City Police Department.
141. Id. para. 1.
2000]
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXVIII
sors, which deprived him of his rights and liberties as guaranteed
by the United States and New York Constitutions and federal and
state laws. 14 2
3. Procedural History
Defendant City of New York moved to dismiss the complaint
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to
state a claim, on the grounds that Monzon's § 1983 and pendant
state claims were statutorily time barred. 4 3 On December 6, 1999,
the district court denied the City's request to dismiss Monzon's
Monell claim.'
D. Municipal Defendant's Motions to Dismiss
As discussed above, the City of New York filed motions to dis-
miss in both the Clinton and Monzon lawsuits. 45 Both motions
asserted various grounds for dismissals of the complaints. 46 With
respect to the municipal liability claims, the City claimed that they
were time barred, and raised two primary bases in each case: first,
that the plaintiffs knew, or should have known, of their Monell-
based claims, at the latest, in Clinton's case, upon the vacatur of his
conviction, '14 and in Monzon's case, upon his acquittal; 148 and sec-
ond, that the 30th Precinct corruption scandal was sufficiently pub-
licized so as to give plaintiffs notice of their alleged municipal
liability claims more than three years prior to the filing of their
respective complaints. 49
142. Id. paras. 41-44.
143. New York City Memorandum of Law in Support of Its Motion to Dismiss at 2,
Monzon v. City of New York, 98 Civ. 4872 (LMM), 1999 WL 1120527 (S.D.N.Y. Dec.
7, 1999) (on file with author) [hereinafter City's Monzon Memorandum].
144. Monzon, 1999 WL 1120527.
145. Clinton, 1999 WL 105026, at *1; Monzon, 1999 WL 1120527, at *1.
146. Clinton, 1999 WL 105026, at *1; Monzon, 1999 WL 1120527, at *1.
147. Municipal Defendants' Memorandum of Law in Support of Their Motion to
Dismiss, reprinted in Appendix, supra note 30, at 52-55; Municipal Defendants' Reply
Memorandum of Law in Support of Their Motion to Dismiss, reprinted in Appendix,
supra, note 30, at 190-95. The City filed its motion and supporting papers on behalf of
the City of New York and the New York City Police Department. Municipal Defend-
ants' Memorandum of Law in Support of Their Motion to Dismiss, reprinted in Ap-
pendix, supra, note 30, at 50.
148. City's Monzon Memorandum, supra note 143 at 7-8.
149. Municipal Defendants' Memorandum of Law in Support of Their Motion to
Dismiss, reprinted in Appendix, supra note 30, at 54, 192-95; City's Monzon Memo-
randum, supra note 143 at 8-9.
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1. Clinton Motion to Dismiss/Summary Judgment Motion
In the Clinton case, the City argued specifically that, under the
law, Clinton was on notice of his claim when the New York court
vacated his conviction. The City argued that in accordance with
the Supreme Court's decision in Heck v. Humphrey,150 a § 1983
claim accrues when "the prosecution terminates in [the plaintiff's]
favor. "151
Clinton responded that because Heck determined accrual for
§ 1983 claims based on an unconstitutional conviction or sentence,
it did not apply to his Monell claim.' 52 The Monell claim is based
on actions of the municipal defendants, as well as those of the indi-
vidual officers, a fortiori, he could not be aware of an official pol-
icy, custom and/or practice, at the time that his conviction was
vacated.
Unlike the claims in the cases subject to the decision in Heck,
the claims against the moving defendants are not based solely
on the specific actions directly leading to the unlawful convic-
tion, rather plaintiff has alleged various actions by the moving
defendants, apart from the actions of the former police officers
involved in his arrest, that support a municipal liability claim.
Thus, the accrual of this claim cannot be measured by the date
of his release from prison or of the vacatur of his conviction. It
must be measured, as [the Second] Circuit has stated, time and
time again, when the claimant "knew or had reason to know of
his injury," and in the case of a Monell claim, this cannot be
"inferred from a single incident of illegality, such as a first false
arrest or excessive use of force, absent some additional
circumstances. ,153
Clinton argued alternatively that, should the court conclude that
the three-year limitation period had expired prior to his filing of
the complaint, the court should toll the statute of limitations under
equitable tolling principles.154 He maintained that he was entitled
to the benefit of equitable tolling because the individual defendant
ex-police officers' "unlawful and fraudulent conduct concealed the
basis of [his] cause of action, and the municipal defendant's custom
150. Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994).
151. Municipal Defendants' Memorandum of Law in Support of Their Motion to
Dismiss, reprinted in Appendix, supra note 30, at 52.
152. Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, Clin-
ton v. City of New York, No. 98 Civ. 3810 (JSM), 1999 WL 105026 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 2,
1999), reprinted in Appendix, supra note 30, at 87-88.
153. Id. at 88 (internal citations omitted).
154. Id.
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and practice and ensuing investigation further obscured informa-
tion necessary to form the requisite knowledge of the claim. 155
In response, the City argued that Clinton had particular knowl-
edge at the time of the vacatur which put him on notice.156 Specifi-
cally, the City cited to an affirmation of Assistant District Attorney
Emory Adoradio, dated two years after Clinton's arrest and filed in
support of the vacatur.15 7 The affirmation asserted that during the
course of Adoradio's investigation into allegations of corruption in
the 30th Precinct, he obtained information that Clinton's arrest and
evidence in his case were fabricated. 158 The affirmation asserted
that Clinton corroborated this information during the Adoradio's
interview of Clinton, in the presence of Clinton's defense
attorney. 159
The City also argued that Clinton's testimony about his arrest,
presented shortly after the vacatur in a grand jury proceeding
against defendant Checke, and a March 1995 news article naming
Clinton, were further evidence of information which put him on
notice of the precinct corruption. 160
The City further cited the "well-publicized nature of the 30th
Precinct scandal, ' 161 as an additional basis in support of its argu-
ment that Clinton should have been on notice of his Moneil claim
more than three years prior to the filing of his complaint.
On the equitable estoppel issue, the City argued that it had not
concealed "a single relevant fact" from Clinton,162 and that regard-
less, he was not entitled to have the statute of limitations tolled,
because any fraud by the 30th Precinct officers could not preclude
discovery of Clinton's harm. 1
63
155. Appendix, supra note 30, at 94-96.
156. Municipal Defendants' Reply Memorandum of Law in Support of Their Mo-
tion to Dismiss, reprinted in Appendix, supra, note 30, at 192-93.
157. Id. at 192 (citing Affirmation in Support of Dismissal of Indictment (Dec. 10,
1994), reprinted in Appendix, supra, note 30, at 173-74).
158. Affirmation in Support of Dismissal of Indictment (Dec. 10, 1994), reprinted in
Appendix, supra, note 30, at 173, para. 3.
159. Id. at 173, para. 4.
160. Municipal Defendants' Reply Memorandum of Law in Support of Their Mo-
tion to Dismiss, reprinted in Appendix, supra, note 30, at 193.
161. Id.
162. Municipal Defendants' Reply Memorandum of Law in Support of Their Mo-
tion to Dismiss, reprinted in Appendix, supra, note 30, at 195.
163. Id. at 196 (relying on precedent in Barrett v. United States, 689 F.2d 324, 327
(2d Cir. 1982)).
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a. The District Court's Decision
The district court concluded that the municipal liability claim
was untimely because it was filed more than three years after the
dismissal of Clinton's indictment. 164 The court agreed with the City
that the Assistant District Attorney's affirmation put Clinton on
notice of his claim.' 65 In support of its conclusion, the court found
that the inclusion of the 30th Precinct scandal in the Mollen Com-
mission's Report, as well as the extensive newspaper and cable net-
work coverage of the 30th Precinct scandal, should have put him
on notice of his claim.' 66 The court was further persuaded on the
notice issue by the fact that Clinton testified before the grand jury
against arresting officer Checke-"a process that should have
made the viability of his claim obvious.' '167
The court refused to toll the statute of limitations, concluding
that the City was innocent of any wrongful concealment. Instead,
the court concluded that any efforts to conceal the nature of the
wrongdoing were conducted by the individual officers, not the
City.168 The court noted that the City had not taken any steps to
conceal the officers' actions except those necessary to the integrity
of an investigation, and had taken "affirmative steps" to inform
Clinton "of the circumstances surrounding his arrest" by having
him testify to a grand jury.169
b. The Second Circuit Decision
On appeal, Clinton argued that the information about the indi-
vidual former police officers' actions, advanced by the City and im-
puted to him, could not, by itself, place him on notice of a Monell
policy and practice claim as a matter of law. 170 Clinton stressed the
lack of factual information in the record presented by the City to
support dismissal of the claim.' In particular, Clinton challenged
164. Clinton v. City of New York, No. Civ. 3810 (JSM), 1999 WL 105026, at *3
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 2, 1999).
165. Id. at *2.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id. at *2.
170. Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant at 24-25, Clinton v. City of New York, No. 99-
7336 (2d Cir. Oct. 29, 1999) (on file with author) [hereinafter Clinton Appellate
Brief].
171. Id.
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the legal and factual significance of the Adoradio affirmation,
which had been central to the district court's decision. 172
In his brief to the court of appeals, Clinton argued that the affir-
mation did not provide any new information, other than the fact
that in December 1994 an assistant district attorney was investigat-
ing allegations of police corruption in the 30th Precinct.173 Clinton
vigorously argued that such information could not be the basis for
notice of his Monell claim.174 First, the affirmation was dated two
years after his arrest.1 75 Second, it did not contain any reference to
the dates and timeframes of the allegations nor investigation of
corruption in the 30th Precinct. 176 Third, the affirmation did not
reveal any new information to put Clinton on notice of his Monell
claims. Clinton's brief states:
[Plaintiff] was well aware prior to the filing of this Affirmation
that the police had fabricated evidence and lied; [Plaintiff] knew
he was innocent, so that this information could not alert him to
anything more than he already knew. This information was
about the culpability of individual officers. Such information
cannot be the basis for alerting him to a municipal liability
claim,'
77
Clinton also challenged the significance of the media coverage of
the 30th Precinct scandal and the doctrinal foundation for adopting
a per se rule on the sufficiency of such coverage as a matter of
law. 178 Clinton asserted that if news coverage of the scandal were
considered in determining the moment of accrual of his § 1983 mu-
nicipal liability claim, various thorny factual issues would arise.'79
For example, there were questions about Clinton's awareness of
the news, including the content of articles and news announce-
ments, that were beyond the scope of the motion and the district
court's authority. 8 °
The Second Circuit concluded that all of Clinton's claims were
without merit.' 8'
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 25.
175. Id. at 23.
176. Id. at 26.
177. Id. at 24-25.
178. Id. at 27-29.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 27-28.
181. Clinton v. City of New York, No. 99-7336, slip op. at 3 (2d Cir. Oct. 29, 1999)
(on file with author).
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2.. Monzon Motion to Dismiss
a. The Parties' Arguments
In Monzon, the City asserted the same arguments regarding the
timeliness of the Monell claim that it had raised in the Clinton case.
In fact, it relied on the district court's decision in Clinton to support
its argument that the publicity from the 30th Precinct scandal put
Monzon on notice. 182
Monzon asserted the same counter-arguments raised in Clin-
ton. 83 He argued additionally that his limited English language
skills left an issue of fact for the jury concerning what he should
have known based on media coverage of the scandal.1 4
b. The District Court's Decision
On December 6, 1999, the district court denied the City's request
to dismiss the municipal liability claim. 185 The court concluded that
it could not decide as a matter of law on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion,
"that plaintiff was, or should have been, aware that he had a Mo-
nell claim prior to April of 1996 when he was contacted by the
District Attorney's Office to testify against one of the individual
defendants.' 1 86 The court further concluded that an issue of fact
existed as to whether newspaper reports put Monzon on notice of
this claim. 187 The parties eventually settled the case. 188
PART III
The premise of the Second Circuit and Southern District of New
York decisions in Clinton is that Clinton's testimony in an investi-
gation of an individual police officer, statements of an assistant dis-
trict attorney, and news coverage of the 30th Precinct scandal
provided Clinton with sufficient information, at the time that the
182. City's Monzon Memorandum, supra note 143, at 7-9.
183. The Plaintiff urged the court to reject Judge Martin's decision and reasoning in
Clinton. Monzon's Memorandum, supra note 31, at 20.
184. Id.
185. Monzon, 1999 WL 1120527. The district court granted the motion to dismiss
on the remaining claims against defendants the City of New York and the New York
City Police Department.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. The parties settled for $60,000. Letter from Jose A. Muniz to New York City
Corporation Counsel (July 11, 2000) (accepting $60,000 settlement offer on plaintiff's
behalf) (on file with author); Stipulation Discontinuing Action (July 11, 2000),
Monzon v. City of New York, No. 98 Civ. 4872 (LMM), 1999 WL 1120527 (S.D.N.Y.
Dec. 7, 1999) (on file with author).
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New York courts vacated his conviction, to put him on notice of his
Monell claims. 18 9 The underlying ruling is that notice of the cor-
ruption is notice of the injury caused by the City's policy, practice,
or custom. A careful review of the case and the judicial analysis
adopted by the courts reveals various legal and practical shortcom-
ings to this approach.
While Clinton did indeed testify before a grand jury just over
three years before filing his complaint, that testimony in no way
implicated the municipal liability claims. As far as the court record
shows, Clinton testified solely about the events surrounding his ar-
rest. Clinton merely repeated that he was wrongfully arrested by a
police officer. This testimony was used to substantiate the prosecu-
tion's charge that the arresting officer, Edward Checke, had per-
jured himself when he testified against Clinton before a grand jury
in Clinton's criminal action, and that he provided a factually inac-
curate account of Clinton's arrest. 190
Similarly, the Assistant District Attorney's affirmation is legally
insufficient to support summary dismissal of the complaint. The
affirmation's contents may be distilled into three essential pieces of
information. First, Assistant District Attorney Adoradio was in-
vestigating allegations of police corruption in the 30th Precinct.1 9'
Second, during his investigation Adoradio learned through cooper-
ating police officers that fabricated evidence was used in plaintiff's
arrest.192 Third, that Adoradio's interview with plaintiff, in the
presence of plaintiff's counsel, corroborated the cooperating police
officers' information.193 Again, these statements do not implicate
the municipality.
The news accounts focused on the individual officers in the pre-
cinct. Throughout these accounts, the law enforcement investiga-
tion and arrests are mentioned. 194 Some of the news articles were
189. Clinton v. City of New York, No. 99-7336, slip op. at 2 (2d Cir. Oct. 29, 1999);
Clinton v. City of New York, No. 98 Civ. 3810 (JSM), 1999 WL 105026, at *2
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 2, 1999).
190. Affidavit in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss (Aug. 28, 1998),
reprinted in Appendix, supra, note 30, at 146, para. 8; Indictment in People v. Clinton,
reprinted in Appendix, supra, note 30, at 147-54.
191. Affirmation in Support of Dismissal of Indictment (Dec. 10, 1994), reprinted in
Appendix, supra, note 30, at 173.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 173-74.
194. See supra notes 86-87, for newspaper coverage of the 30th Precinct scandal and
investigation.
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published prior to the invalidation of Clinton's conviction and sub-
sequent release from prison. 195
While the district court in Monzon reached a different conclu-
sion on the notice question, the court's analysis mirrors the analy-
ses in the Clinton decisions. The district court in Monzon
determined that it could not conclude that the plaintiff received
notice of his Monell claim prior to when the District Attorney's
Office contacted him to testify against one of the police officers
named as a defendant in Monzon's case. 96 The court concluded, a
fortiori, that once the plaintiff was contacted to testify, he was on
notice of his Monell claim. The court appears to have applied the
same analyses as the district and Second Circuit courts in
Clinton.197
Neither the law nor the facts, however, support the analytic ap-
proach adopted in these cases. The plaintiffs' testimony before
grand juries and at trial, the district attorney's statements, and the
news media accounts do not provide specific information about
anything other than the respective individual police officers' bad
acts. As a consequence, they do not prompt inquiry or raise the
specter of concern that would put either plaintiff on notice to con-
sider a possible action against the City of New York, the entity that
must have acted directly against the plaintiff. This is particularly
relevant in police misconduct cases where target communities, spe-
cifically communities of color, are exposed daily to police abuse
and intrusion. As a result, these "accounts" are of dubious value as
the bases for judging the accrual period for the municipal liability
claim. Moreover, in the context of a motion to dismiss or a sum-
mary judgment motion, where factual issues are beyond the pur-
view of the trial judge, whether news coverage should have put the
plaintiff on notice is solely for the jury to decide.
195. In fact, the City in Clinton submitted two such articles. Appendix, supra note
30, at 176-81.
196. The court concluded that:
While plaintiff may have had notice that the felony complaint and the grand
jury and trial testimony against him were false more than three years prior to
the filing of the present complaint, the Court cannot find as a matter of law
on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion that plaintiff was, or should have been, aware that
he had a Monell claim prior to April of 1996 when he was contacted by the
District Attorney's Office to testify against one of the individual defendants.
Monzon, 1999 WL 1120527.
197. Compare Monzon v. City of New York, No. 98 Civ. 4872 (LMM), 1999 WL
1120527 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 7, 1999), with Clinton v. City of New York, No. 99-7336 (2d
Cir. Oct. 29, 1999), and Clinton v. City of New York, No. 98 Civ. 3810 (JSM), 1999
WL 105026 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 2, 1999).
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The courts' analyses and reasoning in both cases is evaluated in-
fra from three different legal vistas within the courts' tri-issue
framework, dividing the analyses into the plaintiffs' testimony,
state officials' statements, and media coverage of the precinct scan-
dal. I address the doctrinal limits of the courts' decisions and
methodology. Specifically, I analyze the manner in which the anal-
ysis fails to comport with the theoretical engine driving the Su-
preme Court's decision in Monell. I also discuss the decisions' lack
of adherence to circuit precedent on the legal standard applicable
to accrual questions in municipal liability cases. I dissect the fac-
tual basis for the decisions, concluding that the facts in the record
fail to support the Clinton courts' conclusions that he was on notice
more than three years prior to filing his complaint. Lastly, I raise
the issue of the courts' silence on the racialized context in which
these cases arise.
A. Plaintiff's Testimony and Law Enforcement
Officials' Statements
The Clinton and Monzon courts' consideration of the plaintiffs'
testimony against individual police officer defendants, and the
courts' reliance in Clinton on the Assistant District Attorney's af-
firmation, does not adhere to the Supreme Court's doctrinal and
theoretical interpretation of municipal liability pursuant to § 1983.
1. Doctrinal Deficiencies and Weaknesses
To be on notice of a municipal liability claim, the plaintiff must
be on notice of the injury and that the municipality's policy, prac-
tice, or custom is the source of that injury in the legal sense. 198
Thus, to be on notice of a municipal liability claim is to be on no-
tice of the municipal actor's direct role in the plaintiff's injury, vis-
A-vis a municipal policy, practice, or custom. After all, "Monell
[was] a case about responsibility." 199 This approach to the notice
question is wholly consistent with the Supreme Court's interpreta-
tion of local government liability under § 1983. Simple causation
based on the municipality's position as employer is insufficient be-
cause respondeat superior is not an available liability theory
against a municipality.200 For liability to accrue, the municipality
198. Pinaud v. County of Suffolk, 52 F.3d 1139, 1157 (2d Cir. 1995).
199. Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 478 (1986).
200. Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978).
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must cause the injury through enforcement or implementation of
its policies, practices, and/or customs.20 1
Yet the court's decision in Clinton circumvents Monell by con-
cluding that a plaintiff would be on notice of a legal claim when the
plaintiff learns that the state is prosecuting individual officers and
investigating police corruption. This analysis assumes that the
plaintiff will become aware of a municipal liability claim, which
must be based on institutional wrongdoing via enforcement of
some policy, simply by learning that officers are being prosecuted
for their actions and that the state is investigating claims of police
corruption.2 o2
This analysis fails to consider the requirement of institutional
malfeasance, which is direct municipal action that holds a munici-
pality accountable for those policies that are "the moving force of
the constitutional violation, 20 3 not for the mere bad acts of its em-
ployees or representatives. Nevertheless, these decisions have
turned what had been a clearly understood doctrine of direct liabil-
ity on its head. It appears that in the Second Circuit, a municipality
is not liable for the actions of its tortfeasor employee under a the-
ory of respondeat superior in accordance with Monell, and a mu-
nicipality may also rely on the principle of respondeat superior 20 4
as a procedural time bar against a § 1983 municipal liability claim.
Thus, a municipality has the best of both worlds. First, the doctrine
is a substantive shield, because the municipality is protected from
liability for police officers' acts absent some policy; second, the
doctrine serves as a procedural sword, because the theory is availa-
ble to the defendant in asserting the proper time for accrual of the
claim and notice to the plaintiff.
Clearly, the Supreme Court did not intend, nor expect, that "a
local government may not be sued under § 1983 for an injury in-
flicted solely by its employees or agents. '20 Nor did it intend that
a plaintiff would be responsible for determining that a municipal
policy caused or allowed the employee or agent to inflict injury on
201. Id. at 690.
202. This appears counterintuitive since it would be more difficult to establish lia-
bility where the municipality is indeed responding to individual officers' illegal actions
by investigating and prosecuting these "bad actors."
203. Monell, 436 U.S. at 694.
204. "The doctrine holding an employer or principal liable for the employee's or
agent's wrongful acts committed within the scope of the employment or agency."
BLACK'S LAW DICrIONARY 1313 (7th ed. 1999); see also W. PAGE KEETON ET AL.,
PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS §§ 69-70 (5th ed. 1984 & Supp. 1988).
205. Monell, 436 U.S. at 694.
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the plaintiff, without direct information about a municipal policy
and its connection to the employee's acts.
A plaintiff's testimony about an individual police officer's bad
acts that caused the plaintiff's injuries is merely an articulation of
information the plaintiff had at the time the injury occurred. For
example, testimony that the officer lied about the plaintiff does not
demonstrate knowledge of an institutional policy, practice, or cus-
tom. Therefore, it cannot be sufficient notice to toll the statute.
Although both Clinton and Monzon knew that they were innocent
and that the officers involved in their arrests had lied, this does not
establish that an individual was on notice of a possible claim. In
Pinaud v. County of Suffolk, the Second Circuit recognized that
such information does not necessarily place a plaintiff on notice
that a municipal policy was the cause of the injuries.2 °6
Indeed, an opposite approach ignores the reality of police mis-
conduct victims who are disproportionately black and Latino. For
these individuals, police misconduct, especially law enforcement in-
trusion into their daily lives, is so commonplace as to be expected.
As such, the actions of the police in Clinton and Monzon, and
within the 30th Precinct where police targeted African Americans
and Latinos, for example, are viewed as typical of the institutional
racism which pervades society. While society at large may view
such actions as aberrations, and appear surprised or shocked by
police misconduct, people of color this as "business as usual" by
the police.
The Assistant District Attorney's affirmation in Clinton was also
legally insufficient to put a plaintiff on notice. Nothing in the affir-
mation suggests, or otherwise would lead Clinton to inquire about,
the existence of a City policy-in the form of an official statement,
a policymaker's acts, or some custom-which caused Clinton's in-
juries.2 7 The affirmation only states that the Assistant District At-
206. 52 F.3d 1139, 1157 (2d Cir. 1995).
207. This is particularly inappropriate with respect to New York City's Police De-
partment, which has been the target of numerous claims of corruption and police
abuse and historically has denied institutional malfeasance and wrongdoing. E.g.,
MOLLEN REPORT, supra note 4, at 1-9, 51-69, 90-101, 107-09 (detailing history of cor-
ruption in New York City, police culture which minimizes and conceals corruption,
and Police Department's failure to hold police accountable, but also recognizing that
the vast majority of officers are honest); City of New York Office of the Mayor, Exec-
utive Order No. 42 (July 24, 1992), 1992 N.Y. LEGIS. SERV. 330 (establishing Mollen
Commission, in part, so that "the misdeeds of a few must not be allowed to sully or
taint the reputations and sacrifices of the vast majority of honest and dedicated men
and women who serve on the police force"); Clifford Krauss, 2-Year Corruption In-
quiry Finds a 'Willful Blindness' in New York's Police Dept.: Mollen Report Blames
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torney was "presently investigating allegations of police corruption
in the 30th Precinct in Manhattan. '20 8 Indeed, a careful reading of
the affirmation suggests that the affirmation could, by its own
words, lead the plaintiff to believe that the Assistant District Attor-
ney's then-current investigation did not encompass events of the
past two years. In fact, it suggests that the Assistant District Attor-
ney's discovery of information about Clinton's case was an unfore-
seen and unrelated result of the Assistant District Attorney's
investigation. The affirmation states:
During the course of this investigation, I learned through coop-
erating police officers formerly assigned to the 30th Precinct
who were participants in the arrest of Reynaldo Clinton that the
circumstances leading to the arrest of defendant and recovery of
narcotics from his car had been fabricated by the police.20
9
The City's own historical rejection and dismissal of reports con-
cluding that the Police Department and the City have encouraged
and facilitated the very conduct that flourished in the 30th Precinct
further support this interpretation,210 which is just as likely to be
accurate as the claim that this put the plaintiff on notice. On a
motion to dismiss, where there is some equipoise in the possible
readings of the parties' arguments, the court should conclude that
the movant has failed to satisfy the burden of showing that the
plaintiff cannot prove any set of facts in support of the plaintiff's
claim.
Gap in Responsibility for Rogue Officers, N.Y. TIMES, July 7, 1994, at Al; KNAPP
REPORT, supra note 4, at 1 (finding widespread police corruption). See generally NEW
YORK CITY POLICE CORRUPTION INVESTIGATION COMMISSIONS 1894-1994 (Gabriel J.
Chin ed., W.S. Hein 1997) (1895).
208. Affirmation in Support of Dismissal of Indictment (Dec. 10, 1994), reprinted in
Appendix, supra, note 30, at 173.
209. Id.
210. E.g., David Kocieniewski, Bratton Challenges Testimony, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 12,
1996, at B4 (reporting that Police Commissioner Bratton "rebutted a rogue police
officer's court testimony that the 30th Precinct's rampant corruption was encouraged
and initiated by the precinct's two top commanders"); cf. MOLLEN REPORT, supra
note 4, at 13 (characterizing New York City Police Department approach to investiga-
tions of allegations of corruption as a narrow focus on the single corrupt cop as the
"rotten apple," rather than on patterns of wrongdoing); id. at 70-71 ("[T]he New York
City Police Department had largely abandoned its responsibility to police itself and
had failed to create a culture dedicated to rooting out corruption... [due to] a deep-
seated institutional reluctance to uncover serious corruption.. . ."); COMMISSION TO
COMBAT POLICE CORRUPTION, supra note 4 (finding, based on a study of disciplinary
cases in 1994-96, penalties were in many cases grossly inadequate).
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2. The Legal Standard
The courts' decisions are also counter to Supreme Court and
Second Circuit precedent in police misconduct cases regarding the
quantum of information necessary to provide notice of municipal
liability. The initial inquiry into notice of an injury caused by a
municipal policy is inextricably linked to the inquiry into the level
of evidence necessary to establish the necessary proof of such pol-
icy. Although the plaintiff's complaint must contain only a prop-
erly pleaded claim, 11 the Second Circuit's and the Southern
District's courts' decisions appear to impose an additional pre-fil-
ing burden similar to truncated discovery.
Consider the typical case of an individual who is physically in-
jured, or whose constitutional rights are otherwise violated, by a
single action of a police officer or some other municipal officer.
Such a plaintiff would face a tremendous challenge and significant
burden of proof in establishing that a single incident can lead to an
inference of a municipal policy.212
Supreme Court precedent in this area is convoluted. In
Oklahoma City v. Tuttle,213 a plurality of the Court stated that
"where the policy ... is not ... unconstitutional, considerably more
proof than the single incident will be necessary in every case to
establish both the requisite fault on the part of the municipality...
and the causal connection between the 'policy' and the constitu-
tional deprivation. '214 Yet, in Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati,215 a
plurality of the Court held that a municipality could be liable
where an official policy-maker's single decision results in a consti-
211. Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit,
507 U.S. 163, 168 (1993).
212. For a discussion of municipal liability based on a single bad act of the police,
see Adam S. Lurie, Ganging Up on Police Brutality: Municipal Liability for the Un-
constitutional Actions of Multiple Police Officers Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 21 CAR-
DOZO L. REV. 2087 (2000).
213. 471 U.S. 808 (1985).
214. Id. at 824 (internal footnotes omitted) (emphasis added). Three other Justices
agreed that a single incident of excessive use of force by a police officer would be
insufficient to establish a municipal policy. Id. at 833 (Brennan, J., concurring in part
and concurring in the judgment, joined by Marshall & Blackmun, JJ.). Although a
majority of the Court in Tuttle could not agree as to the viability of a § 1983 claim
based on inadequate training, the Court subsequently unanimously recognized such a
claim, albeit subject to a higher threshold of proof. In City of Canton v. Harris, 489
U.S. 375, 388 (1989), the Court held that municipal liability may be imposed "where
the failure to train amounts to deliberate indifference to the rights of persons with
whom the police come into contact."
215. 475 U.S. 469 (1986).
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tutional violation.216 This is far from recognizing that the actions of
a police officer without such policy-making authority could be con-
strued as a municipal policy, however. Only in City of Canton v.
Harris,217 a failure to train case, has the Court suggested that a
single incident could permit an inference of a municipal policy. In
City of Canton, the Court imposed a high threshold of misconduct
for municipal liability, requiring that the municipality act with "de-
liberate indifference" of the rights of the individual.218
Based on the Supreme Court's interpretation of what may con-
stitute a municipal policy for § 1983 purposes, the individual de-
scribed in the above hypothetical could not proceed on a municipal
liability claim against the government. A claim based on a single
action invites summary dismissal for legal insufficiency on the face
of the complaint, or as factually unsubstantiated. Although a sin-
gle incident may be sufficient for a failure to train claim, the plain-
tiff in such a case must establish deliberate indifference, a
particularly onerous burden of proof. Where such a claim is
against a municipality for the actions of its police, the claim almost
takes on an "enhanced deliberate indifference burden" because of
the police "code of silence. '21 9 This code makes it extremely diffi-
cult for a plaintiff to procure information regarding individual po-
lice officials' actions and how they relate to police policy, customs,
and/or practices because officers do not speak out about corrup-
tion. However, as one court in the Eastern District of New York
has stated, the existence of such code may be the basis for a failure
to train or supervise claim since adequate supervision may avoid
deprivation of protected rights.22°
Initially, it may appear that the Clinton and Monzon cases fall
within the category of claims which may proceed based on a single
incidence because both complaints charged the City with liability
for failure to adequately select, hire, train, supervise, and disci-
216. Id. at 480.
217. 489 U.S. 378.
218. Id. at 388.
219. Ariza v. City of New York, No. CV-93-5287, 1996 WL 118535, at *2-3
(E.D.N.Y. Mar. 7, 1996) (citing a report by the Mollen Commission describing a
"Code of Silence," or "Blue Wall of Silence," that shields corrupt officers by discour-
aging honest police officers from reporting corruption).
220. Id. at *5-6 (finding that, in a police officer's complaint against the New York
City Police Department for a § 1983 violation of his freedom of speech, a code of
silence was evidence of deliberate indifference to his constitutional right by failure to
adequately train or supervise employees).
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pline.221' However, Clinton and Monzon involved clearly illegal
acts by police officers that are not easily or directly connected to
the types of municipal actions which are the basis for liability under
Monell. The police officers' fabrication of evidence and perjury are
not executions of an official policy, ordinance, or regulation. Nor
are they actions representative of a municipal custom or practice
within the "failure to train" category because they are single ac-
tions not obviously attributable to a municipality's training proto-
col. This is not to say that plaintiff could not prove that the actions
are attributable to municipal policy, or custom, but for purposes of
notice of a municipal liability claim, the individual officers' actions
do not resoundingly fall within a category of conduct which should
place a plaintiff on notice of a legally cognizable municipal liability
claim.222
The Second Circuit recently articulated the nuanced difference
in this type of case in Walker v. City of New York,223 which involved
a claim against the City of New York for failure to train and super-
vise officers not to commit perjury or prosecute the innocent.224
The court concluded that where proper conduct is so obvious, the
plaintiff could not support an inference of deliberate indifference
unless there is a history of conduct so that the obvious proper re-
sponse is no longer likely.225
To be on notice of an injury caused by a municipal policy, the
Second Circuit has held that mere knowledge of an illegal arrest is
221. See Amended Complaint, Clinton v. City of New York, No. 98 Civ. 3810
(JSM), 1999 WL 105026 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 2, 1999), reprinted in Appendix, supra note
30, at 21-30; Monzon Complaint, supra note 130, paras. 41-44.
222. Cf Walker v. City of New York, 974 F.2d 293 (2d Cir. 1992) (finding that a
§ 1983 claim against a police department involving perjury by the police survived
summary judgment because, while an officer usually does not have to be trained not
to commit perjury, plaintiff might show a pattern of perjury in the face of which the
failure to train or supervise would become deliberate indifference).
223. Id.
224. Id. at 298.
225. The court states:
Where the proper response-to follow one's oath, not to commit the crime
of perjury, and to avoid prosecuting the innocent-is obvious to all without
training or supervision, then the failure to train or supervise is generally not
"so likely" to produce a wrong decision as to support an inference of deliber-
ate indifference by city policymakers to the need to train or supervise ....
... While it is reasonable for city policymakers to assume their employees
possess common sense, where there is a history of conduct rendering this
assumption untenable, city policymakers may display deliberate indifference
by doing so.
Id. at 299-300.
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insufficient.226 A claim based on a municipality's policy or custom,
"does not necessarily accrue upon the occurrence of a harmful act,
but only later when it is clear, or should be clear, that the harmful
act is the consequence of a [City's] 'policy or custom.' , 227 The cir-
cuit court has noted that its application of this "delayed accrual
theory" is appropriate because "[w]here no single act is sufficiently
decisive to enable a person to realize that he has suffered a com-
pensable injury, the cause of action may not accrue until the wrong
becomes apparent. 228
Thus, claims against a municipality based on a "policy or cus-
tom" accrue when the plaintiff "knew or should have known
enough to claim the existence of a 'policy or custom' so that [the
plaintiff can] sue the [municipality]. '"229
In the Clinton and Monzon cases, however, the courts' decisions
did not sufficiently consider how information about an individual
officer's illegal actions could provide information that would put
the plaintiff on notice of a municipal policy that caused the injury.
Rather, the courts accepted that knowledge of one equates with
notice of the other. Yet plaintiffs need more information. In Clin-
ton and Monzon, for example, the plaintiffs needed information
that would connect-in the legal sense-the officers' misconduct
with the City's policy on how to deal with this misconduct. Since
the City's officials had historically publicly claimed to aggressively
discipline corrupt officers, nothing to notify the plaintiffs of the
City's role in facilitating the corruption.230 The plaintiffs needed
credible refutations of the City's own denials. In Clinton and
Monzon, however, the courts imposed a significant burden on the
plaintiffs because they required that the plaintiffs have more
knowledge and insight about the City's actual role in the corrup-
tion than is reasonably possible in a municipal liability case, and
certainly more than the Supreme Court has required in the past.
226. Pinaud v. County of Suffolk, 52 F.3d 1139, 1157 (2d Cir. 1995)
227. Id.; see also Veal v. Geraci, 23 F.3d 722, 724 (2d Cir. 1994) (holding that a
§ 1983 "claim accrues when the alleged conduct has caused the claimant harm and the
claimant knows or has reason to know of the allegedly impermissible conduct and the
resulting harm").
228. Singleton v. City of New York, 632 F.2d 185, 192-93 (2d Cir. 1980) (quoted in
Pinaud, 52 F.3d at 1157).
229. Pinaud, 52 F.3d at 1157 n.17. In Pinaud, the Second Circuit distinguished be-
tween a § 1983 action against an individual and one against a municipality, concluding
that accrual in the former does not foreclose delayed accrual in the latter. Id. (distin-
guishing Eaglestone v. Guido, 41 F.3d 865 (2d Cir. 1994), which involved claims
against individual defendants, and the case before it which involved a county).
230. Supra note 210, and citations therein.
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In Clinton and Monzon the courts concluded that information
that the plaintiffs testified against individual police officers, and in
Clinton, the Assistant District Attorney's investigation of a corrup-
tion allegation two years after Clinton's unlawful arrest and incar-
ceration, were sufficient to put plaintiffs on notice of municipal
liability claims. However, there is no obvious and direct causal
connection between individual corrupt officers and a municipal
policy. As already noted, the police department regularly denies
any pattern of police misconduct, instead characterizing any and all
bad police actions as aberrations and individual acts that are
neither encouraged nor condoned by the department. 23'
3. Statements' Factual Insufficiency
Assuming individual police officers' bad acts could be the basis
for notice of a municipal liability claim, this would still require
proof of a pattern of conduct. The pattern is the link to the munici-
pality because, absent institutional support or inaction, such re-
peated action could not continue or flourish. However, the case
records in Clinton and Monzon lack the factual development of
such a pattern.
In both cases, the plaintiffs' testimony to juries merely involved
describing what the officers did to them. It did not involve the
description of a pattern, custom, or policy. Indeed, their testimony
could not encompass such allegations because neither was aware of
any such policy at the time of his respective testimony. The plain-
tiffs simply responded to the district attorney's questions regarding
their unlawful arrests.2 32
The statements contained in the affirmation in Clinton also fail
to provide additional suggestive information about a policy of po-
lice misconduct. Neither individually nor collectively can the state-
ments therein be considered to place Clinton on notice of a
municipal claim because this information was about the culpability
of individual officers. These statements do not place him on notice
of the City's training, supervisory, and disciplinary polices and cus-
toms, and what role they played in the advent of his injuries. Cer-
tainly the fact that Assistant District Attorney ("ADA") Adoradio
received information that officers lied in Clinton's case, and that
Clinton corroborated this information is not "new" information to
231. Supra note 210, and citations therein.
232. Affidavit in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss (Aug. 28, 1998),
reprinted in Appendix, supra note 30, at 146; Monzon's Memorandum, supra note 31,
at 6.
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Clinton, for purposes of alerting him to his claims against the City.
He was well aware prior to the filing of the affirmation that the
police fabricated evidence and lied; he knew he was innocent, so
that this information could not alert him to anything more than he
already knew.
The only information set forth in the affirmation that could ar-
guably be construed as information which Clinton did not have
prior to the vacatur of his sentence is ADA Adoradio's assertion
that the ADA was involved in an investigation of allegations of
corruption in the 30th Precinct. At the time of Clinton's illegal
arrest, prosecution, and sentencing, Clinton knew that the individ-
ual ex-police officers involved in his criminal case had lied. Clin-
ton, however, did not have knowledge of the corruption in which
these officers were involved, or the City's involvement in facilitat-
ing and permitting such illegal actions within the 30th Precinct. In
certain situations such a statement might suffice to place a plaintiff
on notice of a pattern, thus alerting the plaintiff of a municipal lia-
bility claim. However, this statement provides nothing more than
information about ADA Adoradio's connection to the 30th Pre-
cinct and Clinton's criminal case.
Equally important is the information left out of the ADA's affir-
mation. The affirmation does not state that ADA Adoradio in-
formed Clinton or his counsel of any substantive information
concerning the corruption scandal and/or the ensuing investigation
in the 30th Precinct.233 It does not say anything about the timing or
scope of the investigation, the bases of the corruption allegations,
or the period covered by the investigation. These are not inconse-
quential matters because it could have been possible that the ADA
was investigating actions that occurred after Clinton's unlawful ar-
rest and incarceration. Alternatively, and just as likely, it could
have been an investigation concerning corruption totally irrelevant
to the unlawful actions that were the basis for Clinton's Monell
claim.234
233. This is the procedural difficulty with the lower and circuit courts' approach.
Since this was a motion to dismiss converted to a summary judgment motion without
the benefit of any pretrial discovery, neither plaintiff nor the City deposed ADA
Adoradio, or otherwise inquired, about the information which the courts imputed to
the plaintiff based on the Affirmation's statements.
234. We can only speculate as to the reasons for this vague statement, but one pos-
sible reason is that the success of the investigation depended on maintaining secrecy
in order to protect the integrity of the investigation, as well as those involved in fer-
reting out the corruption; see also MOLLEN REPORT (finding New York City Police
Department infested with corruption and an institutional reluctance to address cor-
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Neither the grand jury testimony nor the affiant's statements can
be the basis for alerting plaintiffs to a municipal liability claim since
the Second Circuit has recognized that an unlawful arrest and pros-
ecution do not, as a per se matter, put the plaintiff on notice of a
possible municipal liability claim. 23 5
B. Media Coverage
In addition to the plaintiffs' testimony, and the knowledge im-
puted to Clinton based on Assistant District Attorney Adoradio's
affirmation, discussed supra Part III.A, the courts also considered
the effect of news media coverage of the 30th Precinct corruption
scandal. Unlike the court in Monzon, which left these questions
for the jury, the courts in Clinton inappropriately resolved matters
ruption); COMMISSION TO COMBAT POLICE CORRUPTION, supra note 4 (finding New
York City Police Department failed to adequately address police corruption).
Notably, neither report can be considered, per se, to have placed Clinton on notice
of a municipal liability claim. First, Clinton was incarcerated on the date of the Mollen
Commission Report, thus at best leaving a factual question as to whether he had ac-
cess to the report. The MOLLEN REPORT was issued less than three years prior to
Clinton's filing his complaint, and thus even if treated as a basis for notice, it places
him safely and squarely within the three-year limitations period.
Police corruption is neither unique to nor a recent phenomenon in New York or
any other part of the United States of America. E.g, GAO REPORT, supra note 4
(noting recent police corruption in several United States cities, including New York,
Chicago, and Philadelphia, and specifically their connection to drug-related activities
by the police); Michael Perlstein, Two Convictions Close Corruption Case; Ex-cops
Face Prison for Cocaine Trafficking, TIMES-PICAYUNE, May 6, 1998, at B1; Mark
Fazlollah, Civil Rights Groups Criticize Police Forcible Entries in Philadelphia, PHILA.
INQUIRER, Apr. 2, 1998; Carol Goar, Breaking the Bond of Trust Philadelphians are
Shaken Over Revelations of a Racism and Corruption Scandal, in the Police Depart-
ment, TORONTO STAR, Nov. 11, 1995, at B5; Kevin Sack, Racism of a Rogue Officer
Casts Suspicion on Police Nationwide, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 4, 1995, at 1; Jennifer Mad-
dox, Corrupt Police Taint Communities, STUART NEWS, Aug. 12, 1996, at C1 (discuss-
ing several corruption cases in Florida, Tennessee, and Louisiana); Officer Convicted,
supra note 87 (discussing heightened concern about police perjury nationally in light
of 30th Precinct perjury scandal); New Breed of Bad Cop, supra note 86; Officers Held
in Probe of Corruption, L.A. TIMES, May 4, 1995, at A31 (discussing string of corrup-
tion cases in New York City); Malcolm Gladwell, In Drug War, Crime Sometimes
Wears a Badge; New York's Latest Police Scandal Reflects Growing Temptations Fac-
ing Officers, WASH. POST, May 19, 1994, at Al (noting a national wave of police cor-
ruption and New York State's scandals); see also Martin A. Schwartz, Admissibility of
Investigation Reports in § 1983 Civil Rights Actions-A User's Manual, in SWORD &
SHIELD REVISITED: A PRACTICAL APPROACH TO SECTION 1983, at 546 (Mary Mas-
saron Ross ed. 1998) (discussing the report by the "Mollen Commission" and other
investigative documents on police misconduct in New York and in Los Angeles,
California).
235. See Singleton v. City of New York, 632 F.2d 185, 195 (2d Cir. 1980) (affirming
that a single false arrest ordinarily cannot provide notice of an official policy).
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solely within the province of the jury by considering the impact of
news coverage on Clinton's knowledge of the source of his injury.
One of the issues that should have been reserved for the trier of
fact is whether Clinton was aware of any newspaper articles or
other news coverage of the 30th Precinct scandal or the conviction
and sentencing of the former officers involved in his arrest. Reso-
lution of this issue cannot be achieved on pretrial motions because
these are the very types of factual issues that are within the pur-
view of the trier of fact, and simply cannot be resolved as a matter
of law.
Moreover, the reliance on English-language, mainstream media
in these cases reveals the pervasive racial and cultural influences
that dominate the law. The media sources cited by the courts ex-
hibit their adoption of a standard of knowledge based on newspa-
pers and news programming familiar only to a segment of the New
York population. This standard does not reflect the common expe-
rience of all New Yorkers,236 or of society generally. Not everyone
reads The New York Times, Newsday, or USA Today, or watches
the Cable News Network, the news sources cited by the district
court.2 37
People of color,238 who are victims of police abuse in significant
and disproportionate numbers,2 39 are particularly disadvantaged by
this approach because they do not constitute a majority of the
236. LATIN LOOKS: IMAGES OF LATINAS AND LATINOS IN THE U.S. MEDIA 14-16
(Clara E. Rodriguez ed. 1998) (discussing the disproportionately small amount of
news coverage about Latinos and the small number of Latino correspondents, as well
as the stereotypical portrayal in the news of Latinos as objects and "problem
people").
237. Clinton, 1999 WL 105026 at *2 (citing LEXIS ALLNEWS file). The district
court in Clinton specifically referred to the numbers of stories run in each of these
publications in support of its conclusion that the 30th Precinct scandal was highly
publicized. Id. at *2 & n.1.
238. "People of color" and "communities of color," as used in this article, refer to
African Americans, Asian Americans, Asian/Pacific Islanders, Latinos, and blacks
and Latin Americans of Caribbean ancestry, as well as discrete communities where
they make up a majority of the population.
239. The 30th Precinct scandal is a prime example of this fact since the victims of
the police corruption were black and Latino; see also HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH,
SHIELDED FROM JUSTICE: POLICE BRUTALITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE UNITED
STATES (1998), available at http://www.hrw.org/reports98/police/index.htm (discussing
how racial and ethnic minorities are abused by police); Harvey A. Silvergate, 'Race
Profiling' Inflicts Injustice on Individuals, NAT'L L.J., June 22, 1998, at A20 (discuss-
ing racial profiling in law enforcement); NEW JERSEY ADVISORY COMMITrEE TO THE
U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, THE USE AND ABUSE OF POLICE POWERS: LAW
ENFORCEMENT PRACTICES AND THE MINORITY COMMUNITY IN NEW JERSEY (1994)
(describing the use and abuse of police powers against minorities).
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readers of these print media. For example, although the Clinton
court relied on The New York Times to prove notice, only 8.7% of
daily readers are African American, 4.5% are Asian, and 7.9% are
Latinos, compared with 76.2% who are white.24° This low reader-
ship is a consequence of complex factors. First, mainstream media,
media that is English-language and historically located outside of
immigrant communities or communities of color, does not treat
people of color as a target audience. 241 Apparently this is the case
because these communities are deemed unattractive to advertisers
due to their low purchasing power-an assumption proved inaccu-
rate by the significant buying strength and habits of these
communities. 242
Second, people of color are less likely to be interested in and
persuaded by the issues as covered by the mainstream media be-
cause these news services provide scant coverage of issues of par-
ticular importance to people of color, and what little coverage they
do provide perpetuates racist stereotypes.243 Indeed, "[m]inority
240. SCARBOROUGH RESEARCH, 2000 SCARBOROUGH NEW YORK STUDY (RE-
LEASE 1) (2000) (on file with author). The percentages for the Sunday edition are
comparable.
241. Gilbert Cranberg, Trimming the Fringe: How Newspapers Shun Low-income
readers, 35 COLUM. JOURNALISM REV. 52 (1997) (finding that the press does not tar-
get inner-city customers, and that "database marketing relies heavily on identifying
and targeting look-alikes-non-subscribers who most closely resemble existing read-
ers in terms of residence, demographics, and life-style"). The main reason for ignoring
these communities appears to be economic, with newspapers avoiding minorities and
low-income readers because it is assumed they are of little interest to advertisers. This
calculation has proved inaccurate and costly, since people of color have tremendous
consumer buying power, as recognized by the vast number of local advertisers and
telephone businesses who target these communities with focused advertisements. See
THE 2000 NATIONAL HISPANIC MEDIA DIRECTORY, FACT SHEET (2000) (estimating
that in 1999, Hispanic publication advertising sales totaled $650 million) (on file with
author).
These ideas are not limited to those within the media. Advertisement agencies that
have direct influence on advertisement rates and trends in ethnic and/or non-English
media advise avoiding these media, based on stereotypes of the media's clients. Terry
Pristin, Ad Agency Urges Avoiding Black and Hispanic Radio, N.Y. TIMES, May 13,
1990, at B7 (discussing internal company document that instructed sales representa-
tives to warn companies not to place ads with stations with black and Hispanic listen-
ers because "advertisers should want prospects, not suspects").
242. Supra note 241
243. ROD CARVETH & DIANE ALVERIO, NETWORK BROWNOUT 2000: THE POR-
TRAYAL OF LATINOS IN NETWORK TELEVISION NEWS, 1999 (2000); Sreenath
Sreenivasan, As Mainstream Papers Cut Back, the Ethnic Press Expands, N.Y. TIMES,
July 22, 1996, at D7 (finding that ethnic press fill the gap left by mainstream press by
covering "issues of real concern to immigrants"); Phuong Le, Numbers Double in 7
Years Ethnic Papers Thriving Across U.S., S.F. CHRON., Aug. 31, 1993 at Al ("One
reason for the [ethnic] papers' success is that they help new immigrants adjust to life
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journalists and many. of their white colleagues and supervisors say
the overwhelming majority of press coverage still emphasizes the
pathology of minority behavior-drugs, gangs, crime, violence,
poverty, illiteracy-almost to the exclusion of normal, everyday
life."'24" Understandably, stereotypical characterization of African
Americans, Asian Americans, and Latinos as "problem people"
and criminals further alienates this population from mainstream
media.245
According to one report based on interviews of 175 reporters,
editors, and publishers from more than thirty newspapers nation-
wide, "no complaint about press coverage was voiced as frequently
by minorities (or acknowledged as readily by many whites) as the
overwhelmingly negative nature of most stories on people of
color-especially blacks and Latinos-and the concomitant ab-
sence of people of color from the mainstream of daily news cover-
age. '246 Indeed, this is the general experience within the news
industry:
[N]ews is what editors who assign stories and put them in the
paper decide is news, and even the most conscientious editors
(and reporters) are largely captives of their own experiences, in-
in the United States.") [hereinafter Numbers Double in 7 Years]. Mark H. Willes, the
Chief Executive Officer of the Times Mirror Co., stated last year that with respect to
the Los Angeles Times circulation, "When we ask Latinos why they don't read the
Times, they said we were not relevant to them, we didn't understand them or respect
them, we didn't cover the things they were most interested in, and they didn't see
themselves reflected in our paper." Mark H. Willes, Remarks at the 1999 Convention
of the American Society of Newspaper Editors (Apr. 15, 1999), in American Society
of Newspaper Editors, It's Your Future: Economic Imperatives of Changing Audi-
ences, 1999 CONVENTION (1999), at http://www.asne.org/kiosk/archive/convention/
conv99/economicimperatives.htm (last modified Oct.. 27, 1999). He did, however, note
that "[t]hose are all things we can change, and we are." Id.
244. David Shaw, Negative News and Little Else: By Focusing on Crime, Poverty
and Aberrant Behavior, Newspapers Fail to Give a Complete Portrait of Ethnic Minori-
ties, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 11, 1990, at Al [hereinafter Negative News and Little Else].
245. See generally, CARVETH & ALVERIO, supra note 243 (listing crime stories as
encompassing 14% of the stories about Latinos); LATIN LOOKS: IMAGES OF LATINAS
AND LATINOS IN THE U.S. MEDIA, supra note 236, at 14-16 (discussing the dispropor-
tionately small amount of news coverage about Latinos and the stereotypical por-
trayal in the news of Latinos as "problem people"); Sreenath Sreenivasan, Newscasts
in Tagalog and Songs in Gaelic, N.Y. TIMES, Sept., 8, 1997, at Dl (examining tremen-
dous growth in ethnic programming due to audience seeking nontraditional televi-
sion); William Glaberson, Minority Journalists Gather to Share Hopes and Concerns,
N.Y. TIMES, July 29, 1994, at A12 (reporting on minority journalists and speakers at
journalists convention who "say mainstream news organizations still present a dis-
toned, stereotypical, and sometimes demeaning view of minorities"); Negative News
and Little Else, supra note 244, at Al.
246. Negative News and Little Else, supra note 244, at Al.
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terests and perceptions. In our still largely segregated society,
most whites-especially most whites old enough to be high-
ranking editors-don't have the daily experience and exposure
that would enable them to automatically incorporate a minority
sensibility in their own decision-making.
This means, among other things, that certain stories and issues
aren't covered (or are undercovered), certain stereotypes are
perpetuated, certain errors are made, certain perceptions are
missed (or misunderstood).,47
Third, English-language media is inaccessible to many immi-
grants who do not read English. Consequently, this population re-
lies on second language and ethnic media for news. 248 This last
factor is becoming increasingly important as the number of persons
speaking languages other than English in the United States
grows.2 49 The locus of the lawsuits discussed herein is a prime ex-
ample of the influence and this trend. New York City is a multil-
ingual city, with various enclaves of ethnic and linguistic
communities that thrive, in part, due to their ability to maintain the
integrity of their language and customs within these enclaves.25 °
For many New Yorkers, English is not the language in which they
obtain information or generally communicate with others in the
City or the world. According to the 1990 U.S. Census, 41% of New
Yorkers speak a language other than English at home, 251 a fact that
is not lost on news editors who recognize that the ethnic and vari-
ous non-English language press are attractive to this community.252
247. David Shaw, What's the News? White Editors Make the Call; Newspapers: Even
the Most Conscientious are Often Captives of Their Own Experiences and Perceptions,
L.A. TIMES, Dec. 13, 1990, at Al. (showing that the percentage of minorities among
professionals on newsroom staff did not exceed 21%, and a majority showed less than
13% of supervisors were minorities).
248. Numbers Double in 7 Years, supra note 243, at Al (reporting increase in ethnic
press and newspapers in languages other than English).
249. For example, as of 1998, more than 10% of the United States population was
of Hispanic origin. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, THE HISPANIC POPULATION IN THE
UNITED STATES 1 (1998), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2000pubs/p20-
525.pdf.
250. See U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, 1990 CENSUS OF POPULATION AND HOUS-
ING SUMMARY TAPE FILE 3 (1992) (showing that 36.8% of those living in New York
City were "foreign born," including 953,449 persons who entered the United States
between 1980 and 1990; of the 41% who speak a language other than English at
home, 20% do not speak English "very well").
251. Id.
252. At the April 2000 American Society of Newspaper Editors annual convention,
the outgoing president stated in his keynote address that "there is a 'direct correla-
tion' between a person's sense of community and his or her readership of a newspa-
per. 'Thus, we do well to help readers and potential readers feel that they belong to
the community ... ' Cheryl Arvidson, ASNE's Anderson: 'Readers Expect Us to Get
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Indeed, in Monzon, the plaintiff alleged that he did not speak
English. 3
Based on these factors, it is not surprising that these news
sources are neither the most prominent nor the most trusted within
communities of color. It is, therefore, unlikely that members of
these communities would derive information about law enforce-
ment, or perceive as unbiased news about police corruption, from
these sources. Yet this is the most ironic aspect of the courts' ap-
proach and treatment of ethnic and non-English language media.
If people of color do not derive credible information from main-
stream media, and ethnic and non-English language media provide
coverage of police misconduct more expansively than the main-
stream media because of the importance of the issue in these com-
munities, then perhaps this type of coverage would, in the courts'
opinion, place plaintiffs on notice of a municipal injury. We will
not know in Clinton or Monzon, however, precisely because of the
marginalization of these media sources and their coverage of police
misconduct.
What the courts have done, then, is fashion a legal doctrine that
is completely normative, adopting and privileging a particular view
of knowledge and information gathering, a view that is based on
racial and ethnic privilege and dominance within media. This ap-
proach misinterprets the law, subverts the fact-finding role of the
jury, and undermines the goals of § 1983.
The courts in Clinton also impermissibly disregarded the City's
burden on summary judgment to establish that no factual disputes
existed and that the City was entitled to a decision as a matter of
law.254 On its motion, the City presented no evidence that Clinton
actually read the cited news articles, saw the cable television cover-
age, or otherwise had information during his incarceration or after,
garnered through the media, that would alert him, or any reasona-
ble person, to the injury and municipal policy that would be the
basis for a federal civil rights claim against the City of New York.255
Things Right,' Reflect Community, Be in Touch, FREEDOM FORUM ONLINE, Apr. 11,
2000, at http://www.freedomforum.org/news/2000/04/2000-04-12-07.asp.
253. Monzon Complaint, supra note 130, para. 6; Monzon's Memorandum, supra
note 31, at 19 (citing Monzon Complaint para. 6).
254. Clinton v. City of New York, No. 98 Civ. 3810 (JSM), 1999 WL 105026, at *3
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 2, 1999).
255. It is unlikely that the City could present such evidence since it did not proceed
with, or request, discovery to discern the plaintiff's actual knowledge, or information
supporting an allegation about what the plaintiff should have reasonably known. See
Clinton Appellate Brief, supra note 170, at 11, n.3.
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This approach flies in the face of civil rights jurisprudence, the
recognized social and legal significance of § 1983 and its remedial
purpose, and the courts' historically broad reading and application
of the law in § 1983 actions.256 As the United States Supreme
Court stated more than two decades ago, "[t]he very purpose of
§ 1983 was to interpose the federal courts between the States and
the people, as guardians of the people's federal rights-to protect
the people from unconstitutional action under color of state law,
'whether that action be executive, legislative, or judicial."' 257
Similarly, the City's unsuccessful argument in Monzon, that dis-
cussion of police corruption in the report of the "Mollen Commis-
sion" put Monzon on notice, would have recast the pretrial motion
practice inquiry, and demanded that plaintiff know about every
document and report on police conduct. For example, in Monzon,
the City cited the Mollen Commission's report as a basis for finding
that Monzon was on notice. Such a standard is not only unsup-
ported by the caselaw and § 1983 legislative goals and history, but
is unworkable in practice. It raises questions as to access to docu-
ments and reports, and fails to resolve the more subjective problem
of what type of information in these reports would place a plaintiff
on notice of a municipal liability claim.
The difference in the courts' treatment of media coverage in
these two cases is revealing. In the Clinton case, the lower court
concluded that the precinct scandal was "a major news item, 25 8
further justifying the court's decision that Clinton was on notice
more than three years before filing the complaint, and conse-
quently time barred from bringing suit. By contrast, the district
court in Monzon concluded that the impact of newspaper reports
on the plaintiff's constructive knowledge was a question for the
jury. 9
One explanation for the difference in treatment may be that the
media coverage was used as additional justification, rather than the
sole or even primary justification, for concluding that the plaintiff
256. See, e.g., Lynch v. Household Finance Corp., 405 U.S. 538, 549 (1972) (stating
that § 1983 "must be given the meaning and sweep that [its] origins and [its] language
dictate") (footnote omitted); Will v. Michigan Dep't. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 73
(1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("It would be difficult to imagine a statute more
clearly designed 'for the public good,' and 'to prevent injury and wrong,' than
§ 1983.").
257. Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 242 (1972) (quoting Ex parte Virginia, 100
U.S. 339, 346 (1879)).
258. Clinton, 1999 WL 105026, at *2.
259. Monzon v. City of New York, No. 98 Civ. 4872 (LMM), 1999 WL 1120527, at
*1 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 7, 1999).
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was on notice in Clinton. In the lower and circuit Clinton opinions,
the primary basis for concluding the plaintiff was on notice was
ADA Adoradio's affirmation and the fact that the plaintiff testified
before a grand jury about the investigation of one of the named
defendant ex-police officers more than three years prior to filing
the complaint. 26° Thus, both the district and circuit courts were sat-
isfied that he was on notice based on information and events re-
lated to him specifically, rather than general news coverage of a
police scandal. However, in Monzon, the district court determined
that there was no basis for concluding, as a matter of law, that
Monzon was on notice prior to contact from the District Attorney's
Office for purposes of testifying against one of the named ex-police
officer defendants, such contact having occurred less than three
years before the filing of the complaint.
These cases may be harmonized if they are interpreted to mean
that media coverage may support a finding of constructive notice
and possible untimeliness where there is another, primary, basis for
a court to find that the plaintiff was on notice. As a corollary, the
courts may also have been influenced by the extent and timing of
plaintiff's personal participation in the investigation and prosecu-
tion of the individual police officers. The problem with this analy-
sis, as previously discussed, is that it fails to fully consider and
account for the difference between claims against individuals and
those against municipalities for policy-driven actions. They are dif-
ferent doctrinally and legally-the former against an individual
who may claim immunity from suit for his or her own actions, while
the latter is based on a causal connection between a government
policy and the implementation of that policy through municipal
representatives' actions, which is not protected by § 1983 immunity
defenses.26'
PART IV
Plaintiffs in Clinton and Monzon invoked the doctrine of equita-
ble tolling as an alternative basis for the survival of their claims.262
260. See Clinton v. City of New York, No. 99-7336, slip op. at 2 (2d Cir. Oct. 29,
1999); Clinton, 1999 WL 105026 at *2.
261. For a discussion of the individual immunity defenses available in a § 1983 ac-
tion, see NAHMOD, CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 10, §§ 7-8; SCHWARTZ, SECTION 1983
LITIGATION, supra note 10, § 9; Robert F. Brown, Individual Immunity Defenses
under § 1983, in SWORD AND SHIELD REVISITED: A PRACTICAL APPROACH TO SEC-
TION 1983, at 510-45 (Mary Massaron Ross ed., 1998).
262. Equitable tolling must be distinguished from equitable estoppel, although the
two are often discussed together. Equitable tolling stops the statutory time clock for a
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The Clinton courts contemplated the plaintiff's argument, while the
Monzon court would not even consider the argument.263
In accordance with Supreme Court precedent, the Second Cir-
cuit applies equitable tolling to § 1983 cases where the plaintiff
"submit[s] non-conclusory evidence of a conspiracy or other fraud-
ulent wrong which precluded his possible discovery of the harms
that he suffered. ,264 In Keating v. Carey,26 5 the Second Circuit ex-
plained that a defendant's fraudulent actions may be the basis for
delaying the time of accrual until the plaintiff discovers the basis
for the cause of action. The district court in Clinton rejected, as
affirmed on appeal, Clinton's request to apply these principles to
his case.266 The former police officer defendants' intentional con-
cealment of their misconduct and the City's official policy and cus-
tom, prevented the plaintiff from learning or having reason to
certain period, usually resulting in the party proceeding with the action. BLACK'S LAW
DICrIONARY 560 (7th ed. 1999); 28 AM. JUR. 2D Estoppel and Waiver §§ 27-32, 46-47
(2000); 31 C.J.S. Estoppel and Waiver §§ 58-112 (1996 & Supp. 2000). Equitable estop-
pel prohibits the opposition from raising the claim of untimeliness based on actions
taken by that party in misleading or misrepresenting information to the other party
which resulted in some adverse consequences to the plaintiffs. BLACK'S LAW Dic-
TIONARY 571 (7th ed. 1999); 51 AM. JUR. 2D Limitations of Actions §§ 146-48, 150
(1970 & Supp. May 2000); 54 C.J.S. Limitations of Actions 33 85-86, 88-91 (1996 &
Supp. 2000).
263. Clinton, 1999 WL 105026, at *2; Monzon, 1999 WL 1120527.
264. Pinaud v. County of Suffolk, 52 F.3d 1139, 1157 (2d Cir. 1995) (citing Dory v.
Ryan, 999 F.2d 679, 681 (2d Cir. 1993), modified on other grounds, 25 F.3d 81 (2d Cir.
1994)) (emphasis in original).
In Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 397 (1946), the Supreme Court stated that
equitable tolling principles based on the fraudulent concealment of information by
the defendant apply to every federal statute of limitations. In Hardin v. Straub, 490
U.S. 536, 539 (1989), however, the Court reemphasized its prior ruling (as set forth in
Board of Regents v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 483, 483-86 (1980), and Chardon v. Soto, 462
U.S. 50 (1983)) that state tolling provisions should be borrowed along with state stat-
ute of limitations in § 1983 cases. There has been some difference of opinions among
the circuits as to the effect of Hardin on Holmberg, as applied to § 1983 matters, with
some courts construing these Supreme Court cases to permit only the application of
the state's tolling rules, and not federal equitable tolling principles. For a comprehen-
sive discussion of the applicability of equitable tolling to § 1983 cases, including cita-
tions to and case discussions of court opinions interpreting Hardin and Holmberg, see
NAHMOD, CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 10, § 9:34; SCHWARTZ, SECTION 1983 LITIGA-
TION, supra note 10, § 12.5.
265. 706 F.2d 377 (2d Cir. 1983) ("Under federal law, when the defendant fraudu-
lently conceals the wrong, the time does not begin running until the plaintiff discov-
ers, or by the exercise of reasonable diligence should have discovered, the cause of
action."). Although the Second Circuit in Keating referred to equitable estoppel, id. at
382, the Second Circuit has subsequently relied on Keating in its discussions of equita-
ble tolling in § 1983 cases. E.g., Pinaud, 52 F.3d at 1157 (quoting Keating). I will rely
on the Second Circuit's interpretation of its own precedents on this issue.
266. Supra notes 166-169 and accompanying text.
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know of the information that was the basis of his municipal liability
claims within the three-year statue of limitations. Thus, equitable
tolling should have applied given that such a plaintiff is the quintes-
sential litigant entitled to the benefits of equitable tolling
principles.
The plaintiff's claims are precisely the type envisioned as benefi-
ciaries of the doctrine of equitable tolling. The unlawfulness of the
former police officers' conduct depended directly upon the surrep-
titious nature of their actions and on the complex web of lies and
deceit that concealed their actions from the plaintiff and the other
victims of their nefarious actions. Maintaining secrecy from the
victims was essential to the success and continued existence of the
fraud. The District Attorney and United States Attorney conceded
as much by the very fact that the corruption investigation was se-
cret and required cooperation of various police officers in the pre-
cinct.267 Concealment is the essence of the fraud in which these ex-
officers participated.
The district court refused to apply equitable tolling in this case
because the court concluded that the City did not "hide the rogue
officers' conduct beyond that time necessary to conduct an effec-
tive investigation. ' 268 However, the court failed to elucidate when
the necessary time expired, and there is nothing in the record to
suggest that the investigation ended more than three years prior to
the filing of the plaintiff's lawsuit.
The district court also failed to consider the derivative effect of
the individual defendants' fraud upon the municipal liability claim.
The City's official custom facilitated, maintained, and ignored the
actions of the individual defendants, resulting in the conduct giving
rise to the plaintiff's claim. Thus, equitable tolling should have ap-
plied. Failing to invoke the doctrine in favor of the plaintiff re-
warded the City for the actions of its employees' in successfully
concealing their unlawful actions, and denied plaintiff a remedy,
despite his having lost two years of his life while unlawfully incar-
cerated in a state prison.
PART V
A determination of whether a plaintiff has notice of a Monell-
based claim-when a plaintiff knows or "should have known" that
267. Letter from Mary Jo White, United Sates Attorney, by Assistant United States
Attorney Michael Horowitz to United States District Judge Lawrence M. McKenna
(Apr. 2, 1997), reprinted in Appendix, supra note 30, at 102-103.
268. Clinton, 1999 WL 105026, at *2.
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she or he has been injured as a consequence of a municipal pol-
icy-requires assessing the importance and impact of various facts
and events in a case. Yet the plaintiff may not have any actual
knowledge of such information. The task of obtaining this infor-
mation is particularly complex in a municipal liability case because
the injury must result from the implementation of the institutional
defendant's policy.
One solution to this accrual problem is for the courts to focus
solely on the specific information about the municipality and its
policy that is the alleged basis for the plaintiff's injury. In the Clin-
ton and Monzon cases, this would have been the point in time
when the plaintiffs' arrests, incarcerations, and prosecutions re-
sulted from the 30th Precinct corruption that occurred as a direct
consequence of the City's policy, practices, or customs. This ap-
proach accurately and fairly imposes upon the plaintiff the burden
of diligently filing a complaint, based on what she or he knows or
should know about the institutional actor's policies and role as re-
lated to the plaintiff's injuries. It is directly connected to the ac-
crual of the claim against the municipal defendant. Thus,
information about the individual municipal employees, such as the
information gathered from the plaintiffs' testimony against individ-
ual police officers, as well as information contained in the assistant
district attorney's affirmation concerning his participation in an in-
vestigation of allegations of corruption, are irrelevant to accrual.
Nor would this information serve as the basis for a finding of no-
tice, absent some connection between the policy and the plaintiffs'
injuries. Otherwise, notice of the injuries resulting from the indi-
vidual officer's actions would also provide notice of a municipal
liability claim, a theory which the Second Circuit rejected several
years ago.269
While it may be possible in rare cases that notice of injury caused
by a police officer will place a plaintiff on notice of injury caused
by a municipal policy, those cases are more likely to arise where
there is an official policy accessible to the general public. In con-
trast, cases where the City asserts that police corruption and mal-
feasance are aberrational and individual and where police
misconduct has never linked to a City policy or practice, notice of a
municipal policy for § 1983 purposes will include less direct and
obvious municipal actions. In cases involving municipal practices
and customs, those acts which have "not received formal approval
269. See Pinaud, 52 F.3d 1139.
NOTICE OF A 42 U.S.C. § 1983 CLAIM
through the body's official decisionmaking channels . . . [and]
[a]lthough not authorized by written law ... could well be so per-
manent and well settled as to constitute a 'custom or usage' with
the force of law. 2 7
0
Courts should also consider the plaintiff's pre-discovery position.
When a municipality challenges a Monell claim in a motion to dis-
miss or a summary judgment motion, courts should consider the
obstacles the plaintiff faces in asserting a claim against a municipal
entity for police misconduct. A plaintiff asserting a Monell claim
may encounter unique difficulties such as defining institutional ac-
tions only discernible after the plaintiff gains access to municipal
records and files that may be otherwise inaccessible because of
confidentiality guarantees.27'
Determinations as to whether news coverage is sufficient to
place a plaintiff on notice of a § 1983 municipal liability claim
should be treated as questions of fact for the jury. Courts should
not make per se decisions that, as a matter of law, particular media
coverage has met the accrual standard. Otherwise, the courts are
likely to adopt mainstream media standards that do not take into
account or reflect the experiences of § 1983 plaintiffs, or the dy-
namics of multilingual, multicultural communities.
Whether the news source is one of credibility and dependability
within a community on a particular issue should also be a deter-
mining factor. Regardless of whether a jury or a judge resolves the
question of the impact of news coverage on plaintiff's knowledge
of a claim, such determinations must be based on the specifics of
the actual coverage, as well as the news providers involved. The
court should consider the availability and substance of coverage by
highly visible information sources that are well recognized within
the plaintiff's community and with a significant distribution and
270. Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978) (quoting Adickes v.
S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 167-68 (1970) (footnote omitted)).
271. For example, a plaintiff may only discern from a protracted and lengthy record
of misconduct by individual officers that there is a practice, custom or policy at the
root of this misconduct. However, the individual officers may have certain privacy
rights that make access to such records difficult or impossible for a prospective plain-
tiff prior to filing of a lawsuit with its attendant benefit of discovery. E.g., N.Y. Civ.
RIGHTs LAW § 50-a (McKinney 1992 & Supp. 2000); John M. Leventhal, Do Not
Open Unless .... , 214 N.Y. L.J. 1 (1995) (discussing the purpose and application of
§ 50-a); see also Richard N. Winfield, Decision in Schenectady Case Denies Access To
Records of Police Guilty of Misconduct, 71 N.Y. ST. B. J. 37 (1999) (discussing impact
of New York State Court of Appeals decision denying public disclosure of records of
police misconduct incident under state's Freedom of Information Law because infor-
mation is protected under § 50-a).
2000]
564 FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXVIII
readership within the community. The court also should consider
whether the coverage conflicted or cast doubt on the mainstream
news sources' coverage.
Further, the courts should consider the racial and ethnic ele-
ments involved in police misconduct cases. For people of color
who are victims of police abuse, their perceptions of that abuse
differs and is at odds with the dominant norms and perceptions of
police misconduct as individualized and unsupported by institu-
tions. The role of prevalence and dominance of race in law en-
forcement should be a factor militating in favor of a § 1983
plaintiff.
These recommendations would have affected the outcome in the
Clinton case. The court should have recognized that the plaintiff's
testimony and the ADA's statement were insufficient, as a matter
of law, to put the plaintiff on notice because they concerned indi-
vidual officers' bad acts without any direct or obvious causal con-
nection to a municipal policy. Additionally, there was a two-year
lapse between the underlying governmental actions and the affir-
mation, raising unresolvable questions as to the nature and applica-
bility to Clinton of the investigation mentioned in the affirmation.
Alternatively, the court could have determined that the suffi-
ciency of the testimony and the ADA's affirmation were matters
for the jury and inappropriate for decision by motion to dismiss or
summary judgment motion. In this scenario, the plaintiff and the
City could present additional evidence and arguments regarding
what information was available to the plaintiff during the years
prior to the filing of the lawsuit. Similarly, the evidence and argu-
ments that the news coverage created a "news alert" environment,
so as to put Clinton on notice, should have been resolved by the
jury and not the judiciary, as the court in Monzon concluded.
The legislative intent and public policy behind § 1983 assumes a
broad and generous reading of the statute, and is best effectuated
by judicial recognition of the importance of civil rights litigation in
providing a vehicle for change of state-based misconduct, such as
police corruption. Still valid today is the United States Supreme
Court's assessment, made a quarter century ago, that, "[Section]
1983 provides 'a uniquely federal remedy against incursions under
the claimed authority of state law upon rights secured by the Con-
stitution and laws of the Nation.' The high purposes of this unique
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remedy make it appropriate to accord the statute 'a sweep as broad
as its language.' ,,272
272. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 271-72 (1985) (quoting United States v. Price,
383 U.S. 787, 801 (1966)). Hopefully, for the sake of New York's citizenry and the
individual victims of police corruption, there will be no more plaintiffs similarly situ-
ated to Mr. Clinton or Mr. Monzon.
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WHY DID PEOPLE STOP COMMITTING
CRIMES? AN ESSAY ABOUT
CRIMINOLOGY AND IDEOLOGY
George L. Kelling*
INTRODUCTION
In 1994, to virtually everyone's surprise, a lot of people stopped
committing crimes. Although the media first noted sharp declines
in crime in New York City, it was not long before it recognized
similar reductions in criminal activity in other cities as well. This
trend was observed not only in wealthy cities like Boston and San
Diego, but also in relatively impoverished cities like Newark and
New Orleans-albeit somewhat later.
These declines in crime were so steep and unprecedented that
they stunned not just the general public, but criminologists, soci-
ologists, and political scientists throughout the world. Many of
these social scientists had predicted that demographic trends-
more young people in the population-would drive crime upward
to new levels. Today, virtually no one denies that crime has
dropped. The question is, "Why?" Obviously, something signifi-
cant happened to cause so many people to stop committing crime
in so short a period-in many cities, crime dropped to 1960s levels
in a matter of a few years.
One would like to believe that some objective, "scientific" expla-
nation could account for why people stopped committing crime.
Alas, despite the tag "science" in social science, ideology too often
shapes the social scientists' responses to such questions: conserva-
tives tend to find their answers in new policing strategies, imprison-
ment, and changes in culture and values; liberals, their answers in
the economy, demographic changes, gun control, and changing pat-
terns of drug use.
In an absolute sense-a scientific sense-neither the question of
why crime declined in New York City nor why crime declined na-
tionally, is answerable. Any explanations are strictly post hoc.
* Dr. George L. Kelling is currently a professor at the Rutgers University School
of Criminal Justice, a Research Fellow at Harvard University's John F. Kennedy
School of Government, and a Senior Fellow at the Manhattan Institute. Dr. Kelling
received a B.A. from St. Olaf College, an M.S.W. from the University of Wisconsin-
Milwaukee, and a Ph.D. from the University of Wisconsin-Madison.
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Whatever happened in New York City, or Boston, or San Diego
that caused people to stop committing crime has already happened
and no scientific measurement system was in place to record it. At
best, we can reconstruct the history of events, use whatever data
are available, check plausible interpretations, and select what
seems to be the most credible explanation.
Though the question, "Why is crime dropping in America," is
unanswerable, some criminologists and economists like to make it
appear that they can provide answers.' The competing explana-
tions-imprisonment, police practices, the economy, demography,
drug markets, gun control, or combinations of these factors-all
have their advocates and some fairly reasonable arguments can be
developed on behalf of each explanation. The difficulty with these
"macro" interpretations, however, is that they assume that such po-
tential causes of crime reduction operate uniformly in communities
across the country. This assumption is unfounded.
For example, some crime reductions of the latter half of the past
decade appear to be correlated with improved economic condi-
tions. Note the word "correlated." It may be true that improved
economic conditions in some communities resulted in jobs for un-
employed youths who would have otherwise committed crimes.2
But it also may be true that in other communities, reduced levels of
crime have contributed to improved economic conditions. Once
citizens, neighborhood institutions, and police regain control over
public spaces, local commerce can again develop and thrive. In
New York City, areas of Harlem and the Bronx that were once
written off as uninhabitable, but today include thriving commercial
centers, are prime examples of this phenomenon.
Likewise, anyone who has observed police practices understands
that they operate very differently depending upon the neighbor-
hood and community in which they are implemented. For exam-
ple, practices that were routine in Milwaukee during the 1970s
would have been completely unacceptable in New York City dur-
ing the same period. 3 Even imprisonment can affect neighbor-
1. See generally THE CRIME DROP IN AMERICA (Alfred Blumstein & Joel
Wallman eds., 2000) (containing essays purporting to explain the nationwide reduc-
tion in crime).
2. The suggestion put forth by some-that enough New York City drug dealers
went to work at, say, McDonald's to cause the declines in crime-is pretty far-fetched.
3. In Milwaukee during this era, police adamantly refused to meet with citizen or
neighborhood groups. To police leaders, their business was just that-police business.
While police in many other cities may not have been enthusiastic about meeting with
citizens, especially those from minority neighborhoods, few would have been in a po-
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hoods differently. Taking five offenders out of a neighborhood and
imprisoning them could reduce crime substantially in one neigh-
borhood, have no impact on another, and lead to increases in crime
in yet a third.4
In other words, social conditions, policies, and practices interact
with cities, communities, and neighborhoods in very different ways.
Consequently, the only question that can really be asked and an-
swered sincerely is: "Why did people commit fewer crimes in
neighborhood X or community Y?"
The problem for social scientists is that there are no easy ways to
study such neighborhood interactions and attribute causality. To
do so, one first has to spend a lot of time in neighborhoods and
cities, often in quite dangerous locations, collecting an assortment
of disparate data. Then one must make comparisons to broader
economic and demographic statistics-much of it outdated or not
broken down by neighborhood. Even when these tasks are com-
pleted, however, the findings for New York City may have no rele-
vance for, say, Hoboken, New Jersey, which probably has an
entirely different social structure and culture. Few social scientists
bother to conduct the necessary fieldwork. How much easier, in-
stead, to download aggregate Uniform Crime Reports from the
Federal Bureau of Investigation5 and correlate them with widely
available economic and labor data. The simple reality is, however,
that when inferring about crime, the farther one is from the
ground, the less reliable the inference. If criminological research
has demonstrated anything over the past forty years, it is that the
"crime problem" that drives public concern is a local problem, only
understandable within a local context.
"RoOT CAUSES" AND CRIME CONTROL POLICY
In 1967, President Lyndon Johnson's Commission on Law En-
forcement and the Administration of Justice put forward the idea
that crime is caused by poverty, racism, and social injustice-the
litical climate that would have allowed them to maintain the stance of police in
Milwaukee.
4. For example, in some relatively stable neighborhoods, the older criminals keep
the younger ones in check.
5. E.g., FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES 1999:
UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS (2000). For each of the annual Uniform Crime Reports
since 1995, see http://www.fbi.gov/ucr.htm. Searching this web site is an invariably
easier and safer exercise than tabulating data in the streets of a high-crime area be-
cause it can be completed in the privacy of one's own home.
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so-called root causes of crime.6 According to this view, crime pre-
vention occurs through amelioration of these social problems.
Therefore, the only role of police and criminal justice agencies is to
process offenders through the criminal justice system, responding
to crime after it occurs. Directly reflecting the underlying assump-
tions of the 1960s' War on Poverty, these ideas shaped conven-
tional thinking about crime and its control until the early 1990s.
Moreover, this model became the foundation for the criminological
educational enterprise that developed during the 1970s in universi-
ties throughout the country, much of it supported by federal fund-
ing. That crime was caused by poverty, racism, and social injustice
came close to being the official criminological position about the
etiology of crime and, by extension, its solution.
At the time, the police establishment was not terribly enthusias-
tic about many aspects of the Commission's report. Nevertheless,
the report's call for decriminalizing petty offenses such as drunken-
ness, and its endorsement of the idea that "victimless" crimes such
as prostitution should be largely ignored by police, if not
decriminalized, were congruent with the reform movement within
policing. For a variety of reasons, among them corruption and po-
litical entanglements,7 police departments by the 1960s had en-
trenched strategies that sought to limit their attention to the
"serious" crimes of murder, rape, robbery, assault, and burglary.
In attempts to further efficiency, increase control of line officers,
and heighten the focus on serious crimes, police leaders systemati-
cally removed officers from activities such as foot patrol, which ex-
posed them to extensive contact with citizens. All of this was
crystallized brilliantly in Sergeant Friday's "Just the facts Ma'am"
approach to law enforcement.8 It became accepted that the busi-
ness of police was to respond to serious crime after it occurred and
to arrest and process offenders. Furthermore, minor offenses and
juvenile offending, unless serious, were to be the province of social
6. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT & ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, THE
CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY V (1967) (making more than 200 recom-
mendations that the Commission believed were "concrete steps" that could lead to a
"safer and more just society").
7. E.g., George L. Kelling & Mark H. Moore, The Evolving Strategy of Policing,
PERSPECTIVES IN POLICING (Nat'l Inst. of Just. et al. eds, Nov. 1988). While the politi-
cal entanglements of police departments is a long story, during much of the nine-
teenth and early years of the twentieth centuries, the links between police and urban
leaders ("ward bosses") were so close that the police in many communities were al-
most an extension of the political machines. Id. at 4-5.
8. The reference is to Jack Webb's portrayal of Sergeant Joe Friday in the televi-
sion show Dragnet, which aired from 1952-59 and 1967-70.
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workers, not police. Civil libertarians applauded this view as unin-
trusive policing, endorsing the police retreat from minor and juve-
nile offenses, and supporting the idea that police should remain in
their cars and respond only to serious crimes. At base, civil liber-
tarians argued for police to use state authority sparingly. Other
advocates, promoting and ultimately realizing limitations on insti-
tutionalization, also called for similar restraint toward the emotion-
ally disturbed for all but imminently violent individuals.
Meanwhile, crime levels varied considerably during the 1970s
and 1980s, with the overall trend moving up and violent crime
reaching its highest peak in most communities during the late 1980s
and early 1990s. Moreover, fear of crime, with its attendant conse-
quences-citizens avoiding public spaces and facilities, abandoning
certain urban neighborhoods or cities altogether, isolating them-
selves in their homes, and purchasing security hardware such as
guns and dogs-remained consistently high following the 1960s.
And as noted above, by the late 1980s, many criminologists were
predicting a new and even fiercer crime wave looming as a conse-
quence of a large cohort of youth entering their crime-prone
teens.9
How "ROOT CAUSES" REASONING SHAPED EXPLANATIONS FOR
CRIME DROPS IN NEW YORK Crr
In 1994, Rudolph Giuliani, a brash center-right Republican who
promised to reduce crime and ran against "squeegee men,"'1 was
elected mayor of the Democratic city of New York. Within months
after Giuliani and his first Police Commissioner, William Bratton,
took office, unprecedented declines in crime were recorded, espe-
cially for violent crimes such as murder, aggravated assault, and
robbery. Criminologists and the liberal media were caught off
guard. The question raged: "Why is crime dropping in New York
City?" Aside from Giuliani and Bratton's claim that the police
were largely responsible, four general contentions developed to ex-
plain the decline in crime: (1) the New York City Police Depart-
ment ("NYPD") was "cooking the books"; (2) the economy was
improving, causing drug dealers to enter the world of legitimate
work; (3) drug use patterns were changing, including a decline in
9. E.g., JAMES ALAN Fox, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, TRENDS IN JUVENILE VIO-
LENCE: A REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CURRENT AND
FUTURE RATES OF JUVENILE OFFENDING (1996).
10. "Squeegee men" are intimidating individuals who "wash" windows of cars
stopped at traffic lights and demand fees for their services.
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the use of crack cocaine; and (4) demographic shifts led to fewer
youths in the population.
The first open debate about the issue took place at the 1995
meeting of the American Society of Criminology. Commissioner
Bratton addressed the group, putting forth a simple explanation:
"Police can control people. In New York City we have. People
have changed their behavior."11 For the most part, criminologists
responded skeptically. For example, a panel comprised of crimi-
nologists and economists from John Jay College of Criminal Justice
described their examination of every economic variable that could
explain the decline in crime. Their conclusion? None of the fac-
tors explained the decline in crime-therefore, hidden economic
variables, not yet discovered, must explain them.
One troubling new contention also emerged, that police could
indeed reduce crime, but only at the unacceptable cost of harass-
ment and brutality, especially in dealing with minorities. This be-
lief soon became entangled with New York's racial politics, so that
the crime reductions were attributed to the police department's
"scorched earth policies," "broad sweeps," "zero tolerance," and
other draconian police tactics. Two terrible incidents later fueled
those charges: the police torture of a Haitian immigrant 12 and the
police shooting of an unarmed African man forty-one times.13 Un-
doubtedly, those events contributed to negative explanations for
crime reduction. Yet, as tragic as they were, they were tragedies,
not trends.
When it became clear that crime was dropping in cities such as
Boston and San Diego as well, the question changed from "Why is
crime declining in New York City?" to "Why is crime dropping in
America?" Even then, however, New York City remained a spe-
cial case. For example, Fox Butterfield of The New York Times
annually writes "bad" New York and "good" Boston and San Di-
ll. Clifford Krauss, The Commissioner vs. the Criminologists, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
19, 1995, at 43 (chronicling a meeting between Commissioner Bratton and eminent
criminologists).
12. United States v. Volpe, 78 F. Supp. 2d 76 (E.D.N.Y. 1999); see also David
Barstow, The Louima Case: The Overview; Officer, Seeking Some Leniency, Admits to
Louima's Torture, N.Y. TIMES, May 26, 1999, at Al (reporting Office Justin A.
Volpe's decision to plead guilty to the brutal sodomizing torture of Abner Louima in
a New York City police station).
13. E.g., Jane Fritsch, The Diallo Verdict: The Overview; 4 Officers in Diallo Shoot-
ing are Acquitted of All Charges, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 26, 2000, at Al ("The verdict came
down in a tense and racially charged case that led to anti-police demonstrations, ar-
rests, and a reorganization of the department's Street Crime Unit, to which the of-
ficers belonged.").
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ego stories. 4 According to this scenario, New York got its results
by means of "bad cops" harassing citizens, especially minorities,
while in Boston and San Diego, "good cops" solved problems and
worked closely with citizens to reduce crime. Even social scientists
with little knowledge or contact with the NYPD held up the Bos-
ton Police Department as a model for the NYPD to emulate.15
Even the United States Commission on Civil Rights contrasted
New York with Boston and San Diego, suggesting that crime re-
ductions in New York "come at a significant cost to the vulnerable
communities in greatest need of police protection." 16 This, despite
the fact that in 1999 shootings of civilians in New York were at the
lowest recorded levels ever and compared favorably with virtually
every city in the United States.1 7
One possible explanation for why overall trends in crime reduc-
tion were obscured by a focus on a small number of negative
events is that both political enemies of Mayor Giuliani and liberal
social scientists rejected the underlying ideas that shaped New
York's "theory of action." Both Giuliani, and later Commissioner
Bratton, adopted a strategy whose origins lay in the center-right of
academic thought on criminal justice policing. James Q. Wilson
and George L. Kelling's 1982 Atlantic Monthly article The Police
and Neighborhood Safety: Broken Windows was the source.1 8 The
14. E.g., Fox Butterfield, Cities Reduce Crime and Conflict Without New York-
Style Hardball, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 2000, at Al (describing successful efforts by cities
to reduce crime). But c.f, Heather Mac Donald, America's Best Urban Police Force,
CITY J., Summer 2000, at 14-31 (criticizing Butterfield's attack on New York police as
inaccurate).
15. E.g., Orlando Patterson & Christopher Winship, Boston's Police Solution,
N.Y. TIMES, March 3, 1999, at Al (noting that Boston was forced to terminate stop
and frisk policies because of outrage among African Americans in the city). Both the
Boston and San Diego Police Departments deserve all credit they get. They, like the
NYPD, have been national leaders in police innovation-Boston for its work with
neighborhoods and communities and San Diego for its problem-solving approach to
policing.
16. Heather Mac Donald, NY Press to NYPD: Drop Dead, AM. ENTER., Sept. 1,
2000, at 16 (discussing hypocrisy of New York media in berating the police for going
soft on crime while simultaneously criticizing harsh effects of more assertive police
measures).
17. Panel Urges Remedies to Abuses by Police, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 2000, at A18. It
is important to note that comparative data on police shootings are unreliable because
police departments have not agreed upon national standards for data collection.
Moreover, many departments are reluctant to make data about police shootings
public.
18. James Q. Wilson & George L. Kelling, The Police and Neighborhood Safety:
Broken Windows, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Mar. 1982, at 29, available at http://
www.theatlantic.com/politics/crime/windows.htm. This article coined the term "Bro-
ken Windows."
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Broken Windows theory argues that disorderly behavior and con-
ditions, such as broken windows left untended, send a message that
nobody in a community cares, leading to fear of crime, more seri-
ous crime itself, and, eventually, urban decay. Such reasoning is a
direct challenge not only to many liberal policy innovations-
decriminalization of minor and so-called victimless crimes, deinsti-
tutionalization of the emotionally disturbed, and deregulation of
the youthful misconduct in schools and public spaces-but to
"root-causes" theory itself. If the logic of Broken Windows is true,
restoring and maintaining order will prevent the eruption of more
serious crime. As Bratton put it, once people know their obstrep-
erous and minor offenses will be controlled, many will change their
behavior.19
WHAT DID HAPPEN IN NEW YORK CITY?
The story of New York's reduction in crime could start in a vari-
ety of places: with the concern for ending disorder in mid-town
Manhattan and the evolution of the Mid-Town Manhattan Com-
munity Court;2  with the eradication of graffiti in the subway sys-
tem;2 with the reclaiming of Bryant Park (adjacent to the New
York Public Library); with the political decision of former Mayor
David Dinkins to add 6000 new police officers to the NYPD during
the early 1990s; with the evolution of Business Improvement Dis-
tricts, especially the Grand Central Partnership that restored con-
trol over the neighborhood surrounding Grand Central Station;
with Commissioner Raymond Kelly's decision to devise a plan to
reign in "squeegee men" (although Giuliani and Bratton got credit
for eliminating squeegee men, the plans to deal with them were
developed under Commissioner Kelly); or with neighborhood or-
ganizations that demanded throughout the 1970s and 1980s that
something be done to address crime and disorder in their
communities.
19. James Traub, New York Story, NEW REPUBLIC, Jan. 27, 1997, at 12 (discussing
anti-drug initiatives in Washington Heights that led to a reduction in violence).
20. E.g., Joseph P. Fried, Court is Moving Back Into the Neighborhood, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 10, 1999, § 1, at 45 (discussing the successes of community courts as well
as the opening of a new facility in Red Hook, Brooklyn); Matthew T. Crossnon, Third
Branch of Government Deserves Fair Share of Budget, N.Y. L.J., Jan. 27, 1993, at S1
(discussing functions and operation of Midtown Manhattan Community Court).
21. George L. Kelling & William J. Bratton, Declining Crime Rates: Insiders' View
of the New York City Story, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1217, 1220-21 (1998)
(stating that the eradication of subway graffiti "was considered by some to be one of
the most successful urban policy 'wins' on record") [hereinafter Declining Crime
Rates].
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All were important moves to reassert control over the city.
Many grew out of the same concerns that characterized Broken
Windows. In fact, business people in mid-town Manhattan had
been clamoring for restoration of order in the Times Square area
since the 1970s-articulating the Broken Windows thesis even
before Broken Windows had been written. At the same time,
crime was slowly declining in the years prior to the Giuliani admin-
istration. This is neither surprising nor inconsistent with evidence
that the NYPD played a key role in the dramatic crime reductions
of the Giuliani-Bratton era.
The starting point of the New York story of crime reduction
most directly linked to the Giuliani administration was the effort to
restore order in the subway system. As New Yorkers will recall, by
the late 1980s the subway environment was out of control. Despite
the virtual elimination of graffiti by 1989,22 conditions were so bad
that citizens were abandoning the subway in droves. A quarter of a
million passengers a day didn't bother to pay their fare; extortion
of money from passengers via aggressive panhandling was the rule
of the day; robberies were increasing; and things were worsening
fast. The "official" New York Times spin on all this was that the
problem was homelessness23-an interpretation supported by
homeless advocacy groups and the New York City Civil Liberties
Union.24 An initial attempt to restore order was flagging under
vitriolic media and legal attacks by advocacy groups, primarily as a
result of a lack of police leadership-transit police were simply too
busy with "serious crime" to bother with things like disorder and
fare evasion. In response, Robert Kiley, then chairman of the
board of the Metropolitan Transportation Authority, bypassed the
president of the New York Transit Authority and insisted that Wil-
liam Bratton be hired as chief of the Transit Police Department.2 5
In certain respects, the terms of Bratton's hiring were unusual.
Given the root-causes paradigm, chiefs generally were recruited for
a variety of reasons: to resolve a scandal; to improve relations with
the community, especially with minorities; or to run departments
22. Id.
23. E.g., Kirk Johnson, Officials Debate How to Get Homeless out of Subways,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 5, 1988, § 1, at 23 (discussing the sypathetic posture of the Transit
Authority toward the necessary removal of homeless people from the subways with-
out violating their civil rights).
24. Declining Crime Rates, supra note 21, at 1221 (discussing New York Civil Lib-
erties Union's view that the problem "was 'homelessness' and homelessness was not
the TPD's [Transit Police Department's] problem").
25. WILLIAM BRAT-ON & PETER KNOBLER, TURNAROUND 140-142 (1998).
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more efficiently. Although crime might be mentioned during the
search process for a new chief (disorder probably was not), crime
reduction was far from the top of the list of expectations. As much
as anything, many mayors simply wanted police to stay out of
trouble and not rock political or ideological boats. Kiley's expecta-
tions of Bratton, however, were different and explicit: regain con-
trol over the subway and assure passengers that they were safe. In
turn, Bratton had a specific vision of how this could be accom-
plished. First, he had an idea, a guiding theory of action: Broken
Windows. Second, Bratton is an administrative maven. By the
time he got to the transit police he had already headed three police
departments and viewed himself as a "fixer" of badly run
organizations.26
Bratton, however, was out of step with most other police admin-
istrators in two ways: first, he believed that police organizations
could be turned around very quickly; second, he saw mid-level
managers as the key to reforming police departments. Regarding
the former, many academics and police chiefs were saying that
changing police organizations was a slow and tedious process last-
ing as long as ten years. For Bratton, this was unacceptable. He
wanted and promised results quickly. Regarding mid-level manag-
ers, the dominant view in policing was that they, police unions, and
civil service rules were the three primary impediments to police
improvements. While Bratton may have shared that view of un-
ions and civil service, his view of mid-level managers was exactly
the opposite. For him, these managers needed a clear and explicit
mandate, measurable objectives, resources to achieve those objec-
tives, and the need to be held strictly accountable for accomplish-
ing them. Within months after Bratton was hired, the transit police
restored order. Fare evasion dropped to a fraction of what it had
been and robberies steadily declined as well.27 Today, more than
6,000,000 passengers a day ride the subway28 and disorder, fear,
and crime are no longer problems.
The reform of policing New York's subway system was the first
real test of the Broken Windows hypothesis. It also demonstrated
26. E.g., Clifford Krauss, Bratton Builds his Image as he Rebuilds the Police, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 19, 1994, § 1, at 1 (stating that even Bratton's critics "concede that he has
a special ability to innovate and motivate").
27. BRATrON & KNOBLER, supra note 25, at 180 (noting that crime statistics since
Bratton's two years as commissioner included a 22% decline in felony crime, a 40%
decline in robberies, and a 50% reduction in fare evasion).
28. ABOUT NYC TRANSIT, at http://www.mta.nyc.ny.us/nyct/facts/ffintro.htm (last
visited on Nov. 20, 2000).
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that criminal justice organizations could be turned around quickly
with proper leadership. By any standard, it was one of the most
impressive public policy turnarounds in memory. For good or ill,
the turnaround in New York itself eventually overshadowed the
changes in the subway.
In many respects, the New York story is a replay of the subway
story. Mayor Giuliani inherited a political mandate to reduce
crime and, like Kiley, was specific about what he wanted in a police
commissioner. An advocate of Broken Windows himself, Giuliani
recruited Bratton as commissioner on the basis of his subway suc-
cess and their shared views: both believed that crime could be re-
duced, not just a little, but a lot; and swiftly to boot.
What actually happened in the NYPD was far more complicated
than what happened in the Transit Police. The size of the NYPD
alone was daunting-almost ten times the size of the Transit Police,
which, with almost 4000 officers, is among the largest five or six
departments in the country. The crime problems were more com-
plex-crime in the subway consists of a relatively narrow set of
crimes. Further, the NYPD was a troubled organization. It had
been in a muddle for two decades. Preoccupation with corruption
had changed how the police department conceived of its business.
It came to believe its business was staying out of trouble and re-
sponding to crimes after they were committed. Out of fear of cor-
ruption, police officers were even forbidden to make arrests for
drug deals that went on right under their noses.
Yet Bratton went into the NYPD, as he did the Transit Police
Department, with both plans of action and management, and again
"called his shots." He was going to reduce crime; not by the single
digits of three or four percent that had characterized recent years,
but by double digits.
The plan of action was, of course, more inclusive than just imple-
mentation of Broken Windows. Every tactical aspect of policing
came under review, from investigations to warrant service. Yet a
basic commitment to restoring order in New York remained. As
interesting, and ultimately as consequential, was Bratton's cer-
tainty that middle managers were the key to turning around the
NYPD. Everything in his Transit experience strengthened this
conviction. The question was how to make his approach work in a
department with seventy-six precincts. The kind of personal direc-
tion that he provided in Transit's twelve districts was simply impos-
sible in New York's seventy-six precincts-each of which has a
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higher average population 29 or more total police officers than most
American cities.
The answer that evolved in the NYPD was Compstat, an organi-
zational process in which precinct data and accountability were
linked and translated into action.3 ° The singular achievement of
Compstat, one that revolutionized the NYPD, was that it riveted
precinct commanders' attention on precinct problems. Prior to
Compstat, precinct commanders were preoccupied with two things:
what was going on at One Police Plaza (the NYPD's central head-
quarters), and staying out of trouble. Now their careers rested on
knowing their precincts, understanding problems there, and doing
something about them. Compstat was the means by which a rigid
and highly centralized bureaucracy, in a matter of months, was
transformed into a decentralized and highly responsive organiza-
tion. The speed of organizational change was unprecedented in
policing.
The result of these efforts, to use Malcolm Gladwell's phrase,
was a "tipping point."'3 1 Crime plummeted. Did the economy
cause the change? During Bratton's administration, unemploy-
ment never went below 8.7 %.32 Did the number of youths in the
city's population change? No data support this. Did drug use pat-
terns change? Perhaps somewhat, although the evidence is weak.33
Besides, which came first, changes in drug use patterns or new po-
lice activities? One must ignore history and believe in some in-
credible coincidences to deny police a major portion of the credit
for what happened in New York. Kiley first, and then Giuliani and
Bratton, called their shots very specifically. Those attributing the
29. New York City's population of 7,430,000 divided by the number of precincts
yields an average of approximately 98,000 people per police precinct, just under the
threshold of 100,000 that signifies a "large city" in the United States. See DEP'T OF
CITY PLANNING, CITY OF N.Y., POPULATION BY RACE AND HISPANIC ORIGIN: NEW
YORK CITY AND BOROUGHS 1990 AND 1999 (ESTIMATE), available at http://
www.ci.nyc.ny.us/html/dcp/pdf/9099pop.pdf; see also Richard A. Leo, The Impact of
Miranda Revisited, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 621, 637 (1996) (noting that what
people call "big city" police departments typically serve 100,000 people or more).
30. See BRATTON & KNOBLER, supra note 25, at 233 (explaining the evolution of
"the crime meetings" into computer-statistics meetings, or Compstat).
31. MALCOLM GLADWELL, THE TIPPING POINT: How LITTrLE THINGS CAN MAKE
A BIG DIFFERENCE (2000). Gladwell, a staff writer for The New Yorker, examines how
major societal changes can often occur without warning and have far-reaching effects.
32. N.Y. CITY POLICE DEP'T, NEW YORK CITY CRIME CONTROL INDICATORS &
STRATEGY ASSESSMENT 41 (1998) (indicating unemployment statistics for New York
City).
33. Clifford Krauss, Crime Lab: Mystery of New York, The Suddenly Safer City,
N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 1995, at 1.
578
CRIMINOLOGY AND IDEOLOGY
crime reductions to the economy, etc., simply have no data that
support their point of view. Moreover, with the exception of Pro-
fessor Eli Silverman of John Jay College of Criminal Justice, who
studied Compstat in considerable detail,34 no scholars who have
written about the crime drops in New York have done research in
the police department itself.35
The question remains, however: "Why did crime drop so much in
so many locations, virtually simultaneously?"
How CAN WE THINK ABOUT WHY PEOPLE STOPPED
COMMITTING CRIME IN OTHER CITIES AS WELL?
A broad consensus is emerging among social scientists that three
factors drove the outbreak of violence during the 1980s and early
1990s: the post-1985 "crack" epidemic, the proliferation of hand-
guns among youths, and competition among gangs and youths for
drug "turf"-competition that was resolved by intimidation and
killing.36 At one level, those are entirely plausible explanations: in
city after city, the appearance of crack was followed by turf battles,
and they were resolved by violence, most often gun-related
violence.
But attributing the epidemic of violence to crack, guns, and com-
petition for turf, begs the larger issue. Drugs of one kind or an-
34. ELI B. SILVERMAN, NYPD BATTrLES CRIME: INNOVATIVE STRATEGIES IN PO-
LICING (1999) (attributing much of New York City's crime reduction to those innova-
tions developed by Bratton in 1994).
35. E.g., John E. Eck & Edward R. Maguire, Have Changes in Policing Reduced
Violent Crime?, in THE CRIME DROP IN AMERICA, supra note 1, at 207-65. Eck and
Maguire discuss New York City at great length. They immediately inject ideology into
the discussion by presenting New York under the rubric "Zero Tolerance"-a phrase
loved by the left as a substitute for Broken Windows because it both smacks of zeal-
otry and suggests blind non-discretionary policing. Never mind that the phrase is ab-
solutely inconsistent with everything that Wilson, Kelling, and Coles ever wrote about
Broken Windows. We always have presented order maintenance as a highly discre-
tionary set of activities. Moreover, Bratton has explicitly rejected "Zero Tolerance" as
descriptive of his approach (except for dealing with police corruption). Certainly Eck,
an accomplished police scholar, is well aware of this. Then, Eck and Maguire proceed
by offering critiques of Broken Windows, virtually all of which are non-empirical ide-
ological essays rather than articles that would constitute serious research. (I have no
quarrel with ideological essays as long as authors make it clear that they are writing
ideological essays-even if they include numbers.) They then move on to Compstat,
indicating that while there are plausible reasons to think that Compstat might have
had an impact, it probably did not. They draw this conclusion after limiting their anal-
ysis to homicides and without ever visiting an NYPD precinct.
36. E.g., Alfred Blumstein & Joel Wallman, The Recent Rise and Fall of American
Violence, in THE CRIME DROP IN AMERICA, supra note 1, at 1-12 (discussing a myriad
of possibilities to explain the reduction of violent crime in America).
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other have been around for a long time. An illegal market in drugs
has existed during most of the twentieth century.37 Why did illegal
marketing turn so violent after 1985? The answer most often given
is the proliferation of guns. But guns have been around a long
time, too. There have always been ample guns obtainable, whether
legally or illegally. If anything, 1980s gun control measures should
have made them harder to obtain. True, in prior decades their fire-
power may not have been as great, but they were deadly enough.
And youths have been with us forever-maybe not as the same
share of the population, but still in significant enough numbers to
raise havoc if not controlled. What happened to cause parents,
neighborhoods, communities, and cities to lose control of their
young people? Why, as they had in the past, couldn't communities
absorb the guns, drugs, and youth and prevent disorder, crime, and
violence? Answering those questions might inform the solution to
the riddle of why crime is declining nationally.
Starting during the 1950s and 1960s, three broad trends reduced
the capacity of neighborhoods and communities to control them-
selves and their youth. First, urban renewal, expressway construc-
tion, and bussing tore apart neighborhoods, especially inner-city
neighborhoods. Second, the institutional controls that traditionally
regulated youthful behavior were weakened and undermined in
the name of the "rights" of youth, decriminalization, and deinstitu-
tionalization. Finally, criminal justice agencies and police depart-
ments abandoned traditional peacekeeping and order maintenance
and withdrew into highly centralized facilities and strategies.
Urban renewal and highway construction cut through neighbor-
hoods and communities with little regard for the social conse-
quences. Entire neighborhoods in many areas and fragments of
other neighborhoods were bulldozed, either to make room for new
"tower block" public housing or expressways. Poor inner-city re-
sidents, often African Americans, were displaced into adjacent
neighborhoods. Resistance to African Americans moving into
white neighborhoods was often fierce, but their advance was inevi-
table-they had to go someplace. "Blockbusting" and "redlining"
followed, reducing property values and opening the way to absen-
tee landlords.
Public housing, rather than providing housing for the working
poor-giving them a boost until they could enter the private mar-
37. DAVID F. MUSTO, THE AMERICAN DISEASE: ORIGINS OF NARCOTIC CONTROL
107 (3d ed. 1999) (discussing the origin of the illegal drug market in New York during
the early twentieth century).
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ket-became the housing of last resort for the most troubled and
troublesome citizens. By the 1980s, such housing became the nur-
series in which babies (early-teen mothers) raised babies. Stores
and shops abandoned those areas, depriving neighborhoods of the
"ownership" that was essential to maintaining control of public
spaces. Jane Jacobs predicted all of this as early as 1962 in her
classic The Death and Life of Great American Cities.38 Gone as
well were the convenience and jobs they provided neighborhood
residents. And, during the 1960s and 1970s, bussing, whatever the
motivations of its advocates, further weakened the bonds of fami-
lies to neighborhoods. Those who could, moved or sent their chil-
dren to private schools. As children were withdrawn from the
streets on which they once had walked to public schools, their par-
ents' watchful eyes and presence left as well.
Second, in the name of protecting the "rights" of children and
troubled or troublesome populations like the emotionally dis-
turbed against "arbitrary" authority, legislators, courts, and policy-
makers weakened the authority of socializing and controlling insti-
tutions-not much, but just enough to unsettle things. Whether it
was the authority of parents ("You can't spank me"), teachers
("You can't make me cover up my 'school sucks' slogan on my tee-
shirt"), the juvenile court ("You can't stop me from running
away"), or psychiatrists ("You can't make me take medication"),
"rights" trumped both responsibility and control. In the past, a
teacher's insistence that a child cover an objectionable slogan was
non-negotiable; now, a teacher's perseverance meant he could be
sued. Likewise, incorrigible residents of public housing had their
rights: short of committing felonies against their neighbors (and
often even this was not enough) these troublesome tenants could
not be evicted by housing authorities. Like teachers, housing au-
thorities were so "chilled" by the prospect of long and expensive
litigation that they walked away from problems. Like many
schools, large public housing projects spun out of control.
The good news was that the vast majority of young persons were
relatively unaffected by their "rights revolution": they obeyed their
38. JANE JACOBS, THE DEATH AND LiFE OF GREAT AMERICAN CITIES 32 (1961).
The first thing to understand is that the public peace-the sidewalk and
street peace-of cities is not kept primarily by the police, necessary as police
are. It is kept primarily by an intricate, almost unconscious, network of vol-
untary controls and standards among the people themselves, and enforced
by the people themselves .... No amount of police can enforce civilization
where the normal, casual enforcement of it has broken down.
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parents and were respectful to teachers and authority figures.
However, for "wannabes '' 39 and real predators, newfound rights
were made to order. Intimidation, extortion, and "in your face"
confrontations were not only to be tolerated, but in the legal lore
that was fueled by social "science," they were elevated to expres-
sions of cultural diversity that should "enrich" their victims. The
trouble with this formulation was that although it was a popular
notion with intellectual elites and the media, it did not play well in
neighborhoods, especially poor and minority neighborhoods. The
idea, for example, that prostitution was a "victimless crime" was a
cruel joke to inner-city families whose husbands were being hustled
in front of their children by scantily clad prostitutes and whose
daughters were being propositioned obscenely on their way to high
school by cruising "Johns." To use Norman Podhoretz's phrase,
"tolerating the intolerable" became a civic duty for decent
people.4"
Meanwhile, police and agencies of control such as prosecutors
and parole agencies retreated into centralized facilities and strate-
gies. Many in policing, for example, believed that centralizing po-
lice and putting them in cars would improve their efficiency and
make them more effective. Many accepted the idea that police
should intrude into community life as little as possible. They be-
lieved: police should deal only with serious crime; youthful offend-
ers should be handled by social workers; drunkenness and other
"minor" crimes like prostitution should be decriminalized because
they were "victimless." They believed that because crime is caused
by racism, social injustice, and economic inequities, police can do
little about crime to begin with except respond to it once it occurs.
Regardless, whether driven by the quest for efficiency or adher-
ence to ideology, the outcome was the same: centralizing police
and putting them in cars virtually "de-policed" city streets, exacer-
bating the breakdown of other forms of social control.
In similar fashion, courts and prosecutors moved "downtown" as
well. Remote from neighborhoods and communities, they lost any
sense of neighborhood priorities. Like police, prosecutors wanted
to deal only with "sexy" cases: murder, rape, and robbery. Lost on
them and the courts was the reality that entire neighborhoods were
the victims of the so-called "victimless" crime. As for probation
and parole, offenders became "clients" who reported to officers in
39. Youths who are not really intent on mayhem, but who do enough posturing
and "woofing" to intimidate people.
40. Norman Podhoretz, My New York, NAT'L REV., June 14, 1999, at 41.
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downtown offices. The idea that probation and parole agents
should be active in neighborhoods and communities to control
their charges both was alien to their operating strategies and obvi-
ated by their fear of going into tough neighborhoods. Tom Wolfe
caught this pessimistic and jaded attitude just right in his The Bon-
fire of the Vanities.41
So social scientists have a point when they relate the conver-
gence of crack, guns, and high numbers of youth to the explosion
of violence during the late 1980s. They fail to acknowledge, how-
ever, that this convergence happened within the context of weak-
ened families, schools, neighborhoods, and other socializing and
controlling institutions-most resulting from policies they strongly
supported, including urban renewal, decriminalization, deinstitu-
tionalization, bussing, decreased regulation of youth, and the with-
drawal of agencies of control-especially police but not limited to
them-from neighborhoods and communities. Put concisely, the
progressive agenda for cities, so strongly supported and engineered
by political and academic liberals during the 1960s and 1970s, over-
reached itself with a commitment to radical individualism and
drained the capacity of neighborhoods and communities to manage
youth and those prone to obstreperousness. And by the late 1980s,
we lost control of public spaces, especially in poor and immigrant
neighborhoods.
Such interpretations are not just coming from the center-right of
the political spectrum. Liberals, such as Harold Meyerson, have
made very similar observations:
The creation and defense of public space is a distinctly liberal
achievement, as is the creation and defense of untrammeled civil
liberties. In practice, however, these two values have clashed
repeatedly on the sidewalks and streets of America's cities over
the past 15 years, as urban poverty and disorder have both
grown more virulent. On the whole, urban liberal regimes have
tended to defend civil liberties at the expense of public space,
just as conservatives have tended to defend market forces at the
expense of community stability. (On both the left and right, the
individualistic strain in America has been running amok for sev-
eral decades now.) Liberal urban policy has sent many city
dwellers, especially in poorer neighborhoods, scurrying in-
doors-or to ersatz malls, or the suburbs. It is the center-right
41. TOM WOLFE, THE BONFIRE OF THE VANITIES (1988) (presenting a fictional
account of how an opportunistic reporter and politician inflame public opinion when
the protagonist's vehicle strikes a young African American).
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that has risen to the defense of public space in cities, and it is the
center-right that is reaping the political reward.42
In many respects, it is not surprising that all of this came to a
grinding halt in New York City, especially in the subways. The old
saying that "every conservative in New York City was a liberal who
had been mugged" may not have been literally true, but it got at
the reality that virtually no one could avoid intolerable daily con-
frontations and intimidation. The result was a growing demand for
order that even political loyalty could not suppress. Hence, the
election of a center-right politician who was prepared to reject the
crime prevention truisms of the past.
But the violence that grew out of the breakdown of community
controls affected virtually every city in the United States. And in
most, citizens decided: "enough was enough." Cities moved to re-
store control over public spaces. In many communities, prosecu-
tors and probation and parole agencies started to create a presence
in neighborhoods again. Business Improvement Districts spread
nationally. Citizen groups intensified their lobbying and anti-crime
efforts. Strong movements developed to find ways to control the
aggressive emotionally disturbed, if not with medications, then by
institutionalizing them. Housing officials demolished tower-block
high rises and built low-density, dispersed public housing, where
residents involved in the drug trade were speedily evicted. School
officials sought ways to restore order-in some cases reinstituting
mandatory school uniforms and other signs of discipline and con-
trol. Many communities started to return to neighborhood schools.
Collaboration among police, criminal justice agencies, other gov-
ernmental agencies, and the faith community not only formed in
city after city, but demonstrated remarkable persistence and effec-
tiveness. Boston was the strongest example 43-gang violence was
all but eliminated 44-but examples could be given from cities all
42. Harold Meyerson, Why Liberalism Fled the City and How it Might Come Back,
AM. PROSPECT, March-April 1998, at 46-52.
43. E.g., David M. Kennedy, Guns & Violence: Pulling Levers: Chronic Offenders,
High-Crime Settings, and a Theory of Prevention, 31 VAL. U. L. REV. 449, 461 (1997)
(discussing the success of the Boston Gun Project Working Group in dramatically
reducing gang violence in Boston). The Working Group's strategy focused not only
on traditional law enforcement, but also on informing the gang members of the conse-
quences of illegal conduct. Id. at 463-64. "The Working Group also hoped that the
process of communicating face-to-face with gangs and gang members would undercut
any feelings of anonymity and invulnerability they might have, and that a clear dem-
onstration of interagency solidarity would enhance offenders' sense that something
new and powerful was happening." Id. at 464.
44. Id.
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over the country. Courts began to rethink that balance between
individual rights and community interests. Police and prosecutors
rediscovered the power of city ordinances, zoning, and regulations
and applied them to many problems, including drug dealing and
crack houses, as well as controlling gangs.45 In other words, in
every sector, from business to faith institutions, moves were made
to undo social policies that had held crime control hostage. Steps
were taken to re-strengthen socializing and controlling institutions,
increasing their capacity to maintain order and prevent crime.
That the configurations of these movements are different in every
city should come as no surprise.
So what can I conclude?
CONCLUSION
The criminal justice policies that were derived from "root
causes" and its corollaries-decriminalization, deinstitutionaliza-
tion, and deregulation of youth-have had disastrous conse-
quences. Because crime prevention was equated with solving
society's social problems and reacting to serious crime only after it
occurred, the business of criminal justice, criminal justice policy,
and practice had no middle ground.46 Police, prosecutors, and pro-
bation and parole agents ignored minor offenses. Sanctions for mi-
nor offenses were limited or non-existent (often, merely fines that
went ignored and unpaid). On the other end, however, sanctions
for drug dealing and felonies piled up and became more and more
extreme-e.g., "three strikes you're out," "stiff time," and "truth in
sentencing." Without the inclination or authority to intervene in
minor offenses, police and criminal justice agents (add schools and
other socializing institutions as well) sent an alluring but dangerous
message to obstreperous youth: "We can't and won't control your
behavior." At the margins, a relatively small percentage but a
45. In City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41 (1999), the Supreme Court struck
down Chicago's anti-loitering statute on the basis that it was unconstitutionally vague.
Id. at 64. The Court, however, hinted that a similar provision might be valid "if the
ordinance only applied to loitering that had an apparently harmful purpose or effect,
or possibly if it only applied to loitering by persons reasonably believed to be criminal
gang members." Id. at 62. In response to the Court's decision in Morales, Chicago
enacted a narrower, and specifically anti-gang, statute. CHI., ILL., MUN. CODE § 8-4-
015 (rev. 2000).
46. Conservatives as well (especially the far right) were not innocent in this re-
gard-they had their own "macro" approach to explain crime control. For them,
crime was caused by the breakdown of family values which, in turn, was linked to
welfare. But they did not dominate criminal justice thinking as did liberals. Cf THE
CRIME DROP IN AMERICA, supra note 1.
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huge number of youth believed this message and blissfully pushed
on, inexorably heading towards prolonged incarceration-and in
the process terrorizing communities by committing large numbers
of both minor and serious offenses. In other words, liberals like to
blame conservatives for the disastrously high levels of imprison-
ment. Yet it was the liberal disinclination to control youth as they
explored the boundaries of acceptable behavior that sent the mes-
sage that anything went, thus sending many youth careening into
serious crime and prolonged imprisonment.
To the extent that criminologists and social scientists attribute
crime to "macro" causes outside of their control-demography, ec-
onomics, social injustices-they can comfort themselves about the
role they played during the last thirty years. But bad social poli-
cies, many of them strongly supported by criminologists and soci-
ologists, got us into the crime mess, and improved policies are
getting us out of it.
The issue is not just sorting out responsibility, although it is a
first step. Aside from the coming "baby boomerang" now on the
horizon,47 prisons will be releasing vast numbers of offenders back
into neighborhoods and communities. How we think about them
and their impact on neighborhoods will influence the crime trajec-
tory in the decades to come. Clearly, they will need the services of
the educational, service, and faith communities-many desper-
ately. But controls, as well as services, change and shape behavior.
Regardless of whether we are concerned about the arrival of a
large cohort of youth or felons returning from prison, we must be
willing to make strong statements about the boundaries of behav-
ior, not just at the extremes of felonies, but with minor offenses
and obstreperousness as well. To do this we must continue to re-
strengthen the ability of families, neighborhoods, schools, and
other social institutions to control as well as nourish young people.
47. Fox, supra note 9, at 1-5.
WHY CIVIL RIGHTS LAWSUITS DO NOT
DETER POLICE MISCONDUCT: THE
CONUNDRUM OF INDEMNIFICATION AND
A PROPOSED SOLUTION
Richard Emery and Ilann Margalit Maazel*
In thousands of cases around the country, civil rights plaintiffs
successfully sue police officers for violating the Constitution. Yet,
day in and day out, police officers make arrests without probable
cause, use excessive force, deny arrestees medical treatment, and
otherwise violate the Constitution with near impunity. Why don't
civil lawsuits deter this reprehensible conduct?
The answer, this essay posits, lies in the conundrum of
indemnification.1
THE CONUNDRUM OF INDEMNIFICATION
New York City represents and indemnifies police officers in the
overwhelming majority of civil rights cases.2 The city regularly in-
demnifies police officers regardless of whether they acted inten-
tionally, recklessly, or brutally; whether or not they violated
federal or state law; or whether or not they violated the rules and
* Richard Emery (J.D. Columbia, 1970; B.A. Brown University, 1967) is a se-
nior partner at Emery Cuti Brinckerhoff & Abady PC, and has represented victims of
police misconduct throughout the country, arguing cases before the highest courts at
both the state and federal level.
Ilann Margalit Maazel (J.D. University of Michigan, 1997; B.A. Harvard Univer-
sity, 1993) is a lawyer at Emery Cuti Brinckerhoff & Abady PC, and is the former law
clerk to the Hon. John M. Walker of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit. Mr. Maazel previously worked for the firm Paul, Weiss, Rifkind,
Wharton & Garrison, as well as the Federal Public Defenders in the Eastern District
of New York.
1. Although this essay explores the indemnification issue in New York City,
many other jurisdictions provide for indemnification of police and other municipal
employees. E.g., N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 50-1 (McKinney 1999) (Nassau County in-
demnification of police officers); Hennessy v. Robinson, 985 F. Supp. 283 (N.D.NY.
1997) (discussing indemnification in Oneida County); N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW § 18 (Mc-
Kinney 1988) (general New York State indemnification statute for public employees).
2. According to Human Rights Watch, "Officers themselves do not have to pay
personally in civil lawsuits; the city almost always indemnifies the officer and pays. In
the rare case in which the city has not covered the officer, the PBA [Patrolmen's
Benevolent Association, a police officers' union] has done so." HUMAN RIGHTS
WATCH, SHIELDED FROM JUSTICE: POLICE BRUTALITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE
UNITED STATES: NEW YORK: CIVIL LAWSUITS (1998).
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regulations of the New York City Police Department ("NYPD").
Basic political realities explain this practice. Police officers organ-
ize in very powerful unions, most notably the Patrolmen's Benevo-
lent Association in New York, which in turn exert pressure on the
mayor and the city's lawyer, the "Corporation Counsel,"3 to re-
present and indemnify the officers. And the mayor, of course, de-
pends on his police force to preserve the low crime rate that
remains the perceived crown jewel of this administration.
When the city errs on the side of indemnifying every officer, no
one complains. The unions are satisfied-they successfully protect
their members. The police officers are satisfied-they avoid per-
sonal liability for their wrongdoing. The victims, for the most part,
are satisfied-they recover, relatively quickly, from a deep-pocket
municipal defendant that, unlike most police officers, can actually
pay the judgment or settlement. There is simply no one with a
voice in the process with any interest in disturbing the status quo.
Not everyone wins, of course. The taxpayers lose. They pay mil-
lions of dollars to fund these judgments and settlements. The com-
munity loses, because this system perpetuates and protects police
misconduct. And the victims who care more about principle than
money lose, because the law gives the city near absolute discretion
to defend and pay for police wrongdoing, but little incentive to in-
vestigate or discipline officers who violate the law.
COMPENSATION-YES; DETERRENCE-No
Civil rights plaintiffs bring suit for myriad reasons. Some seek
money. Some seek the public vindication of a trial by jury. Some
seek punishment for the police officers that assaulted, strip-
searched, verbally abused, or falsely arrested them. Still others
hope that their cases will deter other officers from future unconsti-
tutional conduct. At the outset of the litigation, most victims of
police brutality seek, at different levels, all of the above, with their
motives often centering on outrage, punishment, and a desire to
effect some systemic change. But, as litigation drags on, their in-
terests often slide toward the unsatisfactory compromise of ac-
cepting money from the public for the wrong they suffered.
Therefore, the outrage felt by most police abuse victims is best as-
3. "Corporation Counsel" is the popular term used to refer to the New York City
Law Department, the agency that acts as the attorney for the mayor, other elected
officials, mayoral agencies, and other selected non-mayoral agencies. As used in this
essay, it refers always to the Law Department as an institution, and not to its head,
Corporation Counsel Michael D. Hess, or any individual staff attorneys.
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suaged by criminal prosecution, internal disciplinary action (includ-
ing termination), better police training and counseling, and civil
litigation that actually forces guilty police officers to pay the settle-
ments or judgments against them.
Private lawyers have no power to convene grand juries and in-
dict. For that they rely upon district attorneys, who themselves al-
most always rely upon law enforcement in their own cases, and
who all too often are loathe to take any action against police, ex-
cept in the most egregious cases.4 Nor can private lawyers disci-
pline, dock vacation days, suspend, fire, retrain or counsel police
officers. For that they depend on police departments themselves.
And police departments-the NYPD included-are notoriously
unable or unwilling to discipline, much less fire, police officers.'
Finally, training is a palliative and generally inadequate way to pre-
vent future misconduct, and is no match for a police culture of
violence.
That leaves civil litigation. Civil litigation is very effective at re-
covering money compensation. The great majority of civil rights
suits actively pursued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 conclude with a set-
tlement for money. When these suits proceed to trial, and plain-
tiffs win, they receive money-often in substantial amounts.
Civil litigation sometimes-infrequently-achieves the goal of
public vindication by jury trial. It is only sometimes effective be-
cause most suits settle and never see the inside of the courtroom. 6
But, plainly, civil litigation is mostly ineffective in punishing police
officers. No prayer for relief in the civil complaint includes impris-
onment, probation, community service, termination, suspension, or
discipline of any kind. At worst, civil litigation "punishes" police
officers only in the sense that they are forced, under oath, under
cross-examination, and in public, to account for their actions. They
are forced to confront the victims they falsely arrested, assaulted,
or unlawfully strip-searched. Often officers endure grueling depo-
sitions by hostile questioners. And if a jury finds for a plaintiff
4. Since 1977, only three City officers have been convicted for on-duty killings.
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, SHIELDED FROM JUSTICE: POLICE BRUTALITY AND Ac-
COUNTABILITY IN THE UNITED STATES: NEW YORK: CRIMINAL PROSECUTION (1998).
5. In 1996, for example, of 5596 complaints of police misconduct filed with the
Civil Complaint Review Board ("CRRB"), 259 were substantiated by the CCRB and
only 51 resulted in discipline of any kind for the police officer. N.Y. CIVIL LIBERTIES
UNION, SPECIAL REPORT: FIVE YEARS OF CIVILIAN REVIEW: A MANDATE UNFUL-
FILLED JULY 5, 1993-JULY 5, 1998, at tbl.IV (1998).
6. This is because plaintiffs choose to settle, as a result of long delays, or to avoid
the inevitable risks of trauma of a trial.
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after trial, the officer must face the public humiliation-such as it
may be-of knowing that a jury heard his testimony, rejected it,
and found that he violated the Constitution.
And if an officer refuses to admit his own wrongdoing, if he lies
under oath, he must for all time live with the knowledge that he
not only committed the wrong that led to the lawsuit, but that he
committed the moral and legal crime of perjury-surely an uncom-
fortable feeling, at best. However, this punishment is still mild in-
deed, and of no solace to the victims of police misconduct-
especially those who seek to translate their horrible experience
into reform of a broken system, and who must helplessly face an
officer who lies with impunity to a judge and jury.
As ineffective as civil litigation is in punishing police officers
who violate the law, it is even less effective in deterring officers
from future unlawful conduct. This is true for one basic reason:
police officers almost never pay anything out of their own pockets
to settle civil lawsuits. Nor do they pay for judgments rendered
after jury verdicts for plaintiffs. Police officers are so far removed
from the process of settling cases and paying money damages that
they often have no idea how much their cases settle for, or even
whether they settle at all. We have deposed many officers who had
been sued one, two, three times before, yet had no idea how any of
those cases were resolved.
Who does pay for police misconduct? The taxpayers do. In the
overwhelming majority of civil rights cases of police misconduct in
New York State, the taxpayer pays every dollar of the settlement
or judgment.' Between 1994 and 1996, for example, New York tax-
payers paid approximately seventy million dollars for judgments
and settlements arising out of police misconduct, almost two mil-
lion dollars per month.8
THE EXISTING INDEMNIFICATION SCHEME
Taxpayers pay for these judgments because of a series of provi-
sions of the New York General Municipal Law, providing for in-
demnification and free legal representation of police and other
employees of New York City and State. As to New York City
employees:
7. E.g., statutes and case cited supra note 1.
8. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 2. Taxpayers also pay for Corporation
Counsel lawyers to defend police officers from civil suits. In 1988, the New York City
Law Department established an entire division of lawyers-the Special Federal Liti-
gation Unit-to defend police misconduct cases almost exclusively.
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At the request of the employee and upon [the employee's "full
cooperation" in the defense of the action and timely notice to
the city of the civil action], the city shall provide for the defense
of an employee of any agency in any civil action or proceeding
in any state or federal court including actions under sections
nineteen hundred eighty-one through nineteen hundred eighty-
eight of title forty-two of the United States code arising out of
any alleged act or omission which the corporation counsel finds
occurred while the employee was acting within the scope of his
public employment and in the discharge of his duties and was
not in violation of any rule or regulation of his agency at the
time the alleged act or omission occurred.9
In addition to free legal representation, the city "shall indemnify
and save harmless its employees" from "any judgment" or "any
settlement" approved by the city, as long as (1) "the employee was
acting within the scope of his public employment and in the dis-
charge of his duties," and (2) the employee "was not in violation of
any rule or regulation of his agency at the time the alleged damages
were sustained."10 This is a duty upon the city, not an option. But
"the duty to indemnify and save harmless. .. shall not arise where
the injury or damage resulted from intentional wrongdoing or reck-
lessness on the part of the employee.""
Finally, § 50-k (5) provides that:
In the event that the act or omission upon which the court pro-
ceeding against the employee is based was or is also the basis of
a disciplinary proceeding by the employee's agency against the
employee, representation by the corporation counsel and in-
demnification by the city may be withheld (a) until such discipli-
nary proceeding has been resolved and (b) unless the resolution
of the disciplinary proceeding exonerated the employee as to
such act or omission.' 2
Most importantly, nothing in the statute prevents the city from
representing and indemnifying police who act intentionally and
recklessly to violate a plaintiff's civil rights. Although the city's
"duty" to indemnify "shall not arise" in this instance, the city's
right or option to indemnify remains. Nor does the statute prevent
9. N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 50-k(2) (McKinney 2000) (emphasis added).
10. Id. (emphasis added.) If a New York City police "officer's conduct was in
violation of a rule or regulation of the New York City Police Department, the City
(through its Corporation Counsel) does not have an obligation to defend the officer
under § 50-k(2)." Schwartz v. City of New York, 57 F.3d 236, 238 (2d Cir. 1995).
11. N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 50-k(3) (McKinney 2000).
12. Id. § 50-k(5) (emphasis added.).
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the city from representing and indemnifying officers who violate
NYPD rules and regulations, or who are actually disciplined by the
NYPD after a disciplinary proceeding.
The indemnification statute "is primarily directed at saving im-
perfect and, therefore, fallible public employees from the poten-
tially ruinous legal consequences following from unintentional
lapses in the daily discharge of their duties."13 "[T]he City's obliga-
tion to defend its employees from liability for alleged acts or omis-
sions occurring during their work is not limited to those employees
who are considered wholly free from fault," and although "negli-
gence is unsatisfactory and worthy of reprimand," no public em-
ployee need pay for the consequences of his own negligent
conduct.14 This makes perfect sense. If our society is to encourage
public service and attract qualified public servants, public officials
cannot face financial ruin for every careless mistake that causes
someone damage. Society must bear that cost.
But, as the statute recognizes, reckless and/or intentional wrong-
doing is another matter. If a police officer intentionally violates
the most basic of civil rights-the right not to be arrested without
probable cause, the right not to be subjected to unreasonable or
excessive force, the right to some medical treatment if injured
while in police custody-why should taxpayers foot the bill? Why
shouldn't a police officer pay for his own misconduct, as do lawyers
and doctors (through, at a minimum, higher insurance premiums),
and, for that matter, criminals?
THE MECHANISMS OF INDEMNIFICATION
The mechanics of representation and indemnification, which are
technically distinct acts, are as follows. Under § 50-k, "[t]he Cor-
poration Counsel of the City of New York makes the initial deter-
mination as to whether the employee will be indemnified" and
represented. 15 These determinations may be reviewed in an Arti-
cle 78 proceeding in New York State Court.16 They may also be
reviewed by federal courts exercising their supplemental jurisdic-
13. Blood v. Bd. of Educ., 509 N.Y.S.2d 530, 533 (App. Div. 1986) (emphasis
added).
14. Id. at 533.
15. Jocks v. Tavernier, 97 F. Supp. 2d 303, 312 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) (discussing indem-
nification); Weitman v. City of New York, 635 N.Y.S.2d 591, 592 (App. Div. 1995)
(discussing representation); Blood, 509 N.Y.S.2d at 531 (discussing representation).
16. Jocks, 97 F. Supp. 2d at 312; N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 7803(3) (McKinney 1994).
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tion 1-the typical (and most sensible) practice where plaintiffs as-
sert § 1983 action against police officers in federal court.'"
The decision by the Corporation Counsel whether to represent
the defendant officer "may be set aside only if it lacks a factual
basis, i.e., is arbitrary and capricious."'19 This is not surprising,
since the statute provides for free representation where "the Cor-
poration Counsel finds [the alleged unlawful act] occurred while
the employee was acting within the scope of his public employment
and in the discharge of his duties and was not in violation of any
rule or regulation of his agency at the time the alleged act or omis-
sion occurred."20 Of course, the officer is the only person who ever
challenges the Corporation Counsel's decision, and that is only
in the rare instance when the Corporation Counsel withholds
representation.
Rather more surprisingly, courts have applied the same arbitrary
and capricious standard to the city's indemnification decision.2'
This deference finds no support in the statute. In direct contrast to
§ 50-k(2), § 50-k(3) nowhere refers to decisions by the Corporation
Counsel or the city or in any way implies that courts should defer
to the city's indemnification decisions. Nor does the Corporation
Counsel have any particular expertise in determining whether of-
ficer acted "within the scope" of his employment or whether he
acted with "intentional wrongdoing or recklessness." Even the
question as to whether the officer violated an NYPD rule or regu-
17. 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (2000). "[I]n any civil action of which the district courts have
original jurisdiction, the district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all
other claims that are so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction
that they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the United
States Constitution." Id. § 1367(a).
18. Jocks, 97 F. Supp. 2d at 312; Harris v. Rivera, 921 F. Supp. 1058, 1061
(S.D.N.Y. 1995); Turk v. McCarthy, 661 F. Supp. 1526, 1536 (E.D.N.Y. 1987).
19. Weitman, 635 N.Y.S.2d at 592 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Wil-
liams v. City of New York, 476 N.E.2d 317, 318 (N.Y. 1985) (same); Blood, 509
N.Y.S.2d at 531; Mercurio v. City of New York, 758 F.2d 862, 864-65 n.1 (2d Cir. 1995)
(per curiam).
20. N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 50-k(2) (McKinney 1999) (emphasis added).
21. Jocks, 97 F. Supp. 2d at 313 ("Th[e] determination [whether to indemnify],
made by Corporation Counsel, may be set aside by this Court if the determination
was arbitrary and capricious.") (internal quotation marks omitted); Williams, 476
N.E.2d at 318, (noting that whether the officer acted within the scope of his employ-
ment and in the discharge of his duties "and thus was entitled to ... indemnification
by the city [is] to be determined in the first instance by the Corporation Counsel ...
and his determination may be set aside only if it lacks a factual basis, and in that
sense, is arbitrary and capricious"). The language in Williams, however, is dicta, as
Williams itself dealt only with the question of whether the officer was entitled to rep-
resentation by the Corporation Counsel.
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lation is a purely legal non-technical question, and as easily decided
by a court as by the Corporation Counsel. Unlike other "adminis-
trative agencies," which often have expertise in technical fields un-
familiar to judges, the Corporation Counsel has expertise only in
the law itself-an area in which courts are uniquely qualified. All
of the usual rationales for deference to administrative agency deci-
sions are therefore missing here.
As a policy matter, the courts' deference to the city's indemnifi-
cation decisions is unfortunate. The deferential "arbitrary and ca-
pricious" standard of review effectively gives the city carte blanche
to indemnify, or not indemnify, whomever it wants. As a result,
indemnification decisions ultimately become a function not of law,
but of politics, and except for the rare, highly-publicized, extra-
egregious case, or a few cases involving off-duty police not even
arguably acting "within the scope" of their employment,22 politics
dictate-and very powerful police unions ensure-that the city al-
most always indemnifies the police.
The first requirement under § 50-k(3), that a police officer be
"acting within the scope of his public employment and in the dis-
charge of his duties," has received unexceptional treatment in the
courts. While police officers on-duty almost always act "within the
scope," occasionally, off-duty officers may not.23
The second requirement-that the officer not be "in violation of
any rule or regulation of his agency at the time the alleged damages
were sustained," is somewhat more complicated. At least one
court has suggested that the city cannot invoke this clause unless,
at a minimum, the city agency pressed departmental charges
against the officer.24 In Blood v. Board of Education, a school-
teacher who accidentally struck a student in the eye with a book-
bag was "reprimand[ed]" and given an "unsatisfactory rating" by
the Board of Education.2 5 The court nevertheless ordered the Cor-
poration Counsel to represent the teacher because, inter alia, "no
disciplinary charges were filed" against the teacher "whose teach-
ing career ... continued uninterrupted," and therefore no determi-
22. E.g., Jocks, 97 F. Supp. 2d 303; Turk v. McCarthy, 661 F. Supp. 1526, 1528,
1537 (declaring a shooting by off-duty officer at amusement park not "within the
scope"); Weitman, 635 N.Y.S.2d at 592 (finding that an off-duty officer on vacation did
not act "within the scope"); Kelly v. City of New York, 692 F. Supp. 303, 308(S.D.N.Y. 1988) (asserting that an officer's misconduct arising from "prior personal
dispute" while off-duty was not "within the scope").
23. E.g., cases cited infra note 22.
24. Blood, 509 N.Y.S.2d at 533-34.
25. Id. at 531.
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nation was made that the teacher had violated any Board of
Education rule or regulation.26
The First Department repudiated this view just two years ago,
when it held that the Corporation Counsel has "authority to make
a determination, separate and apart and in the absence of any deter-
mination by . . . the Police Department, that [an officer] had vio-
lated certain Police Department rules and regulations, and is
therefore not entitled" to representation by the city.27 The Second
Circuit adopted an even broader approach, interpreting § 50-k(2)
to permit representation of the officers where the Corporation
Counsel "determines that no violation of any rule or regulation of
the employing city agency has occurred, or if no agency disciplinary
proceedings have been commenced against the employee, or if dis-
ciplinary proceedings resulted in the exoneration of the
employee. 28
Thus, irrespective of whatever disciplinary charges the NYPD
may bring, the Corporation Counsel again has effective plenary
power to determine whether police officers violated department
rules or regulations.
The third requirement, that the officer not act with "intentional
wrongdoing or recklessness," receives next to no discussion in the
case law. It is almost never litigated. One principal reason for this
may be that, given the Corporation Counsel's perceived discretion
to apply this standard, no police officer could meaningfully chal-
lenge the city's decision not to indemnify on this ground.29
In sum, no law prevents the city from indemnifying police who
act intentionally or recklessly, who violate department rules and
regulations, or who violate even clearly established constitutional
law. The city has effective carte blanche to indemnify and re-
present whomever it wants, given the highly deferential (and highly
26. Id. at 531-32.
27. Bolusi v. City of New York, 671 N.Y.S.2d 478, 478 (App. Div. 1998) (emphasis
added).
28. Mercurio v. City of New York, 758 F.2d 862, 864 (2d Cir. 1985) (emphasis
added); Behar v: City of New York, No. 98 CIV. 2635 (HB), 1999 WL 212685, at *3-4
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 13, 1999) (discussing that Corporation Counsel's decision not to re-
present officers was not "arbitrary and capricious" where there existed pending
NYPD disciplinary proceeding against them).
29. In at least one case applying New York State's largely analogous public of-
ficer's indemnification statute, N.Y. PuB. OFF. LAW § 18 (McKinney 1988), a court
held that the city has no obligation to indemnify an officer where the jury awarded
punitive damages, "[b]ecause the jury, by awarding punitive damages on each claim,
found that [the misconduct] involved intentional wrongdoing or recklessness." Coker
v. City of Schenectady, 613 N.Y.S.2d 746, 747 (App. Div. 1994).
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suspect) "arbitrary and capricious" standard of review some courts
have applied. And given the practical conundrum described in the
beginning of this essay, this legal regime ensures indemnification
almost all of the time-and hardly deters unconstitutional police
misconduct, if at all.
A PROPOSED SOLUTION
What are the solutions here? Given that the city shall not in-
demnify police who act intentionally or recklessly, or "in violation
of any [NYPD] rule or regulation," and assuming that the city actu-
ally applied this law, then the city could almost never indemnify
any police officer for any § 1983 judgment. Certainly any officer
liable for punitive damages, by definition, acts intentionally or
recklessly.30 Arguably, any officer liable for assault and battery-
by definition intentional acts-acts with "intentional wrongdoing
or recklessness."' 3' And any officer who not only violates the Con-
stitution, but "clearly established" law under the Constitution,32
presumably violates at least some NYPD "rule or regulation." It is
plainly against NYPD rules to arrest someone without probable
cause.33 It plainly violates NYPD rules to use unreasonable or ex-
cessive force.34 It plainly violates NYPD rules to exhibit reckless
disregard for the life of a prisoner within police custody.35
Applying the law as written, the city therefore could almost
never indemnify police officers, and plaintiffs would almost never
be compensated. But this result is unsatisfactory. First, given the
personal assets of most police officers, plaintiffs would not recover,
violating a core purpose of the civil rights laws-to compensate ag-
grieved plaintiffs. Second, without the prospect of compensation,
few victims of unconstitutional conduct would sue in the first in-
30. Coker, 613 N.Y.S.2d at 74; Hartford Accident. & Indem. Co. v. Hempstead,
397 N.E.2d 737 (N.Y. 1979).
31. E.g., Masters v. Becker, 254 N.Y.S.2d 633 (App. Div. 1964); see generally RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 21 et seq. (1977) (elucidating the elements of
assault).
32. "As a general rule, police officers are entitled to qualified immunity," and
therefore are not liable under § 1983, "[i]f (1) their conduct does not violate clearly
established constitutional rights, or (2) it was objectively reasonable for them to be-
lieve that their acts did not violate those rights." Oliveira v. Mayer, 23 F.3d 642, 648
(2d Cir. 1994).
33. NEW YORK CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT PATROL GUIDE § 110-1 (1995).
34. Id. § 104-1 ("EXCESSIVE FORCE WILL NOT BE TOLERATED.")
(double emphasis in original).
35. Id. § 112-3(2).
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stance. And if plaintiffs did not sue, there would be no civil rights
judgments or settlements to deter police, indemnification or not.
A better solution compensates and deters. That can be achieved
by the following: After the jury's verdict as to liability and dam-
ages, the judge presiding over the civil rights case should determine
what portion of the judgment the city must indemnify. The court's
decision should be informed by a number of factors targeted to-
wards deterrence. An officer who is more culpable, who commits
intentional wrongdoing, or who acts brutally or with particular dis-
regard for a victim's constitutional rights, or whose behavior could
not have been anticipated or controlled by the city, should pay a
greater percentage of the judgment. This would provide the great-
est deterrent for the most egregious constitutional violations.
The court also should examine the officer's prior disciplinary his-
tory. If an officer has a history of misconduct, and received little,
no, or inadequate prior discipline from the NYPD, then the city
should indemnify a greater part of the judgment. This would put
the city on notice that its disciplinary procedures are inadequate,
and provide financial incentives to improve them. Conversely, if
an officer has a history of police misconduct, and received proper
and adequate discipline by the city, then the officer should be re-
quired to pay more of the judgment himself. This would reward
the city for instituting internal disciplinary measures to deter police
misconduct, and deter problem officers from committing miscon-
duct yet again.
Similarly, if the city did not adequately discipline the officer for
the misconduct at issue in the instant lawsuit, then the city should
be required to indemnify a greater part of the judgment. And if an
officer was properly disciplined by the city for the misconduct at
issue in the lawsuit, then the officer would be required to pay more
of the judgment himself. This again encourages the city to mete
out appropriate discipline to officers who violate the law.
Another factor for the court to consider is the defendant of-
ficer's ability to pay the judgment. It neither deters police officers,
nor benefits plaintiffs, to saddle an officer with a huge judgment
that can never be paid. The less of the judgment an officer can
afford to pay, the more the city should indemnify the officer, irre-
spective of the relative culpability of the officer and the city.
Finally, prevailing plaintiffs should always be compensated. Not-
withstanding the above factors, it should be the rare case (if any)
where the city will not indemnify a police officer at all. To guaran-
tee real compensation, the city must pay at least some portion of
20001
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the judgment. Compensation is not only a central purpose of the
civil rights laws; it induces plaintiffs to bring the very lawsuits that
deter (or should deter) the police from committing unconstitu-
tional conduct in the first instance. If, for example, a plaintiff were
the subject of particularly brutal and outrageous misconduct,36 re-
sulting in the NYPD's termination of the perpetrating officer, the
above factors (the horrible nature of the misconduct and the
NYPD's appropriate disciplinary response) would otherwise coun-
sel against indemnification. This would be unfair and cruelly
ironic-since the severe nature of the police misconduct caused the
plaintiff unusually severe damage. This final factor-the plaintiff's
right to actual compensation-would help prevent such an unfair
and unintended result. In addition, a legislative presumption
favoring the city's indemnification of at least fifty percent of the
judgment would all but ensure that plaintiffs are fairly
compensated.
Finally, the indemnification scheme should apply whether or not
the police officer acted "within the scope of his public employ-
ment," provided that the officer acted "under color of state law."
An off-duty officer shoots with an NYPD gun. An off-duty officer
is able to arrest someone because he is an NYPD police officer. It
would be shocking if the NYPD failed to discipline a police officer
for egregious misconduct committed under color of state law, even
if the officer did not act "within the scope of his public employ-
ment." Since the civil rights laws themselves prohibit unconstitu-
tional conduct committed "under color" of state law, the
indemnification statute should be calculated to deter the same.37
This entire indemnification scheme should be written into the
municipal law itself. Such a law, passed by the New York State
Legislature, would not implicate issues of either comity or federal-
36. United States v. Volpe, 78 F. Supp. 2d 76 (E.D.N.Y. 1999), affd in part, dis-
missed in part, 224 F.3d 72 (2d Cir. 2000); N.Y. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, DEFLECTING
BLAME: THE DISSENTING REPORT OF MAYOR RUDOLPH W. GIULIANI'S TASK FORCE
ON POLICE/COMMUNITY RELATIONS (March 1998), available at http://www.nyclu.org/
blamel.html.
37. We propose leaving § 50-k(2), concerning representation of officers by Corpo-
ration Counsel, as is. In addition, § 50-k(3), as it applies to settlements, would remain
unchanged under this proposal. It is simply too complicated and burdensome for a
court to make indemnification decisions where no evidence has been taken, no trial
conducted, and no determination of liability made by a jury. In order to apply the
above multi-factor test to settled cases, courts would have to hold hearings and hear
evidence concerning all of these factors-the officer's level of culpability, his intent,
his disciplinary record, etc. This would be costly for all parties and would unnecessa-
rily discourage settlement. In any event, if a police officer is to pay a portion of a
settlement, that can be part of the settlement negotiation between the parties.
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ism.38 And, as now, this state indemnification statute would apply
wherever the civil rights suit were brought-whether in state court,
or (pursuant to its supplemental jurisdiction) in federal court.
Such an indemnification scheme has many immediate advan-
tages. It places the indemnification decision in the hands of courts,
not the municipality itself, ostensibly removing political pressure
from the indemnification decision.39 Most importantly, such a law
would say loudly and clearly to every officer: "You are not insured;
you have no security that your misconduct will cost you nothing."
With the indemnification decision in the hands of courts, not city
lawyers, no officer could be at all sure that the city and the tax-
payer will foot the entire bill for violations of clearly established
constitutional law. That decision would be made-after the evi-
dence is presented, after trial, and after the jury's verdict-by a fair
and neutral arbiter. Deprived of near absolute impunity from the
financial consequences of their unconstitutional acts, police officers
will, finally, be and feel accountable for their conduct in some tan-
gible way.
Finally, such an indemnification scheme would provide police of-
ficers and the city direct incentives to deter future police miscon-
duct. It would encourage the city to discipline officers when
officers should be disciplined. It would punish the city for failing to
do so. And it would impose greater penalties for more serious mis-
conduct and for repeat offenders.
We therefore propose that, although § 50-k(3) remain un-
changed as to indemnification of settlements, the following
paragraphs concerning the city's indemnification of judgments
against police officers be added:4"
A court will determine to what extent the City must indemnify
and save harmless any of its employees employed by the New
York City Police Department in the amount of any judgment
obtained against such employees in any state or federal court,
provided the act or omission from which such judgment arose
occurred while the employee was acting under color of state law.
The court's decision shall be determined according to the fol-
lowing eight factors:
38. If a federal indemnification statute were enacted instead, the specter of a fed-
eral judge making indemnification decisions for municipalities-which are arms of the
states-could well pose such problems.
39. To the extent, of course, that judges are not influenced by political
considerations.
40. This essay takes no position as to indemnification of other city employees.
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(1) the culpability of the officer and seriousness of the of-
ficer's conduct from which the judgment arose;
(2) whether the officer committed intentional wrongdoing;
(3) whether the officer has a history of misconduct;
(4) whether the City imposed inappropriate and/or inade-
quate discipline for the officer's prior misconduct;
(5) whether the City imposed inappropriate and/or inade-
quate discipline for the officer's conduct from which the judg-
ment arose;
(6) the plaintiff's or plaintiffs' interest in receiving actual and
adequate compensation;
(7) the officer's financial ability to pay the judgment; and
(8) the interests of justice in the particular case before the
court.
The greater the culpability of the officer and seriousness of the
conduct, the more intentional the wrongdoing, and the more ex-
tensive the officer's history of misconduct, the less shall the City
indemnify the officer. Conversely, to the extent the City im-
posed inappropriate and/or inadequate discipline for the of-
ficer's prior misconduct, and to the extent the City imposed
inappropriate and/or inadequate discipline for the misconduct
that led to the judgment, the more shall the City indemnify the
officer. In applying factors six and seven, the court shall also
ensure that the plaintiff(s) always receives adequate and actual
compensation.
In addition, and notwithstanding the above factors, in order to
ensure that the plaintiff(s) receives adequate compensation,
there shall be a rebuttable presumption that the City shall in-
demnify greater than fifty-percent of the judgment.
CONCLUSION
The complex interplay between an indemnification statute that
puts the cost of police misconduct on taxpayers, political pressure
by powerful police unions, and plaintiffs' (and plaintiffs lawyers')
desire for the municipal deep pocket, conspire to strip the civil
rights laws of any meaningful deterrent effect. Until the above-
proposed or some similar measure is put into place, § 1983 will
benefit only the civil rights bar and those few victims of unconstitu-
tional conduct brave enough to sue the NYPD. But if and when
such a measure is enacted, the civil rights laws may better serve
their core purpose: preventing unconstitutional conduct from oc-
curring at all.
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HOW DO WE REDUCE CRIME AND
PRESERVE HUMAN DECENCY?
THE ROLE OF LEADERSHIP IN POLICING
FOR A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY
Benjamin B. Tucker*
INTRODUCTION
The issue of crime reduction and prevention has been on the so-
cial, political, and economic agenda of modern America for more
than a century.1 During the final quarter of the twentieth century,
a new cadre of well-educated and forward-thinking police leaders
implemented innovative approaches to crime and other problems
affecting the quality of life in communities across the country and
sparked a revolution of sorts in policing strategy. We enter the
new millennium having witnessed record and sustained reductions
in serious crime and significant progress toward reinventing our
police departments through a ground swell of innovation in polic-
ing centered on community-policing theories.
True progress, however, is in the eye of the beholder. Many in
minority communities would question just how far we have come.
During the last decade, this country experienced startling and dis-
turbing displays of police brutality and corruption.2 These inci-
dents of misconduct have prompted vigorous inquiry into policing
* Benjamin B. Tucker is an Associate Professor at Pace University. Previously,
he was the Deputy Director of Operations, U.S Department of Justice, Office of
Community Oriented Policing Services, Chief of Operations in the Office of the Man-
hattan Borough President, First Deputy Commissioner/Executive Director of the
New York City Human Rights Commission, and Assistant Director of the New York
City Police Department Civilian Complaint Review Board. He was also the Director
of Field Operations at the Center on Addiction and Substance Abuse at Columbia
University, and a New York City police officer. The author received his B.S. degree
from the John Jay College of Criminal Justice and his J.D. from Fordham University
School of Law.
1. For example, Theodore Roosevelt, faced with slums, a rising crime rate, and a
corrupt police force, "brought a reforming zeal to the New York City Police Commis-
sion in 1895 and set the standard for the modern NYPD." POLICE DEP'T OF THE CITY
OF N.Y., WHO WE ARE, at http://ci.nyc.ny.us/html/whoweare.html.
2. Consider, for example, the cases of Abner Louima, Amadou Diallo, and Pat-
rick Dorismond. E.g., Editorial, New York's Police Commissioner, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
10, 2000, at A20 (discussing how the police torture of Abner Louima and the shoot-
ings of two unarmed black men, Amadou Diallo and Patrick Dorismond, "raised
questions about training, reporting of violations and the expansion of independent
street crime units ... ").
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practices across the United States. The United States Commission
on Civil Rights has investigated whether the New York City Police
Department is engaging in "a pattern or practice of conduct...
that deprives persons of rights, privileges, or immunities secured or
protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States."3 Ac-
cording to some commentators:
Unquestionably, policing in the United States is under extensive
criticism today. Its credibility is under major attack and nearly
every month another incident involving excessive force or cor-
ruption receives national coverage. The excessive force incidents
have been particularly damaging to the image and reputation of
law enforcement in this free and democratic society.4
Allegations of racial profiling, perjury by police officials, and
other patterns and practices suggestive of police misconduct reveal
the grim reality that our society remains in crisis with respect to
police-community relations. All of this threatens to undermine the
"progressive changes that have taken place ... dealing with [the]
structure and function [of police organizations,] ... technological
advances, and those involved with the recent emphasis on integrity
and ethics."5 Indeed, strained relations between the police and mi-
nority communities have historically been among the most well-
documented and difficult urban problems to solve. The problem
has been especially acute in the relationship between the police
and the African American community, and more recently has man-
ifested itself in similar ways between the police and the Hispanic
community.
3. 42 U.S.C. § 14141 (2000). The United States Commission on Civil Rights, orig-
inally created under the Civil Rights Act of 1957, is an independent, bipartisan fact-
finding agency of the Executive Branch. For information on the Commission, see
http://www.usccr.gov/index.html. The Civil Rights Act of 1983 established a new Com-
mission. Id. In August 2000, the Commission released a report entitled Police Prac-
tices and Civil Rights in New York City based on a May 26, 1999 hearing on the impact
of police practices on civil rights in the community. Letter from Mary Frances Berry,
Chairperson, Unites States Commission on Civil Rights, to The President, The Presi-
dent of the Senate, and the Speaker of the House of Representatives, http://www.
usccr.gov/nypolprc/tran.htm. The Commission expressed "a strong interest in studying
the methods used by the city to balance crime fighting with the exercise of appropri-
ate restraint, particularly following the highly publicized tragedies involving Abner
Louima and Amadou Diallo." Id. For a response by the New York City Police De-
partment, see N. Y.P.D. Response to the Draft Report of the United States Commission
on Civil Rights-Police Practices and Civil Rights in New York City, available at http://
www.ci.nyc.ny.us/html/nypd/pdf/dclm/execsumm.pdf.
4. CLEMENS BARTOLLAS & LARRY D. HAHN, POLICING IN AMERICA 341 (1999).
5. Id.
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Significant data exist regarding citizens' attitudes toward police.
Although the findings have been consistent, they have not been
favorable. Analyzing public opinion polls conducted since the
1960s, Tuch and Weitzer found that well publicized incidents of po-
lice brutality temporarily lead to lessened support for police on
both a local and national level.6 Although both blacks' and whites'
views are affected, blacks' support of the police is more likely to
erode; and "well publicized brutality incidents have greater longev-
ity for blacks and Latinos than for whites."' 7 Others have shown
that significant differences exist in the attitudes toward the police
of various racial and ethnic groups. For example, Samuel Walker,
analyzing Bureau of Justice statistics, notes that while 22% of Afri-
can Americans had "very little or no confidence in the police,"
only 9% of whites agreed.8 Polls focusing on Hispanics as a distinct
group have determined that their views "fall somewhere between
those of whites and African Americans."9 In September 2000, a
survey of city residents, commissioned by the New York City
Council, offered further insight into "the city's paradoxical rela-
tionship with its police force . ,x"10 The poll revealed:
[T]hat residents unequivocally appreciate the department's role
in rolling back crime but are suspicious of its tactics, its attitudes
and its commitment to disciplining brutal or corrupt officers.
The poll also found that the department had significantly greater
support from white residents than from blacks or Hispanics,
many of whom reported being afraid or concerned when ap-
proached by the police."
By almost any measure, people of color feel a lack of trust in and
respect for, as well as a high level of fear of, the police. One need
only recall the string of high-profile cases involving police en-
counters with blacks and Hispanics resulting in death or serious
injury to the citizens.'" These incidents eroded the general public's
confidence in the police, while specifically raising the level of ten-
sion in police-minority community contacts. At the same time, the
6. Steven A. Tuch & Ronald Weitzer, Racial Differences in Attitudes Toward the
Police, 61 PUB. OPINION Q. 642, 647-48 (1997).
7. Id.
8. SAMUEL WALKER, THE POLICE IN AMERICA: AN INTRODUCTION 215 (3d ed.
1999) (citing BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE
STATISTICS 1995, at 133 (1996)).
9. Id.
10. C. J. Chivers, Approval and Wariness in Poll on Police, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15,
2000, at B9.
11. Id.
12. See supra note 2.
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police feel that they are often under-appreciated by the community
and that any public scrutiny of their actions is undeserved. These
conditions do not bode well for the future of police-community re-
lations in our country.
However, without greatly improved police-community relations,
the significant reductions in crime we have achieved, especially
those gains driven by community-policing strategies, will not be
sustained. Continuing to institutionalize police department re-
forms and successful policing strategies, and strengthening police-
community relations, will require innovative and sustained police
and political leadership.
WHAT HISTORY HAS TAUGHT US
Little more than thirty years have passed since I joined the ranks
of the New York City Police Department. The Knapp Commission
was about to begin its investigation into police corruption, sparked
by allegations made by police officer Frank Serpico, who broke the
"blue wall of silence. ' ' 13 Crime was on the rise and would reach
record highs before finally leveling off almost twenty years later.
It was November 1969, and a year before, the Omnibus Crime
Control and Safe Streets Act of 196814 was passed by Congress to
address the rise in crime. Among its formidable contributions, the
Act established the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration
("LEAA"). LEAA was charged with implementing a comprehen-
sive program of aid to state and local criminal justice agencies, with
a particular emphasis on street crime and riot control. In 1973, a
report published by the American Bar Association, Standards Re-
lating to the Urban Police Function, offered further insights into the
complex role of police in our society.15 It noted "that police of-
ficers were primarily peacekeepers rather than crime fighters: They
spent most of their time maintaining order rather than fighting
crime."' 6 From that point forward, the face of policing in our ur-
ban centers, and to a lesser extent in other areas of the country,
would change forever.
13. WHITMAN KNAPP, KNAPP COMMISSION REPORT ON POLICE CORRUPTION
(1972).
14. Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 197 (codified in scattered section of 18 U.S.C. and
42 U.S.C.).
15. WALKER, supra note 8, at 35-36 (citing AM. BAR Ass'N, STANDARDS RELAT-
ING TO THE URBAN POLICE FUNCTION (2d ed. 1980)).
16. Id.
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This transformation was driven by recommendations from ap-
pointed bodies such as the President's Commission on Law En-
forcement and Administration of Justice, and its report, The
Challenge of Crime in a Free Society, 7 as well as the National Ad-
visory Commission on Civil Disorders, and its "Kerner Commis-
sion" report 8 and the National Commission on the Causes and
Prevention of Violence.' 9 These reports highlighted problems with
the way police departments were run and the manner in which they
carried out policing functions. The reports noted, among other
things, that the police had "[p]aid too little attention to effective
organization[; g]iven inadequate attention to community issues and
concerns[; n]ot seriously considered preventive or less coercive
strategies to deal with civil disorder and[; n]ot explored alternative
strategies to deal with violence."2 Moreover, they suggested that
police needed to affect changes in "[t]he quality of police person-
nel[; t]he quality of officer preparation and training[; t]he manage-
ment structure within law enforcement agencies[; h]ow the police
relate to the community[; h]ow the police deliver services to the
community and[; h]ow the police define their responsibilities."'2 1
In response to these criticisms, some police administrators and
managers began to look for solutions to problems and answers to
questions that now challenged their traditional policing practices.
Motivated to meet the challenge and further driven by the anti-
crime initiatives of the Johnson, Nixon, and Ford administrations-
and supported by significant federal funding from LEAA-police
17. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT & ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, U.S.
DEP'T OF JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY (1967).
18. NAT'L. ADVISORY COMM'N ON CIVIL DISORDER, REPORT OF THE NATIONAL
ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS (1968). The Commission is popularly
known as the "Kerner Commission," named after its Chair, Governor Otto Kerner.
19. DAVID L. CARTER & LOUIS RADELET, THE POLICE AND THE COMMUNITY 55
(6th ed. 1999) (citing NAT'L COMM'N ON CAUSES AND PREVENTION OF VIOLENCE,
LAW AND ORDER RECONSIDERED 292 (1969) [hereinafter CARTER & RADELET],
[There] is an evident inability of the police, as presently organized, manned
[sic] financed, equipped, and led, to meet effectively any of the demands and
expectations placed on them by the public. These inadequacies are evi-
denced in their inability to prevent a crime; their declining record in solving
crimes known to them; their sluggish response to and indifferent investiga-
tion of all but major crimes or those involving important persons, businesses
or institutions. Particularly evident is the inability to deal effectively with
crime in minority-populated ghettos for reasons, which involve [considering]
minority group attitudes and non-cooperation as important as police atti-
tudes, facilities, and efficiency.
Id.
20. CARTER & RADELET, supra note 19, at 55.
21. Id. at 55.
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leaders began to implement changes. Thus, in the 1970s and 1980s,
police departments in a number of large2 2 and small cities2 3 began
to experiment with new ways of providing police services and fight-
ing crime.
Research flourished and played a critical role in helping law en-
forcement officers test traditional assumptions about police opera-
tions, organization, management, and deployment. Findings from
key studies including the Kansas City Preventive Patrol Experiment
(1974),24 the Kansas City Response Time Experiment (1976),25 the
Newark Foot Patrol Experiment,26 and the Newport News Problem-
Oriented Policing studies in the 1980s27 were all extremely useful to
law enforcement officials.
But perhaps the most important driving force behind effective
change and the improvement of management, administration, and
operations in policing has been the leadership of more progressive
police administrators who understood the importance and value of
exploring new crime-prevention and crime-fighting strategies. In
addition to funding provided by the federal government, these po-
lice chiefs and command staff received financial support for these
reform efforts from such professional organizations as the Police
22. Richard A. Leo, The Impact of Miranda Revisited, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOL-
OGY 621, 637 (1996) (noting that what people call "big city" police departments typi-
cally serve 100,000 people or more).
23. Lewis D. Solomon, Local Currency: A Legal And Policy Analysis, 5 KAN. J.L.
& PUB. POL'Y 59, 71 (1996) ("[S]mall cities (in the range of 50,000 - 100,000) typically
outperform larger ones in a number of social variables, including crime, health,
mental illness, recreation, education, and higher participation in cultural matters.").
24. CARTER & RADELET, supra note 19, at 87 (citing GEORGE L KELLING ET AL.,
THE KANSAS CITY PREVENTIVE EXPERIMENT: TECHNICAL REPORT (1974)).
25. CARTER & RADELET, supra note 19, at 87 (citing KANSAS CITY, MISSOURI
POLICE DEP'T., RESPONSE TIME ANALYSIS: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY (1977)).
26. CARTER & RADALET, supra note 19, at 88 (citing GEORGE L. KELLING, PO-
LICE FOUNDATION, THE NEWARK FOOT PATROL EXPERIMENT (1981)).
27. CARTER & RADALET, supra note 19, at 88 (citing JOHN ECK & WILLIAM SPEL-
MAN ET AL., PROBLEM SOLVING: PROBLEM ORIENTED POLICING IN NEWPORT NEWS
(1987)).
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Foundation,28 the Police Executive Research Forum,29 and the In-
ternational Association of Chiefs of Police.3°
The "reform period" in policing,3' which began in the 1930s, had
clearly stagnated as we entered the 1970s. However, the 1970s
marked a rebirth of reform and a transition to a more community-
based mode of operation. Many felt significant excitement and
high expectations about the future of policing because of this
transition.
CHANGE FOR THE BETrER
Over the next thirty years, law enforcement would undergo great
progress and development on several levels within the policing pro-
fession. The composition and practices of police departments
would begin to change.
A. Racial Diversity of Police Departments Increases
Civil rights advocates, who had long expressed concern over the
limited representation of minorities in urban police departments,
would witness positive shifts in the racial composition of police de-
partments. By 1993, the majority of officers in Detroit, Washing-
ton, D.C., and Atlanta were African American.32 By the same time
28. The Police Foundation was established in 1970 with assistance from the Ford
Foundation. From 1970 through 1990, the Police Foundation sponsored what would be
some of the most significant police research in the history of policing in this country.
E.g., CMTY. POLICING CONSORTIUM, ABOUT THE CONSORTIUM, at http://www.com-
munitypolicing.org/aboutl.html (last visited Nov. 24, 2000).
29. The Police Executive Research Forum ("PERF") is a national organization of
police executives representing larger jurisdictions. Its mission is to improve the pro-
fessional quality of police services through the use of research and development.
PERF is based in Washington, D.C. Id.
30. The International Association of Chiefs of Police is a professional organization
of top law enforcement executives from the United States and abroad. It facilitates
"the exchange of information among police administrators [and promotes] the highest
standards of performance and conduct within the police profession." Id.
31. The "reform period" refers to the period in American policing which marked
the efforts of police administrators to move away from police corruption towards the
professionalization of policing. It was prompted by the findings and recommendations
of the National Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement, also known as the
Wickersham Commission. REPORT OF THE NAT'L COMM'N ON LAW OBSERVANCE &
ENFORCEMENT RELATIVE TO THE FACTS AS TO THE ENFORCEMENT, THE BENEFITS,
AND THE ABUSES UNDER THE PROHIBITION LAWS, BOTH BEFORE AND SINCE THE
ADOPTION OF THE EIGHTEENTH AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION, ENFORCEMENT
OF THE PROHIBITION LAWS IN THE UNITED STATES, H.R. Doc No. 722 (3d Sess. 1931)
(discussing the abuses arising from the enforcement of Prohibition laws). Police ad-
ministrators placed strong emphasis on training and focused on making the police
more efficient in their crime fighting efforts.
32. WALKER, supra note 8, at 37.
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in Miami, 47.7% of the police force was Hispanic, while African
Americans constituted 17.4% of that force.33 Furthermore, Afri-
can Americans moved into important leadership roles as police
chiefs in cities such as New York City, Los Angeles, Atlanta, Chi-
cago, and Houston. 34
B. Women Rise Through the Ranks
Women, who were historically underrepresented in policing, in-
creased their numbers in police departments due to the passage of
the 1964 Civil Rights Act, which prohibited employment discrimi-
nation on the basis of sex.35 Today, women represent about 13% of
police officers in big city departments.36 Female officers are now
assigned the same duties as male officers, including routine patrol
duties. Additionally, departments have tried to eliminate many of
the barriers to recruiting women, 37 and as a result, women have
risen to the highest levels of policing. For example, a former stu-
dent of mine, a recruit in the New York City Police Academy class
of 1979, is now an assistant chief and former patrol borough com-
mander in the Bronx. I like to think that, in some small way, she
and her fellow recruits were influenced during their careers by my
insistence that the police officer's role is not simply to enforce the
letter of the law, but to temper application of the law with common
sense, respect, and consideration for the people he or she serves.
C. Training Improves
Police training has advanced, with entry-level training growing
from 300 hours in the 1960s to more than 1000 hours in many de-
partments by the 1990s. 3s At the same time, many departments
have instituted field training as an adjunct to their traditional acad-
emy training, offering practical, hands-on guidance by experienced
officers to new recruits.39
Of critical importance, new policies and procedures were insti-
tuted to check police behavior on the street. Police departments
developed standard operating procedures to shape and control the
exercise of police discretion. This policy shift was prompted by an
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 20003-2(a) (1999) (enacted July 2, 1964).
36. WALKER, supra note 8, at 37 (citing SUSAN E. MARTIN, THE POLICE FOUND.,
WOMEN ON THE MOVE: THE STATUS OF WOMEN IN POLICING (1990)).
37. WALKER, supra note 8, at 37.
38. Id.
39. Id.
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increase in lawsuits and driven significantly by Supreme Court de-
cisions on such police practices as search and seizure 40 and interro-
gations,41 but also by protests from the minority community
concerning police misconduct, particularly the use of deadly
force.42 For example, an innovative policy instituted in 1972 by the
New York City Police Department reduced firearms discharges by
officers by 30%, a significant decrease in the use of deadly force.43
Over the next decade, as police departments in other cities adopted
similar policies, the national rate of citizens shot and killed by po-
lice decreased by 50%. 44
D. Overcoming Institutional Resistance to Change
However, police unions made strides as well, and "by the 1970s
* . . had established themselves as a powerful force in American
policing. ' 45 Many officers felt "angry and alienated over Supreme
Court rulings, criticisms by civil rights groups, poor salaries and
benefits, and arbitrary disciplinary practices by police chiefs."
46
Unions secured salary and benefits increases for officers and won
grievance procedures to protect officers' rights during disciplinary
40. E.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). Terry confirmed that courts must guard
against harassing behavior that violates Fourth Amendment protections against un-
reasonable search and seizure, and that, whenever practical, police must obtain prior
judicial approval of searches and seizures through the warrant procedure. Id. at 15-21.
However, Terry also permits police, when using proper procedure, to conduct limited
searches of suspects' outer clothing as a means of discovering if the suspect has weap-
ons that might be used to assault the officer. Id. at 27, 30.
41. E.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (holding that statements ob-
tained from defendants during incommunicado interrogation in police-dominated at-
mosphere, without full warning of constitutional rights, were presumptively
compelled and therefore inadmissible as having been obtained in violation of Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination). Miranda also indicated what law
enforcement could do to overcome this presumption of coercion: the giving and con-
scientious heeding of a set of four warnings. Id. at 467-72. Although Congress chal-
lenged Miranda by establishing voluntariness as the touchstone of the admissibility of
confessions in federal court, 18 U.S.C. § 3501 (2000), Miranda was recently upheld by
Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000) (holding that Miranda announced a
constitutional decision of the Court that Congress could not supersede by statute).
42. Former New York City Police Officer James J. Fyfe's research made particu-
larly noteworthy progress with respect to the use of deadly force. See, e.g., JEROME H.
SKOLNICK & JAMES J. FYFE, ABOVE THE LAW: POLICE AND THE EXCESSIVE USE OF
FORCE (1993); James J. Fyfe, Who Shoots?-A Look at Officer, Race and Police Shoot-
ing, 9 J. POLICE SCI. & ADMIN. 367 (1981).
43. WALKER, supra note 8, at 38 (citing James J. Fyfe, Administrative Interventions
on Police Shooting Discretion: An Empirical Analysis, 7 J. CRIM. JUST. 309 (1979)).
44. WALKER, supra note 8, at 38.
45. Id. (citing HERVEY A. JURIS & PETER FEUILLE, POLICE UNIONS (1973)).
46. WALKER, supra note 8, at 38.
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hearings.47 These unions, with their new power within the profes-
sion, made police reformers uneasy because unions tended to "re-
sist innovations and [become] particularly hostile to attempts to
improve police-community relations. '4 8
Notwithstanding their growing influence and enormous impact
on police administration, police unions did not fare well in their
battle to avoid the onset of the citizen review process.
E. Citizen Review
Civil rights groups favored citizen review of police actions in or-
der to address concerns "that minority citizens were the victims of
systemic police abuse and that police departments did not investi-
gate complaints or discipline officers. '49
While serving as assistant director of the New York City Police
Department Civilian Complaint Review Board ("CCRB"), I had
the opportunity to witness personally the Patrolmen's Benevolent
Association's ("PBA") opposition to change. I had been ap-
pointed by then Police Commissioner Robert J. McGuire, on the
eve of the first in a series of congressional hearings, examining
charges of police brutality.50 For the next three-and-one-half years,
working as principal deputy to Charles J. Adams, the executive di-
rector, I helped to revise management practices and policies, and
to strengthen the investigations process. We met strong opposition
from the PBA even though we kept its leadership informed of pro-
spective changes in board policy that had an impact on their mem-
bers. On more than one occasion, we prevailed in our efforts to
exercise our management prerogative to implement policies, such
as making available to precinct commanding officers the CCRB
records of certain officers under their command for whom they
were accountable. Although the establishment of citizen oversight
of police practices was slow, it grew steadily through the 1970s and
1980s, and by the 1990s, a citizen review process existed in many of
our big cities.
47. Id.
48. WALKER, supra note 8, at 38.
49. Id. at 39.
50. Representative John Conyers Jr., then chair of the House Subcommittee on
Criminal Justice, conducted hearings on police brutality in New York in November
1983. E.g., Sam Roberts, Koch Defends Police at Hearing on Brutality, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 29, 1983, at Al.
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A CRITICAL INNOVATION: THE RISE OF COMMUNITY POLICING
The rise of community-policing strategies in the last two decades
of the twentieth century is the most important and promising new
development in policing for a democratic society. There is little
doubt that by the 1980s, the police profession found itself adrift. It
was still reeling from the cumulative effects of the 1960s: the civil
rights movement; the assassinations of President John F. Kennedy,
Dr. Martin Luther King, and Senator Robert F. Kennedy; riots in
inner-city communities across the country; protests against the Vi-
etnam War; and landmark Supreme Court decisions redefining po-
lice policy and procedures. This period of social upheaval was
followed by the 1970s, during which research findings such as the
Kansas City Preventive Patrol Experiment51 shattered the long
standing assumption that random police patrols deterred crime.
Policing had become "an occupation in search of a [new]
strategy. 52
By the 1980s, that strategy had arrived in the form of community
policing. The community-policing philosophy is grounded in the
thesis that officers who shed their traditional crime-fighter role,
and work more closely with neighborhood citizens to develop pro-
grams and strategies to solve problems, can more effectively ad-
dress crime and related issues affecting the community. Hence,
community partnership and problem solving took center stage as
the new core strategy.
Solid empirical support for community policing is found in the
seminal article, The Police and Neighborhood Safety: Broken Win-
dows.53 Authors James Q. Wilson and George L. Kelling explained
that foot patrol had only limited deterrent effect on crime.54 The
research also suggested that police could not fight crime by them-
selves but were very dependent upon citizens for information.
Furthermore, police could reduce fear by concentrating on less se-
rious quality of life problems. 56 The nearly universal acceptance of
this theory in academia set the stage for police chiefs, elected offi-
51. COMMUNITY POLICING: CLASSICAL READINGS 49 (Willard Oliver, ed. 2000).
52. George L. Kelling, Forward to COMMUNITY POLICING: CLASSICAL READINGS,
at ix (Willard Oliver, ed. 2000).
53. James Q. Wilson & George L. Kelling, The Police and Neighborhood Safety:
Broken Windows, ATLArrIC MONTHLY, Mar. 1982, at 29-38.
54. Id. at 29.
55. Id. at 34-35 (describing situations in which citizens pass along information
about neighborhood crimes to officers engaged in community policing).
56. Id. at 32-33 (describing the effect of disorder in the streets on the community's
fear of crime).
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cials, and community leaders to act, implementing community po-
licing strategies that appeared to offer meaningful solutions to
endemic problems and concerns that had previously seemed
insurmountable.
From the perspective of police leaders, the "Broken Windows"
rationale is clearly rooted in the lessons of the past quarter century.
Changes in demographics and strains on limited police budgets in
the face of increasing violence and drug use in neighborhoods were
a major inducement for government and citizens alike to share the
responsibility for keeping communities safe. As a driver of change,
community policing shared the spotlight with Herman Goldstein's
concept of "Problem Oriented Policing," which asserts that instead
of treating crime and disorder as general categories, the police
should identify and focus on specific problems such as chronic al-
coholics in the neighborhood, or abandoned buildings that served
as drug houses. 57
A number of police departments around the country embraced
community policing and set about testing various strategies based
on the theory. Each of them adopted the spirit and tenor of the
philosophy, yet explored its own way of assessing problems and
implementing solutions. By the late 1980s, community-based polic-
ing had caught on and was generating a renewed confidence
throughout the profession. George Kelling correctly argued that "a
quiet revolution is reshaping American policing."58 Indeed, a new
era had begun. What Kelling termed a "quiet revolution" soon
counted among its revolutionaries law enforcement officials from
departments in the smallest villages and the largest of big cities. In
addition, the five principal professional police organizations-the
International Association of Chiefs of Police ("IACP"), the Na-
tional Organization of Black Law Enforcement Executives ("NO-
BLE"), the National Sheriffs Association ("NSA"), the Police
Executive Research Forum ("PERF"), and the Police Founda-
tion-also saw the potential of community policing.5 9 Even as
many in the policing profession found it difficult to move away
from what had been the traditional reactive crime fighting role,
57. Herman Goldstein, Improving Policing: A Problem-Oriented Approach, 25
CRIME & DELINQUENCY 236, 244-47 (1979).
58. George L. Kelling, Police and Communities: The Quiet Revolution, in COMMU-
NITY POLICING 60 (Willard Oliver ed. 1988).
59. The Community Policing Consortium, a partnership of these five organiza-
tions, was created and funded in 1993 by the U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of
Justice Assistance ("BJA"). Responsibility for the Consortium was transferred from
BJA to the Office of Community Oriented Policing Services ("COPS") in 1995.
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other, more visionary police leaders saw the opportunity for police
to become more proactive, working in partnership with the com-
munity to find solutions to the underlying causes of crime.
The Community Policing Consortium offered the following per-
spective with respect to the scope of community policing:
Community policing is democracy in action. It requires the ac-
tive participation of local government, civic and business lead-
ers, public and private agencies, residents, churches, schools,
and hospitals. All who share a concern for the welfare of the
neighborhood should bear responsibility for safeguarding that
welfare .... [R]esearch reveal[s] that community institutions are
the first line of defense against disorder and crime .... Thus it is
essential that the police work closely with all facets of the com-
munity to identify concerns and to find the most effective
solutions.6 °
Over the past one hundred years, "American police departments
changed from inefficient and corrupt political enterprises to enter-
prises with a nonpartisan professional mission. ' 61 There have been
significant "improvements in personnel standards and systems of
accountability, including the values of due process and equal pro-
tection" during the last thirty years.62 The experience of the past
decades has produced a vast amount of research about policing and
has promoted a "new candor about police discretion and about the
limits of the police's ability to control crime."'63 There is now no
question that "police [today] are remarkably open to innovation
and experimentation. 64
While these changes were occurring in police departments, a
number of mayors, city managers, and community groups began to
recognize the advantages for community-based collaboration of-
fered by community policing. There are myriad instances in which
the support from one or more of these three groups has validated
the importance of community policing and problem solving in local
neighborhoods. Notable examples include Madison, Wisconsin,
where Police Chief David C. Couper pioneered the restructuring of
his department, placing strong emphasis on organizational change
through leadership and training designed, among other things, to
60. CM-Y. POLICING CONSORTIUM, UNDERSTANDING COMMUNITY POLICING: A
FRAMEWORK FOR ACTION, TRACING THE ROOTS OF COMMUNITY POLICING, at http://
www.communitypolicing.org/chap2fw.html.
61. WALKER, supra note 8, at 40.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. (quoting DAVID H. BAYLEY, POLICE FOR THE FUTURE 101 (1994)).
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emphasize a customer orientation and focus toward citizens;65 San
Diego, California, where Police Chief Bob Burgreen introduced
the problem-oriented approach to policing in the fall of 1989;66 Se-
attle, Washington, where the police chief, supported by the newly
elected mayor, became a partner in support of the South Seattle
Crime Prevention Committee in its efforts to address public safety
and crime related problems; 67 and Portland, Oregon, where Police
Chief Tom Potter and citizen groups prevailed in getting the City
Council to pass resolutions adopting community policing as the
new approach to address the public safety concerns of neighbor-
hoods and businesses.68
By 1992, the climate was right to reinforce the notion that com-
munity policing was a viable option in the attack on serious crime
in the country. Crime was a prominent issue in the presidential
campaign, and if the idea of putting 100,000 additional officers on
the streets had strong appeal, then linking this idea to the commu-
nity-policing philosophy was sure to be a winner among many po-
lice executives and academics interested in policing. Community
groups seeking opportunities to work in partnership with the police
applauded proposed federal legislation to support these ideas.
By the summer of 1994, President Clinton had succeeded in se-
curing the passage of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforce-
ment Act of 1994,69 from which the Office of Community Oriented
Policing Services ("COPS") program was born. The COPS pro-
gram had the following goals: (1) increase the number of officers
deployed in American communities, (2) foster problem solving and
interaction with communities by police officers, (3) encourage in-
novation in policing, and (4) develop new technologies for assisting
in reducing crime and its consequences.7 ° This was an ambitious
undertaking, and the authorizing language creating the program
would require the COPS office to accomplish these goals in just six
years, with a budget of $8.8 billion.71 The police were ready and
COPS funding would serve as the catalyst for change.
65. DANIEL E. LUNGREN, CRIME PREVENTION CTR., ATTORNEY GEN'S OFFICE,
CALIFORNIA DEP'T OF JUSTICE, COMMUNITY ORIENTED POLICING & PROBLEM SOLV-
ING 67 (1992).
66. Id. at 77.
67. Id. at 113.
68. Id. at 60.
69. 42 U.S.C. § 14141 (1994).
70. Jeffrey A. Roth & Joseph F. Ryan, The COPS Program After 4 Years-Na-
tional Evaluation, RES. IN BRIEF (Nat'l Inst. of Just., Wash., D.C.), Aug. 2000, at 1.
71. "The 1994 Crime Act provided COPS with $8.8 billion and six years to fund
the addition of community oriented policing officers and advance community policing
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LESSONS FROM THE PAST CAN HELP US SURVIVE THE FUTURE
Six years have passed since the COPS office began providing re-
sources to state and local police and sheriffs' departments. Crime
rates have continued to hold at record lows. 72 The number of re-
ported index crimes has declined by 16% nationwide since 1995.73
One of the most visible and dramatic reductions in crime occurred
in New York City. Mayor Giuliani, citing figures from the Mayor's
Management Report for fiscal year 2000, noted that despite its sta-
tus as the nation's largest city, New York ranked 165th in per cap-
ita crime among 217 cities with populations exceeding 100,000. 71
He noted further that crimes in the seven major categories fell
7.8%, continuing a pattern over the last eight years.75
However, although the crime data tell a positive story, one need
only recall the brutal assault on Abner Louima, and the deaths of
Amadou Diallo and Patrick Dorismond, to know that there is
much work to be done. Indeed, as a colleague, Jeremy Travis,
noted in a recent article, "[i]t is the best of times and worst of times
for the New York Police Department. '7 6 Travis underscored the
tenuous state of police-community relations, particularly police-mi-
nority relations, in New York City.77 He offered, for the considera-
tion of city leaders, lessons learned from "innovative studies
tested" across the country on how they might help in addressing
police-community tensions.78 These included: (1) soliciting "the
public's views of police performance through regular, independent
surveys"; (2) "publish[ing] regular independent surveys of police
nationwide." OFFICE OF CMTY. ORIENTED POLICING SERVS., ATTORNEY GENERAL'S
REPORT TO CONGRESS 4 (Sept. 2000).
72. See FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, CRIME IN THE UNITES STATES 1998:
UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS 6 (1999) (reporting that crime rates in 1998 were the low-
est since 1973), available at http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/Cius 98/98crime/98ciusOl.pdf.
73. E.g., FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, CRIME IN THE UNITES STATES 1999:
UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS 7 fig.2.2 (2000) (showing a decrease in index crimes be-
tween 1995 and 1999 of 16.1%, and a decrease in the rate of index crimes per 100,000
inhabitants of 19.1%), available at http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/Cius-99/99crime/99cius.pdf.
"The Crime Index is composed of selected offenses used to gauge fluctuations in the
overall volume and rate of crime reported to law enforcement" and includes such
offenses as murder, non-negligent manslaughter, forcible rape, robbery and aggra-
vated assault, and the property crimes of burglary, larceny-theft, motor vehicle theft,
and arson. Id.
74. Eric Lipton, Giuliani Gives Status Report With Peaks And Few Dips, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 15, 2000, at B9.
75. Id.
76. Jeremy Travis, Policing Police Misconduct: The next NYPD commissioner can
learn from the best new tactics from across the nation, N.Y. POST, Aug. 14, 2000, at 2.
77. Id.
78. Id.
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officers to get a firm sense of officer morale and the pressures of
the job"; (3) and [conducting] "ongoing, independent audits of crit-
ical police functions, including crime reports, enforcement actions
and responses to 911 calls."79
Such suggestions, however, are valuable only to the extent that
the leaders to whom they are directed are willing to acknowledge
that a problem exists, are open to the possibilities for change, and
are genuinely committed to resolution. I have worked with police
chiefs and mayors alike who recognized that police-community
tensions existed in their cities. They were dedicated to finding
common ground and seeking lasting solutions with a view towards
improving police-community relations.
It may sound like a clichd to state that one must lead by exam-
ple. However, in my experience, it is absolutely essential that po-
lice administrators, mayors, and others in leadership roles do
exactly that. It is not enough for leaders to hire more officers, buy
better equipment, or improve technology. Our leaders must show
that they have strong values, ethics, integrity, and respect for and
commitment to all of the people they serve. At the same time, they
must ensure that police officers and civilian workers in the agencies
they lead are aware of the values the administrators hold, and
know that everyone in the organization is expected to live by them.
Those in leadership positions must be sensitive to citizens' con-
cerns as well. They must anticipate potential problems arising from
the use of certain law enforcement strategies and police practices
that may be viewed by segments of the community as having an
adverse impact on them, thus eroding community support for the
police. Leaders must be open to engaging in regular communica-
tion and candid discussions with the community on a regular basis
and, most importantly, during times of crisis.
In his book, Turnaround: How America's Top Cop Reversed the
Crime Epidemic, former New York City Police Commissioner Wil-
liam Bratton, who served during the early Giuliani administration,
observed "[h]ow ironic [it would be] if the police, [who are] per-
ceived in many neighborhoods to be part of the problem, turned
out to be in the forefront of a movement toward understanding and
resolution."80 There is no irony in this statement at all. The police
must take the lead in resolving these conflicts. As Bratton ex-
plains, "American policing can and must be an essential and signifi-
79. Id.
80. WILLIAM BRATrON & PETER KNOBLER, TURNAROUND: How AMERICA'S Top
Cop REVERSED THE CRIME EPIDEMIC 311 (1998).
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cant force in addressing the issues of race and police behavior. '81
But to achieve these goals, "it is essential that police identify and
train new leaders. '8 2 Moreover, the training should reinforce the
notion that those who take the oath to serve have a duty to conduct
themselves as professionals. We need a continuing commitment to
changing both the formal and informal processes that influence the
conduct of our police. I believe that the social contract between
the public and the police requires nothing less.
We remain at a crossroads with respect to police-community re-
lations and, in particular, police-minority relations, in New York
City and elsewhere in this country. Extraordinary leadership and
commitment, especially by police executives and police unions, will
be required to improve relations with communities of color. But
with the support of mayors, city managers, city councils, and others
from the public and private sectors, police departments will be en-
couraged to seek and find solutions. Although we tend to focus on
these issues at times of crisis, the problem is systemic, and it de-
serves focused and interdisciplinary attention from every sector of
our community. We cannot afford to hope that the next crisis or
tragedy resulting from a police-community interaction will happen
in some other city, on some other leader's watch. The fact is that,
while these incidents have geographic boundaries, the media en-
sures that reports of their occurrence reach us everywhere in real
time. This has the effect of making localized crises national crises.
The effect is cumulative, and each new event feeds and reinforces
concerns that police conduct is largely motivated by racial and
other biases, fueling a suspicion that police overreach in the name
of legitimate law enforcement.
In the words of former New York City Police Department chief
of personnel, my colleague and good friend Mike Julian, "We tell
cops not do the wrong thing; we need to show them how to do the
right thing. '83
81. Id. at 312.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 313.
I A
REBELLIOUS OR REGNANT: POLICE
BRUTALITY LAWYERING IN
NEW YORK CITY
Jessica A. Rose*
C'mon it's no great news: Means do prefigure ends.'
INTRODUCTION
"What might a rebellious law office look like? Turn loose your
imagination for just a moment."'2 This Comment presents this chal-
lenge to lawyers confronting the problem of police brutality in New
York City. This Comment suggests that in order to challenge po-
lice brutality on a systemic level, While at.the same time empower-
ing the client and community, the progressive legal community of
New York City must adopt a form of practice that is more "rebel-
lious" in its methodology. It also provides well-deserved recogni-
tion for the dedicated work that a growing community of
progressive lawyers is doing to combat this problem and for the
rebellious spark that drives their work.'
The problem of police brutality is perhaps the most pressing so-
cial and political issue in New York City today.' In August 1997,
the world looked on with horror as the incident involving Abner
* J.D. candidate, Fordham University School of Law, 2001; B.A., Sociology and
Latin American & Caribbean Areas Studies, magna cum laude, State University of
New York at Binghamton, 1994. Thanks to the lawyers and community organizers
who made this Comment possible and who struggle every day against police brutality
and misconduct. Thanks also to Professor Russell Pearce for his guidance and sup-
port, and to the editors and staff of the FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL for their
invaluable assistance. Finally, I would like to thank my family and friends for their
love and encouragement (codo a codo seguimos pa'lante).
1. GERALD P. LOPEZ, REBELLIOUS LAWYERING, ONE CHICANO'S VISION OF
PROGRESSIVE LAW PRACTICE 377 (1992) [hereinafter LOPEZ].
2. Id. at 83.
3. I believe most poverty/social change lawyers are dedicated, intelligent lawyers
who are committed to fighting poverty and struggling for justice. See Paul R. Trem-
blay, Rebellious Lawyering, Regnant Lawyering, and Street-Level Bureaucracy, 43
HASTINGS L.J. 947 (1992).
4. "Police brutality, the abuse of authority and the use of excessive force by law
enforcement officers, is one of the significant and divisive problems currently con-
fronting the United States .... The net result has been a tremendous decline of public
confidence in law enforcement and in the judicial system for failing to adequately
deter police misconduct." Sa'id Wekili & Hyacinth E. Leus, Police Brutality: Problems
of Excessive Force Litigation, 25 PAC. L.J. 171-73 (1993).
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Louima brought to light the frequency and severity of police bru-
tality in New York City. Mr. Louima, a Haitian immigrant, had
been arrested and brought to the 70th Precinct house where of-
ficers forced him into the bathroom, severely beat him, and
sodomized him with the handle of a plunger.5 Then on February 4,
1999, plain-clothes officers fired forty-one shots at and killed Ama-
dou Diallo in the vestibule of his Bronx home as he was reaching
for his wallet.6 On February 25, 2000, an Albany jury acquitted
those four police officers and the community expressed outrage.7
On March 16, 2000, undercover narcotics officers shot and killed
Patrick Dorismond, an unarmed twenty-six year old security
guard.8 The officers had approached Mr. Dorismond asking to
purchase marijuana and a scuffle ensued. The police found no
drugs or weapons on him.9
Following this string of killings-all of unarmed men of color at
the hands of New York City Police Department ("NYPD") of-
ficers-the city erupted in protest and street mobilizations to decry
the practices of the police. 10 The city, state, and federal govern-
ments were called upon to scrutinize and censure the NYPD's
practices. 1 On an international level, human rights organizations
5. David Kocieniewski, Injured Man Says Brooklyn Officers Tortured Him in
Custody, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 13, 1997, at B1.
6. David Jackson, Winning War on Crime Has a Price Giuliani Alienates Many in
New York City's Black and Hispanic Communities, DENVER POST, Apr. 20, 2000, at
A23; see also Amy Waldman, Diallo Parents Sue City and Officers Over Son's Death,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 19, 2000, at B4.
7. Daniel J. Wakin, 15 Arrested After Protest Against Police, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 18,
2000, at B4.
8. Jackson, supra note 6, at A23; see also Jayson Blair & Andy Newman, Draft of
U.S. Report Is Said to Fault City's Policing, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 12, 2000, at B1.
9. Randal C. Archibold, Criticism of Giuliani and Police Mounts After Funeral
Violence, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 27, 2000, at B1.
10. Wakin, supra note 7, at B4.
11. Id. ("The Civil Rights Division of the United States Justice Department and
federal prosecutors in Manhattan and Brooklyn have been investigating New York
City police practices since the 1997 assault on Abner Louima. In addition, Mary Jo
White, the United States Attorney in Manhattan, said after the Diallo verdict that her
office was examining evidence in the case to see if the officers violated his civil
rights."); see also Archibold, supra note 9, at B6 (explaining that H. Carl McCall, the
Comptroller of New York State, has requested a state commission to investigate and
improve police and community relations, as well as describing a call for federal over-
sight and action by Mark Green, the city's Public Advocate, and C. Virginia Fields,
the Manhattan Borough President); Federal Inquiry is Sought into Shooting Response,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 7, 2000, at B8 (describing how Congressmen Jerrold Nadler and
Charles B. Rangel requested an examination by the Justice Department into the judi-
cial reviews of the police shootings which killed Amadou Diallo, Gidone Busch, and
Patrick Dorismond).
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published reports on the crisis of police brutality in the United
States. 12 As Bill Goodman, the legal director of the Center for
Constitutional Rights ("CCR"), explains, "Today it's not as easy to
identify movements. But one movement which is more easily iden-
tifiable is the movement against police brutality."' 3
This Comment examines the legal representation of victims of
police brutality in New York City through the lens of Professor
Gerald Lopez's theory of rebellious lawyering.' 4 This Comment
presents the narratives of four plaintiffs attorneys and two commu-
nity organizers working to combat police brutality and analyzes
whether the legal community is approaching this crisis in a "rebel-
lious" way.15 Part I discusses the model of rebellious lawyering, its
12. E.g., AMNESTY INT'L, U.S.A., POLICE BRUTALITY AND ExCESSIVE FORCE IN
THE NEW YORK CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT (1996); see also HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH,
SHIELDED FROM JUSTICE: POLICE BRUTALITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE U.S.
(1998).
13. Interview with Bill Goodman, legal director, Center for Constitutional Rights,
in New York, N.Y. (Oct. 22, 1999) (unpublished interview transcript, on file with the
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL) [hereinafter Goodman Interview].
14. LOPEZ, supra note 1, at 429. Professor Gerald P. Lopez is a professor of law, at
the University of California, Los Angeles School of Law. For other works by Profes-
sor Lopez see Gerald P. Lopez, A Declaration of War by Other Means, 98 HARV. L.
REV. 1667 (1985) (reviewing RICHARD E. MORGAN, THE RIGHTS INDUSTRY IN OUR
TIME (1984), which "charges that the 'rights industry' has become too ready to ignore
or discount the social costs of rights" and primarily discussing Morgan's lack of analy-
sis of the "elite academic left" and "streetwise" groups); Gerald P. Lopez, Economic
Development in the Murder Capital of the U.S., 60 TENN. L. REV. 685 (1993) (discuss-
ing the impact of public perception on economic development in East Palo Alto,
where a coalition of small businesses and residents brought a lawsuit against the city
for mishandling a development project that promised to bring jobs and other benefits
to the largely minority population); Gerald P. Lopez, Lay Lawyering, 32 UCLA L.
REV. 1 (1984) (discussing how storytelling is used to facilitate problem-solving by lay
lawyers, including how individuals rely on stock stories that reflect their conception of
the world, and how storytellers must combine multiple perspectives and create a co-
herent narrative, and the resulting ethical and political implications); Gerald P. Lo-
pez, Reconceiving Civil Rights Law Practice: Seven Weeks in the Life of a Rebellious
Collaboration, 77 GEO. L.J. 1603 (1989) (examining the use of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 litiga-
tion to promote social change by assessing the actual legal practice, including the
types of firms and clients typically involved, rather than doctrine); Gerald P. Lopez,
Training Future Lawyers to Work with the Politically and Socially Subordinated: Anti-
Generic Legal Education, 91 W. VA. L. REV. 305 (1989) (arguing that "despite some
real and unappreciated successes, legal education remains a stubborn underachiever"
in training future lawyers to work with politically and socially subordinated people);
Gerald P. Lopez, The Work We Know So Little About, 42 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1989)
(asserting that legal education must take "seriously a diverse range of scholarship and
teaching that focuses rigorous, eclectic, and sustained attention on the 'Maria Elenas'
[low-income women of color and other socially and politically subordinated people]
of our communities) (internal quotations added).
15. Professor Gerald Lopez introduced the term "rebellious" lawyering. LOPEZ,
supra note 1, at 38.
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critique, and related theories, including the model of "regnant"
lawyering. Part II describes, through the narratives of the lawyers,
the four primary methods of legal representation that are being
used by those seeking to challenge police brutality in New York
City and, in some cases, to change the system which produces and
condones police misconduct: individual representation, class ac-
tions, archival of complaints and referral, and community organiz-
ing. Part II then explores the narratives of two community
organizers who have had extensive experience working with law-
yers on the issue of police brutality.16 Part III examines the rebel-
lious and regnant characteristics in each of the four methods of
legal practice. This Comment also addresses the limitations of the
current forms of representation in realizing the goal of combating
police brutality and achieving social justice for subordinated
groups. It concludes that the legal community must develop a
more creative and rebellious methodology if it is to accomplish its
goals and that it must focus on its potentially transformative impact
on society, rather than satisfying itself with small, isolated strug-
gles. Finally, it makes recommendations for how progressive law-
yers can reshape their practices to embody a more rebellious
model and thereby better assist existing community efforts to com-
bat police brutality.
I. THE MODEL OF REBELLIOUS LAWYERING
A. Gerald Lopez's Theory of Rebellious and
Regnant Lawyering
In his book, Rebellious Lawyering, One Chicano's Vision of Pro-
gressive Law Practice, Professor Gerald Lopez proposes a model of
lawyering that challenges the traditional approach of many pro-
gressive lawyers. Lopez argues that a "rebellious" practice must
create a collaboration between lawyer and client that draws on
16. This Comment does not include the accounts of actual survivors of police bru-
tality. The families of victims and survivors of police brutality who have become
politicized through their experiences are often consumed with their organizing efforts.
For them, this is not the time for an academic analysis of their experiences-it is a
time for action. It is also difficult to locate or interview survivors of police brutality
who have not been politicized. This is due to several factors. Many non-politicized
survivors of police brutality are either unknown by progressive lawyers and or-
ganizers, or they are known but choose to limit the nature and duration of their rela-
tionship to the lawyers and organizers based on the specific legal needs of their
individual cases. Perhaps, for these individuals, reliving their encounters with the po-
lice is too painful; the emotional aspect of this issue might therefore discourage partic-
ipation in the larger political struggle and discussion.
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both of their experiences and lawyering skills in order to alleviate
the client's subordinated position in society (the client's subordina-
tion can result from the marginalized position her economic status,
race, gender; sexual preference, age, etc., places her in with respect
to the power structure of society). 17 Lopez asserts that both law-
yers and lay people possess "lawyering" skills that can be used in
the lawyer-client collaboration. Lopez calls for the "professional"
lawyer to recognize and encourage the use of the client's "lay"
lawyering skills.18
1. Theory: The Rebellious Lawyering Model
Rebellious lawyering seeks to empower subordinated clients.
Lopez contrasts this model of lawyering with "regnant" lawyering,
which perpetuates the traditional power inequity between lawyer
and client and client and society.19 He draws on theories of and
experiences in mobilization, community organizing, and deprofes-
sionalization.20 As Lopez describes it, "[T]hose who would 'lawyer
17. See generally Angelo N. Ancheta, Community Lawyering, 81 CAL. L. REv.
1363 (1993) (describing rebellious lawyering in the context of the Asian Pacific Amer-
ican community).
18. The steps used in "professional lawyering" are the same as the steps used in
"lay lawyering." LoPEZ, supra note 1, at 38-44. Both involve perceiving the difference
between the reality we would like and the one we are living in, and trying to take the
actions necessary to change our lives to conform with our vision of how we would like
the world to be. Id. Whether this is complex contract negotiations or filing an applica-
tion for food stamps, the process is fundamentally the same. Id. Lopez sees the law as
a "set of stories and storytelling practices that describe and prescribe social reality and
a set of conventions for defining and resolving disputes." Id. at 43.
19. The term "regnant" lawyering was also introduced by Professor Gerald Lopez.
LopEz, supra note 1, at 23.
20. Infra Part I.A.3. Poverty law and social change lawyering literature reflects a
long history of concern about the lawyer-client relationship and client empowerment.
Examples of this perspective are: Anthony V. Alfieri, The Antinomies of Poverty Law
and a Theory of Dialogic Empowerment, 16 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 659
(1987-88) (asserting that "poverty can be soundly attacked only by applying an inte-
grated theory of empowerment") [hereinafter Alfieri, Antinomies]; Anthony V. Al-
fieri, Reconstructive Poverty Law Practice: Learning Lessons of Client Narrative, 100
YALE L.J. 2107 (1991) (discussing story-telling as a method of client empowerment in
poverty law advocacy) [hereinafter Alfieri, Reconstructive Poverty Law Practice];
Richard D. Marsico, Working for Social Change and Preserving Client Autonomy: Is
There a Role for "Facilitative Lawyering"?, 1 CLINICAL L. REV. 639 (1995) (suggesting
ways to preserve client autonomy); Louise G. Trubek, Embedded Practices: Lawyers,
Clients, and Social Change, 31 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 415 (1996) (examining two
models of alternative social change lawyering-"client nonprofit" and "the social jus-
tice law firm."); Lucie E. White, To Learn and Teach: Lessons From Driefontein on
Lawyering and Power, 1988 Wis. L. REv. 699 (1988) (describing a lawyer whose work
with South African villagers consisted of "challenging structures of domination that
disabled the community, and creating sources of their own power") [hereinafter
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rebelliously' must ...ground their work in the lives and in the
communities of the subordinated themselves."'2 1 The elements of
rebellious lawyering are: consciousness of the ways the interper-
sonal relationship between lawyer and client can further dis-
empower the client; continuous reevaluation of the legal and non-
legal approaches to problems faced by clients; actively working in
coalition and collaboration with other professionals and commu-
nity members; and analysis of the impact of the lawyer's work on
the client's life, as well as the context, interplay, and implications of
the lawyer's work on local, regional, national, and international
levels.22
Rebellious lawyering is a theoretical and practical response to
"regnant" lawyering. According to Lopez, the elements of regnant
lawyering are: focusing on litigation; dichotomizing between ser-
vice (individual representation) and impact (e.g., class actions or
legislative advocacy) litigation; viewing "community education" as
diffuse, marginal, and uncritical work; viewing "organizing" as a
supplemental, sporadic, and auxiliary activity; viewing the lawyer
as the "legal problem-solver" and the client as the "fact-giver";
generally seeing other institutions and groups as only a means of
assistance in a certain aspect of a case; and failing to see the larger
picture-how different levels and aspects of society respond to
challenges of the status quo.23
Therefore, rebellious lawyering seeks to address the defects of
regnant lawyering, namely, "the interpersonal domination of cli-
ents by lawyers; the disempowerment that accompanies reliance on
litigation-based dispute resolution or its equivalent; and the ineffi-
cacy of intrasystemic remedies to achieve meaningful change in the
lives of poor clients. 24
2. Criticisms of the Rebellious Model
Various criticisms have been leveled against the rebellious
model. These largely focus on the application of the theory and the
White, Lessons From Driefontein]; Lucie E. White, Subordination, Rhetorical Survival
Skills, and Sunday Shoes: Notes on the Hearing of Mrs. G., 38 BuFm. L. REv. 1 (1990)
(explaining how "speech norms and coerced speech practices that accompany race,
gender, and class domination-undermine the capacity of many persons in our society
to use the procedural rituals that are formally available to them" and concluding that
there must be a gradual "relocation of bureaucratized governance in participatory
institutions") [hereinafter White, Sunday Shoes].
21. LoPEZ, supra note 1, at 38.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 24.
24. Tremblay, supra note 3, at 952.
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narrowness of its focus. Critics have proposed different techniques
of lawyering to achieve the goals of the rebellious model while al-
lowing lawyers a greater flexibility in the nature of their practice.
a. Tremblay: Macroallocation v. Mesoallocation
Professor Paul R. Tremblay argues that rebellious lawyering re-
quires a "justifiable, justice-based allocation of resources away
from the clients' short-term needs and in favor of a community's
long-term needs."25 Tremblay contends that a response focused on
the collective rather than the individual is in tension with the cli-
ent-centeredness that the rebellious model also advocates. 2 6 This
tension raises ethical concerns and issues of the "deferral thesis.
27
The weighing of these different considerations is arguably an exer-
cise of distributive justice. 8 In this regard, the lawyer is balancing
macroallocation and mesoallocation concerns. Macroallocation
takes into account the interests of society at large.2 9 Mesoalloca-
tion considers how to apply the macroallocation to a specific recipi-
ent.30 Tremblay concludes that clients cannot be expected, when
offered an informed and free choice, to be self-sacrificing unless
they are fairly certain of the future benefits in which they, in part,
will share.31 Accordingly, Tremblay asserts that to a certain extent,
rebellious lawyering necessitates the lawyer to impose this long-
term view.32 The lawyers interviewed for this Comment all believe
they adhere to a client-centered approach to representation; they
all reported cohesion between their goals and their clients' goals.
Therefore, it is unclear how a conflict between mesoallocation and
macroallocation concerns would be resolved if a conflict did arise.
On a hypothetical level, these lawyers all believe that they would
follow their clients' desires.
25. Id. at 950. Tremblay terms this idea of deferring present benefits in exchange
for promises of long-term benefits the "deferral thesis." Id. at 955.
26. Id. at 958.
27. Id. at 959-62. Tremblay looks to the field of bioethics to explain the deferral
thesis. Id. (discussing how in bioethics the client must have informed consent to insure
that the client understands the risk analysis involved in the medical treatment, plan,
or study. The doctor not only considers the goal of curing the client, but is also influ-
enced by the drive to develop effective treatment for future clients).
28. Id. (framing distributive justice in the context of resource allocation within
medicine and law).
29. Id. at 962.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 967.
32. Id. at 967-68.
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b. Southwdrth and Sisak: Devaluation of the Lawyer's
(Transactional) Skills
Professor Ann Southworth asserts that Lopez is "excessively
pessimistic" regarding the ranges and importance of the skills that
lawyers can, and should, provide to their clients.33 Southworth
maintains that lawyers have skills based on specialized knowledge
unique to their profession that should be recognized and utilized in
progressive lawyering.34 Southworth acknowledges that as the
scope and effectiveness of impact litigation has narrowed, the im-
portance of community organizations and their community mobili-
zation efforts has grown.35 But in contrast to Lopez, she argues
that these organizing and community education efforts should be
supplemented by a broader range of services from lawyers and that
utilizing lawyers' unique abilities would enable the community or-
ganizations to expand their work and to take full advantage of law-
yers' technical expertise.36
Like Southworth, Janine Sisak proposes an expanded definition
of rebellious lawyering that includes transactional representation. 37
Sisak analyzes the work of Brooklyn Legal Services Corporation A
("Corp. A") through the lens of rebellious lawyering and suggests a
hybrid approach in structuring financing transactions for commu-
nity organizations and small businesses.38 Sisak describes Corp.
A's work as a response to the community's needs and as an effort
to effect social change.39 These are two characteristics of rebellious
lawyering. However, Corp. A' s lawyers see themselves as tradi-
tional in that they use transactional skills and do the "legal" end of
the work that the clients' request of them.4" Also, in Corp. A's
33. Ann Southworth, Taking the Lawyer out of Progressive Lawyering, 46 STAN. L.
REV 213, 215 (1993).
34. Southworth suggests that lawyers can use their distinctive skills in a variety of
ways, such as "general counsel and as providers of transactional representation" to
community groups, organizations, and small local businesses. Id. Although Lopez rec-
ognizes the role of the lawyer as the bridge between lay and professional lawyering,
Southworth feels that lawyers can serve perhaps most effectively as technical assist-
ants, performing tasks such as "negotiating on the client's behalf, structuring relation-
ships, drafting agreements, and navigating procedural and political obstacles." Id. at
222-23.
35. Id. at 228.
36. Id. at 227-30; see also Trubek, supra note 20, at 419 (discussing the growing
number of nonprofit organizations that work with marginalized people).
37. Janine Sisak, If the Shoe Doesn't Fit ... Reformulating Rebellious Lawyering to
Encompass Community Group Representation, 25 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 873 (1998).
38. Id. at 875.
39. Id. at 881.
40. Id.
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work, the client's empowerment is only part of the "whole process"
of community empowerment.4 Sisak asserts that the definition of
rebellious lawyering must be expanded to include alternate models
of legal representation that can also seek to empower the client
(e.g., transactional representation).42 However, she does not think
this would undermine rebellious lawyering if the model is viewed
as an "evolutionary process.
43
c. Handler, Simon, and Blasi: Too Narrowly Focused and
Unhelpful In Effecting Collective Social Change
Rebellious Lawyering fits into what Professor Joel F. Handler
deems the legal camp of "postmodernism for transformative polit-
ics."' 44 His critique of this approach to law is that it lacks "meta-
narratives" (overarching themes) that create and encourage collec-
tive identities and movements.45
Similarly, Professor William H. Simon critiques poverty law
scholars as not contributing meaningfully to larger collective ef-
forts at institutional and systemic change.46 Simon asserts that a
source of this ineffectiveness is an excessive concern by these
scholars with "professional domination" of clients.47 He stresses
that "not all lawyer power and influence should be seen as illegiti-
mate domination. ' 48 He also finds that the new poverty law schol-
arship has "tended to sentimentalize poor clients and especially
41. Id. at 887. Sisak suggests the possibility that community empowerment may in
fact happen outside of the lawyer-client relationship. Id. Empowerment may occur,
for instance, "in the internal collective action of the community group [client]." Id. at
888.
42. Id. at 890.
43. Id. Fitting transactional work into the rebellious model requires "redirecting
the model's theoretical focus away from the attorney-client relationship and toward
some other source of empowerment. Although this shift seems drastic, it does not
undermine the model if rebellious lawyering is considered an evolutionary process."
Id.
44. Joel F. Handler, Postmodernism, Protest, and the New Social Movements, 26 L.
& Soc'y REV. 697 (1992) (stating that the "major theme in postmodernism . . . is
subversion, the commitment to undermin[ing] dominant discourse" and positing that,
"deconstruction, as a form of politics, is ultimately disabling").
45. Id. at 727; see also Ascanio Piomelli, Appreciating Collaborative Lawyering, 6
CLINICAL L. REV. 427, 444 (2000) (reviewing the different critics of collaborative
lawyering scholars: Professors Gerald Lopez, Lucie White, and Anthony Alfieri).
46. William H. Simon, The Dark Secret of Progressive Lawyering: A Comment on
Poverty Law Scholarship in the Post-Modern, Post-Reagan Era, 48 U. MIAMI L. REV.
1099 (1994) (stating that "[t]he Dark Secret of Progressive Lawyering is that effective
lawyers cannot avoid making judgments in terms of their own values and influencing
their clients to adopt those judgments"); see also Piomelli, supra note 45, at 446.
47. Simon, supra note 46, at 1100-01; Piomelli, supra note 45, at 446-48.
48. Simon, supra note 46, at 1106.
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poor 'communities'... and to underestimate the difficulties of col-
lective practice."4 9
Professor Gary L. Blasi asserts that lawyering scholars should
produce works that can be both practical and useful to practice. °
Blasi puts forth four primary critiques of postmodern critical schol-
arship:51 (1) "comprehension of the theory ... is no small contin-
gency" ;52 (2) it is too universally and harshly critical of other
practitioners;53 (3) its focus on the "individual lawyer/client
microworld" is too narrow;54 and (4) it fails to look for structure or
explanation above the level of local narrative.55
Lopez does not argue for clients' narratives to take precedence
over the narrative of lawyers, but rather that the two narratives be
given equal treatment, and that the lawyer and client be seen as
"co-eminent" practitioners. 6 Lopez's theory focuses on the local
level and individual story. However, he also stresses the impor-
tance of connecting with other problem-solvers, such as neighbors,
organizers, public employees, and policy makers. 57 He further en-
courages professional and lay lawyers to identify and address the
correlative impact of their work and the broader society (e.g., na-
tional and international interests). 58
3. Related Theories
Lopez's theory of rebellious lawyering draws upon several theo-
ries of social change lawyering. A common theme throughout so-
cial change legal theory is the notion of client empowerment
through the use of client narrative and voice in the development
and representation of the client's case.59 The relationships between
lawyer, client, and community within their respective groups and
49. Id. at 1114.
50. Gary L. Blasi, What's a Theory For?: Notes on Reconstructing Poverty Law
Scholarship, 48 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1063 (1994) (critiquing postmodern critical scholar-
ship and encouraging a more collective theory); see also Piomelli, supra note 45, at
450-52.
51. Blasi, supra note 50, at 1064, cited by Piomelli, supra note 45, at 451-52.
52. Blasi, supra note 50, at 1074.
53. Id. at 1088-89 ("The critical gaze rarely falls on the mirror: it is about the
practice of others.").
54. Id. at 1087 ("Never has so much theory rested on so little practice.").
55. Id.; see also Piomelli, supra note 45, at 451-52.
56. Lopez, supra note 1, at 55; see also Piomelli, supra note 45, at 480.
57. Lopez, supra note 1, at 38.
58. Id.
59. E.g. White, Sunday Shoes, supra note 20.
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with each other are seen as opportunities for societal and personal
transformation.60
a. Critical Lawyering
Critical lawyering examines different aspects of social and politi-
cal stratification and marginalization (e.g., race, gender, and sexual
orientation) and analyzes the role of the legal system in the perpet-
uation of these processes. It also posits that law can be used as an
arena for reexamination of the different facets of structural domi-
nation.61  According to Austin Sarat and Stuart Scheingold,
"[C]ritical cause lawyering implies a different understanding of the
lawyer-client relationship. Attorneys are admonished to relate to
clients as listeners and learners rather than as translators. ' 62 The
theory of critical lawyering stresses that this redefinition of the law-
yer-client relationship is necessary in order to resist and counteract
the barriers that have been imposed to restrict access by subordi-
nated groups to the justice system.63 Lucie White explains that bu-
reaucratic institutions and procedures, such as administrative
hearings at welfare offices, can impede subordinated groups from
"meaningful participation in their own political lives."'64 The criti-
cal lawyer sees the lawyer-client relationship as collaborative, as
opposed to hierarchical. 65 Lopez draws from this collaborative ap-
proach to lawyering. Lopez, like the critical lawyering theorists,
stresses the importance of client voice and the use of the client's
knowledge in the legal process.66
b. Professionalism and Antiprofessionalism
Both proponents and critics of legal professionalism have advo-
cated for a heightened duty of lawyers to represent people who
60. See generally id. (noting that lawyering literature recognizes a long history of
this attitude toward client empowerment).
61. Trubek, supra note 20, at 416-17. According to Louise G. Trubek, critical lawy-
ering addresses two primary concerns: "[I]mproving lawyer-client relationships in or-
der [sic] more effectively to serve subordinated groups, and rethinking the
relationship between legal work and political mobilization." Id.
62. Austin Sarat & Stuart Scheingold, Cause Lawyering and the Reproduction of
Professional Authority, in CAUSE LAWYERING: POLITICAL COMMITMENTS AND PRO-
FESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES 9 (Austin Sarat & Stuart Scheingold eds., 1998) [herein-
after Sarat & Sheingold, Cause Lawyering].
63. White, Sunday Shoes, supra note 20, at 4-5.
64. Id. at 4.
65. Sarat & Scheingold, Cause Lawyering, supra note 62, at 16.
66. LOPEZ, supra note 1, at 377; see also supra text accompanying note 22 (discuss-
ing the elements of rebellious lawyering according to Lopez).
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have been denied access to the legal system. Proponents of profes-
sionalism argue that lawyers have a professional duty of public ser-
vice and political commitment.67
Critics of professionalism argue that it is a theory that immunizes
lawyers from external critique and regulation. Professionalism is
criticized as a means of maintaining control of the market for legal
services and preventing other professionals and the lay community
from acquiring leverage within the legal system.68 Richard Abel
advocates for non-lawyers to be encouraged to offer "legal ser-
vices," and the public at large to perform legal functions them-
selves with assistance, such as simplified legal forms and
handbooks.69 This is similar to Lopez's recognition of the role of
"lay lawyers" in problem solving.70 He explains that "[t]he chal-
lenge involved in getting a handle on professional lawyering rests
not in what is unique about such lawyering but what it has in com-
mon with what everyone practices in getting by from day to day."71
c. Popular Education
Paolo Freire pioneered the theory of popular education in his
work on the community education and politicization of the poor
and marginalized in Brazil and throughout the Third World.72 He
asserted that, given the necessary tools, individuals could enter into
a dialogue with each other and society at large that had the poten-
tial for personal and political transformation. Education is seen as
a tool by which the oppressed can transform their situation and
achieve political and social transformation.73 Freire states: "Criti-
cal and liberating dialogue, which presupposes action, must be car-
ried on with the oppressed at whatever the stage of their struggle
67. Sarat & Scheingold, Cause Lawyering, supra note 62, at 10; see also Richard L.
Abel, Taking Professionalism Seriously, 1989 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 41, 51 (1989) (argu-
ing that professionalism could "lobby vigorously for greater public expenditure on
federal, state, and local legal aid and public defender programs" and that "the profes-
sion should require a significant pro bono contribution by all lawyers") [hereinafter
Abel].
68. E.g., Sarat & Scheingold, supra note 62, at 10. Sarat and Scheingold explain
that, "Professionalism is, in this view, an excuse for excluding those groups .... In-
stead of building consensus, enhancing ethical standards, and raising levels of compe-
tence, professionalism is seen as part of a top-down project of social control." Id.
69. Abel, supra note 67, at 48.
70. LOPEZ, supra note 1 at 43-44.
71. Id. at 43.
72. Richard Shaull, Foreward to PAOLO FREIRE, PEDAGOGY OF THE OPPRESSED 9
-10 (Myra Bergman Ramos trans., 1981).
73. PAOLO FREIRE, PEDAGOGY OF THE OPPRESSED 34-35 (Myra Bergman Ramos
trans., 1981).
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for liberation. ' 74 Through the process of popular education the
student and teacher are considered "critical co-investigators in dia-
logue. '75 The popular education model has important implications
for rebellious lawyering. The two theories emphasize the impor-
tance of student/client voice, the goal of empowerment and societal
change, and the student/client serving as co-strategist in problem
solving with the teacher/lawyer.76
d. Community Organizing
In Rebellious Lawyering, Lopez explores the relationship of
community organizers and lawyers. In examining methods of com-
munity organizing, Lopez draws a parallel between regnant lawyer-
ing and what he calls "orthodox organizing. '7 7 The various
elements of orthodox organizing are: organizers organize and typi-
cally do not develop groups or "movements"; organizers establish
connections in the community in order to further their particular
goals, and not because they see it as a necessary step to movement
building; organizers exercise power, for example by setting meeting
agendas and goals; organizers assume that the "oppressed" are
willing and capable of sharing their experiences and articulating
their grievances; regardless of the local circumstances, organizers
follow a standardized organizing formula; organizers assert a will-
ingness to work in coalition with any group (even if this is not a
true desire or, alternatively, best for the particular project); or-
ganizers view the impact of their efforts as inherently radical; and
finally, organizers consider themselves as the preeminent
"pragmatists of power. ' 78
Just as Lopez argues that regnant lawyers should become more
rebellious, he advocates that organizers should challenge the ortho-
doxy of organizing and adopt a more rebellious methodology. 79 A
"rebellious" community organizer should: be "life-sized" as op-
74. Id. at 52.
75. Id. at 68.
76. Seunghee Cha, Still Not Client-Centered-Analyzing "Lawyers as Counsel-
ors": A Client-Centered Approach Through the Lens of Paolo Freire's Pedagogy for
Liberation (1999) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the FORDHAM URBAN LAW
JOURNAL) (discussing how the theories of Paolo Friere can inform client-centered
lawyering). See generally, Alfieri, Antinomies, supra note 20, at 666 (discussing
Freire's pioneering theory of popular education and its affects on critical
consciousness).
77. LOPEZ, supra note 1, at 353.
78. Id. at 353-54. Pragmatists of power seem to be those willing to use power from
any source necessary to accomplish a goal. Id.
79. Id. at 357.
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posed to the ultimate "pragmatists of power."8 This means that an
organizer should not be more or less noticeable than those around
her.81 Lopez asserts that awareness of the work of professional or-
ganizers opens the process of mobilization and thus they should
also renounce their invisibility despite the advantages of working
behind the scenes.82 Further, Lopez advocates that organizers
should "renounce exaggeration," thus challenging the myth that
professional organizers are necessary to social change;8 3 and recog-
nize that every person engages in pragmatic problem-solving (as do
rebellious lawyers).84 Organizers must connect the local, regional,
and national dynamics of power to their work and "imagine social
and political arrangements responsive to inevitably plural commu-
nities. ' 85 Lastly, they should participate in meaningful coalitions
that address the realities and tensions at la frontera-the bounda-
ries that divide "us" from "them. 86
Saul Alinsky, another theoretician and practitioner of commu-
817nity organizing, established what are known as the Alinsky con-
cepts of mass organization for power.88 He organized in poor
communities throughout the United States and founded the Indus-
trial Areas Foundation and a training institute for organizers.89
Lopez, like Alinsky, stresses communication as the most essential
component to organizing.9° Similar to Lopez's theory of rebellious
lawyering, Alinsky stressed that the dialogue must be a two-way
experience. This is facilitated as messages are conveyed so that
80. Id. at 358; see also id. at 353 ("Organizers tend to consider themselves the
preeminent 'pragmatists of power' in any situation and in any relationship.").
81. Id. This contrasts the orthodox organizer who sees himself or herself as inher-
ently radical and necessary for social change to occur. Id. at 353-54.
82. Id. at 358-61.
83. Id. at 361.
84. Id. at 366.
85. Id. at 368. This requires diverging from a standardized organizing formula and
adopting a plan that addresses the realities specific to the situation. Id. at 353-54.
86. Id. at 373 ("'Color-blind, radical populism' never has been what it was made
out to be .... It tries to define out of existence the very differences-gender, ethnic,
class, ideological-that define and give life to politics of all sorts. . . .Experience
teaches that it serves most often to affirm, not to challenge the status quo.").
87. Id. at 362-63. Lopez is critical of promoting the centrality of professional or-
ganizers in fundamental social change. Id. According to Lopez, lay social activists,
progressive lawyers, and other groups have adopted this notion of the idealized pro-
fessional organizer. Id.
88. SAUL DAVID ALINSKY, RULES FOR RADICALS: A PRACTICE PRIMER FOR RE-
ALISTIC RADICALS, at About the Author (1971) [hereinafter ALINSKY, RULES FOR
RADICALS].
89. Id.
90. Id. at 81.
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people will be able to relate them to their own experiential
knowledge. 91
H. TI4 PROBLEM OF POLICE BRUTALITY IN NEW YORK CITY
A. Lawyers' Narratives-Different Methods of
Legal Representation
The actual accounts of people working in the legal field of social
change are not often heard. Mainstream media either downplays
or ignores organizing efforts and litigation victories. This is evi-
denced by sparse media attendance at progressive demonstrations,
marches, court case filings, proceedings, and rulings. Academic
and professional journals similarly afford scant space for publica-
tions by and about progressive lawyering. Lawyers themselves
often do not create a space for their clients' voices to be heard in
the legal process, and instead translate clients' stories into legal ar-
guments and clients' narratives into under-emphasized "impact
statements" or "witness/victim testimonies." As Lopez explains,
"our oral traditions rarely report activist work as well as they
might. Most such stories seldom circulate outside small, local cir-
cles."' 92 The use of narrative, or storytelling, is a central element of,
rebellious lawyering.93 Accordingly, this Comment frames the
analysis of legal representation in cases of police brutality in the
context of the stories of the lawyers who are actually doing the
lawyering and the community organizers working with them. At
the same time, the limits and alterations inherent in every layer of
reporting are recognized. 94
The process of dialogue and narrative can be an empowering
tool in the relationship between lawyer and client and among cli-
ents. Dialogic empowerment also can occur between lawyers.
91. Id.
92. LoPEZ, supra note 1, at 8.
93. See id. at 39-44. ("We learn to use stories-to understand the world and to
solve problems-by living in our cultures."). Id. at 40.
94. Lucie E. White recognizes this reality of story-telling in her analysis of the
lawyering in a black South African village, Driefontein. White, Lessons from Driefon-
tein, supra note 20, at 701. She states, "The story I tell sets out just one version of
'what happened.' Like every story, it has an inevitable ambiguity .... I do not seek to
resolve these questions in the way I tell the story or in the way I comment on it.
Questions, tensions, gaps will remain in the end; indeed, they constitute the particular
richness of the narrative form." Id.
95. Alfieri, Reconstructive Poverty Law Practice, supra note 20, at 2147. Alfieri
posits that reconstruction of the poverty law practice requires an integration of client
narratives in every aspect of the lawyer-client relationship (e.g., interviewing, counsel-
ing, investigation, negotiation, and litigation). Id.; see also John Kilwein, Still Trying:
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This Comment endeavors to contribute to dialogic empowerment
within the legal community to strengthen the legal community's ef-
forts to combat police brutality.
1. Individual Representation: Matthew Flamm and
Ellen Yaroshefsky
a. Matthew Flamm
Matthew Flamm is private practitioner in Brooklyn, New York.
He works with a part-time associate and a receptionist. His work
encompasses criminal representation, Civilian Complaint Review
Board ("CCRB") advocacy, Police Department employee discipli-
nary actions (brought in the Department Advocates Office of the
Police Department), and civil actions. He started his career in the
New York City Law Department. He explains that he learned this
area of practice from the defense perspective, which put him in the
position of justifying and defending police officers' conduct and
trying to avoid judgments against the Police Department. How-
ever, he used the "heightened duty" of government lawyers to try
to see that justice was done.96
Individual justice is the primary goal and motivator for Mat-
thew.97 He feels that in police brutality lawyering there are "prin-
ciples at stake and real issues of public concern to litigate." 98
However, according to Matthew, the frustrating aspect of his prac-
tice is the lack of systemic impact from individual litigation. He
says there is a "total disconnect" between individual legal actions
and the police officers' subsequent conduct since there is fre-
quently little or no disciplinary action and the city usually indemni-
fies the officers for damages. 99
Matthew considers himself a traditional lawyer since his work is
limited to the legal system and the avenues of redress provided by
the government. He is rebellious, however, in that he sees his work
Cause Lawyering for the Poor and Disadvantaged in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, in
CAUSE LAWYERING: POLITICAL COMMITMENTS AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILI-
TIES 181, 185 (Austin Sarat & Stuart Scheingold eds., 1998) (discussing Alfieri's the-
ory as "dialogic empowerment ... attempt[ing] to give her or his clients greater class
consciousness, a recognition that they are part of an oppressed group in society with a
history").
96. Interview with Matthew Flamm, Esq., in Brooklyn, N.Y. (Oct. 26, 1999) (un-
published interview transcript, on file with the FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL)
[hereinafter Flamm Interview].
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
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and the issue of police misconduct in a political and philosophical
framework. He views litigation simply as part of the larger picture
of combating police brutality.100
Matthew prides himself on seeing his clients as individuals who
are worthy of respect. In fact, he says, he generally likes his cli-
ents.' 01 He has found that his attitude toward client participation
in the legal process sets him apart from most attorneys. 10 2 He in-
volves his clients in the decision-making process of the case, partic-
ularly regarding decisions affecting the outcome of the case (e.g.,
when to seek settlement; what agency, or individual to sue). How-
ever, he clearly delineates between the lawyer's and the client's
work. He feels that "the day-to-day stuff-letter writing, demands,
etc.-is the lawyer's job."'01 3 On occasion, "with the right client,"
he will have his client assist in different aspects of the investigation
for a case. He sees the client's role as,. "inherently passive."'"
In terms of non-legal action and collaboration with community
groups and other professionals, Matthew voices a certain sense of
isolation and frustration.0 5 He is a member of the Police Watch
Referral Panel and has done some presentations to Bar Associa-
tions. He has thought of reaching out to community groups, but
feels "pigeon-holed in terms of legal representation."'0 6 Matthew
expresses interest in finding information about community groups
working around the issue of police brutality. He recognizes the
need for groups that address the emotional injuries that result from
police brutality and provide support to victims and their families. 107
He has used the press on occasion. When he has had interactions
with the press, he has generally had the clients speak for
themselves. 108
Matthew, who is white, lives in Brooklyn, but feels that he is not
a part of his clients' communities, which are largely comprised of
people of color. He thinks this is partly because he is not a "tre-
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.; see also MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(a) (1983) ("A lawyer
shall abide by a client's decisions concerning the objectives of representation ... and
shall consult with the client as to the means by which they are to be pursued. A lawyer
shall abide by a client's decision whether to accept an offer of settlement of a
matter.").
104. Flamm Interview, supra note 96.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
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mendous self-promoter." 10 9 He feels connected to the community
through the service he provides for its members. Recognizing that
issues of race, class, and gender affect his relationship with his cli-
ents, Matthew is conscious of the need to treat people with
respect. 110
b. Ellen Yaroshefsky
Ellen Yaroshefsky is a Professor at Cardozo Law School in Man-
hattan, New York. Ellen went to Rutgers Law School (then known
as the "People's Electric Law School") when it was noted for its
radical lawyering and activism."' As a student in the constitu-
tional law clinic, she worked on one of the first "long hairs on the
New Jersey Turnpike" cases. 12 She then went to Seattle, where
she worked with a Native American tribe and started handling po-
lice misconduct cases. When she moved back to New York she
continued her work at the Center for Constitutional Rights
("CCR"). Currently, she is working on a case involving the shoot-
ing and killing by the police of a Hasidic Jew, Gidone Busch, in
Borough Park, Brooklyn.' 3 She and her co-counsel, the "dream
team" of Johnnie Cochran, Barry Scheck, and Peter Neufeld, ap-
proach the case with the broad goal of changing the way the NYPD
operates.' 1 4 This contrasts with Matthew's individual case ap-
proach that focuses on individual justice and compensation.
Ellen maintains a client-centered approach to representation,
but finds that her clients have a broader focus than just wanting
money damages. She suggests to her clients that if their goal is to
change the NYPD and society at large, that then they must work
with the community." 5 For instance, in the Gidone Busch case she
has gone to the Borough Park community several times to meet
109. Id.
110. Id. ("[Y]ou cannot stop making judgments about someone based on race, what
they look like, where you are meeting them and how they are acting and then you get
past that superficial stuff.").
111. Interview with Ellen C. Yaroshefsky, professor of law, Cardozo Law School, in
Manhattan, N.Y. (Oct. 21, 1999) (unpublished interview transcript, on file with the
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL) [hereinafter Yaroshefsky Interview].
112. Id. (describing how in Lewis v. Hyland, 554 F.2d 93 (3d Cir. 1977), one of the
first "long hair" cases, she fought to get an injunction against the police stopping long-
haired men who looked like hippies driving along the New Jersey Tirnpike).
113. Id.; see also Andy Newman, Disturbed Man Wielding a Hammer is Killed by
Police in Brooklyn, N.Y. TiMEs, Aug. 31, 1999, at B1; Kit R. Roane, Neighbors Ask
'Why?' After a Killing, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 1, 1999, at B6.
114. Yaroshefky Interview, supra note 111.
115. Id.
636
2000] NYC POLICE BRUTALITY LAWYERING
with different community members and groups.1 16 She, like Mat-
thew, sees litigation as part of the bigger picture, stressing that,
"you can't see litigation in a vacuum." '117
She sees legal action as one tool for creating social change, and
to that extent, she identifies herself as a rebellious lawyer. She
aligns herself with the Lawyer's Guild and explains that she went
to law school to prepare herself to facilitate social change. Al-
though she is not currently involved in community activities, she
has been in the past and hopes she will be again. She has never had
run-ins with the police, explaining that, "It's not an experience that
typically happens to a white woman. That's precisely the point." '118
Based on her experiences, she thinks that issues of gender, race,
and class shape her interaction with clients and their communities.
She also feels that, as she has gotten older, her age has affected
people's perceptions of her.119 In her interactions with the Hasidic
community she has felt the gender-role distinction; Hasidic men
are not accustomed to dealing with women on the level of client-
lawyer. This is in contrast to her experiences with African Ameri-
cans and Latinos. She thinks she is able to sympathize with the
experiences of marginalized people, while acknowledging that she
is not an "oppressed person. 12 0
2. Class Actions: Bill Goodman of the Center for
Constitutional Rights
Bill Goodman is the legal director of the Center for Constitu-
tional Rights ("CCR") in Manhattan, New York. CCR is a non-
profit legal organization that fights for human and constitutional
rights both domestically and internationally. Bill began his work
around police misconduct in 1961, the year he started law school
and the year the Supreme Court recognized that the Federal Civil
Rights Act provides private citizens the right to sue the govern-
ment for violations of constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C.
116. Id.
117. Id. When asked whether she thought legal action is an effective way of com-
bating police misconduct in New York City, she responded that she does not "see
things as 'either-or's' anymore. [She] think[s] each little incremental piece adds up to
the over-all bigger picture. It's like a synergistic effect." Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. Alfieri views sympathy as an integral component of the attorney-client dia-
logue and as a means through which the attorney is able to honor the client's indepen-
dent exercise of judgment. Alfieri, Antinomies, supra note 20, at 699. Alfieri defines
sympathy as an "ethic and ideal of shared ends experienced in the relation between
self and others." Id.
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§ 1983.121 In 1962, he went to Virginia to intern at a small civil
rights firm that, according to Bill, Jet Magazine described as "the
first integrated law firm in the South. ' 122 That summer, the firm
began to consider suits against the police as a possible means of its
financial survival. Then in 1964, once out of law school, he joined
the firm that his father began in 1950 with Dave Crockett. The
firm focused on representing political radicals and explored ways
to sue the police for misconduct. They had found that common-
law tort actions did not work and were exploring police misconduct
cases pursuant to § 1983.123 Since then, he has worked on dozens
of cases involving police and corrections officer misconduct.
CCR currently is pursuing a class action against the Street Crime
Unit ("SCU") of the NYPD for its alleged illegal pattern and prac-
tice of predominately targeting its stop and searches at African
American and Latino men.124 The name plaintiffs consist of sev-
eral African American and Latino men and the National Congress
for Puerto Rican Rights.125
Bill describes the culture of CCR as focused on litigation. Ac-
cording to Bill, CCR works to eliminate the barriers between
judges, lawyers, and clients that are set-up by the traditional model
of lawyering.126 In that respect, he describes CCR's work as non-
traditional. However, he does not distinguish between rebellious
and traditional lawyering. 127 He, like Matthew and Ellen, recog-
nizes that litigation is not the sole solution to police brutality. How-
121. Goodman Interview, supra note 13. Bill sees § 1983 suits as a way of getting
private voices heard in court to challenge how the police department should or should
not work. Id. Thus, these suits allow the community to scrutinize the operations of the
police. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Nat'l Cong. For Puerto Rican Rights v. City of New York, 194 F.R.D. 105
(S.D.N.Y. 2000).
125. Goodman Interview, supra note 13. Several of the initial plaintiffs were re-
ferred by Police Watch and Karl Franklin, the former legal director of Police Watch
personally. Id.; see also Interview with Karl Franklin, legal director of Police Watch, in
Manhattan, N.Y. (Oct. 22, 1999) (unpublished interview transcript, on file with the
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL) [hereinafter Franklin Interview].
126. Goodman Interview, supra note 13.
I've always thought that the culture of the law and the underlying message is
one which seeks to divide lawyers from judges, lawyers from one another,
lawyers from legal workers, and most certainly lawyers from clients. It's also
the ways we analyze issues, we separate out issues, we pull them apart and
isolate them. If that's a traditional model of lawyering, then we are not tradi-
tional. We work at eliminating these barriers.
Id.
127. Id.
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ever, he stresses that without legal action police misconduct would
be more frequent and more egregious.
Bill acknowledges the effects of race, gender, and class in the
staff's interaction with clients and emphasizes that CCR has taken
leadership on these issues in the courtroom. However, he is reluc-
tant to give any concrete examples and stresses that he believes
people simply want effective legal assistance. 128
Bill divides his time between Detroit, Michigan and Brooklyn,
New York. He and his family have never had problems with the
police. He is motivated in his work to challenge police brutality
because he feels it is "as stark a demonstration of injustice that we
are going to see in our lives.' '1 29
3. Archival of Complaints and Referral:
Karl Franklin, Police Watch
Karl Franklin was the legal director of Police Watch ("PW") in
Manhattan, New York. PW is a non-profit organization that has
legal referral, community organizing, and archival components to
its work. 30 PW's twin goals are to provide direct services to peo-
ple who have been victimized by the police and to organize around
the issue of police brutality and misconduct. The legal services are
provided through a Legal Advisory Board and a Legal Referral
Panel. The Legal Advisory Board, which provides advice and legal
direction, is made up of established legal organizations in New
York City such as CCR, the Legal Aid Society, the National Law-
yers Guild, the NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund, and
the Puerto Rican Legal Defense and Education Fund. The Legal
Referral Panel handles individual referrals received through PW's
hotline. The attorneys are a combination of politicized practition-
ers experienced in police brutality work and straight (non-political)
practitioners. PW charges the panelists a one hundred dollar an-
nual fee to participate in the panel and requires ten percent of any
settlement or judgment collected by the lawyers from cases re-
ferred to them through PW.' 3 ' Karl feels that this portion of the
project has worked extremely well.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Franklin Interview, supra note 125. Shortly after this interview, Karl left Police
Watch to start a private practice in Brooklyn, New York.
131. Id.
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PW also has a Community Advisory Board.132 Its collaboration
with various community organizations enables PW to take part in
the larger movement against police brutality and introduce non-
legal approaches into their work. 133 The community organizations
that are members of the Community Advisory Board were integral
in setting-up PW in New York and establishing it in the larger New
York movement against police brutality and misconduct.13 4 The
community component of PW has been a harder "row to hoe" forpw.135
Karl became involved in police brutality work as a community
organizer. His first experiences with this kind of work were the
demonstrations in reaction to the beating of Rodney King by Los
Angeles police officers in 1991.136 He identifies himself as a rebel-
lious lawyer and went to law school for the specific purpose of
learning a technical skill that would assist him in his organizing ef-
forts. Karl's law school education helps him to do "his part in the
movement," particularly in supporting political prisoners in the
United States. 137 He sees law as a tool, yet he recognizes its limits
in creating social change.'38 He thinks individual cases are not go-
ing to change the dynamics of police misconduct in communities
and that the only way to fundamentally change existing power
structures is through community organization.139 As a member of
132. The community component of PW consists of the Community Advisory
Board. Id. The Community Advisory Board is composed of the Malcolm X Grass-
roots Movement ("MXG"), the National Congress for Puerto Rican Rights
("NCPRR"), the Committee Against Anti-Asian Violence ("CAAAV"), the Audre
Lorde Project, and Forever In Struggle Together ("FIST"). Id.
133. "[Tlhe underlying goal of Police Watch is to do a better job at community
organizing around the issue of police brutality and misconduct .... [T]o hook up the
individuals with a community organization that is doing work on the issue .... So, the
project has an advocacy arm to its work." Id.
134. There is also a Police Watch project in San Francisco, California. Id. Both are
projects of the Ella Baker Center for Human Rights which is also based in San Fran-
cisco. Id.
135. Karl feels that some tension resulted from a lack of clearly delineated roles
and guidelines in the establishment of the Community Advisory Board. Id. There also
have been differences in the visions of the organization and some of the board mem-
bers on how best to approach projects. Id.
136. Id.; see also Sa'id Wekili & Hyacinth E. Leus, supra note 4, at 183-86 (discuss-
ing the Rodney King incident and the subsequent "riots" that followed the trial,
which resulted in the acquittal of the four Los Angeles Police Department officers).
137. Franklin Interview, supra note 125.
138. Id. ("It's a tool and if it isn't serving its purpose, then there are other tools to
use to get what you need to get done. It's a means to an end.").
139. Id. In discussing the role of community organizing in the organization's work,
Karl explains, "[I]n essence, the issue isn't going to be solved by litigation. Individual
cases are not going to change the dynamics of police misconduct in these communi-
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the Malcolm X Grassroots movement, Karl is personally involved
in community organizing around police brutality, and other issues
such as removing police from the public high schools, and advocat-
ing community control of police precincts. 140
Karl grew up and still lives in the public housing projects in
Crown Heights, Brooklyn. He thinks that there are issues that he
is not qualified to handle based on his personal background. For
example, he has to "check [himself]" regarding his preconceptions
and reactions when working with the transgender community. He
struggles to overcome these limitations and believes that in order
to address police brutality he has to see the struggle in a broader
context. 14 1 He also sees the issues of race, gender, and class as sig-
nificant in the outreach and organizing work of PW. For example,
when the project had a Latina staff person who spoke Spanish,
they received more calls from the Latino community. The current
administrative director of the project is a lesbian and has been able
to forge ties with the gay, lesbian, bisexual, and transgender com-
munities. One of the main tasks of PW is to reach as many com-
munities as possible. Karl explains, "By no means is [the gay,
lesbian, bisexual, and transgender] community saturated with our
literature. So, I think there [are] some places where we are quite
well known, and then there are others where we have a lot more
work to do."' 42
4. Community Organizing: Karl Franklin, Police Watch, The
Community Advisory Board, and Grassroots
Outreach and Education
Police Watch has a Community Advisory Board and provides
community outreach and education.'43 Of the four case studies,
PW has the most in-depth and on-going community involvement in
its work. Karl, PW's former legal director, explains that even
though the members of the Community Advisory Board were in-
strumental in bringing PW to New York and continue to work to-
ties. What's going to change this dynamic is when the communities are organized.
There must be a fundamental change to the power structures." Id.
140. Id.
141. Karl sees the issue of police brutality as primarily a problem that the Latino
and African American communities have to deal with in New York City. Id. He feels
that these communities and others have to reach across interest group and racial lines
and say, "We may not agree on everything, but we certainly agree that these people
we are paying should not beat us up." Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.
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gether and value each other's contribution in the police brutality
movement, there have been hurdles to get over in establishing a
solid and ongoing collaboration between the different community
organizations and PW. Karl is open and candid in this self-critique
of the project and accepts the fact that the organization needs to
examine this issue further.
B. Through the Lens of the Community Organizer
In examining the "rebelliousness" of lawyers working with the
issue of police brutality in New York City, it is critical not only to
engage the lawyers in a self-examination of their practices, but also
to listen to the experiences of the community organizers and survi-
vors of police brutality who have worked with lawyers on this issue.
This is another aspect of the dialogic process that is an integral
component to rebellious lawyering.
At the time of this writing, New York City is reeling from a se-
ries of police killings of unarmed young men of color and the sub-
sequent legal battles and street-level organizing.'44 The following
interviews with two community organizers reflect the intensity of
these troubled times. The acquittal of the four police officers who
fatally shot Amadou Diallo 4 5 was announced the day of the inter-
view with Richie Perez of the National Congress for Puerto Rican
Rights ("NCPRR"). 146 The interview ended when the verdict was
announced because Richie had to participate in a live reaction in-
terview with WBAI radio. The office of the Committee Against
Anti-Asian Violence ("CAAAV") was empty on the day of the in-
terview with Hyun Lee because the staff was involved with street-
organizing efforts and support for those who were arrested in the
aftermath of the Diallo verdict. The Louima and Diallo verdicts
represent the standard by which other cases of police brutality will
be viewed by the courts. Richie Perez asserts that, "They set the
standard by which atrocities will be punished. And if these and
other atrocities are not punished we are not going to get the others
punished."' 47
144. Supra notes 5-11 and accompanying text.
145. Supra Introduction (discussing the police killing of Amadou Diallo).
146. The National Congress For Puerto Rican Rights is often referred to in short-
form as "the Congress," but to avoid any confusion with the United States Congress,
this Comment will refer to the organization as NCPRR.
147. Interview with Richie Perez, National Congress For Puerto Rican Rights in
Manhattan, N.Y. (Feb. 25, 2000) (unpublished interview transcript, on file with the
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL) [hereinafter Perez Interview].
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1. Richie Perez and the National Congress for
Puerto Rican Rights
Richie Perez has been politically organizing and working with the
community to combat police abuse for more than three decades.
He is a well-respected and trusted presence in the progressive com-
munity, particularly in the community of color and the younger
generation of activists. 48 One of Richie's most striking character-
istics is his ability to organize from the background and periphery,
thus enabling a new generation of organizers to redefine the direc-
tion of the police brutality movement while at the same time shar-
ing in the experiences and advice of an seasoned organizer. 49
Richie first worked on the issue of police brutality in the late
1960s and worked on this issue throughout the 1970s as member of
the Young Lords Party.150 The Young Lords was a political organi-
zation of Puerto Rican youth that dealt with issues such as police
abuse, unlawful imprisonment, and prison abuse.' 5' In the mid-
1970s he was involved in the struggle to save open admissions in
the City University of New York system. At the time, he was a
teacher at Brooklyn College and had experiences with police sur-
veillance and investigation, and was ultimately imprisoned for his
organizing activities. 52 During that period, he was part of a group
that founded the Black and Latino Coalition Against Police Brutal-
ity.' 53 In 1979, he was a founding member of the Committees
Against Fort Apache the Bronx, a group that spearheaded a cam-
paign against the book and film, Fort Apache the Bronx.154 Richie
sees parallels between the book and film's portrayal of the South
148. The author of this Comment is aware of Richie's reputation through personal
experiences with youth organizers and community organizers working around the is-
sue of police brutality.
149. Perez Interview, supra note 147 ("An organization that cannot constantly re-
plenish itself will die. So we made a decision in the early '90s that we wanted to
change the nature of our organization and find a vehicle for giving it to young people
to run. It didn't mean that we were retiring, just that we wanted to put ourselves as
more of a resource, rather than at the center of everything... [We are] like these 500-
pound elephants. People don't have room to grow."); see also Interview with Hyun
Lee, the Committee of Anti-Asian Violence, in Manhattan, N.Y. (Feb. 28, 2000) (un-
published interview transcript, on file with the FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL)
[hereinafter Lee Interview].
150. Perez Interview, supra note 147.
151. Id.
152. Perez was on trial for two years on charges of conspiracy to incite a riot. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id.
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Bronx and the defense counsel's depiction of the same area in the
Diallo trial.155
In 1981, the Committees Against Fort Apache the Bronx were
merged into the newly formed National Congress for Puerto Rican
Rights.1 5 6 Committing police brutality and injustice in the criminal
justice system were, and remain, a part of the NCPRR's platform.
In the late 1980s, the focus of the NCPRR shifted from racially-
motivated violence and police complicity to police brutality it-
self.1 57 The NCPRR Justice Committee specifically focuses on po-
lice brutality and related issues.1 58 As the Committee began
working with families victimized by the police, it saw the political
rhetoric it had been advancing being tied to real life examples and
becoming more accessible to the community at large.1 59 Each indi-
vidual case highlighted "fault lines in the criminal justice sys-
tem. '1 60 Through its work with the families it began to broaden its
membership body to people who were not "political" and had been
thrust into the anti-police brutality movement by suffering tremen-
dous personal lOSS.161 Richie stresses that once the NCPRR makes
a commitment to a family it is a commitment that must be kept for
as long as it takes for the family to gain justice. 62
The NCPRR has brought together various segments of the Pu-
erto Rican community and the community of color at large.
Through the NCPRR's work around police brutality it has forged
alliances between the families of survivors and victims of police
brutality, veteran and younger community organizers, students,
155. Id. Richie states that the depiction of the South Bronx by both the film and the
defense counsel was, "a home for savages, social parasites, and only the police repre-
sented civilization there. They had a dirty job and a very dangerous job. By dehuman-
izing the residents of the South Bronx they justified what was called 'street justice' or
'street tactics' being meted out by the police." Id.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id. This reflects Alinsky's position that organizers must be flexible, open to
change, "adaptable to shifting political circumstances, and sensitive enough to the
process of action and reaction to avoid being trapped by their own tactics." ALINSKY,
RULES FOR RADICALS, supra note 88, at 6.
160. Perez Interview, supra note 147.
161. Id.
162. Id. "[W]e tell the families from the beginning that we cannot guarantee you
justice, if we reach a working agreement together, what we can promise you is that
you will never struggle alone. As long as you want to struggle, we will struggle with
you .... So like with Altagracia Mayi [whose son, Manuel Mayi, was killed by a racist
gang in Queens] and Iris Baez [whose son, Anthony Baez, was killed with an illegal
chokehold by the police when his football accidentally hit a police car], we have been
together for ten years, we are like [their] family." Id.
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and street organization members. 163 The NCPRR assisted the
Latin Kings and the Nietas street organizations to broker a truce
and create an internal monitoring system.' 64 Richie explains that,
"These [youths] were our family gone wrong who had been pushed
to the underground economy and marginalized and . .. we were
prepared to embrace them if they were seriously committed to
transformation.1 65 The NCPRR and the Parents Against Police
Brutality made a historic alliance with the Latin Kings when the
Latin Kings committed themselves to becoming a positive, political
force in the community. 166 However, according to Richie, like
most individuals and groups that engage in political transforma-
tion, some parts of the Latin Kings remained tied to illegal activ-
ity.1 67  Ultimately, the police jailed the leadership and the
organization's efforts to change its nature were almost entirely
halted. 168
The NCPRR employs a three-part approach to its organizing ef-
forts around the individual cases consisting of legal, media, and po-
litical/community outreach strategies. 69 The NCPRR offers
families its experience and support with the goal of helping families
"get [a] voice and punch. So that as they struggle back from their
loss they find strength to survive, that they are not just the grieving
mother, that after time they become the seeker of justice who has a
moral and eventually a political right to speak on the issues. "170
From this organizing and uniting of families, a group of families
formed Parents Against Police Brutality. 171 If, however, a family
wants to act in a way that the organization feels would be contrary
163. The term "street organizations" here refers to what some call "street gangs."
Id.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id. When the Latin Kings were accused of shooting a police officer in the 46th
Precinct, the families were approached by the police to denounce the Latin Kings. Id.
The parents held a press conference and refuted the accusation and stated their sup-
port for the Latin Kings. Id. Mrs. Baez stated, "I lost my son and I gained a thousand
sons." Id.
167. Id.
168. Id. ("[T]he last thing [the police] want is one thousand organized, militant,
young, politicized Puerto Ricans who respond to leadership-they [would] much
rather have one thousand disorganized, competing youth, serving as a destabilizing
element in our community.").
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id.
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to the family's interests, the NCPRR will limit its relationship with
the family.172
In the NCPRR's experience, one of the most common reasons a
family will not work with it or other community organizers is be-
cause the family is advised by its attorney not to do so. 1 73 This
advice usually comes from private practitioners who do not special-
ize in police brutality work and focus on the possibility of settle-
ment with the city as the goal of the lawsuit.174 As Richie explains,
Many of the lawyers take the cases because they know there will
be a cash settlement down the road. But the families, as they
embark on trying to get justice, distinguish that there is a mone-
tary civil suit (that motivates most of the lawyers), but that there
is [sic] also criminal and civil rights prosecutions that are
available.' 7
5
The NCPRR has found that exacerbating the pressure to settle
placed by many private attorneys, those lawyers often do not in-
form the families about the legal process, deny the families access
to their files, charge exorbitant amounts to initiate the representa-
tion, and commit potential malpractice. 76 Furthermore, families
are often divided as to the desired course of action and have finan-
cial hardships that increase the incentive to settle. 77 The NCPRR
supported the establishment of Police Watch to address this need
for quality and knowledgeable attorneys. 78  On occasion, the
NCPRR has assisted families to change counsel due to this type of
difficulty. 17
9
172. Id. For example, in approximately 1990, the NCPRR was working with a fam-
ily that decided to align itself with the Reverend Al Sharpton. Id. At the time, Rever-
end Sharpton's reputation was under attack. Despite the organization's working
relationship with him, they felt that the alliance would be detrimental to the family.
Id. Richie states that, "We felt that this decision was a breach on their part and told
them that. We would continue to support the case, but we would not participate in
press conferences that we felt were harmful to them, or other [detrimental] activities."
Id.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id. ("But from the families' point of view settlement does not mean that any-
one gets punished. Nor does it mean that the city has agreed to admit to any wrongdo-
ing. Almost invariably the families say that 'this is not what we are in this for, money
cannot bring back my kid."').
176. Id. Examples of the potential malpractice that Richie has observed some law-
yers commit are filing late and/or incomplete papers with the court. Id.
177. Id.
178. Supra Parts II.A.3-4.
179. Perez Interview, supra note 147.
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The NCPRR also has extensive experience with progressive legal
institutions and individual lawyers.180 According to Richie, one of
the limitations of progressive lawyers and organizations like CCR
is that they do not have the capacity to take every case.181 This
causes the organizations to engage in a selection process which
searches for cases that represent larger issues. 8 2 Due to the scar-
city of resources, these legal organizations prefer class actions to
individual actions which "leaves us with the vacuum of who then is
going to do the individual cases.' 1 83 Richie observed that small law
offices do not have the resources necessary to initiate and with-
stand the long process of a police brutality lawsuit.' 84
Over the years of its organizing in the community around the
issue of police brutality, the NCPRR has observed that survivors of
police brutality and families of survivors and victims now often
know how to respond to incidents with the police independently of
community organizations.185 This may be an indication that the
movement against police brutality has accomplished a degree of
self-empowerment in the community at large.
2. Hyun Lee and the Committee Against Anti-Asian Violence
Hyun Lee began her police brutality organizing work when she
joined the staff of the Committee Against Anti-Asian Violence
("CAAAV"). 86 On her first day of work in 1994, she met with a
Korean woman who, following an argument with a taxi driver over
payment of a fare, was arrested and subsequently assaulted both
verbally and physically by the police. 87 CAAAV is a grassroots
organization that has a small staff and corps of volunteers that
work to address various issues confronting the Asian community in
New York City.188 It currently has three main projects: the Youth
180. Id. NCPRR was one of the name plaintiffs in the Street Crime Unit class ac-
tion brought by CCR. Nat'l Cong. For Puerto Rican Rights, 194 F.R.D. 105 (S.D.N.Y.
2000).
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id. ("They don't need us to tell them to have a press conference, to put up
banners, to carry pictures of their children. This is now common-sense knowledge in
our broader community.").
186. Lee Interview, supra note 149.
187. Id.
188. Id.
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Leadership Project, the Women Workers Project, and a project
that is focused on the effects of gentrification in Chinatown.'89
Issues of police brutality and injustice in the criminal justice sys-
tem, in general, often arise in the various projects. 19° For example,
one of the youths in the Youth Leadership Project in the Bronx
and some friends were subjected to an illegal "stop and frisk" and
selective enforcement; they were then "put through the system."' 9'
According to Hyun, the youths' rights were violated while they
were in police custody.' 92 CAAAV staff obtained a lawyer for the
youths and brought the lawyer to the precinct. CAAAV staff also
went to court with them and interviewed witnesses. 93 Another ex-
ample of issues pertaining to the police and criminal justice system
permeating the various aspects of CAAAV's work is its organizing
efforts with street vendors in Chinatown. For the past several
years Mayor Giuliani has been attempting to curb the proliferation
of street vendors in certain areas of Manhattan. 94 The police have
been enforcing this policy by removing the vendors from the
streets, which has often resulted in altercations. 95 Until recently,
the CAAAV, like the NCPRR, engaged in advocacy on behalf of
claimants in individual police brutality cases. 1 96 According to
Hyun, due to limited resources and a decision that the organization
could be more effective doing grassroots organizing, it reduced its
individual caseload. 197
When CAAAV does engage in individual case advocacy it ac-
companies the client to his or her initial appearance in court. 98
CAAAV assists the client in navigating the justice system and ex-
plains the procedures and the client's rights. CAAAV also fre-
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id. "Selective enforcement" is the term used to refer to the police's execution
of their duties in a manner that affects marginalized communities in a discriminatory
manner, such the disproportionately high rate of stop and frisk of young men of color
in New York City. See, e.g., Nat'l Cong. For Puerto Rican Rights, 194 F.R.D. 105
(S.D.N.Y. 2000).
192. Id.
193. Id. Hyun explains that, "By the nature of the community that [CAAAV] works
with, we often get cases of young people who are put through the system unfairly." Id.
CAAAV bases their involvement on these cases on whether it advances their "or-
ganizing work and the struggles of the community." Id.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id.
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quently translates for the clients to their attorneys.'99 CAAAV
found that working with Legal Aid attorneys was easier than work-
ing with the court-appointed 18(B) lawyers [court appointed pursu-
ant to Part 18(B) of N.Y. County Law (Representation of Persons
Accused of Crime or Parties Before the Family Court or Surro-
gate's Court)]2°° because they had a relationship with the Legal
Aid Society as an organization. CAAAV found that the 18(B) law-
yers were often disinterested in the clients' cases and were resent-
ful and hostile toward CAAAV organizers' presence.2 0 '
Hyun believes it has been easier to work with individual progres-
sive lawyers than 18(B) and non-political lawyers. She asserts,
"Legal organizations have their own organizational interests and
there is a lot more we have to negotiate with organizations. With
individuals it is really based on whether you can work with that
personality. ' 20 2 CAAAV has worked closely with a small pool of
lawyers with whom they have established a relationship.20 3
CAAAV sits on the Community Advisory Board of Police
Watch.20 4 However, it has not referred any cases to Police
Watch.20 5 It has also worked with the Asian American Legal De-
fense and Education Fund ("AALDEF"), CCR, and, more re-
cently, through the Women Workers Project, with the National
Employment Law Project ("NELP"). 20 6 Hyun describes the rela-
tionship with the more progressive legal institutions as a relation-
ship "not without contradictions. ' 27 She explains that,
199. CAAAV has had to translate both live communications between the lawyers
and their clients and written correspondence. Id. Hyun stated, "[T]hat's the part of
the work we don't enjoy doing because we feel like we are receptionists for the law-
yers." Id.
200. N.Y. CotjNrY LAw § 722 (McKinney 2000) ("The governing body of each
county and the governing body of the city in which a county is wholly contained shall
place in operation throughout the county a plan for providing counsel to persons
[before the Family Court or Surrogate's Court] charged with a crime or who are enti-
tled to counsel ... who are financially unable to obtain counsel.").
201. According to Hyun, "They would just advise people to go plead this or that
and their whole attitude was just 'listen to me because I am the lawyer' ..... Some-
times the lawyers will not even bother to call for translators because then you have to
wait around for a long time." Id.
202. Id.
203. Id. For example, they have referred cases to John Yong who is in private prac-
tice in Chinatown and formerly worked at the Legal Aid Society. Id. In the past he
was a member of CAAAV. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id.
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You love them because they take up a very important space in
the movement-you need lawyers. You need people who are
trained and able to defend our community.... But at the same
time, it's not so clean. I would say [that] maybe this [is] not just
a contradiction with legal institutions, but all non-profit groups
that have an organizational interest that overtakes our commit-
ment to the movement and to our communities. 0 8
The tensions between organizers and lawyers often emanate from
ideological differences. According to Hyun, lawyers, by nature,
have to focus on the legal merits and the evidentiary strength of
individual cases, while community organizers look at individual
cases within the larger historical context of police brutality and the
criminal justice system's treatment of people of color.2 0 9 These dif-
ferences in ideology and tactics play out in the collaboration be-
tween organizers and legal institutions in deciding whether or not
to encourage and/or organize direct actions during the grand jury
selection process, and whether or not to call for federal investiga-
tion after the failure of local district attorneys to indict police of-
ficers for brutality and murder.210 The tension between the
organizers and lawyers can manifest in every aspect of the working
relationship, "all the way down to ... the tone of language on
picket signs. "211 Hyun explains that,
As organizers, we felt that the police murder of [name omitted]
was a part of a long history of police brutality against people of
color, and a long history of district attorneys' failing to indict
cops for murder. We felt that it almost didn't matter what kind
of position we took, the DA hadn't indicted a cop for murder in
countless other cases before [name omitted] .... For us it's
about movement building among the communities of color and
understanding history, it's about taking the anger of the commu-
nity and doing something with it-building something.21 2
CAAAV tries to connect victims/survivors of police brutality and
their families with other families who have confronted and strug-
gled against police brutality. 13 When considering the type of action
to take in a specific case, CAAAV focuses on the potential political
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id.
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transformation and empowerment of the individual or family with
whom they are working.214
According to Hyun, CAAAV's experiences with progressive le-
gal institutions have served as important learning experiences for
both the organizers and lawyers about "the possibilities and short-
comings of the relationship between community groups and pro-
gressive legal institutions. We undoubtedly need each other for the
movement to grow and will continue to learn from our mistakes to
forge a stronger relationship that serves to advance the struggles of
our community. ' 215 Hyun feels that legal action can be an effective
way of dealing with police brutality when it supports movement
building; however, she also feels that it has the potential of being
counter-productive in that it can give people a false sense of secur-
ity and justice.216
In its organizing work, CAAAV also has had experiences with
progressive lawyers and legal institutions in which the lawyers
made promises that CAAAV relied on, about legal strategies and
theories and possible representation, that did not come to fruition.
The failure of lawyers to deliver on their promises sometimes
meant serious setbacks in their organizing strategies.21 7 She feels
that the optimal working relationship between community or-
ganizers and lawyers will be reached when there are clearly deline-
ated roles and expectations, coupled with a shared agenda.21 8
According to Hyun, a primary difference between organizers and
many progressive lawyers is that "[a]s an organizer you are ac-
countable to a certain community forever. When you have two
hats, as a lawyer and an organizer, this double-identity can lead to
contradictions. "219
In analyzing the role of race, ethnicity, class, and gender, Hyun
talks about "non-movement" lawyers' inability to empathize with
the day-to-day realities of their clients.220 For example, a lawyer
making an inflexible appointment with the client regardless of the
implications for the client's work situation. 2 She is also critical of
some of the lawyers' dehumanizing treatment of their clients who
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id. ("It really sometimes dampens the movement building efforts when people
are encouraged to just look to the legal channels to fight their battles.").
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Id.
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do not speak English.222 Hyun believes that, on an organizational
level, CAAAV has been treated by the courts and the media as a
novelty. 223 For example, people have said, "'[O]h, Asian people
get beaten up by the police too?' or 'Committee Against Anti-
Asian Violence-what violence?"' ' 224 Among other community-
based organizations from other communities of color the largest
struggle for CAAAV has been to place the experience of immi-
grants and Asians specifically into the historic view of police bru-
tality.225 In terms of class, gender, and age dynamics between the
lawyers and the CAAAV organizers, Hyun concludes that "non-
movement" lawyers would prefer to use CAAAV as an intermedi-
ary between them and the clients because the CAAAV organizers
tend to be college educated, middle-class, and English speaking.226
The lawyers also see CAAAV organizers as providers of emotional
and informational support to the clients.227
Her first and only personal experience with the police and the
criminal justice system was when she was fifteen years old and her
father hit a bicyclist during a family trip in Alabama.228 She recalls
her father being visibly afraid and when she asked him why, he
responded by yelling, "Don't you know what the cops are like in
Alabama? They don't like us. '"229 They waited for the police to
arrive and her father was arrested without the police asking any
questions.23° She returned with her father for the court hearing to
translate for him and remembers the court treating them rudely.23'
III. EXAMINING THE DIFFERENT MODELS OF REPRESENTATION
THROUGH THE LENS OF THE REBELLIOUS
LAWYERING MODEL
Matthew, Ellen, Bill, and Karl all have aspects of their work that
reflect regnant as well as rebellious lawyering characteristics; how-
ever, Karl and PW embody the greatest quantity of rebellious qual-
ities. PW is the newest organization and is staffed by young,
activist lawyers and organizers. The two New York staff people are
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Id.
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an African American male in his late twenties and a white lesbian
woman in her early twenties.232 According to Lopez, the lawyer
living in and being a member of the community with which she
works facilitates rebellious lawyering.233 PW approaches the prob-
lem of police brutality through a multi-faceted lens and are open to
change.
The narratives of community organizers Richie and Hyun offer
both confirmations and contradictions of the lawyers' accounts.
Their two organizations, the NCPRR and CAAAV, have had
markedly negative experiences with individual private practice law-
yers who are not part of the progressive community. 234 Their ex-
periences with progressive legal institutions have been more
complex. Richie and Hyun both recognize the important role of
progressive lawyers in supporting the grassroots movement against
police brutality and in representing individuals who have been sub-
jected to police misconduct.235 Yet, they both emphasize the orga-
nizational/practitioner interests that can conflict with either the
client's desires or the objectives of the larger community move-
ment.236 Hyun suggests that the ideal lawyer would be an individ-
ual lawyer who can consistently commit herself to the struggles of a
specific community.237 She also asserts that lawyers should not
confuse the boundaries between lawyering and community or-ganizing.238 This poses a difficult hurdle in the formulation of a re-
bellious practice: if the client or community articulates a desire for
the lawyer to embody regnant characteristics, then is it not dis-
empowering to deny that direction and impose a rebellious model
of lawyering? A possible solution would be a hybrid approach in
which the lawyer acknowledges and follows the client's directions
but also engages the client in using her own "lawyering" skills in
collaboration with the lawyer.
232. Franklin Interview, supra note 125. Since the date of the Interview with Karl,
the staff make-up of PW has changed.
233. LoPEZ, supra note 1, at 31.
234. Perez Interview, supra note 147; see also supra text accompanying notes 170-
176 and (discussing Perez Interview).
235. Perez Interview, supra note 147; see also supra text accompanying note 180
(discussing Perez Interview).
236. Perez Interview, supra note 147; see also supra text accompanying note 182
(discussing Perez Interview).
237. Lee Interview, supra note 149; see also supra text accompanying notes 202-203
(discussing Lee Interview).
238. Lee Interview, supra note 149; see also supra text accompanying note 219 (dis-
cussing Lee Interview).
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A. Rebellious Characteristics
As previously discussed, the primary characteristics of rebellious
lawyering are: being open to change, utilizing the clients' lay lawy-
ering skills, living in the community, making use of the media, us-
ing the client's storytelling ability, and seeing the larger picture.239
Interviews with the lawyers and community organizers present a
picture of the reality of lawyering surrounding the issue of police
brutality and misconduct in New York City.240 By comparing and
contrasting the characteristics of rebellious and regnant lawyering
with these realities, this Comment presents questions to legal prac-
titioners striving to be "rebellious" and suggests ways to change
their practice to more fully embrace "rebellious lawyering."
1. Being Open to Change/Engaging in
Alternative Problem-Solving
A fundamental aspect of rebellious lawyering is an openness to
change on the part of the lawyer. The lawyer should be able not
only to question his or her routinized problem-solving techniques
(e.g., litigation), but also should listen to the client and ascertain
from the client's story which method of problem solving would be
most effective.241
The NCPRR engaged in a process of redefining its organizing
tactics and political rhetoric to be accessible to and inclusive of the
families of the victims of police brutality, youth, and street organi-
zations.242 This openness to change and desire to integrate commu-
nity voices into their practice is not present in any of the lawyers'
narratives. All four of the narratives show a reliance on litigation,
and in particular § 1983 suits, as the primary problem-solving
technique.
239. Supra Part I.A.1.
240. Supra Part II.
241. Lopez discusses this concept in his description of the "early brainstorming
stage," in which the attorney considers not only how a court will respond to a claim,
but also what other audiences may be potentially available to respond to the client's
needs and concerns. LOPEZ, supra note 1, at 190. Rebellious lawyers should "draw on
marginalized experiences, neglected intuitions and dormant imagination to redefine
what clients, lawyers, and others can do to change their lives." Id. at 29. Lopez asserts
that effective lawyering requires an openness to new insights and a willingness to
scrutinize one's own solutions, even if they are generally successful. Id. Furthermore,
the lawyer to be effective must put these new, creative ideas into action with his or
her clients. Id. at 66.
242. ALINSKY, RULES FOR RADICALS, supra note 88, at 197 (1971); see also supra
note 159 and accompanying text (discussing Alinsky's work and theory).
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Bill says that CCR is committed to using the law in different
ways to address the concerns and expand the rights of CCR's cli-
ents.243 Matthew, similarly, confines his work to the traditional le-
gal arena; however, he is open to possibilities of collaboration with
community groups and sees the need to expand the services pro-
vided to victims of police brutality.2 44
Both Ellen and Karl see litigation as just one possible vehicle to
respond to police brutality. Ellen stated that the community arena
may have greater potential for effecting change; however, she gave
the caveat that this would only be the case if the community was
"organized. '2 45 Karl sees community organizing as being at the
forefront of the work of PW.2 46 This reflects a tension between the
role of rebellious lawyers in social movements. Hyun asserts that
lawyers should use their skills and position in the justice system to
defend organizers and community members.247 She conceptualizes
the role of organizer and lawyer as discrete and separate, yet work-
ing in partnership.248 Her position suggests that legal institutions,
such as PW, should focus on legal advocacy and leave the organiz-
ing to the community organizers. 249 Karl readily admits that PW
needs to engage in a more in-depth dialogue with the collaborating
community organizations and continue to be flexible in its ability
to respond to the needs of different communities.250
2. The Lawyer-Client Relationship: Utilizing Clients'
Lay Lawyering Skills
Lopez insists that a rebellious lawyer must regard "subordi-
nated" clients and other professionals as "co-eminent problem-
solvers. 2 51 Alfieri also discusses this notion of collaboration, ne-
gotiation of shared responsibilities, and use of client-spoken narra-
243. In the context of the Diallo shooting, Bill explains that CCR was in a "position
to do what CCR has always done best-which is to find an innovative litigation strat-
egy to meet the needs of the movement." Goodman Interview, supra note 13.
244. Flamm Interview, supra note 96.
245. Yaroshefsy Interview, supra note 111.
246. Franklin Interview, supra note 125.
247. Lee Interview, supra note 149.
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. Franklin Interview, supra note 125; see also supra text accompanying note 142
(discussing PW's outreach to the gay, lesbian, bisexual, and transgender community).
251. LoPEZ, supra note 1, at 213. "She must learn to work with, and not just for
them, and she must learn to make space, in more than just her thoughts, for what they
bring to the collaboration in the way of experience, know-how, and strategic sense."
Id. Lopez, in his description of an attorney named Sophie, asserts that a rebellious
lawyer must not be limited to "imaginative case processing. She [must] keep[ I a con-
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tives. Alfieri maintains that this is part of the lawyer's
responsibility.252 Richie articulated this concept by saying that the
goal of the NCPRR is to help the families "get voice and punch. '253
A key element of the NCPRR's work is to empower the families to
develop their own voices in the struggle against police brutality.
Matthew, Ellen, Bill, and Karl all maintain that they are client-
centered and are primarily directed by the client in their strategic
decisions.254 Despite this, the interviews did not reflect efforts on
their part to engage in a dialogue with the clients to develop new,
creative responses to police brutality. Matthew does, however, en-
gage some clients in investigative work in preparation for the case.
He also includes the client in the parts of the litigation that require
client input, such as discovery and trial preparation, in a way that
encourages the client's full participation rather than passive acqui-
escence.255 Karl and Ellen state that on occasion (in Ellen's case,
more so in the past), in cases where the clients do not have claims
that are sufficiently meritorious and/or the cases are ripe for com-
munity mobilization, they will refer the clients to community orga-
nizations for alternative means of resolution. 6  For example,
community organizations employ different techniques to garner
support and draw attention to the issue of police brutality. These
techniques include community mobilization or media campaigns. 57
They also collaborate with community organizations and go to
their clients' communities and other public forums to do work-
shops and outreach.
3. Living in the Community
In Rebellious Lawyering, Lopez describes the danger of a lawyer
being seen as a "permanent outsider." Lopez states that, "this
community has had more than its share of so-called friends flitting
in and out trying to make changes. 2 58 The regnant model does not
stant watch, often spending a lot of time outside of her office, for news of efforts that
she can learn from and contribute to." Id. at 32.
252. Alfieri, Reconstructive Poverty Law Practice, supra note 20, at 2141.
253. Perez Interview, supra note 147; see also supra text accompanying notes 170
and 185 (discussing how the larger community also has been effected by this process
of dialogic empowerment in that people on their own prerogative know how to re-
spond to police brutality).
254. Flamm Interview, supra note 96; Yaroshefsky Interview, supra note 111;
Goodman Interview, supra note 13; and Franklin Interview, supra note 125.
255. Flamm Interview, supra note 96.
256. Yaroshefsy Interview, supra note 111; Franklin Interview, supra note 125.
257. Perez Interview, supra note 147; Lee Interview, supra note 149.
258. LoPEZ, supra note 1, at 31.
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require the lawyer to be a part of the community since the lawyer is
serving as a technical specialist and liaison to the legal system. 9
In response to this regnant tendency in the progressive lawyering
community, Lopez asserts that a rebellious lawyer should live in
the same community in which he or she works. 6°
Of the four lawyers interviewed, Karl is the only one who lives
within the community he serves. Karl lives in the housing projects
of Crown Heights, Brooklyn and has grown-up in an atmosphere of
hostility and brutality by the police. Both he, and to a greater ex-
tent, his friends, have been victims of police harassment and
brutality.261
The term "community" can be broadly defined to encompass
one's identity (i.e., ethnicity, religion, race, or sexuality). However,
even broadly defined, Matthew, Ellen, and Bill live in communities
which are separate from their client population. They, and their
families, have never had conflict with the police, except in a civil
disobedience setting. Yet, they all identify with the issue of police
brutality through a common sense of moral and political outrage
and through their friends, acquaintances, and the society in
general.262
Both Hyun and Richie organize primarily among their own re-
spective ethnic groups. Additionally, they both participate in coali-
tion efforts that cross racial and ethnic lines to bring together
victims of police brutality. CAAAV has worked extensively with
AALDEF, which is primarily focused on issues affecting the Asian
community. However, it also works extensively with NELP, CCR,
and the Legal Aid Society, organizations not serving any one eth-
nic or racial group. The two community organizations, therefore,
work with lawyers and legal organizations that do not specifically
serve their racial group. However, Hyun stressed the importance
of a lawyer's ability to empathize with the client's background and
to engage in a respectful collaboration with both the client and
community organizations which support the client.263
259. Id. at 23.
260. Id. at 31.
261. Franklin Interview, supra note 125.
262. Flamm Interview, supra note 96; Yaroshefsky Interview, supra note 111;
Goodman Interview, supra note 13.
263. Lee Interview, supra note 149; see also supra text accompanying note 222 (dis-
cussing Lee Interview).
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- 4. Making Use of the Media
Lopez views the use of the media as a tool for creative problem-
solving and rebellious lawyering.264 All of the practitioners and or-
ganizers have used media as a tool in their work. They have used
print news, radio, television, and public hearings.2 65 Karl believes
that two of the challenges PW has confronted are breaking into
mainstream media and the cost of advertising. He feels that reach-
ing as many people as possible is crucial to accomplishing the pro-
ject's goals.266 Matthew cited the use of the press as the most
rebellious aspect of his practice.267 CAAAV and the NCPRR,
however, have had conflicts in the past with lawyers who discour-
aged the organizations or their clients from going to the media
since they feared that drawing attention to pending cases might
lessen the chances of settlement or indictment. 68
5. Using the Client's Storytelling Ability
Rebellious lawyering stresses the importance of clients' story-
telling because the theory recognizes the silence forced upon
marginalized communities.2 69 Rebellious lawyers must collaborate
with their clients in a manner that enables clients to express their
stories. The client's narrative can be incorporated into every form
of legal representation discussed. The class action, individual ac-
tion, legal referral, archival, and community organizing approaches
can increase client narratives in a variety of ways. Forums in which
lawyers could incorporate client narratives include: in the courts
(e.g., introducing victim impact statements and direct testimony);
before the public (e.g., holding public hearings); in the media (e.g.,
giving interviews and issuing press releases); and by community
outreach (e.g., disseminating posters and educational materials).
The NCPRR and CAAAV have encouraged the community mem-
264. LoPEZ, supra note 1, at 15. The use of media, (for example, a press conference
announcing the filing of a law suit) can be used as a means of making contacts with
other institutions and groups in the community and as a means of engaging the public
at large in the issue. Id. The media can also be used as an alternative to litigation as a
means of "marshaling support." Id. at 206.
265. Flamm Interview, supra note 96; Franklin Interview, supra note 125; Perez
Interview, supra note 147; and Lee Interview, supra note 149.
266. Franklin Interview, supra note 125.
267. Flamm Interview, supra note 96.
268. Perez Interview, supra note 147; Lee Interview, supra note 149. See also supra
notes 174 and 212 and accompanying text (discussing the Perez and Lee Interviews,
respectively).
269. LoPEZ, supra note 1 at 191 (explaining the historic silencing of marginalized
communities).
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bers they have worked with to articulate, in their own terms, their
experiences, and have found that this has enabled their organiza-
tions to reach a broader audience.2 70 According to Hyun, lawyers
often dwell on the legal minutiae of the cases and scrutinize the
organizer's and client's language before they speak to the public.2 7'
Lawyers also have a tendency to speak in "legalese" that obscures
the message they are trying to communicate to the client and pub-
lic at large.272 Hyun cites many examples of lawyers approaching
clients-particularly non-English speaking clients-in a "dehu-
273manizing" manner.
6. Seeing the Larger Picture
Another fundamental characteristic of rebellious lawyering is the
ability to see the client's issue within the larger societal context. A
rebellious lawyer should not only see the impact of the lawyer-cli-
ent collaboration on the client's individual life, but also the impact
it will have and the response it will receive in the local, regional,
national, and international socio-political spheres.2 74 All four law-
yers see the issue of police brutality in the larger socio-political
context. Matthew spoke of the relationship between the citizenry
and the civilian military force in the United States and other coun-
tries.2 75 All four spoke of the political schism between payment of
damages and the budget of the NYPD. The lawyers also spoke of
the role of politicians like Mayor Giuliani and Comptroller Hevesi
in settling or pursuing litigation, and their willingness to accept cul-
pability and responsibility to change. This reflects an understanding
of the reciprocal impact between their legal work and the actions
of local politicians. Karl put the problem of police brutality in the
larger context of the "prison industrial complex" and the criminal-
ization of African Americans in the United States.2 76 Richie spoke
270. ALINSKY, RULES FOR RADICALS, supra note 88; see also supra text accompa-
nying note 159 (discussing Alinsky's work and theory); Lee Interview, supra note 149;
see also supra text accompanying notes 197-199 (discussing Lee Interview).
271. Lee Interview, supra note 149; see also supra text accompanying note 211 (dis-
cussing Lee Interview).
272. Id.
273. Lee Interview, supra note 149; see also supra text accompanying note 222 (dis-
cussing Lee Interview).
274. LOPEZ, supra note 1, at 33. In making this connection, the rebellious lawyer
will be able to "identify emerging interests, to avoid duplication of efforts, and to help
mobilize for increased resources and participation." Id.
275. Flamm Interview, supra note 96.
276. Franklin Interview, supra note 125. By the term "criminalization" of African
Americans in the U.S., I not only refer to the mass incarceration of this part of the
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of police brutality within the larger context of the criminal justice
system and white supremacy.277 Hyun says that CAAAV's China-
town Justice Project comes into contact with police brutality
through its work with youth, street vendors, and low-income re-
sidents.278 CAAAV places police misconduct in Chinatown within
the larger context of gentrification and the policies of the Giuliani
administration. They generally situate police violence within the
context of the criminal justice system and white supremacy.279
B. Regnant Characteristics
As previously discussed, the characteristics of regnant lawyering
are: focusing on litigation; seeing "community education" as dif-
fuse, marginal, and uncritical work; seeing "organizing" as spo-
radic, supplemental mobilization; and viewing lawyers as
preeminent problem-solvers and clients as fact-givers.28 °
1. Focused on Litigation: The Paradigm of Direct Service or
Law Reform
Litigation is appealing because it offers the possibility of forcing
the government to alter its current method of functioning and to
comply with federal constitutional and statutory guidelines. This
can have a tangible impact on people's everyday lives. 281 However,
lawyers working toward the empowerment of subordinated clients
and their communities also must recognize the limits of litigation
and its possible negative effect on community organizing efforts.282
population, but also the systematic perception and labeling of the community as ei-
ther criminal or potentially criminal. See generally ANGELA Y. DAVIS, Race and
Criminalization: Black Americans and the Punishment Industry, in THE HoUSE THAT
RACE BUILT 264 (Wahneema Lubiano, ed., 1997).
277. Perez Interview, supra note 147; see also supra text accompanying to note 159
(discussing Perez Interview).
278. Lee Interview, supra note 149; see also supra text accompanying notes 189-193
(discussing Lee Interview).
279. Id. (stating that other CAAAV programs address different forms of police
brutality).
280. Supra Part I.A.2.
281. LoPEZ, supra note 1, at 171.
282. Professor William P. Quigley, in his discussion of the impact of litigation on
community organizations, highlights the weaknesses of the judicial system, in general,
in regard to social reform. William P. Quigley, Reflections of Community Organizers:
Lawyering for Empowerment of Community Organizations, 21 OHIo N.U. L. REV.
455, 469-70 (1994).
The judiciary is far more disposed to and capable of stopping something
from happening than it is to force something positive to occur .... However,
the real work of organizational development is to take the members' rightful
share of power and redistribute it .... Thus, litigation, particularly litigation
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This aspect of litigation was not discussed in the interviews with the
lawyers. All of the lawyers interviewed saw litigation as just one of
the available tools in social change. None of the lawyers shared
experiences of litigation causing a negative impact on the client or
the community. However, Hyun feels that focusing on legal re-
courses can "dampen" movement-building efforts. She asserted
that being focused solely on litigation as a means of redress could
be counter-productive to community organizing efforts.2 83
Hyun discussed the tension between the desire of legal organiza-
tions to bring precedent-setting litigation and the interests of the
clients and community organizers.2 84 According to Richie, progres-
sive legal institutions and individual lawyers lack the necessary re-
sources to accommodate the large number of individual clients
needing representation. This lack of resources pressures the larger
legal organizations to focus on impact litigation.285
Regnant lawyers narrowly define lawyering as litigation. They
judge different potential aspects of the practice, such as community
education, street theater, and coalition building, as "variously
flawed, utopian, or somehow not really lawyering at all."'286 Critics
of traditional litigation-centered lawyering have observed that di-
rect services and law reform litigation can potentially have a nega-
tive impact on community organizing efforts. For instance,
providing direct service representation may isolate the client be-
cause it fails to connect the client with others who have faced simi-
lar problems, and fails to develop a collective response.287
as the sole approach to a problem, will not likely be effective in solving the
problem.
Id.; Alfieri, Antinomies, supra note 20, at 664 ("Remedial litigation should not be
mounted, even where altruistic relief is possible, without the activization of class con-
sciousness among the poor, nor without the political organization and mobilization of
the poor.").
283. Lee Interview, supra note 149; see also supra text accompanying note 216 (dis-
cussing Lee Interview).
284. Lee Interview, supra note 149; see also supra text accompanying notes 208-208
(discussing Lee Interview).
285. Perez Interview, supra note 147; see also supra text accompanying note 182
(discussing Perez Interview).
286. LoPEZ, supra note 1, at 26.
287. Alfieri, Antinomies, supra note 20, at 684-85. In his discussion of direct service,
Professor Alfieri confronts the possible negative consequences of examining the cli-
ent's problem as an isolated event. Id. Alfieri states, "The failure to address legal
disputes contextually as individual manifestations of class antagonisms inhibits client
politicization and class consciousness ... and too often improvish[es] [a] community."
Id.
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Matthew expressed a frustration with the isolation of his practice
and the narrow and limited impact the individual cases have on the
practice of police officers and the system at large.288 He did not
speak of any experiences of bringing clients together to share ex-
periences of police brutality and he probably has not tried this ap-
proach. Bill spoke of both a class action (the SCU case) and
individual police brutality cases that CCR has undertaken. Al-
though the class action brings together various victims, he too did
not share any experiences of bringing clients together from sepa-
rate cases or the various class actions. Despite the fact that all of
the lawyers interviewed feel that law reform and direct services
alone cannot accomplish social change, there seems to be a lack of
creative and innovative approaches being developed to improve
collaboration with clients and community and to better address the
problem of police brutality. 89
2. Seeing "Community Education" as Diffuse, Marginal and
Uncritical Work and "Organizing" as Sporadic,
Supplemental Mobilization
All of the lawyers interviewed recognize the value of community
education and organizing. However, with the exception of Karl,
their involvement in these efforts is minimal.29° This recognition of
need, coupled with the inaction by the individual lawyers, produces
a crisis in the progressive legal community. If the need to reach
out to, organize with, and educate the community is viewed as an
essential component to social change lawyering, then why are these
lawyers not participating in these activities to a larger extent? The
answers likely would be the common responses of regnant lawyers:
there is not enough time, litigation uses their specialized skills to a
greater degree, there are other people who are doing the organiz-
ing work, or they reach out to the community when there is the
need-when looking for members for a class action or asking for
support for a press conference or rally. If a lawyer is going to work
for the empowerment of the client and community and embody
288. Flamm Interview, supra note 96.
289. Alfieri, Antinomies, supra note 20, at 688. "Framing an attack on a particular
wrong cannot ipsi dixit [sic] unmask domination and liberate consciousness. In the
same way, pressing for judicial creation or enforcement of a particular rule or doc-
trine cannot redistribute class power." Id.
290. LOPEZ, supra note 1, at 153. A characteristic of regnant lawyering is to treat
community education and organizing as collateral to the lawyer's "real" work and to
be involved in these efforts only on a "sporadic, superficial" level. Id.
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rebellious lawyering, the lawyer must create space and give priority
to these alternative techniques of lawyering.
Richie and Hyun both recognize the importance of legal action
in addressing police brutality. One of the three parts of the
NCPRR's organizing strategy is legal action.291 However, both
community organizers stressed that their organizations only will
work with lawyers and support legal action if they see it as benefi-
cial to the larger organizing effort.292 This position places the law-
yers on the periphery of the organizers' response to police
brutality. Therefore, the lawyers and organizers envision the cen-
trality of the legal action and the community organizing differently.
3. Viewing Lawyers as Preeminent Problem-Solvers and
Clients as Fact-Givers
Matthew captures the regnant belief that clients are essentially
fact-givers and lawyers are problem-solvers in his statement that,
"Being a client is actually an inherently passive role. '293 Regnant
lawyers see their role as filling a need in the fight against subordi-
nation and the use of their specialized skills and knowledge places
them in a special position in this struggle. 294 The legal analysis that
is used to determine whether a case is legally meritorious 295 or if
the legal argument can be broadened to bring about a larger scope
of -change296 are exercises which exclude the clients from actively
participating in the outcome of their cases. These practices must
be examined and questioned.
CONCLUSION
The theory of rebellious lawyering has particular salience in the
context of the legal representation of victims of police brutality.
291. Perez Interview, supra note 147; see also supra text accompanying note 169
(discussing Perez Interview).
292. Franklin Interview, supra note 125; Lee Interview, supra note 149; see also
supra text accompanying notes 180 and 216 (discussing Franklin and Lee Interviews
respectively).
293. Flamm Interview, supra note 96; Lee Interview, supra note 149; see also supra
text accompanying notes 104 and 201 (discussing Flamm and Lee Interviews, respec-
tively). Hyun explains that CAAAV has observed 18(B) attorneys in criminal court
also not engaging the clients in a dialogue. The lawyers do not explain the criminal
court procedures and often do not even request translators so that they and the court
can communicate with the client.
294. LoPEZ, supra note 1, at 28.
295. Franklin Interview, supra note 125; Goodman Interview, supra note 13.
296. Yaroshefsky Interview, supra note 111.
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The clients and their communities are, on "lock-down" 97 and they
and their loved ones have been subject to and witnesses of continu-
ous, brutal attacks by the NYPD. As the interviewed legal practi-
tioners and community organizers have recognized, their clients
are looking for more than just pecuniary damages. They are seek-
ing justice and attempting to prevent similar brutalization from re-
curring. The importance and impact of these lawyers' work should
not be denigrated or belittled. The judgments and settlements they
win for their clients are the closest their clients have gotten to ob-
taining justice and recognition for their injuries. However, after
more than two decades of suits against the NYPD for police brutal-
ity and other misconduct, we must attempt to create and encourage
alternative approaches to this dilemma that can bring about sys-
temic change on a greater level.
The lawyers envision themselves as client-centered. They voice
frustration with the limits of litigation in the context of seeking sys-
temic change in the operations of the police. Despite this frustra-
tion, their practices are largely litigation focused and, in this
manner, regnant in character. All four attorneys have rebellious
characteristics and they all acknowledge the importance of commu-
nity organizing and education. They also see police brutality in the
larger political context of the United States.
Police brutality is a symptom of larger power inequities within
the United States. Therefore, the goal of police brutality-related
legal representation should be to abolish such brutality, as well as
the power dynamic that creates and condones this articulation of
inequality. A more rebellious stance on the part of the legal com-
munity would respond to the needs of the clients and the commu-
nity on a more profound level. It is incumbent upon the legal
community to take a more rebellious stance in its practice. The
transformative process of rebellious lawyering must take place on
both an organizational and individual level. Concrete steps can
and should be undertaken by the progressive legal community to
better assist community mobilization against police brutality. Vari-
ous grassroots organizations have created networks to assist each
other in creating a unified response to police brutality in New York
City. Similarly, progressive legal institutions and individual law-
yers must come together to discuss their strategies and methodolo-
gies. Lawyers would benefit from a network by mobilizing support
297. Franklin Interview, supra note 125.
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for their cause and by giving and receiving emotional, political, and
technical support from their peers.298
The "blue wall of silence" that has been cited as a barrier inhib-
iting police officers from exposing misconduct within the police
force appears to have a parallel within the legal community. The
lawyers and community organizers interviewed shared experiences
with private lawyers who have further violated the rights of their
clients in unprofessional and unethical representation. This wall of
silence must be broken as well.
Lawyers, community organizers, survivors of police brutality,
families of victims of police brutality, students, members of street
organizations, and others must recognize each other as collabora-
tors in a joint struggle and work together to fashion a legal re-
sponse to the problem of police brutality that will enable the
community to become empowered.
298. Kilwein, supra note 68, at 195.
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